

EXHIBIT 96

The
Intercept_

OPERATION SMOKE AND MIRRORS

In the Chicago Police Department, If the Bosses Say It Didn't Happen, It Didn't Happen



Illustration by The Intercept.



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Part 1

Two young officers began to hear rumors of a drug gang operating within the Chicago Police Department. They were skeptical at first.

✓ EXPAND ALL PARTS

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N MAY 31, the city of Chicago agreed to settle a whistleblower lawsuit brought by two police officers who allege they suffered retaliation for reporting and investigating criminal activity by fellow officers. The settlement, for \$2 million, was announced moments before the trial was to begin.



As the trial date approached, city lawyers had made a motion to exclude the words “code of silence” from the proceedings. Not only was the motion denied, but the judge ruled that Mayor Rahm Emanuel could be called to testify about what he meant when he used the term in a speech he delivered to the City Council last December, at the height of the political firestorm provoked by the police shooting of 17-year-old Laquan McDonald.

In that speech, Emanuel broke with the city’s long history of denying the existence of the code of silence. He spoke of “problems at the very heart of the policing profession,” and said: “This problem is sometimes referred to as the Thin Blue Line. Other times it’s referred to as the code of silence. It is the tendency to ignore, deny, or in some cases cover up the bad actions of a colleague or colleagues.”

The prevailing narrative in the press was that the city settled in order to avoid the possibility that Mayor Emanuel would be compelled to testify. But the mayor’s testimony, had it come to pass, would have been unlikely to provide much illumination. By contrast, that of the plaintiffs, Shannon Spalding and Danny Echeverria, promised to be revelatory. In the words of Judge Gary Feinerman, they have a story to tell that “purports to show extraordinarily serious retaliatory misconduct by officers at nearly all levels of the CPD hierarchy.”



Shannon Spalding at the site of the former Ida B. Wells Homes on March 3, 2016. Photo: Patricia Evans

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HEN I FIRST MET Shannon Spalding in 2013, she was in despair. She had risked everything to bring to light corruption within the Chicago Police Department, she said, yet no one believed her.

In brief, Spalding recounted that she and her partner, Danny Echeverria, spent over five years working undercover on a joint FBI-CPD internal affairs investigation that uncovered a massive criminal enterprise within the department. A gang tactical team led by a sergeant named Ronald Watts operated a protection racket in public housing developments on Chicago's South Side. In exchange for "a tax," Watts and his team shielded drug dealers from interference by law enforcement and targeted their competition. Their operation went far

beyond shaking down the occasional drug dealer. They were major players in the drug trade on the South Side.



The investigation had multiple targets. Beyond Watts, it was focused on members of his team and senior officials suspected of conspiring with him. It was also rumored both on the street and in the department that Watts was involved in the murders of two drug dealers who defied him.

When Spalding and Echeverria were on the verge of breaking the case open, the investigation was sabotaged by a high-ranking official who outed them as “rats.” Other CPD brass ordered officers under their command to retaliate against Spalding and Echeverria for violating the code of silence. Reprisals were especially harsh against Spalding, leaving her financially devastated, suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and stripped of the job she loves.

When we first spoke three years ago, Spalding’s despair arose not from self-doubt — her conviction about the substance of her story was unshakeable — but from her awareness of the forces arrayed against her. She was oppressed by the knowledge that CPD brass had the power to impose upon the world their own version of reality and in the process portray her as delusional.

“I call it Operation Smoke and Mirrors,” she said at the time. “If four bosses in the department say it didn’t happen, it didn’t happen.”

While the term “code of silence” evokes something essential — the coerced silence of police officers who observe but do not report abuses by their fellow officers — it is, in some respects, a misnomer, a euphemism. The practices to which it refers are less a matter of silence than of tightly orchestrated lying and various means used to maintain *narrative control*.

Today, in the wake of the political upheaval in Chicago precipitated by the Laquan McDonald case, the CPD has lost control of the narrative. This creates space for Shannon Spalding's voice finally to be heard.



This article tells her story. It is based on extensive interviews with Spalding conducted over the last three years. It also draws on interviews with Echeverria and several others who figure in the case, and on the record generated in the course of pretrial discovery. Aided by notes she kept on a daily basis over the years, Spalding gives a richly detailed account of the code of silence not as a vague “culture” among the rank and file but as a set of institutional mechanisms central to the operation of the CPD.


To be clear at the outset: The police officials named as defendants in the whistleblower lawsuit – Chief Juan Rivera, Cmdr. James O’Grady, Chief Nick Roti, Sgt. Maurice Barnes, Lt. Robert Cesario, Sgt. Thomas Mills, and Cmdr. Joseph Salemme – deny the plaintiffs’ allegations. In addition to citing their denials in the public record, efforts have been made to contact each of the defendants, as well as the other law enforcement officials who figure in the story. Each




either did not respond, could not be located, or declined to comment. The Chicago Police Department and the city's Department of Law both said they do not comment on active investigations or litigation. The defendants' depositions, affidavits, and sworn statements, in which they contest Spalding and Echeverria's version of events, are available [here](#).

The counternarrative that emerges from the defendants' legal arguments is that Spalding and Echeverria played at best a marginal role in the Watts investigation, serving as little more than handlers for a confidential informant, and that they – particularly Spalding – were problem officers others did not want to work with. In a February 2015 press release about the case, the city stated that “Superintendent [Garry] McCarthy and the CPD have zero tolerance for retaliation against whistleblowers,” but “the city believes the claims of these particular plaintiffs are without merit.”

According to Spalding, the united front of the defendants against charges of retaliation under the code of silence is the ultimate expression of the code. If she is telling the truth, a group of high-ranking police officials are lying in concert and under oath.





Map: Google Earth



FROM THE START, Spalding's career was braided with that of Ronald Watts. When she joined the department in 1996, he was among the first officers she met. As a rookie, she was assigned to ride with him as part of her training. Over the years, they remained on friendly terms. And throughout their careers, they worked the same streets — the 2nd

District on the South Side — during an era of turbulent change.

While both are native South Siders, they grew up in different worlds, on opposite sides of one of the starkest racial boundaries in the city: the bridge over the railroad tracks (and later the Dan Ryan Expressway) that separates the neighborhood of Bridgeport, long the stronghold of the Daley political dynasty, from the heart of the black South Side.



From center left, Shannon Spalding and Danny Echeverria receive an award from police Superintendent Phil Cline in 2005. Photo: Chicago Police Department

Blond and Irish, Spalding was raised among the many police officers and firefighters who make their homes in Bridgeport. Watts grew up on the other side of the bridge in public housing. When he joined the department and came to the 2nd District in 1994, after a stint in the Army, he already knew the streets and the players.

Roughly 2 square miles, the 2nd District encompasses the heart of the old Black Belt, the African-American city within the city under segregation, which absorbed wave after wave of migrants from the South, then with the end of legal segregation, like a great swollen river, overflowed its banks and spilled into other South Side neighborhoods. Once the most densely populated part of the city, it was by the 1990s

riddled with abandoned buildings and vacant lots. And it contained an extraordinary amount of public housing. 

While some of that housing was built before World War II as segregated housing for blacks – notably the Ida B. Wells Homes, a sprawling row-house development – most was constructed after the United States Supreme Court struck down racially restrictive covenants. Yet it conformed to traditional patterns of segregation. Confronted with opposition from white aldermen who didn't want public housing in their wards, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) in the 1950s and 1960s had built developments in traditionally black areas of the South and West Sides.

The most extraordinary manifestation of this segregation was the so-called South State Street corridor, more than 2 continuous miles of public housing high-rises – the Robert Taylor Homes and Stateway Gardens – and several smaller mid-rise developments a few blocks farther north. By the 1990s, the corridor was said to be the single largest concentration of poverty in the nation.

That was the world Shannon Spalding entered when she came to the 2nd District as a rookie and was assigned to ride with Ronald Watts.



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A walkway at the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, Illinois, pictured on Jan. 3, 1963. Photo: Hedrich-Blessing Collection/Chicago History Museum/Getty Images

“It was culture shock for me,” she recalled recently. “I was in a world I didn’t understand. I was lost. So I needed to learn. He schooled me.”

As they drove through the streets and alleys of the district, Watts shared his knowledge of gangs and drugs with her. Because the drug trade takes such distinctive forms in high-rise public housing, said Spalding, “housing police are a breed apart.” Watts, in her view, was one of the best.

The world they moved through was dominated by two gangs, the Gangster Disciples and the Black Disciples. Between them they controlled the drug trade in public housing. Each operated out of particular high-rises, often at the same development, which were identified accordingly as “GD” and “BD” buildings.

Night and day, an endless parade of customers was served by the young men in the open-air lobbies of the high-rises. At various locations around the perimeters of the buildings, solitary figures stood watch for 12-hour shifts “doing security.” Most were older men and women. Almost all were drug users who supported their habits by doing this work. Like street criers, they sang out the names of the drugs sold in the particular building – “Dog Face!” “Titanic!” “USDA!” – and acted as lookouts. If a police car approached, they called out a warning – “Blue and white northbound on Federal” – and the message was relayed from voice to voice into the interior shadows of the drug bazaar.

An unintended byproduct of the design of the high-rise developments – they had been conceived, in the architectural idiom of the day, as “towers in the park” – was that you could see the police coming from a long way off. As a countermeasure, gang tactical officers, “the jump out boys,” often drove up on the buildings at high speeds, careening across the grounds and sidewalks, in an effort to grab the young men before they had a chance to flee up the stairs and disappear into an apartment or vacant unit. There were frequent arrests. Then, as the police drove away, the drug market would reopen for business.

Tellingly, both drug dealers and police refer to the cat-and-mouse maneuvers of the drug trade as “the game.” For one side, the object is to intercept, for the other, to evade. In the era before public housing on the South Side was demolished, the setting for this contest was derelict high-rises, housing impoverished families, through which wealth constantly circulated. In order to meet the never-ending demand, new “packages” of drugs were regularly delivered and stashed in secret locations, such as vacant units, utility closets, mailboxes, or garbage chutes. Money was harvested and hauled away. (The younger brother of a major drug dealer once described to me a vacant unit filled with grocery bags of cash – like tobacco curing in a shed.)

As they drove through the developments, Spalding recalled, Watts would point things out to her.



The Stateway Gardens complex in the Bronzeville neighborhood on Chicago's South Side, pictured in 1958. Photo: Hedrich Blessing Collection/Chicago History Museum/Getty Images

“Look,” he said one day. “See how they’re rolling the dumpsters out into the fire lane? They’re going to start shooting soon.” The dumpsters would function as barriers against drive-bys. Similarly, he warned her to be careful running into the lobbies at Stateway Gardens, because the young men had strategically placed railroad ties – delivered to the development for landscaping projects – to trip up the police.

Spalding eagerly absorbed Watts's instruction – "I learned something every day" – and enjoyed his company. "He was a likeable person, easy to be around," she said. "He sometimes joked with me – 'OK, Susie Homemaker, you can leave your apron at home today' – but he was always friendly and respectful."

There was one incident during this period, however, that gave her pause. They were on the grounds of Stateway Gardens. Watts identified a stolen car, and they took off in pursuit. The driver ditched the car and ran toward one of the buildings. Spalding began to run after him. Watts called her back. "He really went off on me. It didn't seem to fit with the situation."

When they searched the car, they found a "trap" – a hidden compartment – full of money. She had no role in inventorying the money. Shaken, she tried to understand what had just happened. Watts explained that he was trying to protect her, that he didn't want her running into the high-rise alone. She was unpersuaded. There was no doubt in her mind she could have caught the suspect before he reached the building. The incident stayed with her and troubled her. "It didn't seem right."

On balance, though, she came away with high regard for Watts as "a good cop who got solid information and good results." And she was impressed by the respect he seemed to command on the street. Major gang leaders, who wouldn't engage with other officers, would talk to him.



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Harold Ickes Homes, 2008. Photo: David Schalliol

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NCE SHE BEGAN to get her bearings, Spalding found herself powerfully drawn to the world of public housing. “I was like Christopher Columbus, discovering a new world. I loved going to work. It was so fascinating.”

She developed an easy rapport with the residents, including gang members and drug dealers. Her nickname on the street, inevitably, was “Blondie.”

“You’re only as good as your word,” she observed. “Trust isn’t given. It’s earned. The boys would say, ‘Blondie was always fair.’ I never took their money. I never put drugs on them. They were locked up all the time for things they didn’t do. I earned their respect. So they would tell me things.”

She used to say to them, “I’ve got two rules. Don’t lie and don’t run. If you do, all bets are off.” She laughed. “I was running like a Kenyan back then. I could run 10 miles a day. I had the world’s best Stairmaster — CHA high-rises.”

“Everyone who has ever helped me in an investigation is an invisible person. They’re prostitutes, drug dealers, the homeless, children. The

people most cops don't see. Think about it. Who sees more of what's going on than the homeless and hookers?"



When the opportunity arose in 1997, Spalding joined the public housing south unit and began to work full time in the public housing developments on the South Side. It's hard to evoke how utterly abandoned these communities were at this point in their history. One measure is that in 1995 the federal government had seized control of the CHA from the city. The Department of Housing and Urban Development official installed as director of the CHA, Joseph Shuldinier, had previously run the New York and Los Angeles housing authorities. In a recent interview, he observed that in addition to the degree of concentration and abandonment, Chicago's public housing differed from New York's in two critical respects. The tenant population was much poorer. And while the NYPD had continued to do vertical patrols, the CPD had long ago ceded any real control of public housing high-rises.

Despite the shadow play of enforcement, the developments were de facto vice zones where the sale of drugs was tolerated. Policing largely took the form of containment. The policy was to keep it in this box. Only when crime spilled out of the box did intervention become necessary.

Frustrated by the CPD's lack of responsiveness to the needs of its residents, the CHA had created its own police force in 1989. Spalding and other officers from CPD's public housing unit would regularly work on joint operations with the CHA police.

After several years of federal management, Richard M. Daley's administration regained control of the CHA in 1999 and launched the Plan for Transformation, its strategy for replacing concentrations of high-rise public housing with "mixed-income communities." The

administration's rhetoric sang of inclusion, community renewal, and individual advancement. Mayor Daley was fond of saying, with characteristic fervor, "We're not only rebuilding neighborhoods, we're rebuilding souls." But the reality on the ground was land clearance: The objective was to demolish every public housing high-rise in the city and do so as rapidly as possible. 

By 2000, as the plan began to gather momentum, Chicago's archipelago of public housing high-rises had taken on the aspect of a vast armada of ships loaded with boat people, just offshore, destined to be sunk one by one.



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Ida B. Wells Homes Extension, 2007. Photo: David Schalliol

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MONG THE FIRST things the city did after regaining control of the CHA from the federal government was disband the 270-member CHA police force and replace it with CPD officers. This required rapid expansion of the public housing unit. The city had a \$30 million federal grant for the purpose and ultimately hired 375 additional officers.

Cmdr. Ernie Brown was appointed to head the unit, which was comprised of public housing south and public housing north, both under Brown's command.

When public housing south expanded, Ronald Watts, now a sergeant, joined the unit as a supervisor. He and Ernie Brown, according to Spalding, were said to be friends. Watts brought with him the core of the tactical team he had worked with in the 2nd District and would work with throughout his career: his partner, Kallatt Mohammed, along with Alvin Jones, Brian Bolton, and Bobby Gonzalez.

The expanded public housing unit brought together a large number of officers who had never worked together before, as well as some who had. "Cops are gossips," observed Spalding, and the unit was awash in rumors. There was talk about shakedowns of drug dealers and about big players paying off the police for protection. Some of the rumors focused

on former CHA officers who made the cut and joined the unit. Others focused on Watts and his team. Spalding gave them little weight. Having worked with Watts, she was inclined to attribute the rumors to “professional envy.”

Knowing what she knows now, she wonders, how did she not see then the corruption she would later help uncover?

“I truly didn’t think it was going on.” And to the extent it was going on, she assumed “the bosses” were actively investigating. Looking back now, she realizes she wasn’t included in the big busts involving large amounts of drugs and money. “I may have had great numbers, but I wasn’t with the program.”

It wasn’t hard to shut Spalding out of the action. With only a year and a half on the job, she had landed on a gang tactical team. She was still learning how things were done. And she was a woman. So she wasn’t involved in searches of male suspects and wasn’t in the locker room where, she said, “the real planning and scheming goes on.”

Mickey Spaargaren, a friend from Bridgeport who joined the department when Spalding did and went to public housing south with her, had a different experience. Soon after coming to the unit, he observed patterns of corruption involving, among others, a former CHA police officer named Joe Seinitz, who had made the cut to join the CPD. Eventually, Spaargaren made contact with an FBI special agent named Ken Samuels to report on the corruption he was observing within the public housing unit.

“I can call anyone and make your life miserable. You better keep your mouth

shut.”



Spaargaren was placed on Watts’s team. In an affidavit he provided in Spalding and Echeverria’s whistleblower case, he stated that on multiple occasions the team made large seizures of drugs and money that were never entered into the inventory log. Watts would tell other members of the team that they could leave, that he and Mohammed would do the inventories.

After one major seizure, Spaargaren checked the inventory log the following day and found it was empty “as if there had been no bust at all.”

He challenged Watts about this. Watts responded that he was “trading up” for information that would lead to bigger busts and major arrests. Spaargaren was not persuaded.

“Are you accusing me of stealing, Mickey?” Watts yelled at him. “Well, fuck you. I’ll put papers on *you* and make a case on you. The projects are dangerous. Be careful. You won’t make it out alive.”

Sometime later, Watts told Spaargaren that his commanding officer, Lt. Jimmy Spratte, wanted to talk with him. When Spaargaren informed Spratte about the missing inventory, the lieutenant asked him whether he had gone to the internal affairs division. Spaargaren said he had not, that it was just a suspicion.

“You’re accusing my sergeant and a fellow officer of stealing?” Spratte said. “Well, I don’t believe you.” He told Spaargaren he should have immediately gone to a supervisor.

“You know what?” Spratte said, “I think you’re the corrupt one, and that’s why you didn’t go to a supervisor.”

Spaargaren denied the accusation. Spratte became agitated.


“Pack your fucking bags, you need to get out of this unit. I’m moving you to another team tomorrow. And don’t even think about going to IAD now,” he said. “I can call anyone and make your life miserable. You better keep your mouth shut. You don’t want to lose your life over this. If you report a sergeant to IAD, how long do you think you will last?”


“Mickey was distraught,” recalled Spalding. He decided to take a leave of absence from the department and went to headquarters to execute the necessary paperwork. When Spratte heard Spaargaren had been down at headquarters, he assumed he had gone to internal affairs. They had a fierce exchange, which Spalding overheard.

“Spratte,” she said, “lost his mind.”

Before Spaargaren went to the FBI, Spalding had tried to dissuade him – she thought he was overreacting – but to no avail. Some months later, she was contacted by Special Agent Ken Samuels. They spoke on the phone several times. The main topic of conversation was Joe Seinitz. Samuels also mentioned in passing several other officers, Watts among them. She told him she hadn’t witnessed any criminal activity within the unit.

“I just didn’t see it then.”





Sunrise Supermarket, near the Ida B. Wells Homes, 2010. Photo: David Schalliol

EITHER DID I. Not at first.

During those years, I was a daily presence on South State Street. I had several roles. I was adviser to the Stateway Gardens resident council. I



developed a program of “grassroots public works” designed to create alternatives for gang members. (Full disclosure: I was the source of the railroad ties for landscaping projects, repurposed by drug dealers, that Watts warned Spalding about.) And as a writer I documented conditions on the ground.



It took several years of immersion for me to begin to *see* the ways police were present – and absent – at Stateway. The residents educated me. Coming and going to and from their homes, they constantly navigated the open-air drug marketplaces “up under the buildings.” Day after day, they saw the same dealers in the same positions conducting their business. They didn’t have the moral luxury of demonizing them, for they knew many of them in other roles besides “gangbanger”: as son or nephew, as boyfriend or teammate, as neighbor, as friend. Francine Washington, president of the Stateway resident council, used to invoke this knowledge by speaking of “our in-laws and our outlaws.”

The nature of law enforcement at Stateway was mystifying. The police more often seemed a disruptive presence than a source of order. They didn’t patrol the development in a conventional sense. Nor did they respond with any consistency to calls for service from residents. They mostly interacted with those in and around the drug markets. They would “hit the buildings” and make arrests. Yet somehow nothing ever changed.

The picture was further complicated by conscientious, hard-working officers one encountered, who were civil toward residents and seemed to be trying, however ambiguous their assignments, to do their jobs. It was puzzling why they were not more effective.

Residents used to joke about the lobbies as “the policeman’s ATM machine.” Short on cash, officers could pop in, take money, drugs, or guns off the young men, and go on their way.

In every available forum, residents asked: Why can’t the police shut the drug trade down? Why can’t this community have the same sort of law enforcement other neighborhoods have? Are the bored young men loitering in the lobbies such master criminals? Is the security system of drug addicts shouting out warnings so effective the police are unable to penetrate it?

An African-American officer in the public housing south unit once turned the

question around and put it to me this way: “Think of the police as the working poor. Create a situation in which there’s lots of money and drugs on the street in neighborhoods no one gives a fuck about. What do you think is going to happen?”

From my perspective on the ground, the larger forms of alleged corruption – the shakedowns and protection rackets, the drugs and money seized but never inventoried – were not visible. What was apparent were daily street-level abuses. Excessive force was more the norm than the exception. For some officers, it was sport. They would grade one another on the blows they inflicted. The language of racial invective – “nigger,” “monkey,” “hoodrat” – was routine; on occasion, over the loudspeakers of police vehicles. There were officers who found it amusing to toy with those under their power – arranging a foot race

of heroin addicts to determine who would go to jail, for example, or forcing a woman they had searched on the street to walk home naked from the waist down. And then there was the corruption. Residents used to joke about the lobbies as “the policeman’s ATM machine.” Short on cash, officers could pop in, take money, drugs, or guns off the young men, and go on their way.

Some of the most revealing stories I heard alleged that the police preyed not only on drug dealers, but also on some of the most vulnerable members of the community. While the public housing unit was staffing up, the special operations section was deployed to South State Street. An elite unit that wasn’t tied to districts, SOS would later implode during a scandal involving shakedowns of drug dealers, robberies, and kidnappings. It was disbanded in 2007. In 1999, I interviewed a group of older women after an SOS team did a sweep of their building. They reported money and valued household objects missing. “They don’t just steal big money,” said one woman. “They steal little money.”

Similarly, residents told of certain officers who could be counted on to show up at the development on the first and 15th of the month – on check day – to take money out of the pockets of residents after they left the currency exchange.

During more than a decade of immersion in public housing, I was never in a position to observe police extort payoffs from drug dealers in exchange for protection. Yet I frequently witnessed or heard about police conduct that made manifest just how much *space* there was for abuse: A place where police officers can steal grocery money from the poorest of the poor and indulge in casual cruelty without fear of consequences is a place where anything is possible.





Ida B. Wells Homes Extension, 2007. Photo: David Schalliol



N 2001, THE public housing south unit was hit by a major scandal. Two of its members – Sgt. William Patterson and Officer Daryl Smith – were caught in an FBI sting, ripping off what they believed to be a drug stash house. Their M.O. was to come in on their days off and generate phony search warrants.

They would then hit a drug house, present the bogus warrant, and take everything they could lay their hands on. Having bought into the ruse, their victims would anxiously await the filing of charges that never came.

The arrest of Patterson and Smith served to fortify Spalding's trust in the institution rather than undermining it. She saw it as proof that if officers engaged in serious misconduct, they would be disciplined. She also read it as confirmation that FBI investigations of Seinitz and Watts had yielded nothing.

In 2004, the public housing south unit was abruptly disbanded. Police officials explained that because a number of the CHA high-rises had been demolished by that time, a specialized unit was no longer necessary. The public housing that remained would be policed by the districts and a new roaming “targeted response” unit.

Spalding went to the 1st District, where she became partners with Danny Echeverria. He and Spalding had known each other in passing before they became partners. Riding together, they became close. Known on the street as Blondie and Danny Boy, they worked well together and enjoyed each other's company.

Today their mutual affection and loyalty are evident. They have been through a lot together. Like combat veterans or a long-married couple, each knows things about the other no one else does, and they have amassed narrative wealth to which they hold joint title. Listening to them recount, amid crossfire banter, their adventures and misadventures in public housing, it's clear they loved their jobs.

The 1st District was just north of the 2nd District and included the Harold Ickes Homes, a mid-rise public housing development that was one of the last to be emptied of residents and demolished. As other public housing communities were razed, its open-air drug markets became ever more active and congested.

Spalding and Echeverria attribute a large part of their effectiveness in working Ickes to the quality of their confidential informants, particularly a homeless man whom drug dealers sometimes used as a courier. He would ferry drugs and cash from place to place in a funky knapsack no one was disposed to search. They speak of him almost as a third partner.

After an SOS team did a sweep of their building, a group of older women reported money and valued household objects missing. "They don't just steal big money,"

Spalding christened him “Chewbacca” after observing him jump out of a dumpster in which he had been foraging, “looking crazy” with long anarchic hair and a mouth containing braces but few teeth.

**said one woman.
“They steal little
money.”**



“Somebody,” Echeverria observed of the braces, “must’ve loved him.”

Chewbacca didn’t want to be formally registered as a confidential informant with the city. He worked with Spalding and Echeverria on the strength of their personal relationships. “Chewbacca trusted us,” said Spalding. Their relationship was one of reciprocity. They helped him out with his needs; he gave them information. They didn’t pay him in the conventional sense. Rather, they cared for him, providing him with food and clothing, a sleeping bag and blankets, soap and towels (to shower at the Park District), mouthwash and toilet paper, a bus pass, and so on.

Chewbacca calls Echeverria by his street name, Danny Boy, but he has his own name for Spalding.

“I’m not going to call you Blondie like the rest of them,” he told her early in their relationship. “I’m going to call you Smarty, because you’re the brains of the operation.”



Harold Ickes Homes, 2007. Photo: David Schalliol

A

FTER INTELLIGENCE THAT Spalding and Echeverria provided the basis for a major drug bust, their “pat on the back,” as Echeverria put it, was to be assigned to the narcotics division within the organized crime bureau.

Spalding worked undercover, making buys. Because she was known on the streets of the South Side, she worked the West Side.

Echeverria did enforcement – surveillance, intelligence gathering, and debriefing of those arrested – working out of a satellite office maintained by the organized crime bureau in the 2nd District, which he shared with his immediate superior, Sgt. Roderick Watson. The point of such operations is to work up the food chain. If those at low levels cooperate and provide good information, prosecutors may agree to a reduced charge.

Watts had returned to the 2nd District after public housing south was disbanded, and his office was just down the hall from the organized crime office. According to Echeverria, Watts was on friendly terms with Watson. He would regularly stick his head in the office and inquire casually about what they were working on.

Prior to landing at the 2nd District, Echeverria hadn’t known Watts personally, but he was aware of the rumors and had heard his name on the street. Drug dealers he nabbed in public housing would say things like “Can we buy you lunch?” or “Can we bond out here?” Echeverria was initially confused. “Shut up! They’re not the crew,” he recalled one of the young men saying. “They ain’t like Watts.”

As he did debriefings, Echeverria heard more and more references to Watts. This was particularly true of those arrested at the Ida B. Wells

development. They would say things like “Why are you messing with me, when your man Watts is out there running his game?”

Initially, Echeverria told me, he didn’t give much credence to these statements. Guys facing time can be inventive, he said, and they weren’t providing him with much in the way of specifics. It was after he encountered Bernard Brown, a drug dealer whose picture was posted in the office as one of the top targets in the district, that he began to take the stories about Watts more seriously. Several members of Brown’s crew had been arrested. Echeverria had been debriefing them, when he caught sight of Brown on the street and picked him up.

“He had this Afro with two pony tails,” recalled Echeverria. “He looked like a big black Mickey Mouse.”

Brown was sharp. He immediately recognized Echeverria and Spalding were not officers from the 2nd District because they had different radios.

“You’re the indictment police, aren’t you?” said Brown. Looking for some leverage to cut a deal for himself, he asked, “Do you guys know Watts?”

“That name rings out,” replied Echeverria. “What can you tell me?”

“He’s the motherfucker that be running the dope in the projects,” replied Brown. “Are you *sure* you’re the indictment police? Instead of fucking with us niggers, that’s who you should go indict.”

Brown provided enough concrete information that Echeverria could verify some of what he said with arrest reports and other police documents. He described a criminal enterprise in which Watts and several members of his team were systematically extorting money from drug dealers in public housing. The payoffs were known on the street as

the “Watts tax.” If a dealer paid the tax, his operation was protected from police interference. Watts, according to Brown, was protecting dealers allied with him, while targeting the competition and redirecting seized drugs to his own dope lines.

“For me,” Echeverria recalled, “it was like Big Foot. I’ve always heard about the guy, but is he real? Then I go to the 2nd District, and there’s Big Foot standing in front of me. So I’m thinking, maybe there’s something to what I’ve been hearing.”

The suspect also described an operation in which Watts was extorting money from drug dealers and running his own dope lines.

Among the things he was hearing were rumors that Watts had been involved in the murder of Wilbert Moore — aka Big Shorty — a drug dealer who operated out of the Ida B. Wells development. On January 19, 2006, Moore had been shot down outside a barber shop at 43rd and Cottage Grove.

For Echeverria, “pieces of the puzzle were beginning to come together.” A turning point came when they brought in another “player” who started talking about Watts. “You’re going to lock me up for four bags, when your guy Watts is moving the dope. They run that shit.”

“This guy put it together for me,” Echeverria recalled. The suspect also described an operation in which Watts was extorting money from drug dealers and running his own dope lines. “This was no pizza fund,” said

Echeverria. For a popular drug line sold at multiple sites, according to the arrestee, the Watts tax could be as high as \$50,000 a week. 

He also told essentially the same story about the fate of Big Shorty that Echeverria was hearing from other sources. In the course of interrogating him, Echeverria threw out various different names, including some phony ones, then asked him about Big Shorty.

“Why you asking me about a dead man?”

“What can you tell me?”


“Do you want the street version or the paper version? The street version is you all did it. Watts did it. The paper version is a beef inside the GDs.”

Echeverria was impressed. “You hear a lot of stuff,” he recalled, “guys just lying to live. Not this guy.”

He confronted a dilemma. How could he report what he was hearing without having the code of silence enforced against him for ratting on another officer? “If I put pen to paper on this, *my* career will be over, not Watts’s.”

He called Spalding. “What the fuck do I do with this?” he asked.

“Go get a supervisor and make him do his job,” she replied.



PL JOINT 038291



Ida B. Wells Homes, 2007. Photo: David Schalliol

T

HE PLAN WAS to create a situation in which the supervisor would have to file a report. Procedure would be followed, the allegations would be reported, but it wouldn't come back to Echeverria.

He requested that Sgt. Watson come to the room where the suspect was being held. He used a pretext. "He's asking for a white shirt," he told Watson. "He's got something to say."

Watson entered the room and went to undo the man's handcuffs. While his back was turned, Echeverria made hand gestures to prompt him to talk about Watts. The man launched into a riff about Watts, reiterating to Watson what he had told Echeverria.

"We're not trying to hear that shit," said Watson.

Afterward, Echeverria asked Watson, "Hey, Sarge, how do you want me to handle that information he gave us in the report?"

"Make that shit a negative," said Watson.

Echeverria entertained the possibility that Watson would follow procedure and open a confidential complaint register, or CR. Had he

done so, Echeverria would have been contacted by investigators, but the call never came.

One day, while he was typing up a report, Echeverria recalled, he heard the name “Watts” and tuned into a conversation several detectives were having about Watts’s possible involvement in the killing of Big Shorty. He was struck by the tenor of the conversation. The detectives seemed resigned that the department would not pursue the matter.

Spalding had also heard details about the Big Shorty homicide from a CPD officer detailed to work with the Drug Enforcement Administration, with whom she occasionally exchanged information on an informal basis. The officer told her that the DEA had Big Shorty on a homicide charge. He had offered up Watts and was in the process of proffering when he was killed. (A 2005 [report](#) on an interview with Wilbert Moore conducted by the DEA, CPD, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, which recently became public in the case of a man who claims to have been framed by Watts and his team, establishes that Moore was cooperating with federal law enforcement and was providing information about Watts.)

The police officials named as defendants in Shannon Spalding and Danny Echeverria’s whistleblower lawsuit deny the plaintiffs’ allegations. Each has been contacted for comment, as have other law enforcement officials who figure in the story, and each of them either did not respond or declined to comment, except where otherwise noted. The Chicago Police Department and the city’s Department of Law both said they do not comment on active investigations or litigation. The FBI declined to comment.

Spalding didn't know whether the stories about Watts were true – “I didn't want them to be” – but she was losing her confidence that serious allegations of misconduct were being investigated by the department. “I'm getting more and more confused,” Spalding recalled feeling at the time. “How could these high officials not be doing their jobs? Did I take a different oath?”

While Spalding and Echeverria didn't have definitive proof that Watts and members of his team had committed crimes, they were convinced there was sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation. And they felt obligated to do something.

They decided to go to the FBI. Once they provided their information, they assumed that would be the end of their involvement. Contacting the FBI, however, would prove to be less an end than a beginning. It would alter the trajectory of their lives and set in motion a sequence of events now moving inexorably toward a full public reckoning in Chicago with the nature and consequences of the code of silence within the CPD.

The
Intercept_

OPERATION BRASS TAX

Corrupt Chicago Police Were Taxing Drug Dealers and
Targeting Their Rivals



14

Illustration by The Intercept.



Jamie Kalven

October 6 2016, 8:00 a.m.



Part 2

Chicago police officers Shannon Spalding and Danny Echeverria began investigating an elaborate criminal enterprise within the department that included extortion and possibly murder.

PL JOINT 038295



N THE SPRING of 2007, converging police scandals in Chicago threatened to engulf the Daley administration. Against the background of the long-running Jon Burge [torture saga](#), stories of police criminality dominated the media. A major scandal involving the department's special operations section had erupted. The charges included not only robbing drug dealers but also stealing from ordinary citizens and attempted murder for hire. This was a particular embarrassment to Mayor Daley, for SOS had been strongly identified with his campaign against, as he often put it, “gangs, guns, and drugs.”

The SOS scandal was a textbook example of systemic police abuse in several respects. It was a group phenomenon, not a matter of individual actors. The setting was the war on drugs, and the victims – in this instance, mostly Hispanic and often undocumented – were relatively marginalized and voiceless. Yet it was not the SOS case but a less typical incident that excited the most public attention.


On February 19, 2007, Anthony Abbate, an off-duty officer, had been drinking heavily at a tavern on the Northwest Side. When the bartender, Karolina Obrycka, refused to serve him more alcohol, he came behind the bar and punched and kicked her. Other customers intervened, and Abbate left. Obrycka called 911. She told the officers who responded that she had been attacked by a police officer and the incident had been recorded by the bar's security camera. Neither of these statements was included in the police report. In the days that followed, other officers put pressure on Obrycka and the bar owner not to file charges.

When it became apparent that the Chicago Police Department was not going to take meaningful action against Abbate, Obrycka's attorney released the video recorded by the bar's security camera. The footage of the lumbering Abbate flailing away at the petite bartender went viral. Felony charges quickly followed and he was found guilty.

Superintendent Phillip Cline was forced to retire. (He didn't help himself when he said, in an effort to convey the depths of his disapproval of Abbate, "If I could hit him with a baseball bat, I would.") Mayor Daley began the search for a new superintendent and an antidote to growing public concerns that his police department was out of control.

CITY APPROVES REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF CPD TORTURE

MAY 2015 – The Chicago City Council approves \$5.5 million in reparations to a group of black men who were tortured by police officers under the direction of Jon Burge during the 1970s and 1980s.



Chicago Mayor Richard Daley addresses the National Fraternal Congress on Sept. 9, 2010, in Chicago, Illinois. Photo: John Gress/Getty Images



HAT WAS THE moment, in the spring of 2007, that Chicago police officers Shannon Spalding and Danny Echeverria went to the FBI to pass on evidence of a scandal more extensive and damaging than those dominating the headlines: A CPD sergeant named Ronald Watts was running an elaborate criminal enterprise within the

department, extorting a “tax” from drug dealers and targeting their rivals.

Spalding and Echeverria went on their day off and took precautions to ensure that no one saw them enter the building. They were acutely aware that it was a cardinal sin to go outside the department to another agency, because, as Spalding put it, “that means the bosses can’t control the cover-up.”

They had hoped to meet with Ken Samuels, the FBI agent who had contacted Spalding years earlier at the suggestion of Mickey Spaargaren, an officer who had previously been on Watts’s team, but Samuels was not available. Instead, they met with Special Agent Patrick Smith.

Contrary to their expectation that they would have no further involvement with the FBI once they passed on their information, Spalding and Echeverria found themselves in regular contact with Smith. He called frequently. And they occasionally met with him after work or on their days off.

During this period, Mayor Daley made two concurrent moves in response to demands for police reform. First, he appointed Jody Weis

PL JOINT 038299

superintendent. Not only was Weis an outsider to the department, he had been a high-ranking official within the FBI, prompting speculation that his appointment was designed to head off federal intervention. Second, the CPD's Office of Professional Standards, which had long been criticized for failing to vigorously investigate citizen complaints, was rebranded the Independent Police Review Authority, and Daley installed a well-regarded police monitor from Los Angeles to run it. Whatever else might be said about these moves, they served to deflate the public debate about police accountability. The attention of the press soon moved elsewhere.

As Weis was entering into what would prove a difficult tenure as superintendent, Spalding and Echeverria were becoming increasingly uneasy about their interactions with the FBI. Smith had begun to ask them to break away to do work for him on the clock, which they refused to do. After more than a year of intermittent contact with Smith, they felt the need to make sure they were working within department guidelines. In August 2008, they met with Tina Skahill, the chief of the CPD's internal affairs division. Also present were Smith, Sgt. Tom Chester of the confidential section of internal affairs, who served as a liaison to the FBI, and Lt. Barbara West, commanding officer within internal affairs.

Spalding was gratified by Skahill's response. "She was wonderful."

"This is an important investigation," Spalding recalled her telling them. "It's been on our radar for a long time, but we haven't been able to accomplish

anything. You two have the means to get results.”

Skahill told Spalding and Echeverria they would be detailed to the FBI to work undercover on the investigation of Watts and his team. Spalding expressed concerns about possible damage to their careers were their identities revealed. Skahill assured them their identities would remain confidential. “You will be protected,” she said.

Skahill emphasized the need for secrecy. “Don’t tell anybody. This goes higher than the blue shirts. They have access to your files, your home information. You’re working with people who are criminals with badges.”


(In her [deposition](#) in Spalding and Echeverria’s lawsuit, Skahill confirms that this meeting took place, but her account is considerably less detailed and she repeatedly responds to questions by saying that she does not recall.)

According to Spalding, the formal mechanism for assigning them to the FBI was to transfer them from the organized crime bureau to Unit 543 – “detached services” – a miscellaneous detail that would provide cover for their work on the Watts investigation. They were to report to Tom Chester. Only a handful of people within the department were to



Tina Skahill, chief of CPD’s internal affairs division when Spalding and Echeverria were detailed to the FBI, pictured at a press conference on June 2, 2009. Photo: Chicago Sun-Times

know of their assignment; among them, Debra Kirby, general counsel for the superintendent. Skahill would report directly to Superintendent Weis on the progress of the investigation. 



PLJOINT 038303



Stateway Gardens, 2007. Photo: David Schalliol

T

THE JOINT FBI-IAD investigation was christened “Operation Brass Tax.” When Spalding and Echeverria were transferred to 543 and began reporting to the FBI, no explanation was given to the organized crime bureau. Officers are often detailed to “narcotic task forces” at the FBI, Spalding explained. So, if someone asked what they were working on, that was a sufficient response.

Soon after they came to the FBI, Spalding ran into Ken Samuels, the agent who had called her years earlier to inquire about Watts. She asked him what had become of the case he was working on then and was surprised to learn it was still open. She said Samuels expressed frustration. “The case never went anywhere,” he said. “Whenever it started to go somewhere, it was like Watts was getting a heads-up. We haven’t been able to get inside.”

From the start, Spalding and Echeverria encountered a good deal of interagency distrust. On the first day they reported to the FBI, Spalding recalled, Special Agent Julie Anderson expressed surprise that Watts had become a sergeant. “They promoted him?” she said. “What the fuck is wrong with CPD?”

Anderson was also openly suspicious of internal affairs. “Your department will sabotage this investigation,” she remarked. “As soon as it gets to white shirts, they’ll shut it down.”

For their part, the two street-smart narcotics cops quickly grew skeptical about the FBI’s way of doing things. Among the first tasks they undertook was re-transcribing dozens of CDs of wiretaps in the Watts case, having found transcripts marked “not pertinent” that contained highly relevant material. In one instance, “lu” for “lieutenant” was mistaken for a first name.

In another, “Obama” was mistaken for the president of the United States, when in fact it was a reference to the dope line at the Ida B. Wells Homes operated by a drug dealer named Kamane “Insane” Fears. His crew wore Obama T-shirts (“Yes We Can!”) as a form of marketing rather than an expression of political allegiance. When challenged by the police – “What’s with the shirts?” – they would respond that they were supporting the black presidential candidate from the South Side of Chicago.

On December 12, 2008, a few months after Spalding and Echeverria were formally assigned to the FBI, Fears was shot down at 37th and Calumet. The shooter or shooters pumped 17 rounds into his body. As in the case of Big Shorty, the word on the street was that the murder was the work of Watts.

“The boys call him Thirsty Bird. You have to pay taxes to sell dope. Watts ain’t

Spalding and Echeverria expected to be at the FBI for six months, but the investigation moved painfully slowly. Sometimes this was due to circumstances beyond their

nothing nice. You come up missing if you go up against Watts.”

control. In one instance, Watts had an accident and went on medical leave, but mostly the slow pace of the investigation was dictated by the FBI.

For example, Bernard Brown, then in prison, had been prepared to give a statement for more than a year before Smith told them to bring him in. When Smith finally interviewed him on August 7, 2009, Brown described in detail the structure of Watts’s extortion operation. Smith showed him a photo array. He recognized several officers in Watts’s crew, including one whom he said once proposed giving someone a pass on 60 bags of dope in exchange for an AK-47.

While the FBI had resources not readily available to the CPD – high-tech surveillance tools, funds to pay informants and use as bait in stings – Operation Brass Tax was built, according to Spalding, on the foundation of the street informants she and Echeverria had developed over the years.


Before they were detailed to the FBI, while they were in the narcotics division, they had gone looking for Chewbacca to see what he knew about Watts and his team. Although they had worked with him for years, they had never had occasion to talk with him about Watts. They had always been focused on the particular case they were developing at the time. They couldn’t find Chewbacca at any of his usual haunts. It turned out he was in prison.

He later told them that Watts had put a case on him. At one of the Wells buildings, Watts had approached him and pressed him for information about where some drugs were stashed. In the past,

Chewbacca had cooperated with Watts, but this time he simply didn't know where the drugs were. When he wasn't forthcoming, Watts put someone else's package on him. Knowing he wouldn't be believed over Watts, he pleaded guilty. Chewbacca was often in and out of jail on relatively lightweight charges such as drinking in public, but the drug conviction resulted in a two-year sentence.



PL JOINT 038308



Chewbacca, Spalding and Echeverria's longtime informant, looks out at the Chicago lakefront in 2014. Photo: Shannon Spalding

A

FTER THEY BEGAN working with the FBI, Spalding and Echeverria finally spotted Chewbacca looking for food in a dumpster outside a White Castle at 35th and King. He had recently been released. He climbed into the backseat of their car. After they exchanged greetings and Chewbacca filled them in on his incarceration, they asked,

“What’s all this shit we’ve been hearing about Watts?” Chewbacca started talking and it was a long time before he stopped. He was an avalanche of information, confirming the scope of the protection racket Watts was running. They asked him how many times he had seen Watts paid off by drug dealers.

“Hundreds of times,” Chewbacca replied. “For years. The boys call him Thirsty Bird. You have to pay taxes to sell dope. Watts ain’t nothing nice. You come up *missing* if you go up against Watts. Look at Shorty. Look at Kamane.”

Chewbacca said he had witnessed a confrontation that Big Shorty had with Watts in front of one of the Wells buildings in the days before he was murdered. Watts was pressing Big Shorty for more money. “We

don't eat like that anymore," Shorty told Watts. "I'm done. I'm going to the feds on your ass."

A few days later, he was shot down. "Nobody lives to tell, when they get into it with Watts," said Chewbacca. "Watts leaves no witnesses."

On many occasions over the years, Chewbacca said, he had seen Watts take drugs off one person and put them on another. He imitated Watts passing drugs from hand to hand, saying, "Hmm, who's going to ride the train today?" Growing up on South State Street, Chewbacca had known Watts before he joined the department. Watts was not, he said, a cop who went bad. He was a dope dealer who got the badge to further his criminal vocation.

Angry about being falsely arrested, Chewbacca was prepared to work with Spalding and Echeverria, including wearing a wire, to bring Watts down.

Another one of their informants, a drug dealer at the Harold Ickes Homes on South State Street, had traveled a similar path. Like Chewbacca, he had his own reasons for working to bring Watts down.

"He was really good," said Spalding. "We could never get him." They had built a relationship with the man. "He said, 'You're never gonna get me.' But he helped us get everybody else."

Watts came to the Ickes dealer to get paid off, Spalding recounted. There were drugs and guns on the table between them. "You've got to give me more than you've got on the table," said Watts. The drug dealer misunderstood him. He thought Watts meant he wanted more drugs and guns when he wanted more money than the value of what was on the table. If he had understood, according to Spalding, he would have gone along. She quoted him as saying, "If that motherfucker told me I needed to give him another \$5,000, I would've given it to him."

As a result of this communications glitch, Watts put someone else's package on him and arrested him. He did two years and was particularly upset to have missed the birth of his son. When he came out of prison in the fall of 2009, he had a beef with Watts and was prepared to work with Spalding and Echeverria as a CI — a confidential informant. They developed a sting in which both he and Chewbacca played roles.

In February 2010, Chewbacca ran into Watts and described his role as a drug courier. “Nobody suspects me,” he told Watts. “I walk dope and money up and down State Street all the time. I’m invisible.”

The plan, according to Spalding, was for Chewbacca, outfitted with a pen and baseball cap rigged with audio and visual surveillance devices, to go from 22nd and Michigan to a parking lot at 26th and State, where he would deliver a bag to their CI from Ickes, who would be parked in a covert FBI vehicle.

“Watts isn’t going to take the bait,” Spalding told the FBI agents. She predicted he would observe Chewbacca’s courier routine first. “I know him,” she said. “He’s careful and calculating. That’s why he’s still on the street.”

Watts was not, he said, a cop who went bad. He was a dope dealer who got the badge to further his criminal vocation.

The scenario played out as she predicted. Watts and his partner, Kallatt Mohammed, observed the operation but didn't pounce. "Hey, buddy, that was smooth," Watts told Chewbacca later. "That was so smooth."

Having hooked Watts, they orchestrated a sting on March 31, 2010, to reel him in. An agent gave Chewbacca the bag containing the money. Another agent was to follow Chewbacca to witness the transaction, so he wouldn't have to testify in court.

"Do you have eyes on the CI?" Spalding asked over the phone.

"I'm not going to be daisy-chained to his ass," the agent replied. "I'm going to lunch."

In the end, the agent didn't see the transaction. Nor did Smith, who was observing from a nearby hotel room. He explained to Spalding that he had to go to the bathroom.


Watts, who was off duty, showed up in his police uniform driving an official vehicle. Mohammed was with him. Chewbacca also observed another member of the team – Al Jones – in the course of the sting. Watts intercepted Chewbacca and took the bag. When he looked inside, he became agitated. "It's empty. ... Oh, here it is." Under clothes and other stuff, he found \$5,000. "I'm going to tell you what we're going to do," Watts told Chewbacca. "We're going to have to arrest you for your own good. I'll send in my guys to bail you out."

In all likelihood, Spalding speculated, he would have dispatched other off-duty members of the team to bail out Chewbacca with some of the money they had just ripped off.

Chewbacca was holding a 7-Eleven coffee mug that was wired. While being handcuffed, he managed to hold on to the mug. He protested fiercely that he didn't want to go to jail. He ultimately prevailed. Watts

gave Chewbacca \$770 and released him. The two officers then drove to Mohammed's house where they presumably divided up the spoils. 

Spalding and Echeverria were unnerved. FBI agents had repeatedly expressed suspicions that the CPD was subverting the investigation. Now, in light of the botched sting in which one FBI agent broke contact with the CI and the other took a bathroom break at a critical moment, they wondered: Was the FBI really this inept or was something else going on?



PL JOINT - 038314



Ida B. Wells Homes Extension, 2008. Photo: David Schalliol

T

WO YEARS AFTER the murder of Kamane Fears, purveyor of the Obama dope line, Spalding and Echeverria made a major advance in the investigation. The homicide remained unsolved, and under the pretext of investigating the case, they reached out to those who had been close to Fears. By pretending to be interested only in the

murder, they hoped to make it easier for those they interviewed to talk freely about the operation of the drug trade and thereby gather intelligence about Watts's criminal enterprise. The strategy worked. Over time, they developed a relationship with Fears's former girlfriend.

Fears had been shot outside her home on the 3700 block of Calumet. She was a nursing student at Kennedy-King College. Spalding described her as "well-spoken, no attitude, she had made good choices." Then she met Kamane Fears. "By the time she realized who he was, she was in love and pregnant." The young woman, who could not be reached for comment, became a major source for Spalding and Echeverria. She gave them valuable information about the drug trade. She told them where the Obama dope line stash houses were and described the internal workings of the operation.

“She had been with Kamane dozens of times when he paid off Watts,” said Spalding. One day she was walking a few steps behind Fears and Watts, when Watts patted Fears’s pockets. “Easter’s coming up,” he said. “Where’s my money? My kids need Easter baskets.”

As the demolitions progressed at Ida B. Wells, Fears moved his operation to 37th and Indiana. Watts came around, seeking to tax him as he had at Wells and Ickes. Fears refused now that the high-rises were down and threatened to give Watts up to the feds. A few days later, he was killed.

Early that morning, Fears and his girlfriend were lying in bed together. He got a call on his phone. “I’ve got to go handle this,” he told her. He went outside. She heard gunfire. She looked out the window and saw a hooded figure leaving the scene. The man turned and looked up at the window. She was afraid he saw her.

Knowing how Fears operated, she said, no one could get close to him unless he knew them. The shooter or shooters took two cellphones off his body, so it couldn’t be determined who had made the call that set him up, and retrieved all the shell casings.

Having built their relationship with Fears’s girlfriend on the pretext they were working the homicide, Spalding and Echeverria had, in fact, with her help developed significant new information about the murder. So they took her to the cold case unit, in the hope detectives there would pursue the leads they had generated. The sergeant they dealt with was not welcoming.

Spalding and Echeverria were not in the room when the sergeant interviewed Fears’s girlfriend. After they emerged, the sergeant asked the woman, gesturing toward Spalding and Echeverria, “What did those two do that my guys couldn’t do in two years?”

“It’s very simple,” she replied. “They did something none of your officers did. They knocked on my door and asked me.”

D

URING THIS PERIOD, Spalding and Echeverria also talked with Kamane’s mother and his brother Jerome, aka Monk, who had assumed leadership of the Obama drug operation. The relationships they developed were such that when the mother died, the family invited them to the wake.

One day, as they drove past 37th and Indiana, Monk flagged them down. He leaned in Echeverria’s window, and the three talked for about 45 minutes. Moments after they parted, Spalding received a call from a DEA agent she knew. They set up a meeting in a nearby alley.

“How do you know Monk?” the agent asked. “We’re trying to get a wire up on him. We just saw him flag you down and talk with you.” With a touch of undisguised pride (at least in the retelling), she asked, “Do you want his cellphone number?” She made a phone call.

“Hey, Monk,” she said, “I just wanted to make sure this is still your number. ... Thanks.”

When Watts’s name came up in the course of the conversation, she recalled, the DEA agent was outraged to learn he was still on the force and had been promoted to sergeant. “Watts is still around, as corrupt as he is? We were looking into him 10 years ago. I can’t believe your fucking department. I can’t believe they didn’t do anything about it.”



PL JOINT 038318



Stateway Gardens, 2006. Photo: David Schalliol

B

Y THE SUMMER of 2010, Spalding and Echeverria had, in effect, been orphaned by both agencies involved in the joint investigation. On the FBI side, the behavior of Special Agent Patrick Smith had become increasingly erratic. It turned out he had never done the paperwork necessary to properly establish them at the FBI, and they lost access to the office and car they had been using.

On the CPD side, Tina Skahill, the chief of internal affairs who had assigned them to Operation Brass Tax, had been moved to another command position. They lost their key protector. “Fast forward,” said Spalding. “I believe if Skahill had stayed in place, none of what happened would have happened. She would have protected us.”

Skahill was replaced by Chief Juan Rivera. Well-liked within the department – as one high-ranking official put it to me, the rank and file “know he cares about cops” – Rivera had a longstanding relationship to the Watts investigation. He had been a sergeant in internal affairs when it was initiated. Now, years later, he was back as chief, and the case, still open, was once again his responsibility.

Looking back, Spalding now believes the investigation was designed to fail. Watts was known to be at the center of a far-flung criminal enterprise with multiple co-conspirators. Yet the investigation was reduced to “two cops, one car, one radio ... and good luck.” Nonetheless, the two undercover officers continued to work the case as best they could.

Then the bottom fell out.

The first sign that something was wrong came in August 2010 when they submitted paperwork to Cmdr. James O’Grady of the narcotics division, seeking approval of their Ickes informant as a CI. Word came back from a sergeant they dealt with in narcotics that O’Grady had refused to approve the application and had instructed him, “You are not to work with those IAD rats.”

“You guys are in grave danger,” Rivera said, “and I can’t protect you. So for now you have to be extremely careful. Fly completely under the radar.”

Realizing their cover had been blown, Spalding and Echeverria immediately sought out Rivera. He told them he had informed Deputy Superintendent Ernie Brown that they were working on the Watts investigation. “Brown,” said Rivera, “must have told everyone.”

Today Spalding recalls this as the instant when everything changed. She immediately grasped the implications. “I knew I was doomed.” She remembers every detail. The smell of coffee brewing in the IAD office. The perspiration soaking her shirt. The sensation of free fall.

“What the fuck did you do that for?” she challenged Rivera.

“I thought it would be helpful for you,” he said.

“What do you mean?” she shot back. “Telling someone who’s friends with Watts?”

“I think I might have fucked up,” said Rivera.

My life is in this man’s hands, she recalls thinking, and he is telling me he fucked up. They were, she knew, utterly exposed.

“You guys are in grave danger,” Rivera said, “and I can’t protect you. So for now you have to be extremely careful. Fly completely under the radar.”

Rivera described a meeting of bosses at which O’Grady referred to them as “rats” and

Nick Roti, the chief of the organized crime bureau, said he wouldn’t allow them to work in any unit under him. Although O’Grady was their commander, they had never met him. “He wouldn’t know us if he saw us on the street,” Spalding said. Yet he was, according to Rivera, ordering officers under his command to retaliate against them. “God help them if they ever need help on the street,” Rivera quoted their commander as saying. “It ain’t coming.”

The police officials named as defendants in Shannon Spalding and Danny Echeverria’s whistleblower lawsuit deny the plaintiffs’ allegations. Each has been contacted for comment, as have other law enforcement officials who figure in the story, and each of them either did not respond or declined to comment, except where otherwise noted. The Chicago Police Department and the city’s Department of Law both said they do not comment on active investigations or litigation. The FBI declined to comment.



'GRADY AND ROTI' deny making the utterances S] denials are sweeping and categorical. In statements in the whistleblower case, each made the same sworn declaration: "I never made any statements to or about Plaintiffs or took any action against or relating to Plaintiffs based on any reports they may have made to the FBI of alleged criminal misconduct or corruption by Watts,

Mohammed, or any other Chicago police officer." The Chicago Police Department and the FBI both declined to comment. All the law enforcement officers who are named in this article either declined to comment or did not respond to requests for comment.

Rivera in his deposition denied talking with Ernie Brown about the involvement of Spalding and Echeverria in Operation Brass Tax. He denied ever talking with O'Grady about the two officers. He denied playing any role in outing them. And he denied that the conversation Spalding describes with great emotion as a pivotal traumatic experience – the moment she realized how exposed they were – ever took place.

At the same time, Rivera acknowledged that he had "numerous" conversations with Spalding and Echeverria and they talked "almost every other day." Despite his sensitive position, he was, according to Spalding, an expansive talker. It seemed to give him pleasure to instruct her and Echeverria about how things *really* worked within the department.

"Rivera," Spalding said, "told us stories about *everybody*."

The
Intercept_

HOUSE OF CARDS

How the Chicago Police Department Covered Up for a Gang of Criminal Cops



Illustration by The Intercept.



Jamie Kalven

October 6 2016, 8:01 a.m.



Part 3

Top Chicago police officials carried out a campaign of retaliation against two officers investigating a criminal gang within the department.

∨ EXPAND ALL PARTS

PL JOINT 038323



N FEBRUARY 22, 2011, Rahm Emanuel was elected mayor of Chicago, bringing to an end the 22-year reign of Mayor Daley the Second. His election drew national attention and insistent speculation that he saw the role of mayor as a stepping stone to the White House, something he repeatedly denied. Being mayor of Chicago, he insisted, was his dream job.

No Emanuel appointment was more closely watched than his choice of a new superintendent for the Chicago Police Department. While the integrity of Mayor Daley's Superintendent Jody Weis was never questioned, he had often seemed politically tone deaf and had proved unable to translate his outsider status into effective power within the department.

Emanuel's choice – Garry McCarthy, the police director of Newark, New Jersey – was also an outsider, but he was described as “a cop's cop.” McCarthy had earlier served under William Bratton in New York, where he built his reputation managing CompStat, the data-driven management tool the NYPD had developed for holding commanders accountable for crime in their districts.

For high-ranking police officials, transitions in department leadership are “times of upheaval,” as one put it to me. This is especially true when the new superintendent comes from outside and is an unknown quantity. Among the things known about McCarthy that might have been expected to stir anxieties were his strong identification with CompStat and his intention to move swiftly to make good on Emanuel's campaign pledge to put an additional 1,000 officers on the street.



Superintendent Garry McCarthy leaves a Chicago police station in the Englewood neighborhood following a press conference on May 6, 2013. Photo: Scott Olson/Getty Images

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PERATING LARGELY ON their own without meaningful support from either the FBI or CPD's internal affairs division, Chicago police officers Shannon Spalding and Danny Echeverria carried on as best they could with their investigation into the far-flung criminal enterprise allegedly run by Sgt. Ronald Watts and his gang tactical team. According

to Spalding and Echeverria, the character of their jobs – the very air through which they moved – had fundamentally changed after they were outed by the head of internal affairs, Chief Juan Rivera. Exposed and isolated, now known as “IAD rats,” they knew better than anyone what Watts and Co. were capable of. Yet they continued – “two officers, one car, one radio” – to work the case. Their efforts paid off.

One day, as they drove past the apartment where Monk Fears and his girlfriend lived, they noticed his car was smashed up. The girlfriend told them the following story: She and their baby were in the car with Monk, who was in the process of re-upping, distributing packages, and collecting money — so there was lots of dope and cash in the car. Watts and his team came after them. Watts and his partner Mohammed were in an unmarked car with city plates, and Brian Bolton and Bobby Gonzales, two other members of the team, were in a CPD Tahoe. A wild car chase ensued on the Dan Ryan Expressway, Lake Shore Drive, and ultimately into the Hyde Park neighborhood, where Monk lost control of the car and crashed in a park. He fled on foot. Watts and his team seized the dope and cash. They didn't even check on the condition of the woman and infant who remained in the car.

Monk's girlfriend noticed that a man she recognized, who worked the Obama dope line, was handcuffed in the backseat of the Tahoe. Spalding and Echeverria were familiar with this individual. They tracked him down. He described how he had banged around in the backseat of the Tahoe because he was handcuffed and couldn't brace himself. On 35th Street near U.S. Cellular Field, he said, the officers had taken the cuffs off and released him.

"You didn't see nothing," they told him.

Monk was shaken by the car chase. "They're out of control," he told Spalding and Echeverria. "I don't know where it's going to end." Referring to the fate of his brother, Kamane Fears, he said he was worried he was in line for "the Watts Special."





Harold Ickes Homes, 2009. Photo: David Schalliol

The accelerating pace of public-housing demolitions, it appeared, was destabilizing things not only for the gangs but also for corrupt police who fed on the drug trade. As the buildings came down, the “careful and calculating” Watts, as Spalding once described him, and his team were becoming increasingly reckless.

Several weeks later, Monk’s girlfriend let Spalding and Echeverria know that he had been locked up. They arranged to talk with him via her cellphone. When Monk called, Spalding and Echeverria spelled out the offer the feds were prepared to make in exchange for his cooperation in the Watts investigation. Monk agreed to proffer and to wear a wire in his dealings with Watts. This was, said Spalding, “a huge break in the case.” They made plans to pick up Monk at the facility where he was incarcerated at 8 a.m. on May 4 and bring him to the FBI. (Monk Fears and his girlfriend could not be reached for comment.)

On the afternoon of May 3, Spalding and Echeverria received a call from Tom Chester, the IAD liaison to the FBI. He told them there had been a meeting at which it was decided to take them off the investigation. They rushed to CPD headquarters to talk with Tina Skahill, the former chief of internal affairs. They told her Monk was prepared to proffer, but they were being taken off the investigation. Skahill was aghast. “This cannot happen,” she said. “The superintendent is involved in this investigation.”

Spalding told Skahill that there was about to be a meeting of senior officials, including Rivera and Cmdr. James O’Grady, regarding their fate. Skahill went down to the meeting. She apparently was unable to gain access, because she soon returned and said, “I’ll talk with Juan.”

Later that afternoon, Spalding and Echeverria received voicemail messages from Deputy Superintendent James Jackson, informing them that they were no longer assigned to the FBI and were being reassigned to the CPD. He instructed them to report in uniform to the detached services unit on May 4 at the beginning of their shift.

Juan Rivera was their principal source of information about what had happened. Here is what they say he told them:

A supervisor in the detached services unit had asked Echeverria what he and Spalding were working on. As instructed by Rivera, he referred her to Deputy Superintendent Debra Kirby. Deputy Superintendent Beatrice Cuello called Kirby to confirm that Spalding and Echeverria were working on an undercover investigation and the paperwork was in place. Kirby denied knowing who Spalding and Echeverria were, much less knowing they were involved in an undercover investigation.

“I’m supposed to be over this investigation. I’m not going to clear this up now. Too many bosses look bad.”

On the basis of Kirby’s denials, Cuello and Jackson concluded Spalding and Echeverria were lying when they said they were engaged in an internal investigation. According to Rivera, Kirby admitted to him she had screwed up by not clarifying the situation. He quoted her as saying, “I’m supposed to

be over this investigation.


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I'm not going to clear this up now. Too many bosses look bad. How could we not know what's going on for 2 1/2 years?"

However implausible this account – Why couldn't Rivera, as chief of internal affairs, definitively resolve the matter? – there was no doubt about the outcome. On May 4, Spalding and Echeverria did not go to pick up Monk to take him to the FBI but headed to the detached services unit. En route, they were instructed to go instead to the police academy for a one-day training.



PL JOINT 038331



Harold Ickes Homes, 2010. Photo: David Schalliol

W

HEN THEY ARRIVED, a sergeant addressed them sharply, “You’re not here for a one-day class,” he said. To Spalding, he said, “You’re going to the 3rd District on midnights.” And to Echeverria, “You’re going to 15 on midnights. And don’t act like you don’t know what’s going on.”

They were taken aback by his punitive tone. Echeverria had been talking on his cellphone as they entered the building. The sergeant reprimanded him for doing so. Echeverria handed him the phone. Rivera was on the other end of the line.

“Yes, Chief,” they overheard him say. “Sorry, Chief. ... Yes, Chief.”

The sergeant told Rivera, among other things, that he had received an email from Jackson about Spalding and Echeverria. After his conversation with Rivera, the sergeant handed the phone back to Echeverria.

“I apologize,” he said. “It seems you two really *don’t* know what’s going on. And neither does the chief.”

Spalding later asked Rivera whether he had seen Jackson’s email. He said he had, but he didn’t share its content. “It would just upset you,”

he said. During their lunch hour, they rushed from the academy to headquarters and told Skahill that they were going to be put on the street.

“What? They can’t do that,” Skahill said. “That could get you killed.”

Skahill sent a directive to the academy that the two officers were not, under any circumstances, to be assigned to patrol. They spent the day in a small room at the academy without phones, computers, or radios. They would remain there for most of the next three weeks. At the moment they were poised to bring the Watts investigation to a successful conclusion, they were, as Spalding put it, “placed under house arrest.”

They were given no meaningful work to do at the academy. It was suggested they sit in on classes for the new recruits. And at one point, they were directed to act as “in-car camera instructors,” despite never having used an in-car camera.



Superintendent Garry McCarthy, second from right, listens as Mayor Rahm Emanuel discusses a plan to reassign Chicago police officers from administrative duties to patrol during a press conference on Jan. 31, 2013. Photo: Scott Olson/Getty Images

On May 16, 2011, while they were at the academy, Rahm Emanuel was sworn in as mayor of Chicago, and Garry McCarthy became police superintendent. Within 10 days, McCarthy acted on Emanuel's campaign pledge and reassigned the first 500 officers of the promised 1,000 to beats in the districts.

Spalding and Echeverria were not among them. Skahill had them reassigned to the inspections division, Unit 126, under her command, where once again they sat idle at empty desks. "I have nothing for you to do," Skahill said apologetically.

Their supervisor, Lt. Deborah Pascua, was openly hostile toward them. Echeverria in his deposition testified that she called them "rat motherfuckers" and spread the word within the unit that they should

be shunned. “I’m a lawyer and know how to put a case together,” he quoted her as saying. “I’m gonna work on getting them fucking launched.”

As dispiriting for Spalding and Echeverria as the abuse was the denial of work. When they weren’t sitting at their desks with nothing to do, they were reduced to chauffeuring Pascua around, often on her personal errands. They started getting written up “for this and that” – even, in one instance, Spalding said, on her day off. “They’re trying,” Rivera told them, “to build a false file on you.”

**“They’re trying
to build a false file on
you.”**

On September 13, 2011, Spalding and Echeverria met with Cmdr. Adrienne Stanley, their commanding officer, and told her of the retaliation and hostile work environment. “I don’t want to hear this,” Stanley said. “I don’t want to know.”

She refused their request that she initiate a “complaint register” investigation, or CR. The commanding officer having refused to intervene, Pascua’s campaign against them continued and was joined by others, according to Spalding.

Increasingly concerned about Spalding and Echeverria, Skahill ordered them to discuss the retaliation with Rivera. (Skahill’s memory of these events, as reflected in her [deposition](#), is hazy. In response to questions, she repeatedly replied that she could not recall.)

When Spalding and Echeverria asked Rivera to initiate a CR investigation, he refused. Echeverria challenged him. “Since no one at

CPD will do anything, we need to take this to an outside agency,” he said, referring to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The normally easygoing Rivera responded angrily.

“Look, Dan, right now the entire department is against you and Shannon,” he said. “I’m the only one on your side. If you file a complaint, you will piss me off, and believe me, the last thing you two want to do is piss me off. Then you’ll have no one helping you. Leave it alone.”

Frustrated by Rivera’s refusal to initiate a CR investigation, Spalding and Echeverria sought the advice of Pete Koconis, a former internal affairs officer who had recently retired after 38 years in the department, 17 of them in IAD. Koconis talked with them repeatedly and at length in an effort to assess their credibility.

“If you file a complaint, you will piss me off, and believe me, the last thing you two want to do is piss me off. Then you’ll have no one helping you. Leave it alone.”

“The reason being,” he said of his conversations with Spalding in his deposition in her case, “I wanted to hear her tell me this story more than once and as many times as I could because as a policeman and an investigator, if somebody is lying, they’re going to get tripped up. And I found she was straight on line or on point every time I talked to her.”

Having served on the team that managed the 1999 transition in public housing from the Chicago Housing Authority police to the CPD, Koconis

had independent knowledge of Watts and his team. It was during this assignment that he first became aware of criminal activity by police working in public housing. The information gathered by the transition team was turned over to the FBI. Although he was not directly involved, Koconis was aware of the ongoing investigation of Watts and his team – an investigation that Juan Rivera assumed responsibility for when he joined the confidential section of IAD in 2005. Watts and Mohammed “were not ... the only targets” of the investigation, Koconis stated in an affidavit in another case. “There were multiple members of Watts’s tactical team that were also targets.”


Koconis testified in his deposition that he reached out to Beatrice Cuello to get her assessment of Spalding and Echeverria: “Yeah, I know them,” she replied. “And I find them to be good officers. I don’t know why everybody is messing with them.” She reported that there had been a meeting at which “Roti and O’Grady said that they were IAD rats and that they were not welcome back in narcotics section.”

Having concluded Spalding was telling the truth, Koconis agreed to help. Among other things, he told me, he arranged to meet with the new superintendent. He warned McCarthy of several undetonated scandals within the department, including the Watts case, and urged him to get out ahead of them. He also told him of the retaliation against the two officers who had developed the case against Watts. McCarthy listened, he said, and thanked him for the information.

Koconis confirmed for Spalding and Echeverria that CPD regulations require a supervisor who is informed of misconduct to initiate a CR investigation and forward it to internal affairs. According to Spalding and Echeverria, they repeatedly asked Rivera to initiate CR investigations for various acts of retaliation. Yet he refused. They ultimately named him as a defendant in their lawsuit not for retaliating against them but for failing to protect them from retaliation.

Rivera in his deposition denied that Spalding and Echeverria ever formally requested that he initiate a CR investigation. Such a request would normally take the form of a “to/from” memo, he testified, and he received no such document from either officer. (The sworn statements and depositions of Rivera and the other defendants, in which they contest Spalding and Echeverria’s version of events, are available [here](#).)

I asked Spalding why, in her view, Rivera had not initiated the CR investigations they requested. He had, she said, “made too many deals,” thereby neutralizing his ability to act. Attributing her understanding of this dynamic largely to conversations with Rivera himself – conversations he denies ever occurred – she described him as ensnared in a web of mutual blackmail in which “bosses” have leverage over one another by virtue of their shared knowledge of the “deals” they have made. She gave an example: I’ll make this CR against your guy go away if you’ll promote my guy within your unit. The code of silence and “clout” are thus entwined. Rivera, she recalled, once remarked to her that the bosses “trade CRs for favors like baseball cards.”



PL JOINT 038339



Stateway Gardens, 2006. Photo: David Schalliol



N OCTOBER 2011, Spalding and Echeverria got a call from Rivera informing them they were to return to the FBI and brief a new agent about the Watts case. Shortly afterward, Echeverria was driving with Sgt. Al Boehmer, a liaison between the CPD and FBI. They were talking about the renewed Watts investigation.

“None of this was necessary,” Echeverria said. “We had Monk.”

“The department couldn’t take that risk,” Boehmer told him. “We couldn’t risk having Monk go on the stand and talk about Watts killing his brother.”

Echeverria was stunned. Five months after their removal from Operation Brass Tax, had Boehmer just told him what had really happened? Had the investigation been derailed not because of crossed lines of communication among the bosses but because of where it was leading?

Boehmer’s remark was the first in a series of shocks. Spalding and Echeverria learned from Chewbacca, as the three of them drove to the FBI, that in their absence Special Agent Patrick Smith — Spalding and

PL JOINT 038340

Echeverria's primary FBI contact — had been deploying him on questionable assignments such as buying prescription drugs and Viagra on the street. He also said Smith had not paid him for his work.

When they arrived at the FBI, they reported what Chewbacca had told them. Agents talked with Chewbacca for several hours. Spalding and Echeverria were not in the room. Chewbacca was directed not to talk with them about Smith, and they didn't probe. They didn't want to put him in an awkward position.

Several days later, they spoke with Rivera at CPD headquarters. The conversation took place in the hallway at internal affairs. Rivera informed them that the FBI had initiated an investigation and "Washington" was coming to interview them.

"We're going to have to sit down and figure out what we're going to say," he told them. "We have to be on the same page."

Spalding replied that she did not see any need for a meeting: "I'm going to tell the truth."

"You can't ever tell the truth," said Rivera heatedly. "You'll get all of us fired. I just went through a federal trial with all the SOS shit. I can't withstand another trial."

Spalding understood this to be a reference to the fact that Rivera, as head of IAD, had failed to root out the criminal activities of the special operations section — not only robbing drug dealers but also ordinary citizens, and attempted murder for hire. How could he explain leaving Watts and his team on the street for a decade?

"The chief of internal affairs is the most powerful person in the Chicago Police Department," Spalding observed. "They report only to the superintendent." Yet because of Rivera's failure to exercise that power,

“You can’t ever tell the truth,” said Rivera heatedly. “You’ll get all of us fired.”

“it shifted to the corrupt officers.” Watts understood this, she said. She heard him on more than one occasion say in the presence of other officers at the station house, “You think the feds are ever going to come against me? If they come after me, I’m going to sing a song so loud it’ll crumble the department and bring all the bosses

down with me.” This was not idle talk, she said. He was sending a message.

In the end, they weren’t interviewed. Smith resigned. Because the investigation was still an administrative matter, his resignation effectively ended it. That, at any rate, is what Rivera told them.

They were now “back on the case,” as Spalding put it, “but at a distance.” They didn’t work out of the FBI and were on “a need-to-know basis.” The FBI seemed less concerned with resuscitating the investigation than with damage control. Spalding and Echeverria were told that because of Smith’s shoddy work, the bureau couldn’t use any of the intelligence they developed over the years they worked on the case. The concern, as they understood it, was not that all the evidence was tainted as a legal matter, but rather that if it came out that Smith was a rogue agent, every other case he had worked on would be open to challenge.

The plan was to start over and build a new case. It would be a very different sort of case from the one they had spent years developing. The broad investigation of police corruption involving Watts’s entire team

and implicating various bosses now contracted down to two targets: Watts and Mohammed.

On November 21, 2011, they conducted a sting. It was a reprise of the earlier scenario. Chewbacca tipped off Watts that he would be transporting drug proceeds in his knapsack. He told him he was to pick up a bag from a car at a McDonald's at 26th and King and walk it to another car on 29th Street.

At the appointed time, an undercover officer drove into the McDonald's parking lot and handed a black bag to Chewbacca. The bag contained \$5,200 and a tracking device. The plan, according to Spalding, was that Chewbacca would deposit the bag in the car at 29th and leave the door open. When he arrived at the spot, he couldn't gain access to the car. The FBI hadn't unlocked it. As he was trying to get into the car, Mohammed drove up and took the bag from him.

"Get the fuck out of here," Mohammed said.

"I don't get no money?" protested Chewbacca.

Mohammed told him to meet him later at 30th and King.

Chewbacca then called Watts.

"C'mon now," he said, "I did everything right, man."

Watts revised the plan: They would meet at 22nd and Canal. When Watts showed up some 40 minutes later, Chewbacca expressed relief.

"No, never doubt, brother," Watts said. "Who always takes care of you?"

"You do, Watts."

"There's five large, brother." Watts handed Chewbacca some money, then drove away.

A few minutes later, Chewbacca gave agents \$400. They searched him but found no other money on him. Perhaps the habit of skimming went so deep that Watts couldn't help himself from shorting Chewbacca.



Ida B. Wells Homes, 2006. Photo: David Schalliol



D

URING THIS PERIOD, Spalding and Echeverria continued to report to Rivera. They spoke with him frequently.

“You’re absolutely the most dangerous person to the department right now,” Rivera told Spalding, “because you know too much, and you talk too much.”

But, she thought to herself, I’m the only one around here who *doesn’t* talk.

The hostility from the bosses, Rivera explained, “isn’t about Watts. They’re worried you’re going to tumble *their* houses of cards.” Because the bosses don’t know *what* you know, he went on, they’re worried that you’re investigating *them*.

Their situation, as described by Rivera, was Kafkaesque. They had been outed as working undercover on an internal affairs investigation, but no one knew whether that was the only investigation they were engaged in. So it was all too easy for the bosses to worry that they too were targets.

It was also becoming apparent that there was a particular ferocity to the abuse directed at Spalding. The ongoing attacks were distinguished by their pettiness and ugliness. When she mentioned to Chester, the FBI liaison, that she had purchased tickets to the narcotics division Christmas party, she told me, he urged her not to attend. Roti and O’Grady had both expressed such hostility toward her, Chester said,

that “I wouldn’t be surprised if the chief didn’t have you kicked out. It’s in your best interest not to go.”

On another occasion, O’Grady gave instructions that Spalding was to be barred from entering the organized crime facility at Homan Square, where she was assigned a locker. A supervisor who was present later told her that O’Grady said: “She can piss outside with the rest of the rats.”


The abuse followed her home. One day she reached into her mailbox and found it full of excrement. There was a note: “Since you like shit so much, thought you’d enjoy this.”

“BLACK SITE” REPORTED AT CPD’S HOMAN SQUARE FACILITY

FEBRUARY 2015 – The Guardian reports that Chicago police operate “an off-the-books interrogation compound, rendering Americans unable to be found by family or attorneys while locked inside what lawyers say is the domestic equivalent of a CIA black site.” CPD denies the allegations regarding its Homan Square facility.



PL JOINT 038348



Officer Kallatt Mohammed, caught in an undercover FBI sting, tries to avoid being photographed as he leaves the Dirksen Federal Building on Feb. 13, 2012, in Chicago, Illinois. Photo: Chicago Sun-Times

O

N FEBRUARY 12, 2012, Mohammed was arrested at home, and Watts, returning from Houston, was escorted from the terminal by FBI agents. Both were charged with theft of government funds.

The arrest was widely reported in Chicago media. The most substantial story was by Phil Rogers, a veteran correspondent for Channel 5 NBC News. Superintendent McCarthy stated, “At this point, there’s nobody involved other than the two officers who were arrested.” Rogers, however, quoted “sources close to the investigation” as saying that the allegations against Watts and his team “go back more than 10 years,” that “other officers are under investigation,” and that “troubling allegations have rumbled through investigative circles for years” that Watts had a hand in two homicides. The unnamed source “close to the investigation” was Shannon Spalding.

Why had the FBI and CPD decided to reel in Watts and Mohammed rather than continue the investigation and engage the other targets? Why had they left other members of Watts’s crew on the street? Why had they decided to conclude a decadelong investigation into allegations of massive wrongdoing reaching high and wide within the department with the arrest of two individuals on a single charge of stealing government property?

Rivera's answer, according to Spalding, was that "the powers that be" had determined "the city can't afford another scandal." Were a Watts scandal to erupt, he said, it "would make SOS look like the Boy Scouts." It was, in effect, too big to expose. The arrest and prosecution of Watts and Mohammed were thus designed to contain the scandal rather than expose it.

Soon after Watts and Mohammed were arrested, Spalding told me, she encountered Mike Barz, the commanding officer of the confidential section of internal affairs, in the parking lot of police headquarters at 35th and Michigan. (In an interview with me, Barz denied this encounter ever occurred.)

"You don't learn," he said to her. "You want to tell all. That's not how it works. It's not what you uncover. It's not what you find out. It's what the department says. Your job is to report to them. It's their job to say what happened."

Spalding was taken aback. Barz continued to berate her.

"All those promises they made to you? They lied to you. You want to be a hero? Catch a cop killer. Shut your mouth. That's how you get along. This shit will get you nowhere."

The police officials named as defendants in Shannon Spalding and Danny Echeverria's whistleblower lawsuit deny the plaintiffs' allegations. Each has been contacted for comment, as have other law enforcement officials who figure in the story, and each of them either did not respond or declined to comment, except where otherwise noted. The Chicago Police Department and the city's Department of Law both said they do not comment on active investigations or litigation. The FBI declined to comment.

Barz offered her a final piece of advice. “You know all that work you claim that you did? If you don’t have police reports with your name on them, you never worked on it. It didn’t happen. You don’t exist.”

“But,” Spalding replied, “that was for our protection.”

“Think about it,” said Barz. “For *your* protection?”



READ NEXT: PART 4

Chicago Police Bosses Targeted Cops Who Exposed Corruption



The Intercept



Jamie Kalven

October 6 2016, 8:01 a.m.



Part 4

After Chicago police officers Shannon Spalding and Danny Echeverria filed a whistleblower lawsuit, retaliation against them only intensified.

✓ EXPAND ALL PARTS

PL JOINT 038352

I

N AUTUMN OF 2012, the code of silence was very much in the news in Chicago. The trial of the civil suit brought against the city by Karolina Obrycka, the bartender struck and kicked by off-duty Officer Anthony Abbate in 2007, was unfolding before a jury in the federal courtroom of Judge Amy St. Eve.

One of Obrycka's central claims was that Abbate assaulted her, secure in the knowledge he would be protected by the code of silence within the Chicago Police Department. In support of this claim, her lawyers presented expert testimony to demonstrate the department's failure to adequately investigate and discipline police misconduct. On November 13, 2012, the jury returned a verdict in Obrycka's favor. It awarded her \$850,000 in damages and found that a pervasive code of silence within the CPD had allowed Abbate to attack her without fear of punishment.

Mayor Rahm Emanuel was in his second year in office. In retrospect, the Obrycka verdict afforded him an opportunity to pivot



away from Daley-era abuses and declare a new day for police accountability in Chicago. Instead, his administration, in an unusual move, sought to erase the precedent represented by the jury's finding that a code of silence exists within the CPD. The city entered into an agreement with Obrycka under which it would not appeal the verdict and would pay the award and attorney's fees immediately. Obrycka, in turn, joined the city in asking the judge to vacate the code of silence judgment.

The joint motion created a situation in which the public interest was unrepresented. Two law professors who specialize in police abuse cases – Craig Futterman of the University of Chicago and Locke Bowman of Northwestern University – intervened on behalf of the public. They argued that if the city was allowed to “buy its way out of” the judgment, it would have no incentive to make the necessary reforms. Judge St. Eve ruled against the city, holding that the jury verdict regarding the code of silence “has a social value to the judicial system and public at large.”



In their effort to have the code of silence verdict set aside, city lawyers argued that the CPD had enacted significant reforms since the 2007 bar incident. And they emphasized that the department was now led by a new superintendent who would not permit such behavior to go unpunished.

Superintendent Garry McCarthy reinforced the point by issuing a statement in which he asserted with characteristic bluntness, “I will never tolerate a code of silence in a department for which I am responsible.”

Two weeks before McCarthy uttered those words, Shannon Spalding and Danny Echeverria filed a whistleblower suit, claiming they had suffered retaliation for reporting and investigating criminal activity

within the department. The defendants named in the lawsuit included CPD brass serving directly under McCarthy, among them, Nick Roti, chief of the organized crime bureau; James O'Grady, commander of the narcotics division; and Juan Rivera, chief of the internal affairs division.

The common understanding of the code of silence is that it is a peer-to-peer phenomenon – I've got your back, you've got mine – within the rank and file. Senior officials are implicated to the extent they do not take affirmative steps to discourage operation of the code. The thesis of the Spalding case, by contrast, is that high-ranking officials *ordered* retaliation against the officers for violating the code.

When Spalding and Echeverria filed their lawsuit in the fall of 2012, they had an immediate aim. They hoped that, whatever the ultimate outcome of the suit, the fact of a pending case would serve to deter the retaliation against them that had only intensified after the conclusion of Operation Brass Tax, a joint investigation conducted with the FBI into a drug ring controlled by longtime Chicago police officer Ronald Watts.





Former Chicago police Sgt. Ronald Watts leaves the Dirksen Federal Building on Oct. 9, 2013, after receiving a 22-month sentence for theft of government funds. Photo: Kevin Tanaka/Chicago Sun-Times

After Watts and his partner, Kallatt Mohammed, were indicted, Spalding and Echeverria had returned to the inspections unit where they continued to be ostracized and denied meaningful work. IAD Chief Juan Rivera again refused to file a retaliation complaint on their behalf. (As noted earlier, Rivera in his [deposition](#) denied that he ever received a formal request from Spalding and Echeverria.)

[Barred](#) by Chief Roti from returning to any unit in organized crime, they met with Thomas Byrne, chief of detectives, for whom they had worked when he was commander of the 1st District. A year or so earlier, he had asked them to come work for him in the fugitive apprehension

unit, but they had been unable to do so because Rivera said they were still needed for the Watts investigation. Now fugitives seemed like a good fit. Both Rivera and Tina Skahill provided letters of recommendation for them. Byrne said he would place them on the U.S. Marshals Task Force Team and that as soon as spots opened up they would be deputized as U.S. Marshals. He assured them they would not encounter retaliation in his unit.

On March 20, 2012, they joined the U.S. Marshals Task Force Team. Despite all they had been through, said Spalding, “all we wanted to do was get back to doing real police work.”

It wasn’t to be. “We’re not there for 15 minutes,” recalled Spalding, “and we’re called IAD rats.”

From the start at the fugitives unit, they were in a Catch-22. They were taken off major cases and given low-level assignments like finding unknown turnstile jumpers or people who had been drunk in public. They were told to do only their assigned cases – a limited number of relatively trivial cases – and then were told they were not producing. When they reported to Rivera what was happening, said Spalding, he observed that “that’s what they do”: They give you dead-end work you can’t do, then blame you for not doing it. 

Spalding said Rivera advised them to “record, record, record,” but again refused to issue a complaint register for retaliation or intervene on their behalf.

Amid the hostility in the fugitives unit, there was one seemingly sympathetic presence – Sgt. Thomas Mills, who had been in the confidential section of IAD when Rivera was a lieutenant there. Rivera told Spalding and Echeverria to have Mills call him. Mills later reported to them that Rivera had told him they were great officers. Mills reflected back at Spalding the seriousness of her situation.

“The only thing,” he said, “between those bosses and federal prison is you. If I were you, I’d wear my vest at all times, even coming and going to work.”

By way of illustrating the political realities at internal affairs, Spalding recounted a story Mills had told them. Soon after he came to the confidential section, he was given the assignment of investigating a deputy superintendent. The allegation was that the official lived outside the city. Mills worked on the case for months and concluded the allegation was true. He produced a thick file in support of that conclusion and presented it to his supervisor. The next day, the file came back to him. There was a yellow Post-it on it with the handwritten message: “Make it unfounded.”

Upset, he took the matter up with his supervisor, who replied that he should have known how to handle the investigation “because of who it was.” In other words: The outcome should have been clear, because the accused was a boss with clout.

“From now on,” Mills told the supervisor, “just give me my assignment with the Post-it note already on it telling me what the outcome is before I waste my time.”

After recounting this story, Spalding observed, “It’s like Mike Barz said about the bosses: ‘It’s your job to report to them. It’s their job to say what happened.’ Our problem is that we took the investigation seriously. We never saw the Post-it.”



PL JOINT 038359



Robert Taylor Homes, 2007. Photo: David Schalliol

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PALDING AND ECHEVERRIA'S account of the retaliation they endured after joining the fugitive apprehension unit is corroborated by an [affidavit and deposition](#) provided in their case by Officer Janet Hanna. Now retired, Hanna was the personal administrator for Cmdr. Joseph Salemme and Lt. Robert Cesario of fugitives. She stated that before Spalding

and Echeverria joined fugitives, Cesario warned his administrative staff in the unit that they were “IAD rats” and should not be trusted. He told sergeants under his command, in her words, “to instruct their teams of officers to not provide any backup for Shannon or Danny and to not work with them at all.” Further, Hanna stated that Cesario ordered her to give them only dead-end cases that would not result in arrests, that he personally reviewed their assignments, and that he instructed her to destroy their overtime requests. She also testified that they were denied access to the databases required to do their jobs.

On June 20, 2012, Spalding and Echeverria were ordered to meet with their direct supervisors — Sgt. Maurice Barnes, Cesario, and Salemme. Cesario informed them they were being taken off the task force because they had too few arrests and priority cases. When Spalding and Echeverria challenged Cesario about their lack of activity, Spalding

recounted to me, Salemmé demanded to know whether they were working for internal affairs. “You brought this baggage on yourselves,” he said. “You want to investigate bosses, you want to put bosses in jail, you should have known this would happen to you.”

“It’s a safety issue,” said Barnes, addressing himself to Spalding. “I don’t want to tell your daughter you’re coming home in a box because the team won’t help you on the street.”

Cesario spelled it out for them: They were being shifted from days to nights and reassigned to a nighttime fugitive apprehension team on the North Side. They would never be deputized by the U.S. Marshals, get a take-home car, or overtime pay.

“That will never happen for you,” he said to Spalding.

At the end of the meeting, Spalding asked, “If we had never worked on an internal corruption investigation with the FBI, would any of this be happening right now?”



“No,” replied Salemmé.

Again they asked Rivera to issue a CR. Again he refused.

“I can’t help you anymore,” he said. “The ship is sinking. The bell has rung. It’s over. You have to make it work at fugitives. This is your last stop. There’s nowhere else in CPD for you.”

Spalding and Echeverria had hoped that by filing their whistleblower lawsuit they would gain the protection of the Illinois Whistleblower Act and the abuse would relent. If anything, it intensified. The one person within fugitives they believed to be an ally, Mills, also turned against them. He rode Spalding hard.

“This is a numbers unit, and you’re not producing,” he told her. “There is no way you can redeem yourself.”

“I could have come in with Jimmy Hoffa,” Spalding observed, “and it wouldn’t have made any difference.”

Mills spoke openly about their lawsuit to other officers in front of Spalding and Echeverria. “I don’t know why they left you in this unit after you filed,” he said. “They should have launched you.”

“This isn’t good for you,” he warned Spalding. “God forbid you should have to shoot someone out there.” He pointed to Cesario’s office. “He’s your lieutenant. How do you think that’s going to go for you? He’s going to screw you. It’s dangerous for you to remain here. The bosses are actively working against you. You need to consider your options.”

She interpreted this as a suggestion she leave the department for her own safety.

“I began second-guessing everything I did,” she said.



On one occasion, as she and Echeverria set out in pursuit of a fugitive who had to be tased three times to subdue him the last time he had been brought in, they were told by Mills that the team would be there to back them up. When no one showed up, Spalding contacted Mills. He responded with a text: “Be careful.”

“My worst fear was now my reality,” Spalding recalled. “I was an officer without a department.”

When it seemed things could not get worse, they did. On April 11, 2013, Sgt. Barz and Sgt. Robert Muscolino of internal affairs came to the fugitives unit and arrested Spalding. They took her into a room, closed the door, and held her for over half an hour. Barz read her constitutional rights and informed her that she was the subject of a

criminal investigation on federal eavesdropping charges. He said they had an eyewitness who stated that she recorded conversations with Mills and then played them for others.

She would later learn from Janet Hanna that the complaint against her stated that Hanna was the person for whom she played the recording of Mills. In her affidavit, Hanna recounted being pressed by Muscolino to confirm the complaint. “I repeated that the complaint was untrue,” she stated, “that the alleged conversation never happened, and that at no time ever did Shannon play for me any recording from her phone.”

“He’s your lieutenant. How do you think that’s going to go for you? He’s going to screw you. It’s dangerous for you to remain here.”

Spalding was distraught. Having failed to protect her, IAD was now, she realized, turning its investigative machinery against her and actively participating in the retaliation.

Barz suggested that the charges would go away if she dropped her lawsuit.

“This is retaliation,” she said. “What are you guys doing about Watts?”

“They can’t let him go to trial,” he said. “It’s not in the best interest of the department. They’ll make him an offer he can’t refuse.”

“Yeah,” said Spalding, “and *I’m* going to jail on trumped-up charges.”

He tried to mollify her. “This is all going to disappear,” he said. “None of it happened.”

(In an interview, Barz vigorously contested Spalding’s account. Specifically, he asserted that there was no arrest and that he never said the CR was “going to disappear.”)

After the IAD officers left, Spalding said, Echeverria walked her to her car. In his deposition, Echeverria recalled how agitated she was. “It was hard to have a conversation with her immediately because she was not in the right frame of mind to speak. She was very upset,” he testified. “She was crying. Shit, it made me want to cry.”

Spalding had never understood why it was that Chewbacca and countless others pleaded guilty and cut deals when falsely arrested by the likes of Watts. Now she grasped what it was like to be caught in the machinery of a system, indifferent to your welfare and to the truth, that was dedicated to imposing its own version of reality. The collapse of her faith in the institution to which she had pledged her life was now complete. 

Looking back, Spalding sees this as the moment she broke. “When you work undercover,” she told me at the time, “you learn to keep it together, even when someone has a gun to your head. I’m keeping it together on the outside, but I’m dying inside.”

The next day, she initiated the process of going on medical leave, as did Echeverria. In May 2013, both went on medical leave. After seven months, Echeverria returned to the fugitives unit. Spalding remained on leave. She has been diagnosed by a psychiatrist for the city, as well as her own therapists, as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder due to the trauma of having her identity exposed within the department. This condition prevents her from working in law enforcement.

On June 6, 2014, Spalding turned in her badge and gun. It was, she said at the time, “the saddest day of my life.” Two years later, she speaks with raw emotion of being denied her “calling,” while some of those they investigated are still on the force. “I can’t be on the job, but *they* are.”

“I’m grieving a loss like a death. When they took my badge, they took my soul.”

S

PALDING’S STORY, AS it unfolds, gathers force and gains credibility, through its complexity, coherence, and detail, as well as our knowledge of what the telling has cost her. It is a challenging narrative, because the consequences of believing it are so demanding. It is also incomplete. Things she knows with absolute certainty shade into

things she can only speculate about. Understandably, she inhabits an existential space where it’s tempting to organize all available data around thesis and plot: to make things cohere more tightly than messy reality allows. In my interviews with her, she has consistently resisted that temptation. She remains aware of contingencies, what-ifs, competing explanations. She continues to work the puzzle she is enmeshed in. It’s not hard to see why she is a good investigator. 

While there is much we do not yet know about the dynamics that determined the course of the Watts investigation and the fate of the investigators, what *is* clear are certain outcomes:

Kallatt Mohammed, Watts’s partner, pleaded guilty in August 2012 and was sentenced to 18 months. He admitted in his plea agreement that he extorted protection money from drug dealers at the Ida B. Wells development “beginning no later than December 11, 2007, and

continuing through at least May 22, 2008” – six months out of his long career working with Watts. He said he acted under orders from Watts. In the spring of 2014, Mohammed emerged from prison, having served his sentence.

Ronald Watts initially pleaded not guilty. Then, on July 19, 2013, on the eve of trial, he changed his plea to guilty to one count of theft of government funds. Nothing is known about the substance of negotiations with prosecutors, if any; and there is no indication in the public record that he provided any information about members of his team and others within the department who participated in his crimes.

On October 9, 2013, Watts came before Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman for sentencing. The courtroom gallery was sparsely populated – a few reporters, a couple of family members. Broad shouldered and stocky, the expressionless Watts sat at the defendant’s table in a dark business suit with his fingers tightly laced in front of him.

Judge Coleman was severely constrained in what she could do within the framework presented to her. Although the maximum possible sentence was 10 years in prison and a \$250,000 fine, a sentence of 10-16

CPD OFFICERS SENTENCED TO PRISON FOLLOWING FBI STING

OCTOBER 2013 – Former Chicago police Sgt. Ronald Watts is sentenced to 22 months in prison after being caught stealing money in an FBI sting operation in 2011. His partner, Kallatt Mohammed, was sentenced to 18 months in 2012.

months was indicated under the federal guidelines. The government asked for 36 months. The defense asked for a sentence in line with the federal guidelines.

Watts's lawyer, Thomas Glasgow, emphasized his client's military service, his long career of public service, his role in his family, and the fact that he had no criminal record. In a remarkable passage in the sentencing memorandum he submitted to the court, Glasgow argued that Watts's crime should, for the purpose of sentencing, be treated as less grave than "pick pocketing or non-forcible purse snatching" because it was not "a theft from another person against that person's will" and did not involve "increased risk of physical injury" due to the fact that "the 'taking' was both discussed and agreed upon" by Watts and Chewbacca prior to it occurring.

By contrast, the government lawyer used strong language to describe the harms that flowed from Watts's criminal enterprise. Citing Mohammed's plea statement, she said that Watts had committed crimes such as the one he was charged with many times.



Judge Coleman gave Watts an opportunity to address the court. He declined.

Coleman characterized Watts's crimes as "unconscionable" and "a betrayal." She seized on the government's description of the Wells development as a community "plagued" with crime, drug dealing, and gang activity: "The place was rampant with poverty, unemployment, addictions. The crime stuff comes after. ... You were there to protect those people, and you didn't."

She also spoke of the impact corrupt officers such as Watts have on children in the community. "They're taught not to respect anything," she said. "What else are they supposed to think?"

After a long pause, Coleman announced a sentence of 22 months, followed by one year of mandatory supervision, and restitution of \$5,200 – the amount Watts had taken in the sting.

Watts left the courtroom smiling broadly.

He has since served his sentence and relocated to Las Vegas. Apart from the \$5,200 from the final sting, he retained all assets he may have obtained through criminal activities.

The other members of Watts's team – Al Jones, Brian Bolton, and Bobby Gonzalez – remain on the force. Not long after the arrest of Watts and Mohammed, Jones was promoted to sergeant. (Spalding: “They promote you for your silence.”) Gonzalez has been in the news [recently](#) due to his involvement in [three](#) separate police shootings of young black men over the last two years. None of the officers responded to requests for comment.



Kallat Mohammed leaves the Dirksen Federal Building in Chicago on Oct. 26, 2012. Photo: Brian Jackson/Chicago Sun-Times



S THE WHISTLEBLOWER lawsuit moved forward in court, various of the “bosses” named as defendants or alleged to have conspired with Watts retired from the CPD, claimed their six-figure pensions, and in most instances, moved on to other positions in law enforcement. James O’Grady and Nick Roti took leadership positions with the Illinois State Police. **Ernie Brown** became police chief of Darien, Illinois, and is now executive director of the Cook County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. **Debra Kirby** took a job with the Garda Siochana Inspectorate, the Irish police, and now works for a Chicago-based risk management firm. And Juan Rivera took his leave in the fall of 2015, as the whistleblower suit moved toward trial.



By virtue of Chicago’s demolition of its public housing developments, the scene of the crimes committed by Watts and his team has disappeared. So too have most of their victims as characterized by Judge Coleman at Watts’s sentencing hearing – the vulnerable public housing residents the team exploited rather than protecting, including children in the community who grew up seeing them as the face of civil authority – “invisible people,” as Spalding puts it, whose lack of standing as citizens is a major factor conferring impunity on predatory officers such as Watts.

At various points in this story, individuals have emerged from that invisible world – a world abandoned then, obliterated now – intent on bringing down the criminal enterprise of Watts & Co. Above all,

Chewbacca. Also, Spalding and Echeverria's informant from the Ickes Homes. Perhaps, too, Big Shorty and Monk Fears.

More recently, a man named Ben Baker, against long odds, established to the satisfaction of the judge who had tried him and the State's Attorney's Office that had prosecuted him that he had been wrongly convicted, having been falsely arrested by members of Watts's team.

On January 14 of this year, having served 10 years of a 14-year sentence, Baker was released from prison, after the state's attorney dropped all charges against him for possession of a controlled substance. At his trial in 2006, Baker had testified that the Watts team planted drugs on him and falsely arrested him, because he had refused to pay them off. At the time, the judge did not find credible Baker's description of the protection racket the Watts team operated at the Ida B. Wells development.

With help and guidance from Spalding, attorney Josh Tepfer of the Exoneration Project successfully challenged Baker's conviction on the grounds that Baker's allegations against the Watts team were corroborated by investigative materials available at the time of his trial but withheld from his attorneys. Tepfer supported this claim with FBI documents obtained via the Freedom of Information Act. Although

The police officials named as defendants in Shannon Spalding and Danny Echeverria's whistleblower lawsuit deny the plaintiffs' allegations. Each has been contacted for comment, as have other law enforcement officials who figure in the story, and each of them either did not respond or declined to comment, except where otherwise noted. The Chicago Police Department and the city's Department of Law both said they do not comment on active investigations or litigation. The FBI declined to comment.

heavily redacted, these documents establish that the FBI, IAD, and State's Attorney's Office were engaged in an "ongoing joint investigation" of Watts and his team for more than a decade.

Beyond achieving a measure of justice for Baker, the case is important for what it portends. Tepfer and his colleagues have brought a [lawsuit](#) against the FBI challenging the redactions under the Freedom of Information Act. They have also [brought](#) a [civil suit](#) on behalf of Ben Baker. And they are representing a man named Lionel White who is seeking to have his conviction vacated on the ground that he was framed by Watts's team. Given the evidence that the team routinely used the threat of false arrest to coerce cooperation, how many others have shared Ben Baker's fate of being wrongfully convicted?





PL JOINT 038372



Ida B. Wells Homes Extension demolition and mixed-income development construction, 2008.
Photo: David Schalliol



NINE YEARS AFTER contacting the FBI, six years after being outed within the department, and 4 1/2 years after filing their lawsuit, Spalding and Echeverria finally approached their day in court. The trial was set to begin on May 31.

As the day approached, Spalding was a singular combination of strength and fragility. Financially ruined, emotionally depleted, and grief-stricken over loss of the job that gave her life purpose and used every part of her, she prepared to tell her story in court in the face of the mutually reinforcing denials of the city and the individual defendants.



Moments before the trial was to begin, the judge announced from the bench that the parties had reached a settlement. Addressing the press in the lobby of the federal courthouse, Spalding expressed the hope that the impact of the case would be that no other officer “has to walk one day in our shoes.”

The settlement means the issues presented by the case will not be adjudicated. It does not resolve those issues. If anything, it sharpens them. At a time when the Department of Justice is investigating the

Chicago Police Department, a time when debate about how best to achieve fundamental police reform dominates Chicago politics, the questions bequeathed by the case demand sustained attention.

One set of questions relates to the criminal careers of Watts and his alleged co-conspirators. For the better part of those careers, they were under investigation by internal affairs and the FBI, as well as other law enforcement agencies (the Drug Enforcement Administration, the State's Attorney's Office). How is it that all there is to show for those multi-target investigations over more than a decade are the convictions of

Watts and Mohammed on a single count of stealing government funds in the amount of \$5,200? Was this an instance of investigation-as-cover-up? Was the prosecution the capstone of a massive cover-up, designed not to secure information about Watts's crimes and co-conspirators but to buy his silence? The DOJ team has the means to answer these questions. It can also assess how it is that members of Watts's team – Al Jones, Brian Bolton, Bobby Gonzalez, and others – remain on the force. Did the investigation in fact clear them? More generally, what can be learned from the history of the Watts investigation for the

DOJ LAUNCHES INVESTIGATION INTO CPD

DECEMBER 2015 –

The U.S. Department of Justice launches an investigation “to determine whether there are systemic violations of the Constitution or federal law by officers of CPD.” The investigation focuses on the use of force and accountability.

purpose of diagnosing the changes required in the operation of internal affairs?

Another set of questions centers on the nature of the code of silence. The city has now irreversibly passed over a threshold: The code of silence about the code of silence has been broken. No longer can police officials on the witness stand or in depositions dismiss the term as “TV and movie related” or, in a favorite formulation oft repeated over the years, as “the title of a Chuck Norris movie.”

Mayor Emanuel in his speech to the City Council last December spoke of the code as a problem “at the very heart of the policing profession.” Then several months later, a police accountability task force he had appointed described “a deeply entrenched code of silence supported not just by individual officers, but by the very institution itself.” Elsewhere in the report, the task force called the code “official policy.”

Yet the city in the Spalding-Echeverria case sought to retreat from the implications of those conclusions. As the trial approached, city lawyers,  in an effort to avoid having the mayor testify, offered to admit to the existence of the code of silence, but then qualified the statement by adding that police cover-ups are “not pervasive, widespread, well-settled custom or practice to which the city’s chief policymakers have been indifferent.”

Similarly, Corporation Counsel Steve Patton in announcing the \$2 million settlement acknowledged the code of silence even as he minimized it. It’s a problem that must be addressed, he said, even if only a few officers engage in such behavior.

Putting aside the logical puzzle of how the code of silence can be said to exist if practiced only by a few, the city’s formulation raises a question essential to the diagnostic clarity on which meaningful reform hinges: Is the code of silence occasional aberrant behavior or standard

operating procedure? If Spalding's account is accurate, then the defendants, including some of the most senior officials in the department, lied under oath and did so in concert. (Again, their denials are available [here](#).) If she is telling the truth, then the city of Chicago in this post-Laquan McDonald era of police reform was prepared to present a defense against claims of retaliation due to the code of silence that was itself a classic exercise in the code of silence.

For her part, Shannon Spalding has no doubt about the answer.

"The code of silence is only silent to the outside world," she told me recently. "For cops, it's a constant ringing in your ears from the day you enter the academy to the day you retire."

She paused, reflecting perhaps on what fidelity to the truth has cost her and what it has brought her.

"But I'm deaf to it now."



WHISTLEBLOWER SETTLEMENT REACHED

MAY 2016 — CPD whistleblowers Shannon Spalding and Daniel Echeverria are awarded \$2 million in a settlement of their complaint that CPD systematically retaliated against them due to their investigation of departmental wrongdoing. The city of Chicago has spent more than \$600 million on alleged CPD misconduct since 2004, according to the Better Government Association.



Two Chicago police officers uncovered a massive criminal enterprise within the department. Then they were hung out to dry.

∨ EXPAND ALL PARTS

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PL JOINT 038377

EXHIBIT 98

FILED

VERDICT FORM A

FEB 22 2007

COUNT II-VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT-DIANE KLIPFEL Judge: M. Manning
United States District Court

Question 1: As to Count II, Diane Klipfel's Civil Rights claim against Joseph Miedzianowski, do you find that Miedzianowski violated her First Amendment rights?

Joseph Miedzianowski Yes ☒
No ☐

If your answer is "yes" to Question 1, then answer Question 2. If your answer is "no" to Question 1, then skip Questions 2 and 3 and the damage award; sign and date this form.

Question 2: Was Joseph Miedzianowski acting within the scope of his employment.

Yes ☒
No ☐

If your answer is "yes" to both Question 1 and Question 2, then answer Question 3. If your answer is "yes" to Question 1 and "no" to Question 2, skip Question 3 but go on to the damages portion of this Verdict Form.

Question 3: As to Count II, Diane Klipfel's Civil Rights claim against the City of Chicago, do you find that the City violated her First Amendment rights?

City of Chicago Yes ☒
No ☐

If your answer is "yes" to Question 1, or "yes" to Question 3, or "yes" to both Questions 1 and 3, then assess any damages to be awarded Diane Klipfel:

We, the Jury, assess Diane Klipfel's damages in the sum of:

\$ 7,750,000.00

VERDICT FORM B

COUNT II VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT MICHAEL CASALI

Question 1: As to Count II, Michael Casali's Civil Rights claim against Joseph Miedzianowski, do you find that Miedzianowski violated his First Amendment rights?

Joseph Miedzianowski Yes ☒

No ☐

If your answer is "yes" to Question 1, then answer Question 2. If your answer is "no" to Question 1, then skip Questions 2 and 3 and the damage award, sign and date this form.

Question 2: Was Joseph Miedzianowski acting within the scope of his employment.

Yes ☒

No ☐

If your answer is "yes" to both Question 1 and Question 2, then answer Question 3. If your answer is "yes" to Question 1 and "no" to Question 2, skip Question 3 and go to the damages portion of this Verdict Form.

Question 3: As to Count II, Michael Casali's Civil Rights claim against the City of Chicago, do you find that the City violated his First Amendment rights?

City of Chicago Yes ☒

No ☐

If your answer is "yes" to Question 1, or "yes" to Question 3, or "yes" to both Questions 1 and 3, then assess any damages to be awarded Michael Casali:

We, the Jury, assess Michael Casali's damages in the sum of:

\$ 1,000,000.00

VERDICT FORM CCOUNT III-DEFAMATION-DIANE KLIPFEL

Question 1: As to Count III, Diane Klipfel's Defamation claim against Joseph Miedzianowski, did Diane Klipfel prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Joseph Miedzianowski defamed her reputation?

Yes ☒No ☐

If your answer is "yes" to Question 1, then assess any damages to be awarded Diane Klipfel:

We, the Jury, assess Diane Klipfel's damages in the sum of:

\$ 1,000,000.00

If your answer is "no" to Question 1, then skip Question 2 and sign and date this form. Answer Question 2 only if you answered "yes" to Question 1.

Question 2: If your answer is "yes" to Question 1, at the time he defamed Diane Klipfel, was Joseph Miedzianowski acting within the scope of his employment?

Yes ☒No ☐

[Signature]
 For person
[Signature]
[Signature]
[Signature]
[Signature]

[Signature]
[Signature]
[Signature]
[Signature]
 Date: 02/22/07

EXHIBIT 99

Investigation of the Chicago Police Department



United States Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
and
United States Attorney's Office
Northern District of Illinois

January 13, 2017

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On December 7, 2015, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, and the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois, jointly initiated an investigation of the City of Chicago's Police Department (CPD) and the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA). This investigation was undertaken to determine whether the Chicago Police Department is engaging in a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct and, if so, what systemic deficiencies or practices within CPD, IPRA, and the City might be facilitating or causing this pattern or practice.

Our investigation assessed CPD's use of force, including deadly force, and addressed CPD policies, training, reporting, investigation, and review related to officer use of force. The investigation further addressed CPD's and IPRA's systems of accountability both as they relate to officer use of force and officer misconduct, including the intake, investigation, and review of allegations of officer misconduct, and the imposition of discipline or other corrective action. We also investigated racial, ethnic, or other disparities in CPD's force and accountability practices, and assessed how those disparities inform the breakdown in community trust.

We opened this investigation pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (Section 14141), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI), and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3789d (Safe Streets Act). Section 14141 prohibits law enforcement agencies from engaging in a pattern or practice of conduct that violates the Constitution or laws of the United States. Title VI and its implementing regulations and the Safe Streets Act prohibit law enforcement practices that have a disparate impact based on protected status, such as race or ethnicity, unless these practices are necessary to achieve legitimate, non-discriminatory objectives.

This investigation was initiated as Chicago grappled with the aftermath of the release of a video showing a white police officer fatally shooting black teenager Laquan McDonald. This aftermath included protests, murder charges for the involved officer, and the resignation of Chicago's police superintendent. The McDonald incident was widely viewed as a tipping point—igniting longstanding concerns about CPD officers' use of force, and the City's systems for detecting and correcting the unlawful use of force.

Over the year-plus since release of that video, and while we have been conducting this investigation, Chicago experienced a surge in shootings and homicides. The reasons for this spike are broadly debated and inarguably complex. But on two points there is little debate. First, for decades, certain neighborhoods on Chicago's South and West Sides have been disproportionately ravaged by gun violence. Those same neighborhoods have borne the brunt of the recent surge of violence. And second, for Chicago to find solutions—short- and long-term—for making those neighborhoods safe, it is imperative that the City rebuild trust between CPD and the people it serves, particularly in these communities. The City and CPD acknowledge that this trust has been broken, despite the diligent efforts and brave actions of countless CPD officers. It has been broken by systems that have allowed CPD officers who violate the law to escape accountability. This breach in trust has in turn eroded CPD's ability to effectively

prevent crime; in other words, trust and effectiveness in combating violent crime are inextricably intertwined.

The aim of this investigation was to conduct a thorough, independent, and fair assessment of CPD's and IPRA's practices. To accomplish this goal, we relied on several sources of information.

First, we reviewed thousands of pages of documents provided to us by CPD, IPRA, and the City, including policies, procedures, training plans, Department orders and memos, internal and external reports, and more. We also obtained access to the City's entire misconduct complaint database and data from all reports filled out following officers' use of force. From there, we reviewed a randomized, representative sample of force reports and investigative files for incidents that occurred between January 2011 and April 2016, as well as additional incident reports and investigations. Overall, we reviewed over 170 officer-involved shooting investigations, and documents related to over 425 incidents of less-lethal force.

We also spent extensive time in Chicago—over 300 person-days—meeting with community members and City officials, and interviewing current and former CPD officers and IPRA investigators. In addition to speaking with the Superintendent and other CPD leadership, we met with the command staff of several specialized units, divisions, and departments. We toured CPD's training facilities and observed training programs. We also visited each of Chicago's 22 police districts, where we addressed roll call, spoke with command staff and officers, and conducted over 60 ride-alongs with officers. We met several times with Chicago's officer union, Lodge No. 7 of the Fraternal Order of Police, as well as the sergeants', lieutenants', and captains' unions. All told, we heard from over 340 individual CPD members, and 23 members of IPRA's staff.

Our findings were also significantly informed by our conversations with members of the Chicago community. We met with over ninety community organizations, including non-profits, advocacy and legal organizations, and faith-based groups focused on a wide range of issues. We participated in several community forums in different neighborhoods throughout Chicago where we heard directly from the family members of individuals who were killed by CPD officers and others who shared their insights and experiences. We also met with several local researchers, academics, and lawyers who have studied CPD extensively for decades. Most importantly, however, we heard directly from individuals who live and work throughout the City about their interactions with CPD officers. Overall, we talked to approximately a thousand community members. We received nearly 600 phone calls, emails, and letters from individuals who were eager to provide their experiences and insights.

In addition to attorneys, paralegals, outreach specialists, and data analysts from the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice and the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois, 11 independent subject-matter experts assisted with this investigation. Most of these experts are current or former law enforcement officials from police departments across the country. Accordingly, these experts have decades of expertise in areas such as the use of force, accountability, training, supervision, community policing, officer-involved domestic violence and sexual misconduct, officer wellness, and more. These experts

accompanied us on-site, reviewed documents and investigative files, and provided invaluable insights that informed both the course of this investigation and its conclusions.

During the year it took us to complete this investigation, the City of Chicago took action of its own. Following the release of dashboard-camera video capturing the death of Laquan McDonald, Mayor Rahm Emanuel established the Police Accountability Task Force (PATF). The Mayor charged the PATF with assessing the Police Department and making recommendations for change in five areas: community relations; oversight and accountability; de-escalation; early intervention and personnel concerns; and video release protocols. In April 2016, the PATF issued a report with over a hundred recommendations for improving transparency and accountability. In December of 2016, the City issued a progress report outlining the steps it has taken since April to meet the recommendations made by the PATF.

Perhaps most significantly, the City passed an ordinance creating the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), which is scheduled to replace IPRA in 2017. The ordinance also establishes a Deputy Inspector General for Public Safety, who is charged with auditing the entire police accountability system and identifying patterns that violate residents' constitutional rights. In June of 2016, the City issued a new "transparency policy" mandating the release of videos and other materials related to certain officer misconduct investigations. CPD also pledged to establish an anonymous hotline for CPD members to report misconduct; began an ambitious process to develop an early intervention system; and developed a draft disciplinary matrix to guide CPD in assigning appropriate discipline for various misconduct violations.

The City embarked on other initiatives during our investigation that are intended to improve policing in Chicago. In early 2016, the City began a pilot program for body-worn cameras, and reported recently that the expansion of the program will be accelerated so that all officers will be wearing these cameras by the end of 2017. In the last few months, CPD began an important force mitigation/de-escalation training course for officers, and revised several policies related to use of force. The City also committed to providing additional training on how officers and emergency dispatchers respond to individuals in mental health crisis, and to improving CPD's training more broadly. As part of its efforts to engage community members and improve police-community relations, the City established a Community Policing Advisory Panel that will help develop a new strategic plan for community policing. The City is also undertaking recruitment efforts aimed at increasing CPD's diversity, and recently retained a consultant to complete a staffing analysis to inform deployment decisions Department-wide.

Many of these planned or implemented reforms are discussed in detail in this Report, alongside our assessment of their impact on the problems our investigation found, and whether CPD and the City need to go further.

As noted, while our investigation was underway and the City moved forward with some reforms, Chicago experienced an unprecedented surge in shootings and homicides. In 2016, there were 762 homicides, nearly 300 more than the previous year and, according to the draft of a new study from the University of Chicago Crime Lab, the largest single-year homicide increase of the last 25 years among the five most populous United States cities. Overall, there were 3,550 shootings, with 4,331 shooting victims, in Chicago in 2016, approximately 1,100 more than in 2015. While shootings and homicides occurred in all parts of the City, they were largely

concentrated in Chicago's South Side and West Side neighborhoods. Homicide clearance rates, the rate at which police identify the suspected killer, continued their years-long slide, with CPD clearing only 29% of all homicides, less than half the national clearance rate.

During our investigation, DOJ has enhanced its assistance with CPD's reform and violence-reduction efforts. DOJ has allocated additional funding to CPD to support its efforts, provided technical assistance, and continued and expanded its cooperation through DOJ's Violence Reduction Network (VRN), an innovative approach to support and enhance local violence reduction efforts. Since December 2014, CPD and DOJ, through the United States Attorney's Office in Chicago, have hosted nine Community Trust Roundtables across Chicago's most violence-plagued neighborhoods. These recent efforts build on the foundation of DOJ's longstanding collaborative initiatives with CPD.

It has never been more important to rebuild trust for the police within Chicago's neighborhoods most challenged by violence, poverty, and unemployment. As discussed below and throughout our Report, Chicago must undergo broad, fundamental reform to restore this trust. This will be difficult, but will benefit both the public and CPD's own officers. The increased trust these reforms will build is necessary to solve and prevent violent crime. And the conduct and practices that restore trust will also carry out an equally important public service: demonstrating to communities racked with violence that their police force cares about them and has not abandoned them, regardless of where they live or the color of their skin. That confidence is broken in many neighborhoods in Chicago.

At the same time, many CPD officers feel abandoned by the public and often by their own Department. We found profoundly low morale nearly every place we went within CPD. Officers generally feel that they are insufficiently trained and supported to do their work effectively. Our investigation indicates that both CPD's lawfulness and effectiveness can be vastly improved if the City and CPD make the changes necessary to consistently incentivize and reward effective, ethical, and active policing. While it will take time and concerted focus to implement all of the necessary changes, a strong sign of a genuine and unalterable commitment to such change could increase officer morale more quickly, especially among the countless good officers within CPD who police diligently every day, and who disapprove of some officer conduct they see—and many of whom quietly told us how eager they are for the kind of change that can come only from an investigation like the one we have just completed. It is within this current climate, and with these challenges in mind, that we conducted our investigation and make the following findings.

Force

We reviewed CPD's force practices mindful that officers routinely place themselves in harm's way in order to uphold their commitment to serve and protect the people of the City of Chicago, and that officers regularly encounter individuals who may be armed and determined to avoid arrest. We likewise recognize that officers have not only a right, but an obligation, to protect themselves and others from threats of harm, including deadly harm, which may arise in an instant.

But even within this context, we, in consultation with several active law enforcement experts, found that CPD officers engage in a pattern or practice of using force, including deadly force, that is unreasonable. We found further that CPD officers' force practices unnecessarily endanger themselves and others and result in unnecessary and avoidable shootings and other uses of force.

As discussed throughout this Report, this pattern is largely attributable to systemic deficiencies within CPD and the City. CPD has not provided officers with adequate guidance to understand how and when they may use force, or how to safely and effectively control and resolve encounters to reduce the need to use force. CPD also has failed to hold officers accountable when they use force contrary to CPD policy or otherwise commit misconduct. This failure to hold officers accountable results in some officers remaining with the Department when they should have been relieved of duty. These officers often continue their misconduct including, at times, again using unreasonable deadly force. More broadly, these failures result in officers not having the skills or tools necessary to use force wisely and lawfully, and they send a dangerous message to officers and the public that unreasonable force by CPD officers will be tolerated. We found further that CPD's failure to meaningfully and routinely review or investigate officer use of force is a significant factor in perpetuating the practices that result in the pattern of unlawful conduct we found. Each of these causal factors is discussed further in this Summary and the accompanying Report.

Our finding that CPD engages in a pattern or practice of force in violation of the Constitution is based on a comprehensive investigation of CPD's force practices and a close analysis of hundreds of individual force incidents. We reviewed CPD's policies related to the use, reporting, and investigation of force, including older versions of policies that were effective during our review period, and CPD's proposed revised policies. We spoke with officers at all ranks, including the Superintendent and the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Patrol, to understand how officers are trained to use force, their view of when force is appropriate, and how the policies are interpreted in practice throughout CPD. We also did an in-depth review of officer reports of force, civilian complaints of force, and CPD's and IPRA's review of force, and investigations of allegations of excessive force. We reviewed all documents we were provided related to over 425 incidents of less-lethal force, including representative samples of officers' own reports of force, and of investigations of civilian complaints about officer force between January 2011 and April 2016. We also reviewed over 170 files related to officer-involved shootings.

The pattern of unlawful force we found resulted from a collection of poor police practices that our investigation indicated are used routinely within CPD. We found that officers engage in tactically unsound and unnecessary foot pursuits, and that these foot pursuits too often end with officers unreasonably shooting someone—including unarmed individuals. We found that officers shoot at vehicles without justification and in contradiction to CPD policy. We found further that officers exhibit poor discipline when discharging their weapons and engage in tactics that endanger themselves and public safety, including failing to await backup when they safely could and should; using unsound tactics in approaching vehicles; and using their own vehicles in a manner that is dangerous. These are issues that can and must be better addressed through training, accountability and ultimately cultural change.

Among the most egregious uses of deadly force we reviewed were incidents in which CPD officers shot at suspects who presented no immediate threat. CPD's use of less-lethal force also contributes to the pattern of unlawful conduct we found. We reviewed instances of CPD using less-lethal force, often Tasers, including in drive-stun mode, against people who posed no threat, and using unreasonable retaliatory force and unreasonable force against children. We found also that CPD officers use force against people in mental health crisis where force might have been avoided. These issues are further discussed, along with specific examples, in the [Force](#) Section of this Report.

CPD does not investigate or review these force incidents to determine whether its responses to these events were appropriate or lawful, or whether force could have been avoided. The City is currently taking steps to improve its response to persons in mental health or behavioral crisis, in part in response to the tragic shootings deaths of Quintonio LeGrier and Bettie Jones. While we applaud the steps the City has taken, as discussed in our Report, there are important additional steps the City needs to take. The City must do more to ensure that effective, well-trained "crisis intervention" officers respond to these events, and that mental-health or similar crises are analyzed to determine whether changes to the program or CPD's crisis response are warranted.

We found many circumstances in which officers' accounts of force incidents were later discredited, in whole or part, by video evidence. Given the numerous use-of-force incidents without video evidence, discussed further in [Section II.C.](#) of this Report, the pattern of unreasonable force is likely even more widespread than we were able to discern through our investigation.

In light of these incidents and many more like them, we support the City's decision to accelerate its plan to ensure that all CPD officers have body cameras so that all officers have them by the end of this year. While we urge the City to go forward with this plan, we hope the City will also heed the concerns set out later in our Report that it work with police unions and community groups on policies and protocols for body-camera usage, and that it develop the supervisory and accountability supports necessary to ensure that body cameras are effective, both at preventing misconduct and exonerating officers where they are wrongfully accused.

Our review further determined that CPD and IPRA do not adequately respond to incidents in which officers used unreasonable or unnecessary force—including force that resulted in a person's death and the officer's stated justification was at odds with the physical evidence. Although IPRA's deficiencies—discussed in the [Accountability](#) Section of our Report—have played a central role in allowing patterns of unconstitutional force to persist, IPRA cannot eliminate the pattern of misconduct we found unless CPD's force reporting and investigations change fundamentally as well. As an initial matter, formal and functional gaps in IPRA's jurisdiction mean that many incidents are inadequately investigated or not investigated at all. Where IPRA does act on its jurisdiction, we found that IPRA's ability to fairly investigate force pursuant to its mandate is compromised by deficiencies in how CPD reports force and gathers related evidence immediately after a force incident.

CPD policy requires officers to report force but, in practice, officers are not required to provide detail about the force they used that is sufficient for an adequate review, and most officer

force is not reviewed or investigated. Although shootings where a person is struck are investigated, as discussed in the [Accountability](#) Section, those investigations are inadequate. As a result of so few force incidents being even nominally investigated, and the low quality of the force investigations that do occur, there is no meaningful, systemic accountability for officers who use force in violation of the law or CPD policy. Nor is there any opportunity for meaningful assessment of whether policies, training, or equipment should be modified to improve force outcomes in the future for officers or civilians. The failure to review and investigate officer use of force has helped create a culture in which officers expect to use force and not be questioned about the need for or propriety of that use. In this way, CPD's failure to adequately review officer use of force on a regular basis has combined with CPD's failure to properly train and supervise officers to perpetuate a pattern of unlawful use of force within CPD.

The City has acknowledged and begun to correct a number of deficiencies related to how officers use and are held accountable for force. In March 2016, CPD began a review of its force policies in an effort to provide clearer direction to officers on the appropriate use of force. CPD released the draft force policies in October 2016 for public comment. The proposed revisions address core force principles such as the sanctity of life; ethical behavior; objective and proportional use of force; use of deadly force; de-escalation; and force mitigation. CPD is reviewing the public feedback and, at the time of this drafting, "will in the very near future incorporate suggestions and improvements to prepare final versions of the policies." CPD also has begun providing all officers with force-mitigation training designed to better equip officers to de-escalate conflicts safely; recognize the signs of mental illness, trauma and crisis situations; and respond quickly and appropriately when force is necessary.

These steps are meaningful and important. But to fulfill their promise, this new approach to CPD use of force must be supported by leadership and enforced by supervisors. Moreover, they must be accompanied by changes to how force is reported and reviewed, not only so that officers can be held accountable when they misuse force, but so that CPD can learn from force incidents and make the policy, training, and equipment changes necessary to make officers and the public safer and more secure.

Accountability

Police accountability systems are vital to lawful policing. In combination with effective supervision, a robust accountability system helps identify, correct and ultimately prevent unreasonable and unnecessary uses of force. We also investigated the City's police accountability systems and their effectiveness in identifying police misconduct and holding officers responsible.

The City received over 30,000 complaints of police misconduct during the five years preceding our investigation, but fewer than 2% were sustained, resulting in no discipline in 98% of these complaints. This is a low sustained rate. In evaluating the City's accountability structures, we looked beneath these and other disconcerting statistics and attempted to diagnose the cause of the low sustained rates by examining the systems in place, the resources, and leadership involved with the City's accountability bodies, including CPD's Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA), IPRA, and the Chicago Police Board. We reviewed their policies and practices, interviewed many current and former supervisors, investigators, and other members involved,

and we reviewed hundreds of force and misconduct investigative files from an accountability standpoint. We discovered numerous entrenched, systemic policies and practices that undermine police accountability, as described below. We also took into account that the City has taken many steps during our investigation to address many of these accountability deficiencies, including creating COPA, which will replace IPRA as the independent agency responsible for investigating serious police misconduct. Although we commend the City for these and other recent reforms, they do not sufficiently address many of problems we discovered in the City's deeply flawed investigative system.

The City does not investigate the majority of cases it is required by law to investigate. Most of those cases are uninvestigated because they lack a supporting affidavit from the complaining party, but the City also fails to investigate anonymous and older misconduct complaints as well as those alleging lower level force and non-racial verbal abuse. Finally, and also contrary to legal mandates, IPRA does not investigate most Taser discharges and officer-involved shootings where no one is hit. Some of these investigations are ignored based on procedural hurdles in City agreements with its unions, but some are unilateral decisions by the accountability agencies to reduce caseloads and manage resources. And many misconduct complaints that avoid these investigative barriers are still not fully investigated because they are resolved through a defective mediation process, which is actually a plea bargain system used to dispose of serious misconduct claims in exchange for modest discipline. Regardless of the reasons, this failure to fully investigate almost half of all police misconduct cases seriously undermines accountability. These are all lost opportunities to identify misconduct, training deficiencies, and problematic trends, and to hold officers and CPD accountable when misconduct occurs. In order to address these ignored cases, the City must modify its own policies, and work with the unions to address certain CBA provisions, and in the meantime, it must aggressively investigate all complaints to the extent authorized under these contracts.

Those cases that are investigated suffer from serious investigative flaws that obstruct objective fact finding. Civilian and officer witnesses, and even the accused officers, are frequently not interviewed during an investigation. The potential for inappropriate coordination of testimony, risk of collusion, and witness coaching during interviews is built into the system, occurs routinely, and is not considered by investigators in evaluating the case. The questioning of officers is often cursory and aimed at eliciting favorable statements justifying the officer's actions rather than seeking truth. Questioning is often marked by a failure to challenge inconsistencies and illogical officer explanations, as well as leading questions favorable to the officer. Investigators routinely fail to review and incorporate probative evidence from parallel civil and criminal proceedings based on the same police incident. And consistent with these biased investigative techniques, the investigator's summary reports are often drafted in a manner favorable to the officer by omitting conflicts in testimony or with physical evidence that undermine the officer's justification or by exaggerating evidence favorable to the officer, all of which frustrates a reviewer's ability to evaluate for investigative quality and thoroughness.

Investigative fact-finding into police misconduct and attempts to hold officers accountable are also frustrated by police officers' code of silence. The City, police officers, and leadership within CPD and its police officer union acknowledge that a code of silence among Chicago police officers exists, extending to lying and affirmative efforts to conceal evidence. Officers who may be inclined to cover up misconduct will be deterred from doing so if they

understand that honesty is the most crucial component of their job and that the Department will aggressively seek to identify dishonest officers and appropriately discipline them. However, our investigation found that IPRA and BIA treat such efforts to hide evidence as ancillary and unexceptional misconduct, and often do not investigate it, causing officers to believe there is not much to lose if they lie to cover up misconduct. Investigators employ a higher standard to sustain claims against officers for making false statements under what is known as a Rule 14 charge and they rarely expand their investigations to charge accused and witness officers with lying to cover up misconduct. Nor, until recently, has the City focused much attention on officers' efforts to conceal by mishandling video and audio equipment or by retaliating against civilians who witness misconduct. The City's failure to prioritize Rule 14 investigations must change. When it is aware of information that an officer lied or otherwise covered up misconduct, the City must actively and aggressively investigate and consistently seek to discipline officers who do so.

We found that inadequate staffing contributes both to these investigative flaws and to the City's decisions to forego or short-circuit so many of the investigations it should be handling. The City has recently committed to providing more funding to IPRA when it becomes COPA, and the agency has already begun to hire additional staff. But COPA's range of responsibilities will also be much broader than IPRA's, and there has not been sufficient analysis to determine whether COPA will have the capacity to do any better than IPRA. We also found that poor training accounted for some of these investigative deficiencies. Investigators and leadership at IPRA acknowledged investigative training was inadequate, and IPRA/COPA is developing plans to revamp and increase training for all staff, especially investigators. While we commend IPRA for this reform, improved training is likewise necessary for BIA investigators as well. Such enhanced training is an important step towards improving the quality of misconduct investigations handled and changing the culture to one that is more determined to resolve investigations and reliably determine whether an officer committed misconduct. However, the depth and breadth of that training is unclear. It should not only cover general investigative techniques, but should include training to eliminate biased investigative techniques as well as training in specific areas, including unlawful entry and seizure, domestic violence and sexual assault, and false statement charges under Rule 14.

In the rare instances when complaints of misconduct are sustained, we found that discipline is haphazard and unpredictable, and is meted out in a way that does little to deter misconduct. Officers are often disciplined for conduct far less serious than the conduct that prompted the investigation, and in many cases, a complaint may be sustained, but the officer is not disciplined at all. The police discipline system, including the City's draft disciplinary matrix, fails to provide clear guidance on appropriate, fair, and consistent penalty ranges, thus undermining the legitimacy and deterrent effect of discipline within CPD.

Finally, we also found deficiencies with the Chicago Police Board's systems, which impair its ability to be an effective component of CPD's accountability structure. The Board should focus on improving its civil service commission function of providing due process to officers accused of misconduct and relinquish its role of providing community input into CPD's accountability system to the Community Oversight Board that the City has committed to creating. The fairness of Police Board hearings can be improved by modifying current rules that bar the officer's "negative" disciplinary history but allow the officer's "complimentary" history

as well as favorable character evidence offered by the accused's supervisors. The City can further level the playing field by providing more experienced advocates to represent CPD before the Board and by offering better training for Board members. Allowing Board members to hear evidence directly, instead of a second-hand summary from the hearing officer, and increasing the Board's transparency will further instill community confidence in the Police Board.

Training and Supervision

CPD's pattern of unlawful conduct is due in part to deficiencies in CPD's training and supervision. CPD does not provide officers or supervisors with adequate training and does not encourage or facilitate adequate supervision of officers in the field. These shortcomings in training and supervision result in officers who are unprepared to police lawfully and effectively; supervisors who do not mentor or support constitutional policing by officers; and a systemic inability to proactively identify areas for improvement, including Department-wide training needs and interventions for officers engaging in misconduct.

Both at the outset and through the duration of their careers, CPD officers do not receive the quality or quantity of training necessary for their jobs. Pre-service Academy training relies on outmoded teaching methods and materials, and does not equip recruits with the skills, knowledge, and confidence necessary to serve Chicago communities. For example, we observed an Academy training on deadly force—an important topic, given our findings regarding CPD's use of force—that consisted of a video made decades ago, which was inconsistent with both current law and CPD's own policies. The impact of this poor training was apparent when we interviewed recruits who recently graduated from the Academy: only one in six recruits we spoke with came close to properly articulating the legal standard for use of force. Post-Academy field training is equally flawed. The Field Training Officer (FTO) Program, as currently structured, does not attract a sufficient number of qualified, effective leaders to train new probationary police officers (PPOs), has an insufficient number of FTOs to meet demand, and fails to provide PPOs with appropriate training, mentorship, and oversight. Finally, in-service training is not provided pursuant to any long-term training plan or strategy. Instead, CPD provides only sporadic in-service training, and does not think proactively about training needs Department-wide. Without a long-term training plan, CPD is often called upon to deliver ad-hoc trainings on tight timelines in response to crises. Consequently, in-service trainings are often incomplete and ineffective at teaching officers important skills and information. The recently-mandated Department-wide Taser training exemplifies CPD's problematic approach to in-service training. Large numbers of officers were cycled through this important training quickly in order to meet a deadline set by the City, without proper curriculum, staff, or equipment. This left many officers who completed the training uncomfortable with how to use Tasers effectively as a less-lethal force option—the very skill the training was supposed to teach.

The City recognizes the need for comprehensive reform of its training program. Its plans for reform are discussed in this Report. While laudable, these plans are still preliminary and amount to verbal commitments with uncertain dates for completion. Academy curriculum revisions, restructuring of the field training program, and development of a proactive, well-planned in-service training program are all needed. CPD must also evaluate whether it has the staff, equipment, and physical space to meet the training demands of the Department, and if not, proactively plan for how to meet training needs going forward. CPD must identify the resources

necessary to make these changes, and obtain commitment from the City to provide what is needed.

We found that deficiencies in officer training are exacerbated by the lack of adequate supervision CPD provides to officers in the field, which further contributes to CPD's pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing. CPD does not sufficiently encourage or facilitate supervisors to provide meaningful supervision to officers. Overall, CPD does not hold supervisors accountable for performing certain basic supervisory tasks, including guiding officer behavior or reporting misconduct. Additionally, structural deficiencies in how CPD organizes supervision prevent effective oversight of officer activities. CPD requires supervisors to engage in non-supervisory tasks and manage too many officers at a time. CPD also structures its shift system in such a way that supervisors do not consistently work with the same groups of officers, which inhibits supervisors from learning the needs of officers under their watch. And, much like the deficiencies in CPD's officer training, CPD does not adequately train supervisors on how to provide appropriate supervision. Compounding its supervision problems, CPD does not have a meaningful early intervention system (EIS) to effectively assist supervisors in identifying and correcting problematic behavior. CPD's current behavior intervention systems are underused and inadequate, putting both officers and the public at risk.

Providing robust, meaningful supervision would not only better prevent officer misconduct, it would help CPD better prevent crime in the community. The City and CPD leadership must make the necessary reforms to supervision to protect public and officer safety.

Officer Wellness and Safety

Policing is a high-stress profession. Law enforcement officers often are called upon to deal with violence or crises as problem solvers, and they often are witnesses to human tragedy. In Chicago, this stress is particularly acute, for several reasons. Increasing levels of gun violence and neighborhood conditions take their toll on officers as well as residents. At the same time, the relationship between CPD officers and the communities they serve is strained; officers on the street are expected to prevent crime, yet they must also be the face of the Department in communities that have lost trust in the police. This makes it particularly difficult to police effectively. And these stresses animate the interactions officers have with the communities that they serve—both positively and negatively. As one CPD counselor explained, it is the “stress of the job that’s the precursor to the crisis.”

Our investigation found that these stressors can, and do, play out in harmful ways for CPD officers. CPD deals with officer alcoholism, domestic violence, and suicide. And as explained elsewhere in this Report, CPD officers engage in a pattern or practice of using force that is unjustified, disproportionate, and otherwise excessive. Although the pressure CPD officers are under is by no means an excuse for violating the constitutional rights of the citizens they serve, high levels of unaddressed stress can compromise officer well-being and impact an officer's demeanor and judgment, which in turn impacts how that officer interacts with the public. Some officers are able to manage the stress by shifting their focus to working even harder to do their jobs well. For others, it is more difficult. As these officers struggle with the stress of the job, they can close off and push away those they serve and those who want to help. As noted by the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, “an officer whose capabilities,

judgment, and behavior are adversely affected by poor physical or psychological health not only may be of little use to the community he or she serves but also may be a danger to the community and to other officers.” For precisely these reasons, law enforcement agencies can and should do everything they can to support officers’ physical and psychological well-being.

Because of how officer wellness can impact officer behavior, and the uniquely tense circumstances facing CPD officers each day, CPD officers need greater support from the City and CPD leadership. CPD and the City should think meaningfully about how to better address the stressors CPD officers face, and how to create an overarching operational plan that includes robust counseling programs, comprehensive training, functioning equipment, and other tools to ensure officers are successful and healthy. CPD should move away from traditional strategies that fail to fully address the issue of officer wellness and react to the changing nature of policing in Chicago and the demographic changes in CPD’s police force. CPD needs to transform its officer support system so that officer wellness is an integral part of the Department’s operations and reinforces the values of wellness and a culture that encourages officers to seek assistance when needed. CPD also should work to overcome officers’ concern that using officer wellness services will negatively impact their career, and to educate officers on the value of these services. In this way, CPD can better support its officers’ success, personally and professionally.

Data Collection and Transparency

A lack of transparency regarding CPD’s and IPRA’s activities has contributed to CPD’s failure to identify and correct unlawful practices and to distrust between CPD and the public. Since the start of our investigation, the City and CPD have instituted steps aimed at increasing transparency regarding CPD’s and IPRA’s work. For example, the current IPRA Chief Administrator significantly improved IPRA’s public reporting by expanding the amount of information regarding misconduct investigations that is regularly posted on IPRA’s website. And, following the PATF’s recommendation, the City adopted a “transparency policy,” which created a portal on IPRA’s website where video and other evidence of certain types of police misconduct investigations are posted. These steps go beyond the measures many other agencies put in place.

Our investigation found that additional steps are necessary to ensure the City is as transparent as possible and uses its data to adequately address the patterns and practices identified in this investigation. The City and CPD must improve the ways in which they collect, organize, analyze, track, and report on available data and data trends. Currently, CPD’s data collection systems are siloed and do not allow for meaningful cross-system data collection, evaluation, and tracking. As a result, CPD is unable to easily use the data at its disposal to identify trends, including trends in misconduct complaints, training deficiencies, and more. Improving these systems will allow CPD to better understand its operations, and more easily report CPD activities to the public.

The data that is collected and publicly reported by the City is also incomplete, and at times, inaccurate. IPRA reports only on how investigations are resolved by that agency; but, as discussed in this Report, the findings of IPRA investigators can be set aside, and its discipline recommendations greatly reduced. IPRA’s reporting, therefore, does not give a full picture of how misconduct investigations are ultimately resolved. Independent evaluation of IPRA’s

publicly reported data regarding use of force found that the data was, at least historically, inaccurate. And, even though IPRA's public reporting is far more comprehensive now than it was before, CPD does not aggregate or publish the same information for investigations handled by BIA and the districts. Currently, very little information is published about those investigations, even though those entities handle roughly 70% of all misconduct complaints. Finally, the City should also release more information regarding settlements of officer misconduct lawsuits; publicly available data is, at present, limited to the general nature of the allegation (e.g., "excessive force" or "false arrest") and the settlement amount.

Finally, the City should actively engage the public in crafting solutions in this area. Recent public engagement efforts, such as soliciting public feedback on the video release policy, COPA ordinance, and new use-of-force policies, were important steps toward increasing solicitation of public input into contemplated reforms. Improving and expanding upon these recent initiatives will ensure that the public understands and supports, to the greatest extent possible, the additional reforms currently being considered by the City.

Promotions

Dedicated, highly qualified supervisors are vital to ensuring CPD officers are able to police safely while valuing and respecting the rights of all community members. Under CPD's current promotions system, officers can be promoted to detective, sergeant, or lieutenant based on test scores or evaluation of other merit-based criteria. The merit-based promotion track was created following several lawsuits challenging CPD's promotional exams as discriminatory. The merit promotions system was then later challenged, as part of larger litigation regarding City hiring practices, as unfairly promoting individuals based on political connections rather than true merit. All of these legal battles resulted in several important reforms, including the creation of a City Hiring Plan and corresponding policies intended to organize and structure the merit promotion process.

Despite these important reforms, however, officers we spoke with continue to express skepticism about CPD's promotions system. Much of this is because CPD does not effectively communicate the details of its promotions process to the rank-and-file, and does not provide sufficient transparency following promotional decisions to allay officer concerns. For example, officers are unaware of the metrics used to evaluate individuals who are nominated for merit promotions, or why the officers receiving those promotions were selected. By not sharing this information publicly, and not ensuring Department-wide understanding of the promotions system, CPD has perpetuated an atmosphere of doubt around the promotions process as a whole.

CPD can and should do several things to restore officer and public confidence in its promotions system, and to ensure that the best-qualified candidates are promoted in a fair, lawful, and transparent manner. Promotional exams must be reviewed regularly to ensure they are fair and lawful, and offered often enough to ensure well-qualified candidates have the opportunity to be promoted. Monitoring and oversight of compliance with CPD's merit promotion policies are also necessary to ensure those systems are working as intended, and that merit promotion decisions are as transparent as possible. Without regular review and increased transparency, CPD's promotion processes will continue to be viewed as unfair and ineffective.

Community-Focused Policing

A contributing factor to CPD's unreasonable use of force is CPD's approach to policing. CPD as a whole needs to support and provide incentives to policing practices that are lawful and restore trust among the City's marginalized communities. Within the past several months, CPD and the City have announced ambitious plans to revive community policing in Chicago. Superintendent Johnson has formed a Community Policing Advisory Panel to develop strategies for enhancing community policing within CPD. The Superintendent has pledged to remake the Department's Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), and the Department recently issued a directive expanding community involvement programs in several districts. CPD has several additional community policing-related initiatives underway. We commend CPD for these efforts. This policing approach, when implemented with fidelity to all its tenets, has been shown to be effective at making communities safer while incentivizing a policing culture that builds confidence in law enforcement.

Notwithstanding this recognition, community policing as a true CPD value and driving force fell away in Chicago many years ago, and past attempts to restore it have not been successful. To be successful this time, CPD must build up systems to support and bolster this community-focused approach to policing.

CPD has the officers it needs to make community policing work. During our investigation we observed many instances of diligent, thoughtful, and selfless policing, and we heard stories of officers who police this way every day. We know that there are many dedicated CPD officers who care deeply about the community, are affected by the violence they see, and work hard to build trust between the community and the Department. We heard about officers and command staff who are well-respected and beloved in the neighborhoods they patrol.

But for community policing to really take hold and succeed in Chicago, CPD must ensure that its supervision, training, promotions and accountability systems incentivize and support officers who police in a manner that conveys to community members that CPD officers can be a trusted partner in protecting them, their families, and their neighborhoods. Community policing must be a core philosophy that is infused throughout the Department's policing strategies and tactics.

In recent years, community policing in Chicago has been relegated, through CAPS, to a small group of police officers and civilians in each district. We were told by CAPS staff that CAPS offices were understaffed, and that CAPS officers receive little training on how to accomplish their mandate. Community policing efforts are also poorly funded and institutionally neglected.

In addition to infusing the tenets of community policing throughout the Department, and creating support for community policing beyond the CAPS program, CPD must also change its policing practices so that it can restore trust and ensure lawful policing. The Department has to do more to ensure that officers police fairly in neighborhoods with high rates of violent crime, and in vulnerable communities. A striking feature of our conversations with members from Chicago's challenged communities was the consistency with which they expressed concern about the lack of respect in their interactions with police, whether those interactions come when

they are targets of police activity or when they or their family members are the victims of crime. Advocates and members of the Latino, Muslim, and transgender communities each separately raised concerns with us about the Department's response to potential or apparent hate crimes against members of their communities. There was also a sense that CPD relies too heavily on specialized units, such as Tactical (TACT).

This may not be how CPD intends policing to be conducted or perceived in these neighborhoods, but these experiences impact individual dignity and residents' willingness to work with law enforcement, and should not be ignored. CPD must ensure that it is creating incentives and rewarding policing where building community trust is central to all crime-prevention efforts, whether this policing is done by specialized units, beat officers, or CAPS staff.

Additionally, the City must address serious concerns about systemic deficiencies that disproportionately impact black and Latino communities. CPD's pattern or practice of unreasonable force and systemic deficiencies fall heaviest on the predominantly black and Latino neighborhoods on the South and West Sides of Chicago, which are also experiencing higher crime. Raw statistics show that CPD uses force almost ten times more often against blacks than against whites. As a result, residents in black neighborhoods suffer more of the harms caused by breakdowns in uses of force, training, supervision, accountability, and community policing.

Our investigation found also that CPD has tolerated racially discriminatory conduct that not only undermines police legitimacy, but also contributes to the pattern of unreasonable force. The pattern or practice of unreasonable force, coupled with the recurrence of unaddressed racially discriminatory conduct by officers further erodes community trust and police effectiveness. Our review of complaints of racially discriminatory language found repeated instances where credible complaints were not adequately addressed. Moreover, we found that some Chicago police officers expressed discriminatory views and intolerance with regard to race, religion, gender, and national origin in public social media forums, and that CPD takes insufficient steps to prevent or appropriately respond to this animus. As CPD works to restore trust and ensure that policing is lawful and effective, it must recognize the extent to which this type of misconduct contributes to a culture that facilitates unreasonable force and corrodes community trust. We have serious concerns about the prevalence of racially discriminatory conduct by some CPD officers and the degree to which that conduct is tolerated and in some respects caused by deficiencies in CPD's systems of training, supervision and accountability. In light of these concerns, combined with the fact that the impact of CPD's pattern or practice of unreasonable force fall heaviest on predominantly black and Latino neighborhoods, restoring police-community trust will require remedies addressing both discriminatory conduct and the disproportionality of illegal and unconstitutional patterns of force on minority communities.

Finally, during our investigation, we heard allegations that CPD officers attempt to gain information about crime using methods that undermine CPD legitimacy and may also be unlawful. In some instances, we were told, CPD will attempt to glean information about gang activity or other crime by arresting or detaining individuals, and refusing to release the individual until he provides that information. In other instances, CPD will take a young person to a rival gang neighborhood, and either leave the person there, or display the youth to rival members, immediately putting the life of that young person in jeopardy by suggesting he has provided

information to the police. Our investigation indicates that these practices in fact exist and significantly jeopardize CPD's relationship with the community.

CPD must root out these practices that harm CPD's interaction with the community. Doing so will better support lawful policing, and allow CPD to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public and more effectively address crime. With a community-focused approach that incentivizes and rewards officers for policing actively and in a manner that builds strong, positive community relationships, CPD will be better able to carry out its mission lawfully and effectively.

* * *

Finally, we find that, notwithstanding the City's recent efforts to address the broad problems within the Chicago Police Department, it is not likely to be successful in doing so without a consent decree with independent monitoring. Fixing the problems our investigation found will be neither easy nor quick. The root causes of these patterns of conduct and systemic deficiencies are complicated and entrenched, which is why they have persisted for so long despite repeated, concerted reform efforts by the City and community members from all walks. As Chicago's Mayor said in stating his intention to cooperate with our investigation, "We need a third party in this City because in the past instances . . . we've never, ever as a City measured up with the changes on a sustained basis to finally deal in whole cloth with that situation."

We applaud the City for this recognition and for agreeing to negotiate a set of comprehensive reforms that will be entered as a federal court order and assessed by a team of independent experts in policing and related fields. Through this commitment, the City has signaled its willingness to go further than any previous City administration to ensure that necessary reforms to the Chicago Police Department are made and take root.

We agree that such an approach is necessary. Our investigation found that the reforms the City already plans to implement, as well as the additional reforms our investigation found necessary, will likely not happen or be sustained without the reform tools of an independent monitoring team and a court order. An independent team of policing and other experts will be charged with assessing and publicly reporting on CPD's and the City's progress implementing reforms. A court-ordered, over-arching plan for reform that is overseen by a federal judge will help ensure that unnecessary obstacles are removed, and that City and police officials stay focused on carrying out promised reforms. Together, an independent monitor and court decree will make it much more certain that Chicago is finally able to eliminate patterns of unconstitutional conduct, and can bolster community confidence to make policing in Chicago more effective and less dangerous.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Chicago, Illinois

Chicago is the largest city in Illinois and the third largest metropolitan area in the United States with approximately 9.5 million residents, 2.7 million of whom live within the city limits. The City is racially diverse: 33% of current residents are black, 32% are white, 29% are Latino, and 8% identify as Asian or multi-racial. The median household income in Chicago is \$48,522,

which is below the national average of \$53,889. 22% of the City's residents live below the federal poverty threshold. The unemployment rate for individuals living in Chicago is 5.5%. Black and Latino Chicago residents are disproportionately poor when compared to white Chicago residents. Approximately 35% of black residents and 25% of Latinos live below the poverty line, compared to less than 11% of white residents. The mean household income for black residents is \$30,400, as opposed to \$61,500 for whites.

Chicago is governed by a Mayor, who is the chief executive, and the City Council, which is the legislative body. The City Council is made up of 50 Alderman elected from each of the 50 wards of Chicago. The City Council is led by a President Pro Tempore, currently Margaret Laurino. The current Mayor, Rahm Emanuel, was elected in 2011 and re-elected to a second term in 2015.

In 2015, Chicago reported 24,663 violent crime incidents. 9,649 of those crimes were robberies, and aggravated assaults constituted over 13,000 reported incidents. The City recorded 478 homicides that year. In 2016, there were 762 homicides in Chicago. According to the draft of a new study from the University of Chicago Crime Lab, this is the largest single-year homicide increase of the last 25 years among the five most populous United States cities.

B. Chicago Police Department

CPD is the primary law enforcement agency in the City and the second largest municipal police department in the United States. The Department is led by a Superintendent and a First Deputy Superintendent who reports directly to the Superintendent. The Mayor appoints the Superintendent of CPD with the advice and consent of the City Council. Mayor Emanuel appointed the current Superintendent, Eddie Johnson, in March 2016. As of June 2016, CPD employed approximately 12,000 sworn officers.

CPD is divided into four major bureaus: Patrol, Detectives, Organized Crimes, and Support Services. There are 22 different police districts in Chicago, and three geographic patrol "areas"—Area North, Area Central, and Area South. Each Area is led by a deputy chief who reports to the Chief of the Bureau of Patrol. Each district is led by a district commander who reports to the Area deputy chief. Each district also has specialty units, including gang, saturation, and tactical teams. All officers employed by CPD are required to live within City limits.

There are several unions in Chicago that represent the interests of CPD officers and supervisors. The Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge 7, is the CPD officers' union. Sergeants, lieutenants, and captains are all separately unionized under the Policeman's Benevolent & Protective Association of Illinois, Unit 156. Each union has a separate collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the City. These CBAs include detailed provisions establishing certain terms and conditions of employment. Several CBA provisions relate to areas addressed by our investigation and are specifically discussed within this Report. The supervisors' unions are currently renegotiating their CBAs with the City. The officers' union will begin renegotiating its CBA this year.

C. Chicago's Accountability Systems

CPD's systems for reviewing misconduct allegations are unique and are explained in more detail later in this Report. The Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA), which is external to CPD, serves as the intake agency for all complaints of police misconduct. In 2015, IPRA intake totaled more than 5,000 cases, which were predominantly complaints filed by community members or other officers within CPD.

IPRA is led by a chief administrator, who is appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council. The Mayor appointed the current Chief Administrator, Sharon Fairley, in December 2015. IPRA's budget is set by the City Council. IPRA employs a staff of roughly 80 civilian investigators, supervisory investigators, attorneys, and support staff.

IPRA only has jurisdiction to investigate certain types of misconduct, including allegations of excessive force, domestic violence, biased-based verbal abuse, coercion, weapons discharges, and deaths in custody. Accordingly, IPRA handles roughly 30% of all complaints of misconduct filed against CPD officers.

On October 5, 2016, the Chicago City Council passed an ordinance establishing the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), which will replace IPRA in 2017. Because COPA is not yet in existence, this Report focuses on the work of IPRA, but will note changes that are anticipated as a result of the COPA ordinance.

The majority of misconduct complaints do not fall within IPRA's jurisdiction and are referred to CPD's Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA). BIA is led by Chief Eddie Welch III. There are over 90 sworn personnel assigned to BIA, including officers, sergeants, lieutenants, and one commander. BIA handles investigations related to officer-involved criminal conduct and various rule violations, including abuse of CPD medical leave and CPD's policy requiring that CPD officers live within City limits. BIA also assigns some misconduct complaints to district commanders for investigation.

Chicago has a Police Board made up of nine private citizens appointed by the Mayor with the City Council's consent. The Police Board is not an investigatory body. Rather, it participates in finalizing CPD disciplinary decisions both by presiding over evidentiary hearings in discharge cases and by resolving discipline disputes between IPRA and the Superintendent, as described further below.

There is also an Inspector General for the City of Chicago who serves as the "watchdog for the taxpayers of the City, and has jurisdiction to conduct investigations and audits into most aspects of City government," including some parts of CPD operations. And the police accountability ordinance established a new Deputy Inspector General for Public Safety charged with auditing the police accountability system and identifying patterns and practices that violate residents' constitutional rights.

D. Historical Background of Reform in Chicago

The Chicago Police Department has cycled in and out of the national consciousness almost since its inception, and the last several decades have been no exception. In 1968, images

of CPD officers beating protestors at the Democratic National Convention were captured and broadcast on national television. A commission convened in the aftermath of the event found that the violence amounted to a “police riot.” No officers were prosecuted. In the 1980s and 1990s, a CPD detective, Jon Burge, and several officers under his command used severe interrogation tactics, such as physical force, suffocations, and electric shocks, to coerce confessions from predominantly black men living on Chicago’s South and West Sides. Burge was ultimately fired, and in 2008, decades after the abuse began, he was arrested on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice. He was convicted on all counts, but was allowed to keep his pension from CPD and served only four-and-a-half years in prison. In the 1990s, CPD ran a special enforcement unit within the Patrol Division called the Special Operations Section (SOS). This unit improperly stopped and searched black and Latino community members and seized their cash and other property. Many of the officers working in that unit amassed numerous misconduct complaints. When the activities of the unit became publicly known, it was disbanded, and several officers involved were arrested and sent to prison for robbery and kidnapping. More recently, the circumstances of several officer-involved fatal shootings have generated coverage by national media, including the deaths of Rekia Boyd, Laquan McDonald, Quintonio LeGrier, and Bettie Jones.

In response to these and other incidents, the City has undertaken many reform efforts over the past several decades. In 1972, then-Mayor Richard J. Daley convened a blue ribbon panel that heard four days of public testimony regarding concerns about police abuse. Black and Latino residents testified about illegal stops and searches, excessive uses of force, and unjustified killings of Chicago residents by police officers. The panel issued a report containing several recommendations “for steps that should be taken to eliminate abusive police conduct and improve police performance in Chicago.” In 1997, then-Mayor Richard M. Daley appointed the Commission on Police Integrity “in response to the indictment of seven members of [CPD] on charges of conspiracy, racketeering, and extortion.” The Commission’s charge “was to examine the root causes of police corruption . . . and to propose possible changes to department policies and procedures.” The Commission’s final report recommended changes to CPD’s hiring standards, training program, early warning system, and other “management process improvements.” More recently, the City asked a Chicago-based global consulting firm and a local law firm to jointly conduct an independent assessment “of what [CPD] is doing to prevent and address police misconduct and, specifically, to suggest ways the Department can improve.” The conclusions of that review were released in 2014, and contained roughly 30 pages of recommendations for changes to CPD’s accountability systems. In response to each of these panels and reports, the City and CPD chose to implement some recommendations, and rejected others. Some implemented recommendations lasted; others did not.

Most recently, in the wake of the shooting death of Laquan McDonald by a CPD Officer and the release of dashboard-camera video capturing the incident, Mayor Emanuel quickly responded to widespread community concern by establishing the Police Accountability Task Force (PATF). The Mayor charged the PATF with assessing the Police Department and making recommendations for change in five areas: community relations; oversight and accountability; de-escalation; early intervention and personnel concerns; and video release protocols. In April 2016, the PATF issued a report with over a hundred recommendations for improving transparency and accountability. In December 2016, the City issued a progress report outlining the steps it has taken since April to meet the recommendations made by the PATF. Too little

time has passed to know whether the recommendations the City decided to implement will be sustained.

E. Federal Involvement in Chicago

During the thirteen months of our investigation, and particularly in light of the tumultuous year Chicago saw in 2016, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has proactively enhanced its assistance with CPD's reform and violence-reduction efforts. Beginning in September 2014, Chicago became part of DOJ's Violence Reduction Network (VRN), an innovative approach to support and enhance local violence reduction efforts. This data-driven, evidence-based initiative complemented DOJ's Smart on Crime initiative through delivery of strategic, intensive training, and technical assistance. Through VRN, Chicago received federal support and resources including training, federal law enforcement support, technical assistance from subject-matter experts, and participation in peer exchanges. This support led to implementation of new strategies, policy enhancements, improved technology, and increased analytic capacity.

In October 2016, at the conclusion of the initial VRN program phase, DOJ extended its commitment to the City of Chicago by offering continued support, technical assistance, and resources through at least March 2017. This additional commitment builds on existing strategies that have shown promise in Chicago, such as focusing on high-risk individuals and high-crime neighborhoods; emphasizing timely inter-agency intelligence gathering and sharing; concentrating on homicides, gun violence, and gang activity; ensuring fidelity to agreed-upon strategies throughout each agency; and incorporating trust-building principles into CPD's violence-reduction efforts. DOJ also is facilitating technical assistance to CPD by federal law enforcement agencies and current and former high-ranking police executives with expertise in reducing violence while increasing community trust. The areas of focus for crime-fighting strategies include development and dissemination of a comprehensive crime fighting plan; assessment and managed evolution of the Compstat command accountability program; and enhancing partnerships with state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies.

Further, in October 2016, DOJ allocated additional funding through its Office of Justice Programs (OJP), which now has professionals working directly with the City and CPD to assess community needs and available services in high crime neighborhoods to identify areas that would benefit from multi-sector public and private investments. The new OJP resources are complementary to, and coordinated with, preexisting collaborative initiatives launched by DOJ and CPD to improve community trust. Since December 2014, CPD and DOJ, through the United States Attorney's Office in Chicago, have hosted nine Community Trust Roundtables across Chicago's most violence-plagued neighborhoods.

These recent efforts build on the foundation of DOJ's longstanding collaborative initiatives with CPD. The United States Attorney's Office and other federal law enforcement partners in Chicago, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the United States Marshals Service (USMS) work closely with CPD on a variety of ongoing enforcement initiatives. Last year, each of these federal agencies increased resources dedicated to working with CPD in an effort to tamp down on the current spike in gun violence. Indeed, the United

States Attorney's Office charged more illegal firearms cases in total, and more as a percentage of its overall cases, last year than it has in any year since 2004. Further, longstanding collaborations include, among other programs: Project Safe Neighborhoods, which seeks to reduce gun violence through strategic enforcement, deterrence, and reentry; Chicago's Violence Reduction Strategy (VRS), which is a targeted deterrence partnership aimed at gangs and violent criminals; and Youth Outreach Forums, a DOJ-funded program aimed at helping at-risk youth, 13 to 17 years old.

F. Investigation of the Chicago Police Department

On December 7, 2015, the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, and the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois, jointly initiated an investigation of CPD and IPRA. This investigation was undertaken to determine whether the Chicago Police Department is engaging in a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct and, if so, what systemic deficiencies or practices within CPD, IPRA, and the City might be facilitating or causing this pattern or practice.

We opened this investigation pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (Section 14141), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI), and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (Safe Streets Act). Section 14141 prohibits law enforcement agencies from engaging in a pattern or practice of conduct that violates the Constitution or laws of the United States. Title VI and the Safe Streets Act prohibit law enforcement practices that have a disparate impact based on protected status, such as race or ethnicity, unless these practices are necessary to achieve legitimate, non-discriminatory objectives.

Our investigation assessed CPD's use of force, including deadly force, and addressed CPD policies, training, reporting, investigation, and review related to officer use of force. The investigation further addressed CPD's and IPRA's systems of accountability both as they relate to officer use of force and officer misconduct, including the intake, investigation, and review of allegations of officer misconduct, and the imposition of discipline or other corrective action. We also investigated racial, ethnic, or other disparities in CPD's force and accountability practices, and assessed how those disparities inform the breakdown in community trust.

We relied on several sources of information. First, we reviewed thousands of pages of documents provided to us by CPD, IPRA, and the City, including policies, procedures, training plans, Department orders and memos, internal and external reports, and more. We also obtained access to the City's entire misconduct complaint database and data from all reports filled out following officers' use of force. From there, we reviewed a randomized, representative sample of force reports and the investigative files for incidents that occurred between January 2011 and April 2016, as well as additional incident reports and investigations. Overall, we reviewed over 170 officer-involved shooting investigations, and documents related to over 425 incidents of less-lethal force, including representative samples of officers' own reports of force, and of investigations of civilian complaints about officer force between January 2011 and April 2016. We also reviewed documents provided to us by other City agencies, such as the Office of Inspector General and the City's Law Department.

We also spent extensive time in Chicago—over 300 person-days—meeting with community members and City officials, and interviewing current and former CPD officers and IPRA investigators. In addition to speaking with the Superintendent and other CPD leadership, we met with the command staff of several specialized units, divisions, and departments. We toured CPD’s training facilities and observed training programs. We also visited each of Chicago’s 22 police districts, where we addressed roll call, spoke with command staff and officers, and conducted over 60 ride-alongs with officers. We met several times with Chicago’s officer union, Lodge No. 7 of the Fraternal Order of Police, as well as the sergeants’, lieutenants’, and captains’ unions. All told, we heard from over 340 individual CPD members, and 23 members of IPRA’s staff.

In addition to document review and conversations with CPD and IPRA, our findings were significantly informed by our conversations with members of the Chicago community. During the course of our investigation we met with over 90 community organizations, including non-profits, advocacy and legal organizations, and faith-based groups focused on a wide range of issues. Several of these groups set up meetings for us so that we could hear directly from their clients or membership. We participated in forums where we heard directly from the family members of individuals who were killed by CPD officers. We also met with several local researchers, academics, and lawyers who have studied CPD extensively for decades. Most importantly, however, we heard directly from individuals who live and work throughout the City about their interactions with CPD officers. Overall, we talked to approximately a thousand community members. We received nearly 600 phone calls, emails, and letters during the course of our investigation from individuals who were eager to provide their experiences and insights. We also held several community forums in different neighborhoods throughout Chicago, where community members were able to share their stories in person.

In addition to attorneys, paralegals, outreach specialists, and data analysts from the Civil Rights Division of DOJ and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois, eleven independent subject matter experts assisted with this investigation. Most of these experts are current or former law enforcement officials from police departments across the country. Accordingly, these experts have decades of expertise in areas such as the use of force, accountability, training, supervision, community policing, officer-involved domestic violence and sexual misconduct, officer wellness, and more. These experts accompanied us on-site, reviewed documents and investigative files, and provided invaluable insights that informed both the course of this investigation and its conclusions.

We thank the City, CPD officials, union officials, and the rank-and-file officers who have cooperated with this investigation and provided us with insights into the operation of the Department. We are also grateful to the many members of the Chicago community who have met with us during this investigation to share their experiences.

II. CPD ENGAGES IN A PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OF FORCE

We reviewed CPD’s force practices mindful that officers routinely place themselves in harm’s way in order to uphold their commitment to serve and protect the people of the City of Chicago, that officers regularly encounter individuals who may be armed and determined to

avoid arrest, and that our inquiry should be guided by the perspective of the reasonable officer on the scene rather than perfect hindsight. We likewise recognize that officers have not only a right, but an obligation to protect themselves and others from threats of harm, including deadly harm, which may arise in an instant. We also recognize that the City has taken some steps that—if properly implemented—could represent meaningful improvements to the way that officers use force.

Nonetheless, we found reasonable cause to believe that CPD has engaged in a pattern or practice of unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the deficiencies in CPD’s training, supervision, accountability, and other systems have contributed to that pattern or practice. CPD has not provided officers with adequate guidance to understand how and when they may use force, or how to safely and effectively control and resolve encounters to reduce the need to use force. CPD often does not appropriately supervise officers to identify dangerous tactics or behaviors that may indicate officers need additional training or other intervention. CPD also does not review its force practices as a whole to identify problematic trends or patterns that endanger officers and others. When officers use force, CPD often does not adequately review those force incidents to determine whether the force used complied with the law or CPD policy, or whether the tactics the officer used were safe and effective. Consequently, officers are asked to perform a dangerous job with insufficient guidance as to whether their force practices are safe, effective, or legal. These failures have resulted in CPD engaging in a pattern or practice of using force in a manner that is unconstitutional, contrary to CPD policy, and unsafe. Inappropriate use of force by the police (even when no lasting physical injury is involved) results in fear and distrust from many of the people whom the police are committed to protect and whom the police need as partners in that effort.

The use of excessive force by a law enforcement officer violates the Fourth Amendment. *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). “In determining whether police used excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, the relevant inquiry is ‘whether the officers’ actions [were] objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances.’” *Flournoy v. City of Chicago*, 829 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); *Fitzgerald v. Santoro*, 707 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing *Graham*, 490 U.S. at 396–97). In determining whether force used by a law enforcement officer is reasonable, courts look to “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” *Id.* at 396. Whether a particular use of force is reasonable is “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” *Id.* Courts are mindful that “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” *Id.* at 396–97. An officer’s use of force is unreasonable if, judging from the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest, the officer uses greater force than was reasonably necessary to effectuate the arrest. *Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp.*, 678 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing *Gonzalez v. City of Elgin*, 578 F.3d 526, 539 (7th Cir. 2009)).

A pattern or practice of unreasonable force may be found where incidents of violations are repeated and are not isolated instances. *Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States*, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1977) (noting that the phrase “pattern or practice” “was not intended as a term of art,” but should be interpreted according to its usual meaning “consistent with the understanding of

the identical words” used in other federal civil rights statutes). Courts interpreting the term “pattern or practice” in similar statutes have established that statistical evidence is not required. *Coates v. Johnson & Johnson*, 756 F.2d 524, 533 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Neither statistical nor anecdotal evidence is automatically entitled to reverence to the exclusion of the other.”). A court does not need a specific number of incidents to find a pattern or practice. See *United States v. W. Peachtree Tenth Corp.*, 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The number of [violations] . . . is not determinative. . . . In any event, no mathematical formula is workable, nor was any intended. Each case must turn on its own facts.”).

Although a specific number of incidents and statistical evidence is not required, our investigation found that CPD officers use unnecessary and unreasonable force¹ in violation of the Constitution with frequency, and that unconstitutional force has been historically tolerated by CPD. This finding is based on a comprehensive investigation of CPD’s force practices. We reviewed CPD’s policies related to the use, reporting, and investigation of force, including older versions of policies that were effective during our review period, and CPD’s proposed revised policies. We spoke with officers at all ranks, including the Superintendent and the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Patrol, to understand how officers were trained to use force, their view of when force is appropriate, and how the policies are interpreted in practice throughout CPD and at each level. We also did an in-depth review of officer reports of force, civilian complaints of force, and CPD’s and IPRA’s reviews of force and investigations of allegations of excessive force. We reviewed over 425 incidents of less-lethal force, including representative samples of officers’ own reports of force and of investigations of civilian complaints about officer force between January 2011 and April 2016.

We also reviewed over 170 IPRA files related to officer-involved shootings, which amounts to a significant portion of all officer-involved shootings. The City was not able to accurately identify how many people were shot by CPD officers. We were provided with a list of all incidents involving a weapons discharge between January 2011 and January 2016, but it was inaccurate and incomplete. By comparing this list to other data provided by the City, we were able to identify nine shooting incidents during that time period in which a person was struck that either were not on the list provided by the City or that were not categorized as hits of people. In all, we were able to identify 203 officer-involved shooting incidents in which at least one civilian was shot between January 1, 2011 and March 21, 2016. In those 203 incidents, 223 civilians were shot. We reviewed 151 of these, including all 134 for which the investigation was complete and the disposition was final as of June 2016. In addition to these 151 officer-involved shooting incidents, we also reviewed 22 shooting files that pertained to officer-involved shootings that CPD refers to as “no-hits,” meaning that CPD is not aware of anyone being struck during the incident. As described below, the City does not investigate shootings in which it is not aware that a person was struck. Consequently, those files contain very little information

¹ Throughout this Report, we use the terms “unreasonable” and “excessive” interchangeably; both terms refer to force that exceeds constitutional limits, or in other words, is disproportional in light of the threat posed to officers or others, the level of resistance, and the severity of the crime suspected. When using the term “unnecessary,” we instead mean that force was used when the incident could have been resolved without resorting to the amount of force used.

about the circumstances of those shootings and did not provide sufficient information to determine whether the force was lawful.

The uses of excessive force we identified were not aberrational. Our holistic review of this information, combined with our investigation of CPD's training, supervision, accountability, and other systems, give us reasonable cause to believe that the unreasonable force we identified amounts to a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct. Below we describe some recurring categories of unreasonable force we identified. We also provide illustrative incidents. In all incidents, the description of events comes from CPD's and IPRA's own records.

A. CPD Uses Deadly Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment and Department Policy

CPD's pattern or practice of unreasonable force includes the use of deadly force. Our review of CPD's deadly force practices identified several trends in CPD's deadly force incidents, including that CPD engages in dangerous and unnecessary foot pursuits and other unsound tactics that result in CPD shooting people, including those who are unarmed. We also saw a trend in dangerous and unnecessary shootings at vehicles and other unsafe tactics that placed officers and others in danger of being shot.

1. CPD's pattern or practice of unreasonable force includes shooting at fleeing suspects who present no immediate threat

We found numerous incidents where CPD officers chased and shot fleeing persons who posed no immediate threat to officers or the public. Such actions are constitutionally impermissible. *See Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) ("Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so."). Moreover, "an officer does not possess the unfettered authority to shoot a member of the public simply because that person is carrying a weapon. Instead, deadly force may only be used by a police officer when, based on a reasonable assessment, the officer or another person is *threatened* with the weapon." *Cooper v. Sheehan*, 735 F.3d 153, 159 (4th Cir. 2013); *Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police Agency*, 952 F.2d 321, 324–25 (9th Cir. 1991) (deadly force unreasonable when suspect holding gun was not pointing it or facing officers). *Cf. Williams v. Ind. State Police Dep't*, 797 F.3d 468, 484–85 (7th Cir. 2015) (deadly force justified not merely by possession of weapon, but by suspect's actions).

In some cases, CPD officers initiated foot pursuits without a basis for believing the person had committed a serious crime. In these cases, the act of fleeing alone was sufficient to trigger a pursuit ending in gunfire, sometimes fatal. During subsequent review, almost without exception, officers' reports of these events were accepted at face value, even where there was contrary evidence.

In one case, a man had been walking down a residential street with a friend when officers drove up, shined a light on him, and ordered him to freeze, because he had been fidgeting with his waistband. The man ran. Three officers gave chase and began shooting as they ran. In total, the officers fired 45 rounds, including 28 rifle rounds, toward the man. Several rounds struck the man, killing him. The officers claimed the man fired at them during the pursuit. Officers found

no gun on the man. However, officers reported recovering a handgun nearly one block away. The gun recovered in the vicinity, however, was later determined to be fully-loaded and inoperable, and forensic testing determined there was no gunshot residue on the man's hands. IPRA found the officers' actions were justified without addressing the efficacy of the pursuit or the number of shots fired.

In another case, a CPD officer chased and shot a man. The officer later claimed that during pursuit she ordered the man to stop, at which point the man turned and raised his right arm towards her. According to the officer, the man had pointed a gun at her earlier in the incident and, fearing he was doing so now, she fired. The only gunshot wounds were to the man's buttocks. No weapon was found on the man, but a gun was found on a nearby roof gutter. IPRA found the shooting justified without accounting for the wounds to the man's backside. In another case, a CPD officer chased a man who ran when an officer told him to stop, and then shot the man in the back of the leg. The officer claimed the man had turned to point a gun. After a thorough search of the scene, no gun was recovered. The man, who denied ever turning to face the officer, was found only with a cell phone.

In another case, a CPD officer fatally shot a fleeing, unarmed suspect in the back. The officer told investigators the suspect had turned around to point a black object. This account did not square with the location of the shooting victim's gunshot wounds and appeared contrary to video footage that showed the suspect running away from the officer. Again, IPRA accepted the officer's account, despite the conflicting evidence. IPRA's final report of the incident did not mention the existence of the video.

In another case, video evidence showed the tragic end of a foot pursuit of a man who was not a threat when an officer shot him in the back. The officer, who fired 16 shots, killing the man, claimed on his force report that the man was armed and the man "charged [him] with apparent firearm." The officer shot the man during the foot pursuit, and dashboard-camera footage showed that as the unarmed man lay on the ground, the officer fired three shots into his back. CPD stripped the officer of his police powers after this shooting—his third that year—and the City paid the man's family \$4.1 million in settlement.

To be sure, foot pursuits are a necessary and sometimes important part of good policing. There are circumstances in which officers are legally authorized to engage in a foot pursuit, and should. That said, foot pursuits are also inherently dangerous and present substantial risks to officers and the public. Officers may experience fatigue or an adrenaline rush that compromises their ability to control a suspect they capture, to fire their weapons accurately, and even to make sound judgments. Consequently, officers caught up in the heat of a pursuit "often exhibit a tendency to rush into what can be described as 'the killing zone,' that is, within a 10-foot radius of the offender."² The adrenaline rush also may make it more difficult for the officer to decrease the amount of force used as the threat diminishes. CPD has long had detailed policies regarding vehicle pursuits. It does not have a foot pursuit policy. It should. In addition to not having a

² ANTHONY J. PINNIZZOTTO ET AL., *Escape from the Killing Zone*, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., March 2002, at 1.

policy, CPD has not taken corrective action to address problematic foot pursuits. This puts officers and the public in danger and results in unreasonable uses of force.

2. CPD's pattern or practice of unreasonable force includes firing at vehicles without justification

We also reviewed incidents involving officers who either unlawfully fired at fleeing vehicles, or, in violation of CPD policy, who fired after recklessly positioning themselves in the path of a moving vehicle or refusing to move from the path of a moving vehicle. Shooting at a moving vehicle is inherently dangerous and almost always counterproductive. First, bullets fired at the vehicle itself are unlikely to stop or disable it. Second, the bullets may strike a passenger who is not a threat and may be a victim. Third, bullets fired into a vehicle may not result in surrender, but may instead provoke a fight-or-flight response in which the driver is even more determined to escape or stop the source of gunfire. Fourth, disabling the driver may result in a runaway vehicle that endangers the lives of officers or bystanders. Faced with a threat posed by a moving vehicle, the appropriate response ordinarily is to avoid the vehicle's path, take cover, and summon additional resources to maximize safety and obtain a tactical advantage. This approach likewise minimizes the risk of deadly force.³

CPD policy has long formally recognized the appropriate tactical response to officers facing threats from moving vehicles. Its deadly force policy for the period September 2002 to February 2015 provided, "When confronted with an oncoming vehicle and that vehicle is the only force used against them, sworn members will move out of the vehicle's path." Since February 2015, CPD policy expressly prohibits "[f]iring at or into a moving vehicle when the vehicle is the only force used against the sworn member or another person."

CPD did not enforce its 2002-2015 policy, however. For example, in one case, an off-duty officer witnessed a reckless driver cause a vehicle collision during a high-speed chase. The officer exited his vehicle and ran to the scene. The motorist, seeking to escape, backed up his car, managing to pin it between the officer's vehicle and a tree. The officer moved in front of the trapped car and fired two shots into the windshield, claiming he did so because he heard the car's engine revving. During the IPRA investigation, the officer was never asked to explain why he positioned himself in front of the car or why he could not have stepped out of the way if he believed the car was about to move forward. IPRA found the shooting justified, despite the apparent policy violation and insufficient factual record regarding the officer's claimed need to fire in self-defense.

Our review also included cases involving shots fired at moving vehicles that occurred after CPD's February 2015 change to its deadly force policy. Some of these matters remain under investigation. Absent accountability for violations, the 2015 revisions do not adequately address or resolve the unconstitutional pattern or practice.

³ U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, USE OF FORCE REVIEW: CASES AND POLICIES6, 8 (Police Executive Research Forum, 2013), available at <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/PERFReport.pdf>; USE OF FORCE: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES PAPER 7 (IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center, Rev. 2006), available at <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/370261-iacp-use-of-force-concepts-and-issues-paper-2006.html>.

3. CPD officers exhibit poor discipline in discharging weapons

We found repeated incidents where officers exhibited poor discipline in discharging their weapons, reflecting disregard for innocent bystanders and constitutional standards.⁴ As noted above, for example, in one incident three CPD officers fired a total of 45 rounds, including 28 rifle rounds, at a man during a foot pursuit in a residential area. This man was shot several times, but dozens of the bullets were fired into this residential neighborhood.

In some incidents, officers appeared to fire their weapons merely because others had done so. For example, in one case, two officers chased a man they saw carrying a gun. During the foot pursuit, one officer told his partner he intended to shoot, and then fired 11 shots at the suspect. The partner then fired five shots of his own. Later recounting the incident to IPRA, the partner did not articulate any threatening actions by the man that prompted him to shoot. He stated that the suspect did not turn his body or raise his weapon. Instead, he explained that the first officer began shooting and so he did as well. IPRA did not pursue the matter further and found the use of deadly force justified.⁵ On the evidence available to us, the shooting did not meet the constitutional standard because the officer was not responding to a specific, articulable threat.

4. CPD officers make tactical decisions that unnecessarily increase the risk of deadly encounters

We observed a trend in shootings resulting from CPD officers unnecessarily escalating confrontations or using reckless, untrained tactics, putting themselves in a position of jeopardy and limiting their force options to just deadly force. While these tactical decisions may not always result in uses of force that are unconstitutional, they do result in avoidable uses of force and resulting harm, including deaths. Moreover, these poor tactics are part of the systemic deficiencies that have led to the pattern or practice of excessive force.

a. Failure to await backup and use of unsound tactics in approaching vehicles

Deadly force incidents have occurred when CPD officers failed to await backup and unnecessarily injected themselves into high-risk situations where there was no exigent need to do so. Although not necessarily unconstitutional uses of force, these are avoidable uses of force that present an unnecessary risk to officer and public safety. In one case, an off-duty civilian-dressed CPD officer did not call for backup after witnessing two men exit a car, fire gunshots at an unknown target, and then drive off. Instead, after locating the car stopped in traffic, the officer

⁴ During our review of officer-involved shootings, we saw shootings at dogs that appeared to be unnecessary, retaliatory, or reckless. We also observed that there were many complaints from community members that officers unnecessarily or recklessly killed their dogs and that, like other civilian complaints, these complaints were not adequately investigated. These deficiencies in investigation of civilian complaints are discussed elsewhere in this Report.

⁵ The shooting was of concern for other reasons as well. The first officer claimed the suspect had turned his body to point his weapon at the second officer, prompting him to warn his partner and then pull the trigger. The second officer contradicted this account, claiming the suspect never turned his body and never pointed the weapon. IPRA never pursued the inconsistency and did not mention it in its final report.

approached it on foot and engaged the suspects. The officer fired his off-duty firearm at their car upon seeing an occupant of the car point a pistol at him. The officer fired 10 times, wounding but not disabling either suspect. The officer had fired all his ammunition, leaving him defenseless in the middle of the street. In addition, the CPD officer did this in a high-traffic area, thereby exposing bystanders to the risk of errant rounds from a shootout. And, a nearby uniformed state trooper conducting an unrelated traffic stop drew his gun on the CPD officer, because the trooper was unsure whether he had just witnessed an attempted murder.

In another case, two officers were flagged down by a woman reporting that someone in a car had pointed a shotgun at her. The officers spotted the car and radioed for assistance. They did not wait for backup and instead approached on foot alone. As one officer stood adjacent to the passenger side of the suspect's car, he reportedly saw the driver point a shotgun at him. Standing exposed at close range, the officer fired twice, wounding but not disabling the suspect. The suspect drove off without returning fire. Though the officer was justified in firing in self-defense, the violence may have been avoided altogether if the officers had observed sound tactics.

In another case, an off-duty CPD officer spotted the silhouette of a man in a vacant building and suspected the man was burglarizing it. The officer called 911, but did not wait for other officers to arrive. Instead, the off-duty officer summoned the man out of the building. According to a civilian witness, the burglary suspect angrily exited the building, yelling, "You're not a fucking cop." The suspect then advanced on the officer, who struck and kicked the suspect. According to the officer, the suspect then reached into his waistband and withdrew a shiny object, prompting the officer to fire twice, killing the man. No weapon was recovered. Instead, officers reported finding a silver watch near the man's body. IPRA found the shooting justified without addressing the officer's failure to await backup. According to press reports, in November 2016, this same officer shot a man in the back and killed him, claiming the man had pointed a gun at him during a foot pursuit. No gun was recovered.

We further found instances where CPD officers unnecessarily exposed innocent bystanders to deadly risks. In one case, three CPD officers were driving two civilian witnesses assisting in an assault investigation. Along the way, the officers heard gunshots from a nearby restaurant and saw a group of individuals running. The officers decided to confront the suspected gunmen themselves, with their unwilling civilian passengers in tow. The driver officer stopped the unmarked patrol car within a few yards of the suspects and issued police commands. According to the officers, one of the suspects drew a firearm and pointed it toward the officers and the side of the patrol car, where the two civilian witnesses sat exposed in the back seat. Both the driver officer and front passenger officer opened fire. During the IPRA investigation, both officers acknowledged that the confrontation had placed the civilian witnesses' lives at risk and sought to justify their use of deadly force in part because of that risk. While the suspect was indeed armed, one of the civilians in the backseat denied seeing the man point or raise the weapon at officers. IPRA found the shooting reasonable and justified with no stated concerns about the officers' tactics and without mentioning the civilian's contrary account in its final report.

b. Use of dangerous vehicle maneuvers

Other shooting incidents arose out of officers' use of high-risk, untrained vehicle maneuvers designed to box in suspects' cars. In one such incident, officers in two patrol vehicles tried to stop a car reportedly matching a description of suspected narcotics dealers with a gun hidden in the car. The first patrol car initiated the traffic stop by pulling in sideways in front of the suspects' car, thereby exposing the passenger officer to the risk of gunfire or serious injury if the driver had opted to ram the police car. The passenger officer exited the patrol car and fired upon the suspects as they attempted to drive away. Although it is unclear whether the officer's use of force was constitutional, it is clear that the poor stop tactics unnecessarily placed the officer at risk, thereby increasing the likelihood of a deadly force encounter.

On another occasion, officers used a variation of this box-in technique to trap a car in a high-traffic area. Again, an officer in the lead patrol car ended up firing into the suspect's vehicle, although in this case the car had not fled the scene. The officer acknowledged in his interview that they used the vehicle technique in the field despite never having been trained on the technique.

In another case, CPD officers used unmarked police cars to box in a car driven by an armed robbery suspect. After forcing the suspect to stop, the officer in the front patrol car exited and placed himself between his car and the driver's side of the suspect's vehicle. The suspect backed up, striking the rear police car. As this occurred, the front car officer moved in front of the suspect's car. The suspect then placed the car in drive, turned his wheels, and attempted to drive away. The officer from the front car fired a single shot into the driver's window, claiming he feared the suspect would run him over. The officer's bullet struck the suspect through the driver's window, causing the driver to crash his car into an occupied parked car. IPRA found the shooting justified without addressing the officers' tactics.

c. Reckless foot pursuits

As discussed above, we found repeated incidents of unreasonable uses of force stemming from foot pursuits that were initiated with an insufficient basis to conduct the pursuit. We also identified other cases in which foot pursuits were conducted in a tactically unsound, often reckless manner, some of which culminated in an officer-involved shooting. We found multiple instances in which officers began pursuit without first broadcasting over radio dispatch critical information like location and direction of travel. In addition, officers frequently engage in a dangerous tactic known as "partner-splitting," in which officers split off from one another to pursue one or more suspects. In some cases, one officer drives away from the foot chase, seeking to cut the suspect off from the other side of the block. Partner-splitting covers more territory, but it also can compromise the safety of officers who lose their ability to assist or effectively communicate with each other. It also increases the risk that the officers or innocent civilians will be caught in cross-fire. Because it is dangerous to officers and the public, this tactic should be used only when absolutely necessary to protect the public or officers from imminent harm.

Partner-splitting is not a trained CPD technique, but a practice developed in the field. As one CPD officer put it, "My partner and I have an agreement or we call it protocol, if you will,

that if I'm driving, I stay in the vehicle and he is going to be the one that's going to pursue on foot." The officer offered this observation during an IPRA investigation of a partner-splitting foot pursuit that left him alone in a backyard with a man he claimed pointed a gun at him, resulting in a fatal shooting. The shooting was deemed justified, with no scrutiny of the tactics that precipitated the event.

This lack of policy, guidance, and oversight of foot pursuits presents not only constitutional and safety concerns, but also exposes the City to substantial damages claims in civil rights litigation. *See, e.g., Quintana v. City of Philadelphia*, Civ. No. 10-6088, 2011 WL 2937426 at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2011) ("[A]rming police officers without providing any training on the constitutional limitations of the use of deadly force may amount to deliberate indifference, as could failing to maintain any sort of foot pursuit or partner splitting policy for police officers involved in a foot pursuit.") (citations omitted); *Pelzer v. City of Philadelphia*, 656 F. Supp. 2d 517, 535 (E.D. Pa. 2009) ("[F]oot pursuits tend to be strong in emotion, weak in tactics. . . . A reasonable jury could find the failure to establish [foot] pursuit policies creates a sufficiently obvious risk to the rights of pursuit subjects. . . . A jury may also be able to conclude that the issue of pursuit and patrol policies are the result of a policymaker's decision, and that the City's omission was the moving factor behind the plaintiff's injury.").

A contributing factor to many foot pursuits that end in unnecessary force is CPD's use of a particular stop technique, often called a "jump out." The practice involves groups of officers, frequently in plain clothes and riding in unmarked vehicles driving rapidly toward a street corner or group of individuals and then jumping out and rapidly advancing, often with guns drawn. These actions often cause one of more members of the targeted group to walk away briskly or run from the scene. The officers then zero-in on the fleeing person, often with one officer tasked with chasing him on foot. Some of the most problematic shootings occurred when that sole officer closed in on the subject, thus greatly increasing the risk of a serious or deadly force incident.

Such techniques can be particularly problematic when deployed by CPD tactical or other specialized units using unmarked vehicles and plainclothes officers. It can be difficult, especially at night, to discern that individuals springing out of an unmarked car are police officers. In high-crime areas, residents may be particularly unwilling to stick around to find out. For example, in one case, a tactical officer in plain clothes jumped out of an unmarked car, chased a man who ran from him, and ultimately shot the man from behind. Officers claimed the man pointed a gun, but no weapon was recovered. The shooting victim explained to investigators that he ran because a sedan he did not recognize had raced through a stop sign and headed toward him. Similarly, in another case, two plainclothes officers dressed in black and in unmarked vehicles approached a man and his female passenger as they were getting into their car. According to the woman, the couple did not know they were officers and fled, and an officer shot at the side and rear of the vehicle, killing the man.

CPD should provide officers with guidance and support in conducting field operations in a tactically sound manner that reduces risk to officers and civilians alike. This does not mean a retreat from law enforcement, but rather a move toward practices that are more effective. Policy and guidance are the first step; scenario-based training is the next. As noted by trainers from the FBI Academy, "realistic and practical exercises can instill in officers the skills and mental

preparedness that they can call on automatically when confronting offenders. Law enforcement agencies should ensure that officers receive training in such critical issues as formulating action plans, following established policies, knowing their physical and mental conditions, remaining aware of their surroundings, considering offender reactions, and exploring tactical options.”

B. CPD Uses Less-Lethal Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment and Department Policy

Although CPD documents generally include insufficient detail of when and how officers use force, particularly less-lethal force, our review of CPD records made clear that CPD’s pattern of unreasonable force includes unreasonable less-lethal force. As discussed in detail below, CPD does not require officers to provide detailed information about the amount and type of force they use. The form on which officers are to report force requires officers to indicate via check box, for example, that they used a Taser⁶ or a “control instrument” without requiring them to explain the manner or circumstances in which the force was used. Officers also are not required to provide any details about the amount of resistance they encountered from suspects. Instead, officers use boilerplate, vague terminology like “actively resisted” or “attempted to defeat arrest.” In reviewing officers’ use of less-lethal force, supervisors generally do not conduct any follow-up investigation or request any additional information from officers to help them understand what happened. As a consequence, CPD’s documentation for many uses of less-lethal force do not paint a complete or accurate picture of the amount of force used or why it was used. IPRA investigations of misconduct complaints regarding force are similarly deficient, as discussed in the [Accountability](#) Section of this Report.

In many cases we reviewed, due to insufficient information, we were not able to determine whether the force was reasonable. For example, if an officer reported that he used a “kick” because a subject “balled his fists” and actively resisted, we were unable to determine whether the force used was reasonable because we did not know how many times the officer kicked the subject, where on the body the subject was kicked, or whether it might have been necessary. In many cases, however, the information that was reported was sufficient to demonstrate that the force used was unreasonable. If, for example, an officer reported that he or she used a Taser against someone suspected of a minor property crime as the suspect fled, we determined that force to be unreasonable because, as described below, that level of force is unconstitutional on its face. Even using this conservative methodology—taking officers’ reports of force at face value and not making inferences—we saw a clear pattern of unreasonable force.

1. CPD’s pattern or practice of unreasonable force includes the use of excessive less-lethal force against people who present no threat

CPD’s pattern or practice of unreasonable force includes using excessive force against people who do not present a threat and who are suspected only of low-level crimes or, in some cases, no crime at all. For example, officers used a Taser in “drive-stun mode” against a woman in mental health crisis and whose only documented actions were that she failed to follow verbal

⁶ “Taser” is the brand name of electronic control weapons manufactured by Taser International, Inc. CPD uses Taser brand electronic control weapons and refers to these weapons in their policies and forms as “Tasers.”

commands and that she stiffened.⁷ Officers provided no narrative of the encounter other than to write that the woman was “a high risk mental” who needed to be transported to a hospital for a “mental evaluation.” They noted on the form that the woman was engaged in passive, not active, resistance. This use of force against a woman who was not suspected of any crime was unreasonable and violated CPD policy, which prohibits the use of Tasers against people who only are passively resisting.

The use of unreasonable force to quickly resolve non-violent encounters is a recurrent issue at CPD. This is at least in part because CPD’s policy permits the use of Tasers in situations where it is unreasonable, and allows the use of Tasers in drive-stun mode in any circumstance in which “probe mode” is allowed. CPD’s policy permits use of a Taser (in any mode) to defeat active resistance, defined by CPD policy as “movement to avoid physical control,” without regard to the severity of the crime or whether the person poses any danger to an officer, factors that must be considered in judging the reasonableness of a use of force. *Graham*, 490 U.S. at 396. CPD recently has proposed changes to its Taser policy. The proposed revised policy makes clearer that officers may not use a Taser unless it is objectively reasonable, necessary under the circumstances, and proportional to the threat or resistance of the subject. This is an important change, but the policy still does not place restrictions on the use of drive-stun mode. And, like any policy, it must be enforced in order to be effective.

Some CPD officers resort to Tasers as a tool of convenience, with insufficient concern or cognizance that it is a weapon with inherent risks that inflicts significant pain. Use of a Taser “is more than a *de minimis* application of force” and is a “very significant intrusion on [a person’s] Fourth Amendment interests.” *Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill.*, 705 F.3d 706, 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2013). In an incident we reviewed, a man died after hitting his head when he fell while fleeing because a CPD officer shot him with a Taser. The man had been suspected only of petty theft from a retail store. IPRA deemed this use of a Taser justified. We saw other unnecessary uses of Tasers against people fleeing after committing minor violations, including a man who was suspected of urinating in public, and a 110-pound-juvenile who fled after officers caught him painting graffiti on a garage. In all of these instances, as in many others we reviewed, the officers articulated no basis to support a conclusion that the convenient but painful and at times dangerous use of Tasers, rather than a less severe use of force, was necessary.

As with lethal force, some officers escalate encounters unnecessarily. This includes incidents in which CPD officers use retaliatory force against people who object and claim that

⁷ Tasers can be used in drive-stun or probe mode. Taser probes shot from a short distance incapacitate a person by causing them to lose control of their muscles. Drive-stun mode requires direct contact between the Taser and the person and simply causes pain. Many agencies restrict the use of Tasers in drive-stun mode because it is less effective in minimizing threats and has a high potential for abuse. See, e.g., DIRECTIVE 10.3: USE OF LESS LETHAL FORCE: THE ELECTRONIC CONTROL WEAPON (ECW) 9 (Phila. Police Dep’t, Sept. 18, 2015) (“Personnel must be aware that using an ECW in Drive Stun is OFTEN INEFFECTIVE in INCAPACITATING a subject.”), available at <https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/directives/PPD-Directive-10.3.pdf>; ATT’Y GEN., SUPPLEMENTAL POLICY ON CONDUCTED ENERGY DEVICES § V.4., at 7 (N.J. Attorney General, Rev. March 3, 2016) (“An officer shall not use a [Taser] in drive stun mode unless the officer reasonably believes based on the suspect’s conduct that discharging the device in drive stun mode is immediately necessary to protect the officer, the suspect, or another person from imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.”), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/2016-3-3_Supplemental-Policy-on-Conducted-Energy-Devices.pdf.

they were unlawfully stopped by CPD. In one incident, officers had searched and released a man they had detained to determine if he was armed (he was not). The man then yelled at the officers and put his left foot in front of the squad car tire, taunting them to run over his foot so he could sue them. Instead of backing up, going around the man, or trying verbal techniques to calm the man down, the officers got out of the car and ordered him to stop blocking their car. The man then yelled that he was going to beat and kill them. They arrested him for aggravated assault. Officers reported that, during the arrest, he balled his fists and tried to pull away, so they punched and hit him and took him to the ground. In another incident, officers used pain compliance techniques and forcibly brought to the ground a man because he stiffened and locked his arms while they were arresting him for walking his dog without a leash and refusing to present identification. In both of these instances, officers provided no justification for the level of force they used, or why they did not attempt to resolve these situations with common de-escalation techniques.

2. CPD's pattern or practice of unreasonable force includes the use of excessive less-lethal force against children

CPD's pattern or practice of excessive force also includes subjecting children to force for non-criminal conduct and minor violations. In one incident, officers hit a 16-year-old girl with a baton and then Tasered her after she was asked to leave the school for having a cell phone in violation of school rules. Officers were called in to arrest her for trespassing. Officers claimed the force was justified because she flailed her arms when they tried to arrest her, with no adequate explanation for how such flailing met the criteria for use of a Taser. This was not an isolated incident. We also reviewed incidents in which officers unnecessarily drive-stunned students to break up fights, including one use of a Taser in drive-stun mode against a 14-year-old girl. There was no indication in these files that these students' conduct warranted use of the Taser instead of a less serious application of force.

CPD's Taser policy does not address the use of Tasers on children. It should. Prior to using a Taser on a child, officers should be required to factor into their decision the child's apparent age, size, and the threat presented. The use of a Taser in schools and on students should be discouraged and deployed only as a last resort. Tasers are painful and, because of a child's smaller size, children are especially vulnerable to greater injury from them. That is one reason the Police Executive Research Forum warns that Tasers should not be used against young children and that officers should consider a person's age in deciding whether use of a Taser is reasonable.⁸ CPD policy contains no such admonition, and this is true even under CPD's proposed revised policies. Moreover, in several of the instances we reviewed, officers used the Taser in drive-stun mode, which as noted above is prone to abuse.

We also found instances in which force was used against children in a retaliatory manner. In one incident, an officer's neighbor called to report that some boys were playing basketball on the officer's property. The officer, on duty, left his district to respond and found the teenage

⁸ 2011 ELECTRONIC CONTROL WEAPON GUIDELINES 21 n.27 (Police Executive Rese. F. & Community Oriented Policing Serv.'s, March 2011), available at http://www.nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/2011_Electronic_Control_Weapon_Guidelines.pdf.

boys down the street on their bikes. The officer pointed his gun at them, used profanity, and threatened to put their heads through a wall and to blow up their homes. The boys claim that the officer forced them to kneel and lie face-down, handcuffed together, leaving visible injuries on their knees and wrists. Once released, one boy called his mother crying to tell her an officer had pointed a gun at his face; another boy went home and showed his mother his scraped leg and, visibly upset, said “the police did this to me.” The mothers reported the incident to IPRA. The officer, who had not reported the use of force, accepted a finding of “sustained” and received a five-day suspension. The officer was never interviewed and his reasons for not contesting the allegations are not documented in the file.

In another case, a girl and a boy, both 15 years old, were crossing a street at the light, and one car had already stopped so they could proceed. A uniformed officer in an unmarked car braked hard and changed lanes to avoid the stopped car. The girl claimed the officer got out of the car and yelled profanity (calling her a “fucking idiot” among other things), drawing the attention of a female witness. The girl claimed that when she told the officer that they had the right of way, he pushed her in the back with both hands so hard she fell into a newspaper stand, after which he handcuffed her arms behind her back while she still wore her backpack, hurting her wrists, and did not loosen the cuffs when she complained. The officer called for backup, two officers responded, and the teens were released without charges. The girl reported this incident to IPRA. During the investigation, the officer, who had not reported using any force, claimed the teens were standing in the street obstructing traffic, causing him to slam on his brakes, prompting the teens to laugh at him. He said the teens cursed at him, and he handcuffed the girl for his and her safety because she “was becoming agitated and refused any and all direction.” Despite the existence of four witnesses (the two officers, the boy, and the female witness at the very least), the IPRA investigator obtained a statement only from the accused officer. The investigator did not try to call the female witness until 26 months after the incident (yet wrote that she “did not cooperate with this investigation”). By the time the investigator concluded the investigation in April 2014 and deemed her allegations not sustained, the girl had turned 18.

In another case, an officer forcibly handcuffed a 12-year-old Latino boy who was outside riding a bike under his father’s supervision. A plainclothes officer, responding to a report of “two male Hispanics running from” the area, detained the boy. According to the boy and his father, the officer approached the boy, ordered him to stop his bike, forcibly handcuffed him, pulled him off his bike, and placed him up against a fence. The boy reported he did not understand the man was a police officer or why he was being detained and told the officer he was only 12. According to the boy, the officer responded that the boy was “old enough to bang,” meaning old enough to engage in gang violence. The boy’s father approached the officer, explained that his son was only 12 years old, and asked what was going on. Records of 911 calls reflect a caller reporting that a plainclothes officer had a 12-year-old in handcuffs and was refusing to say why. The officer placed the boy in the back of a police vehicle before eventually releasing him. The officer’s only apparent basis for this detention was the boy’s race, which is constitutionally unreasonable. *United States v. Moore*, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1033 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (“[P]olice could not, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, stop every black male within their perimeter wearing a dark winter coat on a cold January day”); *United States v. Brown*, 448 F.3d 239, 248 (3d Cir. 2006) (reversing conviction where “about the only thing [defendant] had in common with the suspects was that they were black”).

C. Video Evidence Suggests a Broader Pattern or Practice of Unconstitutional Use of Force

Evidence suggests that the pattern of unreasonable use of force identified by our investigation may be even broader than that revealed through CPD documents alone. During our investigation, we reviewed numerous use-of-force incidents captured on video. In many of these incidents, the use of force was facially unreasonable and the videos undercut the officers' descriptions of the incidents. Given the large volume of reported incidents not captured on video, this suggests that the extent of unreasonable force by CPD officers may be larger than is possible to discern from CPD's scant force reports and force investigations alone. Indeed, the inaccurate descriptions of events that *were* undercut by video we reviewed bore striking similarities to descriptions provided by officers in numerous cases with no video.

In one incident captured on cell-phone video, an officer breaking up a party approached a man, grabbed him by the shirt, and hit him in the head with a baton. In his reports, the officer, using language very similar to that used in many other reports we reviewed, falsely claimed that the victim had tried to punch him. Before the video surfaced, the officer's supervisor had approved the use of force and the victim had pled guilty to resisting arrest. The officer has since been relieved of his police powers and is facing criminal charges for his conduct. In another video, a woman exited her car and placed her hands on her vehicle when officers threw her to the ground, hit her, and deployed a Taser against her. The video indicates that the officer's claim that she had refused to show her hands, thus justifying the force used, was false. Despite the existence of the video, IPRA deemed the force reasonable.

We also reviewed a video of an officer choking, hitting, and slapping a man who had refused an order to leave the area in front of a store where the man was shopping with his family. The officer had not reported having used any force at all, and an officer witness to the event did not report the choking. The man complained to IPRA. Investigators there obtained a copy of the store surveillance video, which confirmed the man's account. The officer was then suspended for 45 days.

In many of these cases, IPRA generally accepted the officer's version of events, which were later undercut by video evidence. The Laquan McDonald shooting is one such incident; our review found many others. In one incident, for example, officers justified unreasonable force by falsely claiming in their reports that a woman had attacked them. In the video, officers can be seen aggressively grabbing the woman, who was being arrested for a prostitution offense, throwing her to the ground, and surrounding her. After she is handcuffed, one officer tells another to "tase her ten fucking times." Officers call her an animal, threaten to kill her and her family, and scream, "I'll put you in a UPS box and send you back to wherever the fuck you came from" while hitting the woman—who was handcuffed and on her knees. Officers can then be seen discovering a recording device and discussing whether they can take it. Supervisors approved this use of force and the officers were not disciplined until after the woman complained to IPRA and produced surveillance video of the event. The City paid the woman \$150,000 in settlement of her lawsuit.

Another video shows an officer punching a handcuffed man several times, apparently in retaliation for the man having earlier punched the officer. The officer claimed falsely in his

report, again using language very similar to many other reports we read, that the man had been struggling and kicking and that the force had been necessary to control him. Unknown to the officer, the incident was captured on surveillance video of the hospital where officers had taken him for a psychiatric evaluation. The officer's partner also did not report this unlawful force, and supervisors deemed the use of force justified. It was only after the hospital staff who reviewed the video contacted IPRA that anyone was disciplined.

Video evidence is available in only a sliver of force incidents. This underscores the potential value of body-worn cameras—and functioning in-car cameras—to ensuring that the true circumstances of officer uses of force are known, and that officers can be held accountable when they use unreasonable force. As discussed in the [Accountability](#) Section of this Report, the Mayor recently has announced that the provision of body-worn cameras to all officers will be accelerated. This is commendable, but must be made part of a broader system of accountability in which protocols are put in place to ensure such equipment is used appropriately and that videos are routinely and randomly reviewed by supervisors to determine whether an incident reveals deficiencies in officer use of force.

D. CPD Does Not Effectively Use Crisis Intervention Techniques to Reduce the Need for Force

When individuals experience a mental or behavioral health crisis, law enforcement officers often are the first responders. Officers who are well trained in interacting with people in crisis can reduce the need to use force, save lives, and keep officers and others safer. Chicago has adopted a Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) approach as a means to safely and effectively respond to incidents involving persons in crisis. However, our review of CPD's force reports revealed that CPD uses force against people in crisis where force might have been avoided had a well-trained CIT officer responded to the scene and employed de-escalation techniques. While not all of these avoidable uses of force are unconstitutional, a meaningful number were, and deficiencies in CPD's CIT response contributes to the pattern or practice of unconstitutional use of force.

CPD's documentation of these incidents is often insufficient to determine whether the force was necessary, appropriate, or lawful. Consequently, all we know are the broad contours of terribly sad events—that officers used force against people in crisis who needed help. In one case, officers used a Taser against an unarmed, naked, 65-year-old-woman who had bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Officers used a Taser “to subdue a mental who ignored verbal commands” because he was believed to be a danger to himself and others. Officers twice drive-stunned a man who they then transported for a mental health evaluation. Officers used a Taser in probe and drive-stun mode against an unarmed suicidal man who pulled away from the responding officers. Officers, who were responding to a call that a woman was “off meds” and “not violent,” Tasered an unarmed woman because she pulled away and “repeatedly moved [her] arm.” CPD did not conduct any investigation or review of these incidents to determine whether its response to these events was appropriate or lawful, or whether force could have been avoided.

The shooting deaths of Quintonio LeGrier and Bettie Jones by CPD officers who responded to a call for help with a domestic disturbance laid bare failures in CPD's crisis response systems—the dispatcher did not recognize the call as one involving someone in crisis

and did not ask questions that might have resulted in clues that it did; a crisis-trained officer was not dispatched to the scene; the officers did not use crisis intervention techniques; and the officers made tactical errors that resulted in the shooting death of a bystander who had simply opened her door. In part as a response to this tragic event, Mayor Emanuel in December 2015 called for a review of the City's crisis intervention program. The crisis response review led to the announcement of plans for reforms which, if effectively implemented and sustained, could result in important improvements to the City's CIT program. There are additional steps the City should take. The City should do more to ensure that effective, well-trained crisis intervention officers respond to these events, and that crisis incidents are analyzed to determine whether changes to the program or CPD's crisis response are warranted.

1. CPD's crisis intervention team model needs more support to be sustainable

Like many major city police departments, CPD has developed a CIT designed to respond to incidents involving someone in crisis, whether related to addiction, trauma, or mental health.⁹ While no process is a guarantee against all poor outcomes, an effective crisis intervention approach can reduce the need for force, including deadly force, and prevent unnecessary entanglement of persons in crisis with the criminal justice system where mental health services will better serve the individual and public safety.

CPD purports to adhere to the "Memphis Model" of crisis intervention response consistent with the recommendations of CIT International.¹⁰ While specialized training is the cornerstone of the Memphis Model, CIT is more than just training.¹¹ It requires a dedicated cadre of trained officer volunteers large enough to cover all shifts and all districts.¹² It also requires coordination between dispatch and police, policies that facilitate referrals to mental health providers, coordination with such mental health service providers, and continuous evaluation of CIT outcomes.¹³

CPD began developing its CIT program in 2002 and made initial laudatory steps. It created a dedicated CIT unit to coordinate the CIT program and training. CPD trained its first cadre of CIT police officers in October 2004. By 2005, CPD rolled out CIT to its first two pilot districts and, as of April 2016, had trained 2,200 officers—18% of CPD's approximately 12,000-member authorized strength. In a 2010 study, CPD personnel reported that CIT training was

⁹ CIT is a distinct program, different than other mental health awareness training. CPD's recruit training includes a 14-hour mental health module, and officers are now being provided eight hours of CIT training as part of CPD's newly designed force-mitigation training. However, this basic training does not equip officers with the specialized skills needed for crisis intervention. Similarly, CIT overlaps in some respects with de-escalation training, but CIT training is distinct from and more expansive than CPD's current eight-hour de-escalation training.

¹⁰ See, e.g., CIT International, *CIT is More than Just Training... It's a Community Program*, available at <http://www.citinternational.org/Learn-About-CIT>.

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² RANDY DUPONT ET AL., CRISIS INTERVENTION TEAM CORE ELEMENTS (U. of Memphis Sch. of Urb. Aff. and Pub. Pol'y, Sept. 2007), available at <http://cit.memphis.edu/pdf/CoreElements.pdf>.

¹³ *Id.*

effective and valuable, and that CIT-certified officers were able to more effectively resolve encounters, noting lives saved and diversion to service providers.¹⁴

Over the years, however, CPD has reduced the number of personnel assigned to run the CIT unit, from a high of nine people in 2008-2009, to three people as of late 2016. Those three people now bear the burden of training more officers and administering a CIT program that is being asked to do more than ever. Despite the work of these dedicated individuals and the positive response CIT officers have expressed when employing their skills on scene, CPD has not dedicated adequate resources to the CIT unit, thereby limiting its effectiveness and failing to achieve the promises of effective crisis intervention. In 2016, CPD increased its number of CIT trained officers by approximately one-third and plans to have 35% of the officers in the Department's Bureau of Patrol certified in CIT by the end of 2017. The already overburdened three-member CIT unit has been tasked with training these officers, which has reduced the ability of these hardworking individuals to develop thoughtful, effective, and well-delivered training. And because the staff that comprises the three-member CIT unit is now consumed with increased training demands, it is even more difficult for them to perform other critical functions, including conducting evaluations and follow-up on CIT incidents.

2. CPD should improve its CIT selection process in conjunction with plans to increase the number of CIT officers

As noted, the City has recognized the need for an effective crisis intervention response and has recently announced an ambitious plan to quickly increase its cadre of officers who have received the 40-hour crisis intervention training. The City's commendable desire for a rapid development of the CIT program, however, should not come at the expense of the quality of its crisis intervention response.

Effective crisis response requires a police department to designate and train certain officers to be members of the CIT, and dispatch those officers to all crisis intervention calls. It is important that all CIT officers have volunteered for the assignment. Officers who volunteer are more likely to have a deeper interest in and commitment to working with people in crisis. And they are more likely to develop proficiency and expertise as they become more experienced responding to crisis calls. Volunteers should be screened to determine that they are qualified. Of course, all officers should receive some training in responding to persons in crisis, and it may be useful to provide the full 40-hour CIT training to officers who have not volunteered for or not been accepted to the CIT program. But these officers should not be considered designated CIT officers and should not be dispatched to a crisis call in lieu of a CIT officer.

CPD, understandably eager to improve its crisis response, has deviated from the use of volunteer officers who are dedicated to working with people in crisis. CPD has required certain categories of officers, including all field training officers and sergeants, to take crisis intervention training and has designated those officers as CIT officers. In addition, CPD has dropped most screening for volunteer officers and is simply accepting most volunteers. By

¹⁴ KELLI E. CANADA ET AL., CRISIS INTERVENTION TEAMS IN CHICAGO: SUCCESSES ON THE GROUND, (J. Police Crisis Negot. 2010, Jan. 1, 2011), available at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2990632/#R4>.

making CIT participation mandatory rather than voluntary and failing to screen those who volunteer, CPD has not developed a CIT team consisting of officers optimally suited for this work. While it is true that CPD likely needs more CIT officers to meet the demand of CIT calls, training large numbers of officers who have not volunteered for the task is, in the long run, unlikely to achieve the City's goal of improved crisis intervention response.

The City does not yet know how many additional CIT officers are necessary or where they should be deployed. The City has provided dispatchers with training to recognize when a person is in crisis, and recently developed a straightforward way for dispatchers to identify CIT officers available for dispatch. Already, these laudable steps have resulted in a five-fold increase in the number of calls identified as being crisis related from 2015-2016. This is a positive development because it suggests that dispatchers are becoming adept at identifying these calls and more CIT officers are being directed to handle crisis situations. But it has greatly increased the demand on the small CIT unit and the current CIT officers. And the City does not currently collect data on CIT calls in a way that would allow it to make informed staffing and deployment decisions to ensure an adequate number of CIT officers to cover all shifts in all districts. It has announced plans to do so. Each of these announced improvements should be implemented, supported, and sustained.

3. CPD should analyze crisis incidents to determine whether CIT is functioning effectively

CPD does not have an effective system in place to evaluate its response to CIT calls. CPD has developed a Crisis Intervention Report that is designed to capture important information about its response to crisis calls, including whether the call was recognized and identified as a CIT call before the officer's arrival and whether crisis techniques were employed. Even under CPD's newly revised policies, however, officers do not complete this form if the incident requires any other reporting. Thus, if an officer uses force during the crisis call, the officer will be required to fill out a Tactical Response Report (TRR) and therefore is not required to fill out a Crisis Intervention Report. As discussed above, the TRRs provide very little information about a use of force and include almost none of the information necessary to evaluate whether the crisis response was appropriate. Consequently, CPD has no ability to analyze the most concerning crisis incidents to evaluate its response.

During our review of force incidents, we saw many examples of force, including deadly force, being used against individuals in crisis. We did not see any evidence that CPD had engaged in after-action analysis to determine whether: the force used was reasonable and necessary; the incident had been recognized as a crisis incident and if not, why not; a CIT officer was dispatched to the scene and, if not, whether there were any barriers to dispatching a CIT officer; the officer used crisis intervention techniques; or the incident demonstrated that improvements in policy or training are needed. CPD should develop an after-action review process that answers these questions so that it understands how its CIT team is functioning and can correct deficiencies and build on successes.

CPD also has no mechanism to evaluate the quality of its CIT officers. Once an officer receives the 40-hour training and is certified as a CIT officer, CPD does not evaluate that officer's performance to determine whether the officer is applying the CIT training and is

effective in resolving crises, or whether the officer may need some refresher training or additional support, or is not working out as a CIT officer. Although the City is aware of this need, this improvement was not part of the City's recently announced plans for reform. Without analyzing these incidents and the skills and training of its officers, CPD has no way of knowing whether its CIT program is effective, whether refinements in policies and training are needed, and whether the performance of any individual officers should be addressed.

The City's plans to improve its CIT program—including by increasing and improving data collection, providing training to Office of Emergency Management and Communications dispatchers, and increasing the number of trained CIT officers—are important and long needed. But these steps by themselves are not sufficient. Until they are accomplished, the City cannot know how many CIT officers it truly needs. Similarly, until CPD requires officers to accurately document these events and engages in analysis and evaluation of this data, it cannot know whether its training is effective or in need of improvement. We applaud the City's desire to respond quickly to legitimate concerns about its CIT program, but it is important that the response be based on an understanding of the effectiveness of and challenges to its current program. Failure to develop that understanding may, in the long term, impede its ability to improve its crisis intervention response.

E. CPD's Failure to Accurately Document and Meaningfully Review Officers' Use of Force Perpetuates a Pattern of Unreasonable Force

CPD policy requires officers to report most uses of force, but in practice, officers are not required to provide sufficient detail about the force they used, and most officer force is not reviewed or investigated, notwithstanding CPD policy requirements.

In the most serious instances of force—where an officer discharges his firearm in a manner that could potentially hit someone—CPD responds to the scene to conduct a preliminary investigation, but IPRA has the authority to investigate whether the shooting was justified. Because of IPRA's central role in these cases, all aspects regarding the reporting and review of these uses of force—including CPD's initial response to the scene—is discussed in the [Accountability](#) Section of this Report.

Below, however, we discuss the reporting and review of other uses of force. CPD policy requires supervisors to investigate all reported uses of force, other than shootings, to determine whether they were in compliance with policy. In actuality, however, most force is not reviewed. As a result of so few force incidents being reported and even nominally investigated, and the low quality of the force investigations that do occur, there is no consistent, meaningful accountability for officers who use force in violation of the law or CPD policy. Nor is there any opportunity for meaningful assessment of whether policies, training, or equipment should be modified to improve force outcomes in the future. The failure to ensure the accurate reporting, review, and investigation of officers' use of force has helped create a culture in which officers expect to use force and never be carefully scrutinized about the propriety of that use.

1. CPD does not require officers to accurately report uses of less-lethal force

CPD's documentation of officer use of less-lethal force is consistently insufficient. Moreover, CPD and IPRA have accepted insufficient documentation even when officers' use of force is suspect, or when people complain about the force officers used against them.

CPD policy requires officers to complete a TRR anytime they use force, except for control holds to handcuff someone and techniques attendant to handcuffing or searching a person that do not result in injury or an allegation of injury.¹⁵ As detailed earlier, TRRs do not require officers to provide a narrative but instead present a series of boxes officers check to indicate in standard terms the force used, such as "elbow strike" or "take down/emergency handcuffing," and the resistance encountered, such as "stiffened," "imminent threat of battery," or "attack with weapon." There is a small textbox on the form for the officer to include additional information, but it is too small to provide an actual narrative of the encounter and officers rarely use it at all. The design of the form also discourages officers from providing important details about the force they used. For example, an officer might check that the officer used "kicks," but the TRR contains no requirement that the officer state how many kicks were used, where these blows landed, any injuries they specifically caused, or the order in which events occurred. The form also does not require officers to indicate what alternatives to force they considered or tried, and why these efforts were or would be unsuccessful. If a subject is injured, they must check the box for "injured" but they need not and generally do not document what those injuries were. Officers do often include some description of the encounter either in the arrest report or the case report that is related to the TRR. In reviewing CPD's use of force, we reviewed all of the documents the City provided related to a particular TRR. Even with this additional information, however, the true details of a force encounter were often obscured by a lack of sufficient detail and the use of boilerplate language.

In one typical example, officers documented that they used force on a man who they alleged was trying to interfere with their arrest of his brother for domestic battery. According to the arrest report, the man kept approaching officers as they tried to make the arrest, despite repeated commands not to do so. The officers arrested him for resisting arrest and reported that he tightened his arms and tried to pull away while they were placing him in custody. On the TRRs, the officers checked off "arm bar," "pressure sensitive areas," "control instrument," and "takedown/emergency handcuffing" in describing the force they used. It is impossible for anyone, including these officers' supervisors charged with determining whether the force was reasonable and within policy, to know even approximately how much force these officers used. But what is described could very well be unreasonable—officers provided no details that would justify a takedown, and he appears to have merely been upset that his brother was being arrested. Indeed, in the box in which the supervisor is to document the subject's response to the use of

¹⁵ Officers are not required to report the use of escort holds, pressure-compliance techniques, and firm grips that do not result in an injury or allegation of injury; control holds, wristlocks, and armbars utilized in conjunction with handcuffing and searching techniques that do not result in injury or allegation of injury; that force necessary to overcome passive resistance due to physical disability or intoxication that does not result in injury or allegation of injury, or the use of force in an approved training exercise. See GENERAL ORDER 03-04-05: INCIDENTS REQUIRING THE COMPLETION OF A TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORT (Chi. Police Dep't October 30, 2014).

force, the lieutenant wrote that the man said, “I don’t know why they arrested me.” CPD conducted no follow-up investigation of this use of force.

In many other instances, there are indications in the reports that the force used was more significant than reflected in the opaque description of events. In one incident, officers arrested a man because he “tried to physically interfere” with the arrest of another man. While they were arresting him, he began to pull away and grabbed and pushed the officers. According to the arrest reports, one officer “executed a knee strike.” But four officers filled out TRRs, indicating that they each used force against him. In describing their actions, one officer checked the boxes for “takedown/emergency handcuffing” and “closed hand strike/punch;” the second checked “open hand strike,” “takedown/emergency handcuffing,” “closed hand strike/punch,” and “kick;” a third officer checked “wristlock,” “arm bar,” “takedown/emergency handcuffing,” “closed hand strike/punch,” and “knee strike;” and the fourth officer checked “knee strike.” None of the officers reported how many strikes they delivered, where they landed, or why each was necessary. All four officers checked the box indicating that the man was injured, but those injuries were not described anywhere. In the man’s booking photo, he has abrasions on his face.

For some files we reviewed, the injuries the victims suffered, rather than the explanations by CPD officers, reveal the level of force that CPD officers actually employed. For example, an officer pushed an 18-year-old female student onto his police car, chipping her tooth, because, as he was walking her to his squad car after breaking up a fight between her and another girl outside of their school, she screamed profanities and flailed her arms. The officer reported that the injury occurred when he performed “an emergency take-down maneuver to regain control.” The girl was 5’4” tall and weighed 120 pounds, while the officer was 6’1” and weighed 186 pounds. Without requesting any additional information, supervisors approved this use of force. In the girl’s complaint to IPRA, she alleged that when she informed the officer he had chipped her tooth, the officer responded that he did not “give a fuck.” IPRA exonerated the officer without interviewing him.

It also appears that officers have been instructed on the language they should use to justify force. We saw many instances where officers justified force based on a boilerplate description of resistance that provides insufficient specificity to understand the force used or resistance encountered. For example, officers frequently reported using force because the person “flailed” his or her arms. Officers used a Taser against a man who appeared to be in crisis when he “stiffened his body, pulled away, and flailed his arms;” drive-stunned a man because, when they went to arrest him, he “began to flail his arms wildly;” deployed a Taser against a man who resisted arrest for theft by “flailing his arms;” and drive-stunned a man because, when they tried to arrest him, he “pulled away and flailed his arms.”

The examples above are illustrative of problems we found in the hundreds of files we reviewed. In many of these files, it was nearly impossible for us to understand how much force officers used or whether the level of resistance justified the force used. Further, the design of the form, including that there is so little space for officers to provide a narrative account of the force they used, makes it impossible for officers to provide a complete or useful account of the force incident.

2. CPD rarely reviews or investigates officers' use of less-lethal force

CPD supervisors consistently violate CPD's force review policy. CPD policy requires supervisors to conduct investigations of every reportable officer use of non-shooting force. When an officer is involved in a use of force requiring completion of a TRR, the officer is to "immediately notify their immediate supervisor that he or she has been involved in a use of force incident." The officer must "submit his or her completed TRR to their immediate supervisor for review." The supervisor is to "respond to the scene when the injury to a subject or member is of the severity to require immediate medical attention," "ensure that all witnesses are identified, interviewed, and that information is recorded in the appropriate report," and request an evidence technician to take photos of subjects who were injured. When an officer uses a Taser, the officer must request that a supervisor respond to the scene, and a supervisor at least one rank higher than the officer must respond. Supervisors must also obtain a copy of the Taser deployment data sheet and are prohibited from approving the TRR until it has been received and reviewed.

In practice, little of this happens. In the hundreds of TRR files we reviewed, we rarely saw evidence that supervisors responded to the scene unless officers shot someone. Canvasses for witnesses rarely occur and even witnesses who are present are rarely interviewed. Even where TRRs make clear that a subject was injured, no photographs are taken of the injuries. In most instances, a "mugshot" is taken of arrestees, and in the files we reviewed we sometimes saw unexplained injuries to the person's face. TRRs are routinely approved without any evidence in the file that a Taser deployment data sheet was obtained or reviewed. Indeed, when we referenced these requirements in interviews with officers in an effort to gain an understanding of the system, officers and supervisors of all ranks seemed surprised to hear that these requirements existed. None asserted that these requirements were adhered to on any regular basis and most struggled to explain what these policies require.

In practice, a supervisor may interview the subject of the use of force if the subject is immediately available to the supervisor. Otherwise, for example if the person has been transported to the hospital, he or she will not be interviewed, which means that supervisors generally do not interview the subjects of the most concerning uses of force. If the person is available and agrees to speak with the supervisor, the supervisor typically documents one or two sentences that summarize the person's statement. Many of the interview summaries we saw suggest the interview centered more on what the subject did to justify the officer taking action at all, rather than the circumstances of the use of force itself. These interviews are not recorded and in none of the files we reviewed did the supervisor document the questions asked of the person.

After the supervisor's force review is complete, the supervisor is supposed to review the TRR "for legibility and completeness and indicate approval of such by signing the appropriate box." In 2014, this requirement was modified to require that the supervisor "review the member's TRR and, if appropriate, approve the report." In practice, sergeants view this role as ministerial. They play no role in reviewing the force itself for appropriateness. Sergeants we spoke to told us their only role is to ensure the form is filled out correctly, and none had ever refused to sign a report based on an evaluation of the force itself. From at least 2002 until 2014, the task of evaluating the force used was assigned to the watch commander, who was to record the subject's statement regarding the use of force and conduct an evaluation to determine whether the force was within CPD policy. In 2014, these tasks were given to lieutenants.

Despite the lack of detail describing most uses of force and the near total lack of additional information collected, supervisors routinely use boilerplate language to approve the TRRs, often only minutes after the officer submits it, even where there is information in the file indicating the officer violated CPD policy or the law. In the files we reviewed, we saw only a handful in which a supervisor referred the incident to IPRA for investigation or requested additional information from the officer.¹⁶ Our interviews with CPD officers were consistent with these findings. One commander told us he could not recall ever calling for further investigation of a use of force. Another said that he has never seen an unreasonable use of force on a TRR. That same commander also said he had never seen any TRR wherein he identified a better tactical decision, even if the force was reasonable.

Illustrative of the inadequacy of supervisory review of force incidents is the troubling incident discussed above in which officers deployed a Taser against an unarmed 65-year-old woman who was in mental health crisis. The TRR file contains only a cursory description of the incident, and without reviewing the Taser data download or requesting any investigation, the sergeant approved this TRR three minutes after the officer submitted it, and the lieutenant approved it less than 25 minutes after that. There is no indication that the lieutenant asked the officers any questions about whether this force was necessary or whether there might have been something they could have done to avoid using force against this woman, such as seeking assistance from a crisis intervention trained officer.

Our investigation also found instances in which CPD officers used canines against children and conducted no investigation to determine whether these uses of force were reasonable or necessary. In one case, officers allowed a canine to bite two unarmed 17-year-old boys who had broken into an elementary school and stolen some items. In another case, officers deployed a canine to locate two boys, ages 12 and 14, who had broken into a school and stolen some candy and basketballs. Fortunately, the canine did not bite them and the boys were uninjured. CPD should have investigated these uses of force to determine whether they were reasonable, yet in both cases supervisors approved the force without an investigation.

F. CPD's New De-escalation Training and Proposed Policy Revisions Should be Expanded and Sustained

In March 2016, CPD began a review of its use-of-force policies in an effort to provide clearer direction for officers on the appropriate use of force. CPD released the draft force policies in October 2016 for public comment. The proposed revisions address core force principles such as the sanctity of life, ethical behavior, objective and proportional use of force, use of deadly force, de-escalation, and force mitigation. CPD is currently reviewing the public feedback and has stated that it will incorporate suggestions and improvements to prepare final

¹⁶ Pursuant to City ordinance, supervisors are required to report all Taser uses to IPRA. See CHAPTER 2-57, INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW AUTHORITY (IPRA) 2-57-040(c) (IPRA chief administrator has power and duty to “conduct investigations into all cases in which a department member discharges his or her . . . stun gun, or Taser in a manner which potentially could strike an individual, even if no allegation of misconduct is made”). Notwithstanding this ordinance, unless the supervisor specifically requests additional investigation, IPRA does not investigate Taser discharges. We saw several instances where the supervisor did not notify IPRA that a Taser discharge had occurred, despite being required to do so.

versions of the policies. CPD also has begun providing all officers with force-mitigation training designed to better equip officers to de-escalate conflicts safely; recognize the signs of mental illness, trauma, and crisis situations; and respond quickly and appropriately when force is necessary.

We appreciate that CPD has recognized the need to address some of the problems described in this Report. The steps the City has taken are meaningful and important. To be effective, the new approaches to the use of force must be embodied in these policies, and training must be supported by leadership and enforced by supervisors to ensure officers follow them consistently. CPD's past policy rollouts have faced considerable challenges, with policies sometimes issued before officers have been trained on them, leading to confusion and frustration about what is required and why. CPD's Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) union leadership already has expressed concern that the 2016 draft force policies do not adequately address the concerns of officers. CPD must demonstrate more thoughtful planning and commit more resources and time for the training and rollout of force policy revisions so that officers will understand, accept, and be able to safely and effectively implement the new requirements.

Additionally, these revised policies do not improve upon CPD's deficient procedures, discussed above, for reporting and investigating force. In part because of these deficiencies, officers are not held accountable to the current force policies. Until these deficiencies are addressed, revisions to policies and training are unlikely to achieve the necessary changes in how officers use force.

III. CHICAGO'S DEFICIENT ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTE TO CPD'S PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDUCT

A well-functioning accountability system is the keystone to lawful policing. In combination with effective supervision, a robust accountability system is required in order to identify and correct inappropriate uses of force and other kinds of misconduct—with discipline, training, and counseling as appropriate—which in turn helps prevent misconduct. But Chicago seldom holds officers accountable for misconduct. In the five-year period prior to our investigation, Chicago had investigated 409 police shootings and found that just two were unjustified. It is similarly illustrative that the City paid over half a billion dollars to settle or pay judgments in police misconduct cases since 2004 without even conducting disciplinary investigations in over half of those cases, and it recommended discipline in fewer than 4% of those cases it did examine. Our comprehensive investigation of Chicago's accountability structures and systems found clear indications, set forth in detail in this Section, that those structures and systems are broken.

Together with our law enforcement experts, we scrutinized hundreds of misconduct and IPRA force investigations, and closely reviewed related policies and protocols. We looked at the available resources and organizational structure of CPD's accountability components. We talked to scores of current and former IPRA and BIA investigators and supervisors. We also spoke with many line officers, members of CPD leadership, and police union officials about their experiences with and views of CPD's accountability systems. We spoke with members of the public about these same issues.

Our investigation confirmed that CPD's accountability systems are broadly ineffective at deterring or detecting misconduct, and at holding officers accountable when they violate the law or CPD policy. As with most complicated problems that have built up over time and repeatedly been glossed over, we found that many factors contribute to the systemic deficiencies of CPD's accountability system. These are summarized below.

Our investigation revealed that the City fails to conduct any investigation of nearly half of police misconduct complaints and that a number of institutional barriers contribute to this fact. There are provisions in the City's agreements with the unions that impede the investigative process, such as the general requirement that a complainant sign a sworn affidavit and limitations on investigating anonymous complaints and older incidents of misconduct. That said, the union agreements contain override provisions for some of these provisions that the City rarely utilizes. Other barriers have been created solely by the City, such as internal policies allowing investigative agencies to truncate investigations of serious misconduct through mediation, administratively close complaints deemed less serious, and ignore mandatory investigations into uses of force that could identify misconduct or faulty training issues. The City must work to remove these barriers so it can thoroughly investigate all claims of misconduct and uses of force and thus regain community trust.

Our review of files for complaints that *were* investigated revealed consistent patterns of egregious investigative deficiencies that impede the search for the truth. Witnesses and accused officers are frequently not interviewed at all, or not interviewed until long after the incident when memories have faded. When interviews do occur, questioning is often biased in favor of officers, and witness coaching by union attorneys is prevalent and unimpeded—a dynamic neither we nor our law enforcement experts had seen to nearly such an extent in other agencies. Investigators routinely fail to collect probative evidence. The procedures surrounding investigations allow for ample opportunity for collusion among officers and are devoid of any rules prohibiting such coordination. We found that a lack of resources and investigative training contribute to these investigative problems. We also found that investigations foundered because of the pervasive cover-up culture among CPD officers, which the accountability entities accept as an immutable fact rather than something to root out.

In the rare instances when complaints of misconduct are sustained, discipline is inconsistent and unpredictable, and meted out in a way that does little to deter misconduct. Officers are often disciplined for conduct far less serious than the conduct that prompted the investigation, and in many cases, a complaint may be sustained but the officer is not disciplined at all. The police discipline system, including the City's draft disciplinary matrix, fails to provide clear guidance on appropriate, fair, and consistent penalty ranges, thus undermining the legitimacy and deterrent effect of discipline within CPD. And the City's process for finalizing IPRA's and BIA's discipline recommendations further delays and inappropriately influences discipline, and compromises the ability for such discipline to withstand appeal.

We also found deficiencies within Chicago's Police Board that impair its ability to be a fully effective component of CPD's accountability structure. The Board should focus on its function of providing due process to officers and ensuring they are held accountable as appropriate. The Board's current role as conduit for providing community input into CPD's accountability system may be more appropriately handled by the Community Oversight Board

that the City has committed to working with the Chicago public to create. We found also that the completeness of Police Board consideration of discipline can be improved by modifying current practices, such as the current rules that bar the officer's "negative" disciplinary history but allow the officer's "complimentary" history, and allowing favorable character evidence by the accused's supervisors to be offered at the liability phase of proceedings.

Throughout the time our investigation has been underway, the City has undertaken positive steps to improve its accountability structure and repair its relationship with the community, and it should be commended for this. But the problems we found are complex and entrenched, and have persisted in part because the City has been unable, and at times has not committed the long-term sustained focus and resources, to eliminate the problem and keep it from coming back.

A. Chicago's Systems for Investigating Police Conduct

Chicago's police accountability system is currently divided among three investigative entities: (1) the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA); (2) CPD's Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA); and (3) CPD district offices. IPRA was created in 2007 to replace the Office of Professional Standards and is intended to operate as a civilian disciplinary body that is independent from CPD. IPRA serves two main functions: it receives and registers *all* complaints against CPD officers and assigns them to either BIA or itself, depending on the claim; and it investigates specific categories of complaints as well as other non-complaint police incidents and recommends discipline where appropriate.

IPRA investigates four types of complaints: (1) excessive force; (2) domestic violence; (3) coercion; and (4) bias-based verbal abuse. It also conducts mandatory investigations, regardless of alleged misconduct for: (1) officer weapon discharges (including gun, Taser, or pepper spray); and (2) death or serious injury in police custody. Over the last five years, IPRA has received almost 7,000 citizen complaints per year and retained investigative authority over approximately 30% of them as falling within IPRA's jurisdiction. In addition, it receives notification of approximately 800 mandatory investigations a year. IPRA is headed by the Chief IPRA Administrator (currently, Sharon Fairley), who is appointed by Chicago's Mayor and operates with an 80-person civilian staff.

BIA investigates complaints that are outside of IPRA's jurisdiction, which consists of approximately 70% of all police complaints. BIA is an entity within the Police Superintendent's Office, and the BIA Chief reports directly to the Superintendent. BIA is responsible for investigating four types of officer misconduct: (1) criminal misconduct; (2) bribery and other forms of corruption; (3) drug or other substance abuse; and (4) driving under the influence, as well as all operational and other violations of CPD rules. BIA receives approximately 4,500 complaints per year from IPRA and refers approximately 40% of the less serious investigations to the 22 individual police districts for investigation.

Given that many of the same problematic practices are common to both IPRA and BIA investigations, below we discuss those different entities' investigations hand in hand. Where the evidence we found demonstrates that a specific problem is particularly acute in one entity, we have made that clear.

After IPRA and BIA complete their investigations, the investigator issues a finding of “sustained,” “not sustained,” “unfounded,” or “exonerated.”¹⁷ If one or more of the allegations of misconduct is sustained, the investigator’s supervisor makes a discipline recommendation. While CPD is in the process of changing this, historically, the recommended discipline is not pursuant to any applicable guidelines, but rather is based only upon experience and historical precedence. The investigation concludes with a summary report by the investigator.

Investigators’ findings recommendations and discipline recommendations for all sustained cases at either IPRA or BIA are subject to several layers of CPD review before they become final decisions. First, except in cases where discharge is recommended, the recommendations are subject to a Command Channel Review (CCR), in which supervisors in the accused officer’s chain of command review and comment on the recommended discipline. Next, recommendations, along with CCR comments, are forwarded to the Superintendent for review. Discharge recommendations skip the CCR review and go directly to the Superintendent. If the Superintendent approves the recommendations, the decision is final, but if not, it is subject to another process before the Chicago Police Board, which is made up of nine private citizens appointed by Chicago’s Mayor with the City Council’s consent. If the Superintendent disagrees with IPRA’s recommendations, the Superintendent has the burden of convincing a three-person panel from the Chicago Police Board that the Superintendent is justified in departing from those recommendations.

The Police Board also acts as a reviewing body by adjudicating CPD decisions recommending discharge, or appeals of suspensions over 30 days for sergeants, lieutenants, and captains. Such reviews consist of a full evidentiary hearing before a Police Board hearing officer who makes a report and recommendation, which is reviewed by the full Police Board before a final decision is made. The Police Board’s role in accountability, particularly its role in reviewing disciplinary decisions, is discussed in [Section III.H.](#), below.

Other than in discharge cases, which are heard only by the Police Board, officers also can challenge final CPD discipline decisions through arbitration, which can either be a summary disposition on the record or a full evidentiary hearing, depending on the officer’s rank and the level of discipline recommended. Decisions of the Police Board and arbitrators are subject to administrative review in the Circuit Court of Cook County and can then be appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court.

In October 2016, the City took steps towards creating the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA). COPA, which under current plans will assume IPRA’s responsibilities sometime in 2017, appears to have the potential to be a meaningful improvement over IPRA, but gaps also appear to remain within this entity and through all other components of Chicago’s accountability systems. COPA, and its limitations, are discussed at the end of this [Section](#).

¹⁷ “Sustained” means the complaint was supported by sufficient evidence to justify disciplinary action. “Not sustained” means the evidence was insufficient to either prove or disprove the complaint. “Unfounded” means the facts revealed by the investigation did not support the complaint (e.g., the complained-of conduct did not occur). “Exonerated” means the complained-of conduct occurred, but the accused officer’s actions were proper under the circumstances. See IPRA RULES § 4.1.

B. The City Has Put in Place Policies and Practices that Impede the Investigation of Officer Misconduct

City policies and practices prevent investigation of a substantial portion of CPD misconduct complaints and uses of force, including many it is required by law to conduct. Deficient systems and police culture inhibit many other complaints of police misconduct from ever being filed. These deficiencies keep unconstitutional conduct and practices hidden. We discuss below several of the unnecessary barriers to investigation, including: a formal policy against investigating many complaints about force; referral of verbal abuse complaints to a process in which no discipline can be imposed even if misconduct occurred; a failure to investigate anonymous complaints or complaints without a sworn affidavit; and handling many complaints via a so-called “mediation” process that is in fact antithetical to the tenets and goals of complaint mediation. Collectively, through this patchwork of policies and practices, the City fails to conduct any meaningful investigation of nearly half of the complaints made against officers. This is separate and apart from CPD’s failure to investigate most of the Taser and “no-hit” shootings required under local law or to conduct any review of the vast majority of officer uses of force that are discussed in the [Force](#) Section of this Report.

While IPRA and the City appeared to have acquiesced to, or developed, many of these restrictions to alleviate a crushing docket, the City’s new Police Accountability ordinance has set aside significantly more resources for COPA than IPRA currently has. The City should revisit these restrictions in light of COPA’s expanded capacity and ensure that they are removed. COPA’s capacity, in turn, should be increased further if necessary to allow it to investigate the cases that it has previously been unable to because of the restrictions set out below.

1. The City has unduly narrowed the scope of misconduct allegations that are fully investigated

One way in which the City has acquiesced to narrowing the scope of misconduct complaints it investigates is through the police union contracts’ provision requiring a sworn affidavit from the complainant before a claim is investigated. While officers should certainly not be subject to false claims, this affidavit requirement creates a tremendous disincentive to come forward with legitimate claims and keeps hidden serious police misconduct that should be investigated. Until this affidavit requirement can be changed, however, IPRA and BIA should be acting more aggressively to ensure that this requirement does not stand in the way of investigating meritorious, and sometimes egregious, allegations of misconduct.

Most police misconduct complaints begin with a letter, email, or phone call, through which the complainant provides information about a misconduct incident. But in nearly every case, neither IPRA nor BIA will conduct any meaningful investigation of the complaint unless the complainant meets an investigator in person and provides a complete recorded statement of the incident, and submits a sworn statement that all claims are true and correct under penalties provided by law. The City closes about 40% of all complaints (an average of 2,400 complaints a year) because the complainant did not sign an affidavit. A 2015 report showed that between 2011 and 2014, IPRA closed 58% of its total complaints for lack of an affidavit.

There are many understandable reasons why victims of police misconduct may choose not to submit a supporting affidavit. Chicago residents who have lost faith in police accountability altogether have no interest in participating in that very system. Others fear retaliation—that if they proceed with an investigation, they will be targeted by CPD officers. Many more cannot meet the logistical hurdles necessary to file the affidavit, including taking time off of work during a weekday to sit for a lengthy interview. Additionally, civil rights plaintiffs and criminal defendants—both of whom may have potentially valid misconduct complaints—typically follow their attorney’s reasonable advice and refrain from providing verified statements pending their criminal and civil litigation. In fact, for most of the lawsuits in which police misconduct victims received significant settlements or verdicts, IPRA’s parallel misconduct investigation was closed for lack of an affidavit. In other words, the City routinely *pays large sums* to police misconduct victims who have filed non-verified complaints in civil litigation describing the misconduct in question but fails to *investigate* these same officers for disciplinary purposes because their administrative complaints are not verified. And even criminal defendants who wish to file affidavits so their complaint can be investigated cannot always do so because certain investigators rarely, if ever, go into Cook County Jail or to state correctional institutions to obtain affidavits that would be willingly given.

CPD’s unions correctly note that investigators can “override” the requirement for a sworn affidavit, and we agree that IPRA and BIA should make more use of the override option. IPRA investigators we interviewed relayed that overrides are not encouraged, and no training was provided on how to obtain one. Not surprisingly, this override provision was used only 17 times in the last five years. But, there is also no question that the override option is problematic in a number of respects. To obtain an override, BIA or IPRA must obtain an affidavit from the other agency’s director, verifying that she has reviewed “objective verifiable evidence” and affirms “that it is necessary and appropriate for the investigation to continue.” Not only does this process undermine the independence of IPRA, and create an additional procedural barrier to investigating misconduct, but requiring that objective verifiable evidence exists before an investigation can be undertaken puts the cart before the horse.

Even though the affidavit requirement and the override exception restrict the City’s ability to ultimately sustain a complaint, they should not be used as an excuse to avoid a full and fair investigation that begins immediately upon a complaint being made. Currently, investigators conduct no witness interviews until after securing a sworn affidavit. Yet because investigators already have a statement from the complainant describing the basis of the complaint—albeit not “verified”—most times they have sufficient information to conduct their investigation immediately, before witnesses’ memories fade and evidence disappears. Additionally, by interviewing witnesses and canvassing for additional evidence, IPRA and BIA would be in a better position to consider an override request. Undertaking such investigative efforts immediately, even without an affidavit, will improve accountability and help demonstrate to the community that IPRA and BIA are not indifferent to complaints of police misconduct.

CPD’s and IPRA’s failure to investigate anonymous complaints, pursuant to the City’s collective bargaining agreement with officers, further impedes the ability to investigate and identify legitimate instances of misconduct. As noted above, given the code of silence within CPD and a potential fear of retaliation, there are valid reasons a complainant may seek to report police misconduct anonymously, particularly if the complainant is a fellow officer. Indeed, it

was an anonymous tip that led to the video release of the Laquan McDonald shooting. IPRA and BIA should have greater discretion in investigating tips and complaints from anonymous sources.

Likewise, the CBA contains other provisions that have the effect of impairing investigations of police misconduct. For example, the CBAs mandate disclosure of a complainant's name prior to questioning the accused officer. Like the anonymous complaint prohibition, this provision is problematic because of the significant fear of police retaliation by many complainants. Experts in law enforcement investigations noted that disclosure of the complainant's identity during the investigation has the potential to chill misconduct reporting without providing discernible benefit to the officer. IPRA and BIA already must provide the accused officer with detailed notice of the misconduct charges as well as copies of all relevant police records; this should allow the accused officer to sufficiently prepare before being questioned. Eliminating this identity disclosure requirement, and clearly communicating it to complainants, should encourage more complainants to come forward without fear of retaliation.

Finally, the City has agreed with CPD's police unions to prohibit investigations into older incidents of police misconduct, even where those incidents may include serious misconduct or be probative of a pattern of misconduct. One CBA provision prohibits IPRA or BIA from initiating any disciplinary investigations into incidents over five years old, absent authorization by the Superintendent, and another requires destruction of most disciplinary records older than five years. Yet, CPD's culture and "code of silence" as described elsewhere in these findings may prevent disclosure of serious misconduct in a timely fashion. Moreover, the document destruction provision not only may impair the investigation of older misconduct, but also deprives CPD of important discipline and personnel documentation that will assist in monitoring historical patterns of misconduct.

IPRA and BIA also fail to investigate certain claims of conduct that they cursorily determine are not "serious" enough to warrant a full investigation. Under its "Excessive Force Protocol," IPRA administratively closes, without any investigation, most complaints alleging excessive force in connection with handcuffing, take-downs incidental to arrest, and displays of an officer's gun, because IPRA determines that the force used was "de-minimis." As our expert noted, however, it is relatively easy for officers to gratuitously cause excruciating pain during the handcuffing process merely by overexerting the amount of force used in a trained finger or wrist lock. Such gratuitous punishment is hardly de-minimis, even if it leaves no marks or lasting injury. Similarly, as explained in more detail in above, BIA does not investigate complaints of verbal abuse by an officer, but instead refers them to district supervisors for "non-disciplinary intervention."

It is reasonable for IPRA and BIA to exercise discretion about the resources to assign to certain types of cases. But there is no system in place to ensure that a properly trained investigator is objectively evaluating these force and verbal abuse complaints and performing a sufficiently thorough preliminary investigation to accurately decide whether a full investigation is warranted. Moreover, such information is not properly tracked and maintained to enable IPRA and BIA to determine trends, or ensure that CPD is properly identifying officers who are appropriate candidates for referral to one of CPD's behavioral intervention programs. See Report, Section [IV.B.](#)

2. The City does not meaningfully investigate certain types of force unless a misconduct complaint is filed

IPRA fails to investigate several types of force despite being formally required to do so. IPRA has long been required by ordinance to undertake investigations of Taser discharges and officer-involved shootings where no one is hit,¹⁸ yet, in practice, it investigates neither. This problematic practice results in a large number of potentially serious policy or constitutional violations going undetected and undeterred. The pattern of unreasonable force our investigation found both reflects this longstanding failure to adequately review officers' use of force and underscores the necessity of doing so to eliminate this pattern of unlawful conduct.

IPRA's failure to meaningfully investigate Taser discharges has had significant implications. In 2009, IPRA reported just under 200 Taser uses, and as required under local ordinance, was investigating each use. A year later, CPD expanded its Taser program, and uses jumped dramatically to almost 900 and have since leveled off at almost 600 a year over the last five years. In 2010, as Taser uses were expanding, IPRA stopped investigating all but a few of the Taser uses—in particular, those accompanied by a citizen complaint or an override. The former IPRA Chief Administrator explained this investigative change was simply due to the fact that IPRA does not have resources to more thoroughly audit every Taser use.

While the number of Taser discharges may have outpaced IPRA's ability to investigate each discharge, this does not excuse the City's failure to ensure that somebody reviewed officers' Taser use. By placing responsibility for investigating Taser discharges in IPRA, and then failing to ensure that IPRA did so, the City created a system in which no one assesses whether Tasers are being used appropriately or effectively. This, in turn, prevents the City and CPD from uncovering the potential need for retraining or additional policy refinement, and of course from deterring future misuse of Tasers by holding officers accountable for abuse. While the City's new Police Accountability Ordinance removes jurisdiction from IPRA for investigating most Taser discharges, it does not create a structure to ensure that Taser discharges or other less-lethal uses of force will be investigated in the future. Such a structure is needed to ensure CPD's pattern or practice of unreasonable force does not continue.

IPRA's longstanding decision not to respond to or investigate officer-involved shootings in which officers miss their intended targets is also problematic. Although "no-hit" shootings raise the same legal, policy, tactical, and ethical issues as "hit" shootings, IPRA essentially ignores the cases unless they generate a misconduct complaint. In most no-hit cases, IPRA merely collects written reports from the involved and witness officers. IPRA does not investigate the shooting scene, does not interview anyone, and does not conduct any analysis of physical evidence. Nor, in cases where officers fire at people who escape, is there any indication that IPRA or anyone else checks with area hospitals in an attempt to confirm that in fact no one was struck. Once it collects the often-sparse documentation of a no-hit shooting, IPRA closes its file with the finding, "administrative closure" without any comment on compliance with the law or CPD policy.

¹⁸ The City's new Police Accountability Ordinance narrows IPRA's jurisdiction over Taser discharges, as discussed elsewhere in this Report.

IPRA receives approximately 35 notifications per year for no-hit shootings. Many no-hit shootings we reviewed raised serious questions that warranted investigation, but were ignored simply because the officer missed his intended target. For example, in one case, an off-duty CPD officer fired multiple times at a car, missing the driver, but injuring him with shattered glass. The written reports in the file (there were no recorded interviews) did not address critical questions, such as where the officer stood in relation to the car, where his bullets struck, or the car's direction of travel. Notwithstanding these glaring omissions and CPD's policy generally prohibiting officers from shooting at vehicles, IPRA closed the file.

The difference between a hit and a no-hit shooting case may only be a matter of bad aim; investigation of no-hit cases is thus vital to uncovering deficiencies in policies, procedures, tactics, equipment, and training that could prevent unnecessary or inappropriate shootings in the future.

In nearly all Taser and no-hit shooting cases, no complainant comes forward. This reluctance, even in questionable shootings, is understandable both because of retaliation fears described above and because of the possibility that such individuals may have been involved in criminal conduct. Nevertheless, the officer may have intentionally or unintentionally engaged in unreasonable force in the incident, or otherwise violated policy. It is thus essential that investigations in these cases occur even in the absence of an underlying complaint.

3. Attempts to expedite investigations through so-called "mediation" allow officers to circumvent punishment for serious misconduct

Many serious misconduct complaints that avoid the investigative barriers described above are not fully investigated but instead are resolved through what IPRA calls "mediation." However, this program is not true police-complaint mediation where parties meet to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution of their dispute and, often, gain a better understanding of each other's perspective along the way. Such programs, like the one that has been implemented in conjunction with our consent decree regarding the New Orleans Police Department, provide an opportunity for dialogue and understanding between victims of police misconduct and the officers who are the subject of their complaints in the presence of a neutral third party. "Mediation" at CPD, however, is a euphemism for a plea bargain, and is used in a way that often inappropriately, albeit quickly, disposes of serious misconduct claims in exchange for modest discipline, while misleading the public into thinking that accountability has been achieved.

"Mediation" is used by IPRA to resolve an allegation of misconduct, usually by having the officer agree to a sustained finding in exchange for reduced punishment. Mediation is always used before investigations are complete, including before the accused officer is ever interviewed. This premature use of mediation deprives investigators of important information they could use to better determine the severity and breadth of the misconduct.

The complainant is generally excluded from the process altogether, further separating the "mediation" process used by Chicago from the typical mediation used in other departments. Persons who complain of police misconduct are afforded no opportunity to meet with the officers who are the subject of their grievances or provide input into the resolution of their complaints if

disciplinary action is taken. At the end of this process, complainants receive a letter that even IPRA leadership admits can be misleading, because it advises that the complaint was sustained but never discloses the precise charge that was sustained or the discipline imposed.

These flaws are particularly concerning given how often IPRA uses mediation. From 2013 through 2015, mediations accounted for approximately 65% of all sustained cases. The investigators we spoke to stated that by December 2012, a year after the pilot program began, they were told to attempt mediation in *every* case. So instead of using mediation only in a limited number of appropriate circumstances, such as allegations where the facts are undisputed and there is no victim, IPRA mediates a wide range of complaints despite the seriousness of the allegations. This includes cases that are facially inappropriate for mediation, such as allegations of excessive force and domestic violence by officers.¹⁹ Approximately 50% of the mediations from 2013-2015 were for domestic violence or a full range of excessive force claims.

Moreover, because IPRA is intentionally lenient in exchange for an officer agreeing to mediation, the discipline imposed for misconduct violations resolved through mediation is often far lighter than the allegation facts merit. We reviewed one complaint where an officer fractured his girlfriend's nose during a domestic dispute. In this case, investigators recognized the seriousness of the allegations and requested an affidavit override after they could not secure the victim's agreement to participate in the investigation because the victim feared retaliation from the officer and his friends within CPD. It is laudable that the investigators recognized the seriousness of the offense and pursued the investigation without the victim's agreement to participate in the investigation. Yet, in the end, the investigators still sent the case to mediation, and the officer received only a five-day suspension. Another officer received a one-day suspension for admitting that he had shoved his baton into a victim's side. And in over half of these excessive force and domestic violence cases, there was no real discipline at all, but simply a "violation noted" in the officer's record, such as the case in which a CPD officer who participated in mediation received only a "violation noted" after being accused of verbally and physically abusing his wife in public, where there were witnesses to the event.

In addition to mediation often leading to lesser disciplinary penalties, agreeing to mediate a misconduct complaint also allows officers to accept a sustained finding on a less serious charge in exchange for the IPRA investigator dropping more serious charges from the complaint file. For example, one investigative summary publicly available on IPRA's website describes an officer who was accused of verbally abusing her mother and brother, striking her brother in the head, scratching his face and neck, stealing her mother's Social Security check, and charging unauthorized items on her mother's credit card. The accused officer was ultimately arrested for domestic battery. Yet, IPRA allowed the complaint to proceed to mediation, and after admitting to the lesser violation of scratching her brother's face and neck, this officer was given only a two-day suspension.

¹⁹ IPRA's use of "mediation" to resolve domestic violence disputes is problematic because it minimizes the serious, repetitive nature of this abuse and allows abusers to avoid meaningful punishment, which may empower them to continue the cycle of abuse. Using even true mediation (as opposed to IPRA's current plea-bargain mediation) to resolve domestic violence allegations against police officers would be inappropriate, given the dynamics of domestic violence.

During the course of our investigation, the City and current IPRA leadership recognized that mediation is currently misused. IPRA officials also admitted that mediation is used to reduce caseloads and preserve resources. While this practice may have saved resources, IPRA staff admitted, and we confirmed, that mediation, as it is currently used, is both inappropriate and a significant impediment to true accountability.

Some, but not enough, of the problems described above were addressed in the new ordinance creating COPA. The ordinance prohibits COPA from using mediation for “complaints alleging the use of excessive force that result in death or serious bodily injury and cases of domestic violence involving physical abuse or threats of physical abuse.” The ordinance, however, does not provide sufficient guidance on other circumstances where mediation should not be used as a means to negotiate a plea bargain.

C. Investigations That CPD Does Conduct Are Neither Complete Nor Fair

Our review of hundreds of investigative files revealed that IPRA and BIA investigations, with rare exception, suffer from entrenched investigative deficiencies and biased techniques. These investigative flaws cover not only all complaint-driven investigations conducted by both BIA and IPRA, but also the mandatory investigations into officer-involved shootings handled by IPRA.

Our review of investigative procedures, interviews of current and former investigative personnel, and careful analysis of 400 IPRA and BIA investigations revealed a consistent unwillingness to probe or challenge officers’ accounts of the incident, even when these accounts were inconsistent with physical evidence, credible eyewitness statements, or common sense. Investigators have permitted union representatives and attorneys to coach officers in the middle of recorded interviews—with official protocols actually prohibiting investigators from preventing this, or even referring to it on tape. Investigators frequently failed to collect basic evidence needed for the investigations by failing to interview important witnesses—including the accused officer—and failing to collect information from other court proceedings involving the same incident. These deficient practices, set forth in detail below, undermine accountability.

1. CPD’s initial response to officer-involved shootings

While IPRA is vested with the authority to investigate officer-involved shootings, the initial evidence gathering and reporting on the scene of an officer-involved shooting is largely in the hands of CPD. Understanding the circumstances surrounding the early stages of an officer-involved shooting investigation is important to appreciating how IPRA officer-involved shooting investigations are compromised—and far from independent of CPD—from the outset.

Under CPD rules, all firearms discharges must immediately be reported to CPD supervisors, and if the shot hits a civilian, it triggers two separate but overlapping investigations: (1) a criminal investigation conducted by CPD’s Detective Division to evaluate possible criminal conduct by civilians involved in the shooting; and (2) a mandatory administrative investigation conducted by IPRA to determine whether the shooting officer was unjustified. IPRA does not investigate an officer-involved shooting where no one is hit, as explained previously.

Upon notification of a shooting, IPRA sends investigators to the officer-involved shooting scene, where they must wait outside the taped area until a CPD commander in charge of the scene completes the preliminary assessment, which consists of a walk-through of the area and evidence, as well as individual interviews with the officers and civilians present. At the same time the commander is conducting this preliminary review, many other non-IPRA personnel are allowed within the taped area to also interview witnesses and view evidence, including supervising sergeants, detectives, and union representatives. All of these interviews are conducted outside the presence of IPRA investigators and none are recorded. During these communications and particularly before CPD supervisors arrive on-site, there is no prohibition against officers talking with each other about the shooting, and there is no requirement that they remain separate from each other.

After the commander completes his preliminary investigation, he or she allows IPRA inside the taped area and leads the investigators in a walk-through of the scene and provides a narrative of the incident. Generally, IPRA does not speak directly to witnesses until they convene later at the area headquarters, where, again, CPD controls the flow of information and people. While officers complete police reports and review video, CPD supervisors, detectives, union representatives (often accompanied by union counsel), and sometimes prosecutors from the State's Attorney's Office (SAO) conduct additional, unrecorded private interviews with officers and civilians in one area of the station while IPRA investigators are quarantined in a separate room. Union representatives and attorneys not only interview the involved officers but also may assist in completing police reports concerning the incident.

IPRA is the last in line to interview civilian witnesses and officers. After CPD and SAO interviews are finished and after providing the officer with the two-hour notice required under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), IPRA is then able to conduct recorded interviews of the non-shooting officers at the station. IPRA is sometimes unable to interview civilians at the station, as it depends on the witnesses' willingness to remain at the station after CPD and SAO interviews, as well as cooperation from CPD detectives who are controlling the station scene. Under applicable CBA provisions, the earliest time IPRA can interview the shooting officer is 24 hours after the incident. However, if IPRA makes a preliminary determination that the shooting is unjustified, it will typically refer the matter to the SAO to consider for criminal charges, and defer the interview until it receives a declination letter from the SAO.

These procedures are highly troubling. Allowing involved officers to engage in private, unrecorded conversations with the commander, supervising sergeants, detectives, and union staff before ever speaking with IPRA allows for the inadvertent or intentional conflating of recollections, or the appearance thereof, and greatly impairs IPRA's investigative abilities. If false or mistaken narratives justifying shootings are created during these private conversations and advanced in reports and officer statements, it is exceedingly difficult for even well-trained and diligent investigators to accurately evaluate whether the shooting was justified. We appreciate that officers have a right to counsel, but there are numerous precautions that can be taken to protect the integrity of the investigation without impinging on this right.

The possibility of officer collusion in this setting is more than theoretical. The release of police cruiser video from the 2014 Laquan McDonald shooting led CPD to fire seven officers for falsifying their reports about the shooting. The officers' written reports generally read the same,

stating that the teenager was advancing on officers and threatening officers with a knife. The video of the shooting appears to undercut those seven officers' accounts. Additionally, the release of body-worn camera videos from the July 2016 Paul O'Neal shooting shows officers involved in the shooting speaking to each other about the incident moments after the shooting occurred. Officers can be heard discussing the facts of the incident, including confirming they all had the same perception of events. As concerning, CPD officials condone this behavior, and encourage them to have the conversations without making a record of what was said. One video depicts a CPD command official telling officers who are speaking about the shooting to "talk about that stuff afterwards." The same video captures the official informing one involved officer not to say anything until the administrative process has started, and advising other officers that if they have on a body-worn camera, they should not go near the involved officer until the administrative process has completed.

Notwithstanding these most recent scandals and the many others that preceded it, CPD has not amended its policies to address the risk of officer collusion or inadvertent witness contamination. No CPD policy requires involved or witness officers to separate themselves and avoid speaking to each other about a deadly force incident. This is out of step with accepted practice in many agencies, which follow a protocol similar to this one used by the Los Angeles Police Department:

After all public safety concerns have been addressed, the [on-scene] commander shall ensure that involved officers and witness officers are transported from the scene, physically separated unless logistical problems (e.g., the number of involved officers and/or supervisors) preclude individual separation, and monitored to eliminate the possibility of contaminating their statements prior to their interview by [Force Investigation Division] personnel.

The on-scene commander must be permitted to communicate with officers and witnesses in addressing public safety concerns (e.g., tasks and communications necessary to preserve evidence, secure the scene, address medical needs, determine whether suspects are at large), of course. Once this is done, however, CPD rules should at a minimum prohibit officers from discussing the incident (other than with counsel) outside of IPRA's presence, and this rule should be stringently enforced with significant penalties imposed for violations.

To the extent these restrictions conflict with CBA notice provisions, such as the provision requiring that IPRA provide witness officers with two-hour notice and accused officers with 24-hour notice before interviews, then these provisions should be renegotiated or, alternatively, all witness discussions with CPD must likewise be delayed until IPRA can participate.

We realize that IPRA is now entitled to more control over an officer-involved shooting scene in the wake of the recent passage of the Illinois Police and Community Relations Improvement Act, 50 ILCS 727, but remain concerned that absent proper oversight and guidance, this law will not, by itself, correct the current organizational and control deficiencies that impact accountability for officer-involved shooting scenes.

Additionally, IPRA should interview the shooting officer as soon as possible after the incident, and should not delay it due to a possible criminal investigation. Neither constitutional

rights under *Garrity* nor any other valid investigative principle requires delaying such an interview, and CPD's history indicates that an immediate administrative interview is warranted. If a compelled statement must be taken and a criminal investigation subsequently ensues, IPRA should either assign a "clean" and a "screen" investigative team for the parallel investigations, or it should refrain altogether from performing criminal investigative tasks on behalf of the SAO. Indeed, severing the current relationship where IPRA acts as the criminal investigative arm for the SAO in excessive force cases not only will provide more independence from the SAO but will better ensure that IPRA resources are spent aggressively pursuing administrative investigations rather than serving and acquiescing to the needs and motives of SAO. Finally, the CBA-imposed 24-hour rule should be eliminated for these same reasons, but until this is done, CPD and IPRA should arrive at creative and enforceable ways to ensure that both the shooting officers' well-being and Chicago's broader accountability goals are satisfied.

2. Interviews of officers and civilian witnesses

We identified many cases where investigators failed to take reasonable steps to contact and interview identified civilian eyewitnesses to the incident. For example, in one incident an off-duty officer shot and wounded a burglary suspect who apparently attempted to wrest the officer's weapon from him. During the struggle, the suspect was shot in the chest and abdomen. However, the suspect also sustained a third gunshot wound to his back—an injury not explained by the officer. A witness canvass report identified two residents who reported two loud bangs, a pause, and a final bang. The report plainly raised the question of whether the officer fired the final shot—perhaps the unexplained shot to the back—after the threat was neutralized. Yet IPRA did not interview these two witnesses and instead accepted the officer's account and deemed all three shots justified. Similarly, in one investigation of a complaint of misconduct, an IPRA investigator interviewed an 8-year-old girl who complained that a CPD officer working secondary employment in a school grabbed the girl by her hair, swung her around, and choked her while breaking up a fight in a school hallway.²⁰ IPRA did not interview the identified student witnesses and entered a non-sustained finding based primarily on the accused officer's written statement.

Moreover, in numerous files we reviewed, *officer* witnesses and even the *accused officers* in misconduct cases were never interviewed. In one misconduct case involving an allegation that officers broke into a home and beat two men, IPRA interviewed a mother and her two children who witnessed the incident and testified in support of the claim. IPRA identified but never interviewed any of the officers involved, discounted the mother's testimony and ignored the children's testimony because of their ages, and made a "not sustained" finding. In another case, a man alleged two officers stopped him on the street and slammed him against a car, requiring hospitalization. Although the hospital records supported the injury described and IPRA identified the officers involved, IPRA never interviewed the officers and instead deemed the

²⁰ We note that a significant amount of alleged officer misconduct involves officers working secondary employment. While we did not fully investigate CPD's oversight of officers' secondary work, the review that we did undertake indicated that there is a need for a thorough review of the policies and accountability measures related to officers' secondary employment.

allegation “unfounded” because the medical records indicated that the complainant was intoxicated.

Where investigators do seek to interview officers, they frequently do so by sending what is known as a “to/from” memo requesting that the officer provide written answers to general questions about the complaint. One high-ranking IPRA staff member admitted during our interview with him that he believed inadequate staffing caused investigators to rely too heavily on “to/from” statements from officers instead of conducting live interviews. This practice is not as effective as a live interview; it allows for collusion and for answers to be drafted or influenced by others, whereas hearing the officer directly during an interview allows for more spontaneous responses, more probative follow-up questions, and more well-informed credibility determinations.

Finally, in BIA investigations, interviews are not electronically recorded and transcribed. Instead, the BIA investigator types up the questions and answers provided during the interview, and then tenders the final printed version for witness signature. In the context of the other systemic deficiencies noted herein, this practice further undermines the quality of the interview because it prevents an auditor from meaningfully reviewing or evaluating an interview.

3. Officer collusion and witness contamination

Our review of officer-involved shooting and misconduct investigations revealed that IPRA investigators exhibit little interest in whether CPD officers have colluded with each other or have otherwise been subject to contamination. For example, in one case involving an officer who had shot an unarmed man in the back, IPRA reviewed and obtained a copy of video footage from the officer’s patrol car that appeared inconsistent with the account the officer had related to CPD detectives immediately after the shooting. IPRA postponed its officer interviews for nearly a year while the State’s Attorney’s Office reviewed the matter for possible prosecution.²¹ Although the incident had become well-known throughout the Department and the community, IPRA did not ask the officers if they had seen the video or ask them to relate what they had read, seen, or heard about the incident.

We found this problem in virtually all officer-involved shootings we reviewed, where IPRA investigators very rarely made any effort to explore the possibility that involved officers and witness officers were lining up their stories or had been influenced by outside information such as video footage or press reports. Instead, officers were given free rein to provide apparently rehearsed accounts, with no follow-up questions aimed at ferreting out collusion or contamination. This was true even when the officers used very similar language or otherwise exhibited signs of coordinating their stories. For example, in one case, two officers involved in an officer-involved shooting separately related the incident in nearly identical terms, and even included the same digressions at the same point in the narrative. The IPRA investigator never inquired whether the officers had spoken to each other prior to their investigative interview or asked them to identify all persons with whom they had discussed the incident.

²¹ We discuss the problems associated with IPRA’s decision to delay officer interviews pending a prosecutor’s determination in greater detail below.

Investigators in misconduct complaint investigations demonstrated this same indifference to witness contamination. They frequently use “to/from” memos or unnecessarily delay interviews of accused and witness officers for extended periods, with some case files containing explicit assertions from investigators that an interview delay of months or years is based on the investigator’s heavy caseload. And similar to shooting cases, when interviews do occur, investigators in misconduct complaint cases rarely explore whether the officer consulted with other officers prior to the interview.

Investigators’ routine failure to explore the possibility of officer collusion or other forms of witness contamination contributes to a culture in which officers have felt free to compare their accounts before meeting with investigators. Although investigators generally cannot ask officers to disclose confidential communications with their attorneys or union representatives, they can and should routinely ask officers to identify all other persons with whom they had discussed the incident. This is routine practice in many other agencies.

4. Hidden witness coaching during officer interviews

IPRA itself undermines the integrity of its investigations by actively enabling officers to receive coaching during the course of an investigative interview. IPRA’s investigation procedures manual expressly *requires* investigators to permit legal representatives to consult with officers about questions and their answers *during* a recorded interview.²² In addition, these procedures *require* investigators to hide the extent of this consulting by turning off the tape recorder whenever officers or their representatives request—even if (and often because) a critical question is pending. The procedures likewise *require* investigators not to state on the record who is requesting a pause in the recording, why the request was made, how long the parties were off-tape, and not to mention anything that occurred while off-tape. In striking contrast, IPRA’s procedures for civilian interviews *require* that time on and off tape be recorded.

Although these procedures are limited by their own terms to misconduct investigations—i.e., cases where the officer is accused of specific offenses that may lead to discipline—IPRA applies them in practice to officer-involved shooting investigations as well, despite the fact that in virtually all cases, the officer has not been accused of any particular offense.

The important protections provided by the right to counsel do not explain or justify these practices. We have not identified any other agency that permits witness coaching to occur in the very presence of investigators, much less requires those investigators to cooperate with others in the room to conceal such efforts from the tape recorder and omit any mention of them in the investigative file. At CPD, however, the practice is institutionalized, with IPRA investigators often starting their interviews by inviting officers to use a hand signal if they want the investigator to turn off the tape recorder.

²² See IPRA STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL SECTION E, *Accused Members*, § C.6. (Rev. Jan 1, 2015).

We found these coordinated, coach-and-conceal efforts reflected in many of the investigations we reviewed. Moreover, we found that it was not uncommon for officers to change the course of the narrative or walk back statements they had made after their legal representatives whispered a few words. Consider, for example, this exchange in an interview of a witness officer:

Investigator: Okay. Do you remember hearing anything that your partner might've said during this whole incident? After you exited the uh squad car and you positioned yourselves, do you remember hearing your partner saying anything either commands to the offender or comments to you or anything like that?

Officer: I remember hearing my partner say police as he announced his office.

Investigator: Okay. Was that before or after he fired shots?

Officer: Before.

Investigator: Okay. All right. (pause)

Union Attny: (whispers to client)

Officer: My partner also uh stated he has a gun.

Investigator: Okay. Do you remember when he said that, when your partner said that?

Officer: Inside the dumpster pen.

Investigator: Okay.

Union Attny: (whispers to client)

Officer: Uh as I ordered the offender to put his hands up is when I heard my partner say that, he, he's gotta gun.

These practices are particularly troubling given that witness and subject officers almost invariably share the same attorney and union representative. Under such circumstances, where the representative is coaching witnesses, the legal representatives are in a position to (1) take careful note of what a witness officer states in one IPRA interview and (2) share that information with the next witness or involved officer to be interviewed. Because communications between officers and their legal representatives are generally privileged, IPRA lacks the means to determine the extent to which such information-sharing occurs.

5. Use of leading and otherwise inappropriate questions

IPRA investigators not only routinely facilitated witness coaching by officers' legal representatives, but at times directly sought to influence officers' statements—in the officer's favor—by asking unnecessary leading questions during investigative interviews. For example:

Investigator: Was [the victim] given a sufficient number of verbal commands to drop his weapon before an exchange of fire ensued?

Another example similarly illustrates this practice:

Investigator: Okay. Was there time available or a split-second decision to fire your weapon?

Officer: It was a split-second decision.

We found essentially the same exchange in other cases, such as this one:

Investigator: Okay. Was there time available or a split-second decision to fire your weapon?
 Officer: Yes.
 Investigator: Which one?
 Officer: It, oh it was a split second.

In other instances, the investigator asked leading questions evidently aimed at eliciting from officers a statement that they feared for their lives when they used deadly force. This line of questioning of an officer who shot an unarmed teenager is illustrative:

Officer: Then he stumbled to the ground, and then he came up. That's what I'm saying—he—how he jumped the fence, he stumbled to the ground, came up with his hands still in his waistband. That's when I left one round.
 Investigator: And when he came up, he was facing you?
 Officer: Yes.
 Investigator: Okay, so he—as he's standing back up again, he still had his hands in his waistband?
 Officer: Correct.
 Investigator: And you felt like he had something in his—in his hands?
 Officer: Correct.
 Investigator: And you—you were in danger?
 Officer: Yes, I was—I was in fear—I was in fear of my life.
 Investigator: You were in fear for your life so you fired how many times?
 Officer: Once.

IPRA reviewers also routinely asked officers leading questions about whether they experience “tunnel vision” or “auditory exclusion” that might impair their ability to provide a completely accurate account. We were told that such questions are asked because stress can impair sense perception. However, strikingly IPRA does not pose the same leading questions to civilians—not even civilians such as crime victims wounded by gunfire. Similarly, it bears noting that neither Illinois law nor CPD policy provides for any “cooling off period” before investigators may interview civilians. Instead, stated concerns about the impact of stress on perception and memory appear strictly confined to police officers.

IPRA investigators also pose leading questions that assume the truth of matters in significant dispute. For example, in one case involving a man shot in the buttocks as he fled officers, the IPRA investigator asked a CPD officer, “And uh could you tell which hand let's see, yeah, which hand the [fleeing man] held the weapon in?” Prior to that question, the officer had not said anything to the investigator about seeing a weapon. In another case, also involving a fleeing suspect shot in the back, an officer had told the IPRA investigator that the suspect had not offered any physical resistance other than running away. The IPRA investigator then stated, “Right. Okay. And he was reachin', he had the hand on his weapon.” The officer then replied, “Correct.” Another case, involving shots fired at a vehicle, included this exchange:

Investigator: As [the vehicle] turns I guess that's what you're seein' is the window rolled down?
 Officer: Yes.
 Investigator: And you think they're about to start shootin'?
 Officer: I think the driver is about to start, yes.

6. Failure to probe officer accounts, even when inconsistent with other evidence

Investigators rarely asked officers probing questions about their accounts of officer-involved shootings or the alleged misconduct. This reluctance to ask probing questions was particularly evident in cases where the physical evidence—often gunshots to the rear of a subject, or a lack of a weapon recovered at the scene—appeared inconsistent with the officer's story.

For example, in one case, an officer claimed that as he struggled to extract a suspect from a car, the suspect pointed a gun at him, leading him to shoot the suspect in the abdomen. However, the seated suspect somehow had sustained one of his gunshot wounds to the buttocks. IPRA did not pursue the apparent conflict. In another case, an officer fatally shot a man in the back during a foot pursuit. The officer claimed that he fired because the man faced him while pointing a gun. However, IPRA learned the night of the shooting that the man had been shot in the back. IPRA did not pursue the apparent inconsistency or press the officer for details about his position or that of the shooting victim. In a third case, an officer reported shooting a fleeing suspect in the back after he had allegedly turned to point an object the officer thought was a gun. However, video footage of the incident showed the suspect running away when the officer fired. IPRA never pursued the discrepancy or asked the officers present about what was depicted on the video. This failure to probe officer accounts of incidents even in the face of apparently inconsistent other evidence undermines accountability.

7. Failure to adequately address physical evidence

Our review of IPRA's investigative files identified other deficiencies and irregularities that related to the collection, analysis, and reporting of physical evidence. Although the IPRA procedure manual states that "physical evidence is crucial to any case," and "investigators should pay close attention to physical evidence," we found IPRA files lacking in key respects. CPD routinely swabs recovered weapons and suspects' hands for DNA and gunshot residue (GSR) so it may determine whether an individual held or fired a weapon. Most officer-involved shooting files we reviewed noted the collection of DNA or GSR evidence. Rarely did the files contain the lab results of DNA tests or an explanation for why they were missing. More frequently, we saw lab results for GSR tests, but in most cases, IPRA only mentioned the results in the rationale for their finding when the results corroborated the officers' accounts.

This outcome is troubling, especially in cases where there were sharp disputes between officer and civilian witnesses. For example, in one case, an officer shot a man in the elbow following a foot chase. According to the officer, he saw the man turn and point a gun at him. The officer reportedly told the man, "Drop the gun," and then fired when the man continued pointing the weapon. The officer then claimed the wounded man threw the gun over a fence as

he was falling to the ground. Two other officers, located further away, provided a similar account. However, a nearby resident told IPRA she had seen the conclusion of the foot pursuit but had not seen any gun, and instead saw the man begin to raise both hands after an officer shouted, “Show me your hands.” A second witness reported hearing the same command followed almost immediately by gunfire. Under the circumstances, analysis of the recovered weapon bore special importance, especially because the gun lacked any recoverable fingerprints. Still, IPRA’s final report, which accepted the officers’ version, did not mention the outcome of DNA or GSR tests or state whether they were still pending.

We found IPRA files lacking in other critical respects relating to the collection and analysis of physical evidence. First, virtually none of the files included a copy of crime-scene logs or any other documentation identifying who entered or exited the crime scene or when they did so. Second, many files lacked a report regarding crime-scene measurements or even a scaled diagram of the crime scene that identified the location of key evidence such as expended shell casings, bullet fragments, and the like. Third, few files reflected even a rudimentary effort to analyze bullet trajectories. Fourth, nearly every file lacked any photographs depicting the point of view of any civilian eyewitnesses IPRA interviewed, making it difficult to evaluate the reliability of their accounts.

8. Lack of appropriate use of evidence from civil and criminal proceedings

Some police misconduct allegations are the subject of a criminal prosecution or private civil litigation. IPRA and BIA investigators do not properly review these cases, or, where appropriate, incorporate evidence from these proceedings, in order to inform or strengthen administrative investigations. Additionally, in other cases—particularly within BIA, where the same investigators handle both the criminal and administrative investigations—investigators improperly rely on the outcome of a parallel criminal investigation when deciding whether to substantiate administrative charges based on the same conduct, even though the standards for civil and criminal violations are very different. Both practices result in investigators not using the information at their disposal to properly conduct and resolve administrative complaints.

a. Ignoring evidence from civil and criminal proceedings

The failure of IPRA and BIA to collect information from parallel criminal prosecutions or civil litigation involving the same alleged police misconduct represents a missed opportunity. Some misconduct cases are also the subject of a parallel criminal investigation. Motions to suppress in these criminal cases, as well as the underlying criminal trial, may yield important information that allows BIA or IPRA investigators to discover additional evidence or witnesses, or that assists in credibility determinations of officer witnesses. Yet there is no system that requires investigators to review parallel criminal proceedings, and no such periodic review of such criminal proceedings is done.

Similarly, in excessive force cases, it is not uncommon for the same conduct that IPRA or BIA has jurisdiction to investigate to be litigated in a Section 1983 civil rights lawsuit. Where there is an open IPRA or BIA investigation that is also the subject of a parallel civil case, investigators do not appropriately review and incorporate information from that parallel case into their administrative investigation. Moreover, there is no dependable procedure in which new

civil lawsuits alleging police misconduct trigger investigations by IPRA or BIA. Indeed, many such complaints never make it to BIA or IPRA for consideration, and even when they do, no disciplinary investigation is automatically opened since a lawsuit is not deemed to satisfy the complainant affidavit requirement described above. Though IPRA has the authority to override the affidavit requirement, it rarely exercises it in these circumstances.

However, once a police misconduct lawsuit is settled or judgment is entered in favor of a plaintiff, a City ordinance requires IPRA to review the case in question for a possible disciplinary investigation. But IPRA has no timely systematic review process to comply with the ordinance, and often such settled lawsuits will sit on IPRA shelves for months or years before being reviewed at all. And when reviewed, many of these lawsuits—even though settled—still fail to clear the complainant affidavit requirement, and thus no investigation is ever conducted. And for those settlements that are substantively reviewed and investigated by IPRA—i.e., because they include a supporting affidavit—the complaints almost never result in a sustained finding, despite the fact that the City judged the case worthy of paying large amounts of money to the complainant. During our investigation we discovered that of the hundreds of misconduct settlements IPRA reviewed over the seven-year period from 2009-2015, it recommended discipline in less than 4% of them.

The City should review settlements and judgments on a broader scale to spot for trends, identify officers most frequently sued, and determine ways to reduce both the cost of the cases and the underlying officer misconduct. The City's Office of Inspector General (OIG) recently issued an advisory report criticizing the City's risk management systems as a whole. In particular, the OIG found that because the City does not analyze trends, including trends in police misconduct, or take action on the basis of such analysis, the City "spends tens of millions of dollars annually to pay claims." In response to OIG requests for information, the City's Department of Finance (DOF) admitted that the City "has no comprehensive program in place to examine claims against the City (including small claims, settlements, and judgments)," and that the limited analysis DOF does specifically excludes police misconduct claims. The City responded that a "risk management working group" is being convened, but that police misconduct claims will not be a part of that review, citing the pending conclusion of this investigation. This response should be corrected now that this Report has been issued.

b. Erroneously closing administrative investigations when investigators are unable to prove criminal charges

We also reviewed BIA *administrative* investigations that appear to have been closed simply because there was not enough evidence to hold the officer *criminally* liable. Unlike criminal investigations, in which findings are based on a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, findings in administrative investigations are based on the significantly lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard. This standard is appropriate because, if it is more likely than not that an officer has committed misconduct, the Department must take action to ensure it does not continue. In addition, even where officers' conduct may not have violated any criminal code, it may have violated numerous CPD policies. However, in cases we reviewed that were investigated by BIA, it appeared that BIA did not pursue or sustain administrative charges because criminal prosecution was declined, notwithstanding the possibility of policy violations.

In one case, the BIA investigator documented that he was not sustaining any violations in the administrative investigation because the elements of two crimes the officer had initially been charged with, criminal sexual abuse and unlawful restraint, were not met. That case involved an allegation that a CPD officer attempted to rape a woman at a party. Numerous witness accounts of what took place before and after the attempted rape were consistent, including that the victim reported the assault to the witnesses. The file also contains evidence of numerous text messages sent by the accused officer following the incident, including one in which the officer joked with his friend, “I thought she was an easy lay.” The officer was later arrested, and the victim identified him in a lineup. Prosecutors originally classified the criminal allegations against the officer as potential felonies, but eventually dropped the case. The administrative investigation in the file mirrors the criminal investigation, indicating that BIA did no additional work in the administrative case other than talking to the victim again. In the investigator’s summary of the administrative investigation, the investigator finds the victim’s allegations unfounded, stating “the criminal charge of criminal sexual abuse was Nolle Prosequi by the Cook County State’s Attorney office because the elements of this offense were not met. In addition, the elements of criminal sexual abuse were not met in the administrative investigation.”

9. Superficial investigation documentation and investigative bias in favor of officers

We also identified numerous shortcomings in IPRA and BIA’s final reports concerning officer-involved shootings and other misconduct complaint investigations. For example, the reports typically do not discuss or even cross-reference inconsistencies between officer statements and physical evidence or civilian eyewitness accounts. Similarly, very few point out inconsistencies between officers’ written reports and their interview statements. They often gloss over or simply fail to mention conflicts between officer accounts of the incident. For example, in one case, two officers were running next to each other as they pursued a man carrying a gun. One officer told IPRA the man had turned toward his partner, so he fired repeatedly. However, the partner contradicted this claim. He told IPRA the man had not turned toward him and had not raised his arm. IPRA chose not to mention these conflicting statements or otherwise indicate that the two officers’ stories appeared to be at odds with each other.

In another case, an officer shot a teenager in the back, claiming the boy had turned toward him and pointed a weapon. A firearm was located nearby, but on the other side of a tall hedge. During his IPRA interview, the officer was unusually vague when asked how the gun ended up where it did. First, the officer stated that as the boy fell to the ground, “the gun went over the hedge.” Next, he said the gun “just went over” the hedge, and finally said the boy “*apparently* threw it over” the tall hedge (emphasis added). IPRA did not pursue the matter further with that officer. A second officer, who stood nearby, denied seeing the teenager with a gun. Each interview lasted less than 15 minutes, and the IPRA report failed to include the second officer’s denials or otherwise indicate that the second officer’s account appeared to be in substantial tension with the first officer’s.

IPRA reports sometimes omitted mention of crucial physical evidence that appeared to undermine officer accounts. One of the most troubling cases in this respect involved an officer who shot an unarmed suspect in the back at close range. The officer had reported to arriving CPD detectives that the man had pointed an object she mistook for a gun and opened fire. Those detectives briefed IPRA on this statement when it arrived at the scene. However, less than 24

hours later, IPRA had obtained police video footage that showed the confrontation. Far from supporting the officer's story, the police video, recorded at close range, showed the suspect running away from the officer. Nonetheless, IPRA issued a report that accepted the officer's story at face value. The report did not even acknowledge the police video.

We found other IPRA reports that either exaggerated or misstated evidence in a manner favorable to the officer. In one case, for example, officers shot a man in the leg after he reportedly pointed a gun at them. IPRA accepted the officers' accounts, though they were disputed by a civilian witness at the scene. In finding the shooting justified, the IPRA report stated that the shooting victim had admitted to treating physicians that he had pointed his gun at the police. However, the medical records referenced by IPRA in support of this conclusion actually reflect that the claim about pointing the gun was made by a CPD officer, not the shooting victim.

Finally, in sexual assault and domestic violence cases, we also found that investigators were quick to credit officers' versions of events despite the availability or potential availability of additional evidence. For example, in one case, a CPD officer's wife called the police to report that her husband had pointed his gun at her during an argument. The investigation revealed that the officer had a 19-year history of physically abusing her. The victim's son told investigators that he had pulled out a barbecue fork during the incident to protect himself and his mother. The officer admitted to pulling out his gun during the argument but said he did so because his son had come at him with the fork, and had punched him. The IPRA investigator's summary report noted that there were "conflicting descriptions" of the physical altercation, and that the officer "denied committing the alleged act." The investigator also noted that "although it is undisputed that [the officer] pointed his weapon at [the victim's son], the described sequence of events is in conflict, and the appropriate finding is not sustained." Throughout the case summary report, the investigator credited the officer's version of events and said, despite two contrary witnesses and the officer's history of domestic abuse, that because the officer claimed the alleged events did not occur, there was not enough evidence to sustain any of the allegations of misconduct.

10. Racial and ethnic disparities in the City's handling of misconduct complaints

IPRA and BIA sustained only 1.4% of all closed complaints from January 2011 through March 2016. It is not surprising, given the deficiencies discussed above, that so few filed complaints were sustained. What these deficiencies do not explain are the racial and ethnic disparities in sustaining complaints of CPD misconduct, particularly complaints of excessive force.

Our analyses show that, overall, complaints filed by white individuals were two-and-a-half times more likely to be sustained than complaints filed by black individuals, and nearly two times as likely to be sustained than complaints filed by Latinos: 1% of misconduct complaints filed by black residents, and 1.4% of complaints filed by Latino residents, resulted in at least one allegation being sustained, compared with 2.7% of the complaints filed by whites.²³ A closer

²³ We analyzed CPD's complaint data by comparing the race of the complainant and the findings outcome. A single complaint can include multiple allegations, and each allegation will have a separate finding. We deemed a

analysis revealed that the disparity in sustained rates based on the race or ethnicity of the complainant was even greater at the individual allegation level. Black complainants had 2.4% of their individual allegations sustained; Latinos had 3.2% of their individual allegations sustained; and whites had 8.9% of their individual allegations sustained. In other words, for each allegation contained in a complaint, a white complainant is three-and-a-half-times more likely to have the allegation sustained—and the officer held accountable for his or her misconduct—than a black complainant, and twice as likely to have the allegation sustained than a Latino complainant.

Disparities in how IPRA resolves allegations of excessive force are even starker. 2% of all allegations of excessive force involving black complainants and only 1% of such allegations against Latino complainants were sustained, as compared to 6% of allegations of excessive force involving white complainants. In other words, whites were three times more likely than black complainants to have CPD uphold their allegations of excessive force, and six times more likely than Latino complainants to have their excessive force allegations sustained.

This does not necessarily indicate that the complaint process is biased, as these numbers do not say anything about the quality of the complaint. While our investigation did not determine why these disparities exist, these disparities are significant and should thus prompt IPRA and BIA to take a close look at their practices to ensure that they are not discounting complaints based on the race or ethnicity of the complainant. Such a practice would itself be a disservice to Chicago's black and Latino residents, and would send the message to CPD officers that CPD and the City have a higher tolerance for misconduct against black and Latino complainants, which could in turn lead to disproportionate abuse of individuals within these groups and undermine community trust in CPD. It is thus imperative that the City work to better understand the reasons behind these disparities and eliminate them to the extent they have no race-neutral, legitimate basis.

11. Inadequate training of investigators

The investigative problems we found are in part attributable to the lack of training investigators receive both at the start of their work as investigators and throughout their career. Like the deficiencies in CPD's training more broadly, *see* Report, Section [IV.A.](#), the City does not provide investigators with sufficient training to do their jobs competently and effectively. Investigators we spoke with stated that they do not receive adequate formal training, and they learned how to do their jobs from observing supervisors and co-workers.

As with the lack of general training for investigators, we found that the lack of specific training in how to investigate domestic violence and sexual assault allegations appeared to further undermine BIA's and IPRA's ability to conduct these investigations effectively. Victims of sexual assault and domestic violence may be more likely than other complainants to be reluctant to participate in the investigation beyond reporting due to feelings of shame, however unwarranted. For sexual misconduct in particular, victims may be reluctant to participate in the

complaint sustained whenever at least one allegation was sustained. Thus, for example, if a complaint included five allegations, one of which was sustained and the others unfounded, then the complaint was noted to have had at least one allegation sustained.

investigation because the nature of the misconduct and of investigations means that victims may have to retell intimate and embarrassing details numerous times to complete strangers. Domestic violence victims may be particularly unwilling to continue participation in an investigation when the perpetrator is a police officer, given the potential impact of a sustained domestic violence finding on an officer's career.

Investigations we reviewed indicate that investigators handling these cases may not understand these dynamics, including how to interact with victims in a manner that encourages their participation in the investigation. One investigator told us that it was "up to [the survivors of domestic violence] if they wanted to talk," and admitted that he had not received any training on how to get domestic violence victims to trust him and provide information about their assault. An IPRA investigator we spoke to admitted that many of the investigators handling domestic violence cases believe that an incident does not qualify as domestic violence unless it is "a punch in the face," and that, as a result, many allegations of abuse that do not meet this threshold are not investigated. These misconceptions impact the intensity with which IPRA investigates these claims. For example, in one complaint, the girlfriend of a CPD officer alleged that he pushed her to the ground and hit her on the head with an object, injuring her, and that the officer had assaulted her on four different occasions in the past. Two days after the initiation of the complaint, the victim told the investigator that she did not want to pursue the case further because the officer agreed to seek anger management counseling, and because the two had decided to "work on their relationship." In light of the considerations in domestic violence cases described above, the investigator in this case should have attempted to gain her trust and cooperation to enable the investigation to move forward. Instead, IPRA closed this case.

The City recognizes that investigators need more training, and IPRA is beginning to substantially revamp and increase training for all staff, especially investigators. As part of the newly formed COPA, the City plans to create new trainings for all staff, including a one-week "on-boarding program" for all COPA employees and a new investigator/legal staff academy. IPRA's current Chief Administrator informed us that the academy will last five to six weeks, and will cover topics such as investigative policies and procedures, case management practices, crime scene management, external investigative resources, and investigative skill building. The creation of these new training programs is an important step towards improving the quality of misconduct investigations and changing the culture to one that is more determined to resolve investigations and reliably determine whether an officer committed misconduct. CPD has not informed us of similar plans for BIA investigators, although such training is necessary for those investigators as well.

In addition to the new general training plans described above, the City should also improve allegation-specific training to ensure investigators are equipped to properly handle the nuances and complexities of more complicated allegations. Although IPRA's Chief Administrator informed us that the new training program will cover investigative subject areas, including training in each of the areas under IPRA's/COPA's jurisdiction, the depth and breadth of that training is unclear.

D. Insufficient Staffing Contributes to IPRA's Investigative Deficiencies

Although lack of resources cannot account for all of the investigative deficiencies we found during our investigation, it is clear that the City has given IPRA a tremendous responsibility without providing sufficient resources to accomplish the mission effectively. Many of the troubling shortcuts we found in individual investigations, as well as the policy decisions that prevent cases from being meaningfully investigated, have the hallmarks of an overwhelmed agency working in a constant state of triage. The City has recently committed to providing more funding to IPRA when it becomes COPA, and the agency has already begun to hire additional staff. But COPA's range of responsibilities will also be much broader than IPRA's, and there has not been sufficient analysis to determine whether COPA will have the capacity to do any better than IPRA. The City should be mindful of the concerns discussed below and ensure that it provides resources to COPA adequate for it to succeed.

IPRA's historically high caseload was in part due to the sheer size of CPD and in part due to the large volume of cases it inherited from OPS. When IPRA replaced OPS in 2007, it took on a tremendous backlog of cases, which continued to grow for several years, causing some investigators to carry as many as 60 investigative files. Operating with fewer than 90 total staff, IPRA struggled to work through this backlog while keeping up with new complaints filed against CPD's 12,000-plus sworn members. Although no comprehensive staffing study has been done to determine how many investigators are needed at CPD, IPRA's current staff is too small by any estimate. As described by a former high level IPRA official, "IPRA was never given the resources for the volume it was expected to handle."

In addition to causing the investigative delays described below, IPRA's burdensome workload has negatively impacted its investigatory methods and even its findings. IPRA investigators and supervisors agreed that the resource issue incentivizes investigators to reach not-sustained findings. They explained that it is easy and less work to develop a case enough to justify a not-sustained finding, but that it takes a lot more work to push the case to either a sustained or unfounded finding. Investigators are also inclined towards not-sustained findings because they know the case will not need approval beyond their immediate supervisor. Our review of investigative files indicates that this admission might plausibly explain many instances in which IPRA's findings appeared at odds with the facts.

Insufficient resources also incentivize IPRA investigators to close cases prematurely. Investigators told us that high caseloads led supervisors and IPRA leadership to implement new procedures designed to close cases more quickly, even though they represent poor investigative practice. IPRA staff reported the following examples of such problematic procedures, each of which is discussed elsewhere in this Section, that in their view are directly attributable to inadequate staffing:

- The development of the Excessive Force Protocol that allows for administrative closure, without investigation, of force complaints deemed to be minor, even though proper investigation of such complaints might reveal more serious misconduct.
- Declining to investigate officer firearm discharges where the officer did not hit a subject (either intentionally or unintentionally, e.g., because the officer had bad

aim), even though IPRA supervisors agreed that such investigations would reveal deficiencies in training or policy in need of correction.

- Referral of many cases to “mediation,” because it eliminates the need to interview the officer or write a summary report (and the investigator does not need to attend the mediation), even though mediation may be inappropriate given the conduct alleged.
- Administratively closing investigations of Taser use, even though such investigations are mandatory.
- Relying too heavily on “to/from” statements from officers instead of demanding live interviews, even though live interviews would, among other things, allow investigators to probe behind officers’ statements and make vital credibility determinations.
- Reducing the number of people who review investigative summary reports, regardless of the finding.

All of these procedures sacrifice accountability because they preclude IPRA’s ability to conduct meaningful misconduct investigations in all circumstances.

Lack of resources also means that investigators are not engaging in other important oversight and accountability tasks that would benefit CPD, the City, and the community as a whole. For example, as noted elsewhere in this Report, IPRA is supposed to review settlements entered into by the City in civil rights lawsuits filed against police officers. IPRA staff admitted that these mandatory investigations of settled cases sometimes sat piled up on a shelf for years because such reviews were too time consuming to tackle given their current caseloads. Moreover, although IPRA staff acknowledged that ideally they would be tracking and collecting valuable investigative information from parallel police misconduct lawsuits that are ongoing, they reported being unable to do so due to large workloads. IPRA recognizes that beyond investigating individual allegations of misconduct, with proper resources, the agency could also proactively engage CPD in efforts aimed at preventing future misconduct, such as providing policy and training recommendations to CPD; performing broad-based trend analysis based on its investigations; and monitoring individual officers who are subject to a high number of complaints. Unfortunately, insufficient staffing has prevented IPRA from undertaking these important tasks.

IPRA leadership is enthusiastic about again taking on these tasks and more under the new accountability ordinance once COPA is in place. But it is far from clear whether COPA’s increased funding will sufficiently cover its new expanded responsibilities. Without a meaningful evaluation of needs, and a steadfast commitment to meeting those needs, there is little doubt that high caseloads, with the profound impact this has on the quality and timeliness of IPRA’s investigations, will remain.

E. Investigations Lack Timely Resolutions, Undermining the Quality of Investigations and Credibility of the Process

IPRA expects, and its enabling ordinance requires, that it will complete investigations within six months. However, this is rarely accomplished. In cases where IPRA sustains the allegations in a complaint, it takes an average of two-and-a-half *years* to complete the

investigation. Members of the Department and the public alike are frustrated with how long it takes CPD and IPRA to complete these investigations.

1. Structural deficiencies cause investigative delays

Structural deficiencies within Chicago's investigative entities allow complaints of officer misconduct to go unresolved for unreasonable amounts of time. Investigations are often delayed at the outset because of the affidavit requirement, as discussed above. IPRA and BIA often take weeks and months before securing an affidavit. Not only does this delay the preservation of evidence through witness interviews, but the more time investigators spend chasing complainants for affidavits, the less time they spend trying to complete other investigations, thus causing additional delays.

And after an affidavit is secured, the investigative agencies do not appear to follow strict deadlines for the completion of various steps or the investigation as a whole. While IPRA gives its investigators some guidance on how long it should take to complete some investigative steps, these do not appear to be firm deadlines, nor do there appear to be repercussions for when investigators fail to meet them. Nor are there deadlines for supervisory review, resulting in reviews taking anywhere from one week to six months. While internal deadlines are sometimes easier set than kept, providing clear guidance about important investigative deadlines and prioritizing tasks helps promote timely investigations. Some investigations are inherently more complex than others, and adherence to tight deadlines will be difficult, if not impossible. However, without any firm deadlines for investigative activities, these investigations have strung out for years, often transferring between several investigators before even basic steps are complete.

Another policy causing delay is the unwillingness of IPRA and BIA to pursue administrative charges against an officer while criminal charges are contemplated or pending in court. The Chief of BIA stated that BIA will never conduct parallel investigations, and will always wait for a declination of charges from the State's Attorney's Office before continuing an administrative investigation. IPRA investigators acknowledged following the same practice. This means that administrative investigations remain open for months, if not years, awaiting the resolution of a criminal case that, in nearly every instance, is not prosecuted.

Most investigators interviewed believed incorrectly that such practice is required under *Garrity v. New Jersey*, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (holding that an officer cannot be compelled to make a statement against his will for the purposes of an administrative investigation that will then later be used against him in a criminal investigation). However, parallel administrative and criminal investigations can and do occur as long as precautions are taken to not taint the criminal investigation with any evidence from compelled interviews in the administrative investigation. Given that both IPRA and BIA investigators generally provide investigative assistance to prosecutors in criminal investigations, pursuing parallel investigations may require additional resources, and in some cases, a valid reason may exist for deferring administrative investigations pending the outcome of a criminal investigation. However, when at all possible, IPRA and BIA should pursue the administrative misconduct investigation notwithstanding parallel criminal investigation, even if this requires staffing a "clean" and a "screen" investigative team for purposes of *Garrity*.

Finally, although we are not able to quantify it, our investigation found that another factor contributing to delayed investigations is the lack of resources described above. In many investigations not involving parallel criminal proceedings, important witness interviews did not take place for months or years after the incident, and the investigators admitted in the file that such delays were due to burdensome demands in other investigations.”

2. Investigative delays undermine investigative outcomes and reduce public and officer confidence

The consequences of delayed resolutions of investigations are severe. Most importantly, lengthy delays can make it impossible for investigators to uncover the truth: memories fade, evidence is lost, and investigators may not be able to locate those crucial witnesses needed to determine whether misconduct has occurred. Our review of investigative files shows that many witnesses, and particularly the accused, are not interviewed for months or years after the incident. A Chicago Tribune report reflected consistent results, showing an average four-month delay in officer-involved shooting cases before the shooter was interviewed, and in 15 cases the interview occurred over a year after the shooting.

Delayed investigations also compromise CPD’s ability to make discipline recommendations withstand appeal. Not only do protracted investigations enable the accused officer to argue the case should be dismissed on due process or statute of limitations grounds, but it greatly compromises the City’s ability to present a strong case during the layers of appeal afforded to officers. CPD’s discipline case typically relies on civilian witnesses who may not be available years after the incident or may not be cooperative or invested in the case since they have little to gain and much to lose by testifying openly about police misconduct in front of the accused officer.

Apart from the negative impact on outcomes, investigative delays also undermine the message that the City takes these complaints seriously. It disheartens complainants to learn that an officer they know to be abusive remains on the force for years after being the subject of a credible complaint of serious misconduct. These delays are unwelcome to officers as well: CPD and IPRA delays in completing misconduct and force investigations were one of the first and most frequent complaints we heard from officers from the outset of this investigation. Accused officers who have not engaged in misconduct are burdened with the scrutiny of being under investigation, and may be stuck doing “desk duty” for years while investigations languish. During our investigation, we heard from many officers who described understandable frustration with having their careers put on hold, sometimes for years, while the investigation creeps forward.

F. CPD and the City Do Not Take Sufficient Steps to Prevent Officers from Deliberately Concealing Misconduct

When officers—at any rank—conceal misconduct, it thwarts, often insurmountably, efforts to investigate and hold officers accountable. IPRA and BIA treat such efforts to hide evidence as ancillary and unexceptional misconduct, and often do not even investigate it.

1. Code of silence

One way to cover up police misconduct is when officers affirmatively lie about it or intentionally omit material facts. The Mayor has acknowledged that a “code of silence” exists within CPD, and his opinion is shared by current officers and former high-level CPD officials interviewed during our investigation. Indeed, in an interview made public in December 2016, the President of the police officer’s union admitted to such a code of silence within CPD, saying “there’s a code of silence everywhere, everybody has it . . . so why would the [Chicago Police] be any different.” One CPD sergeant told us that, “if someone comes forward as a whistleblower in the Department, they are dead on the street.”

When officers falsify reports and affirmatively lie in interviews and testimony, this goes well beyond any passive code of silence; it constitutes a deliberate, fundamental, and corrosive violation of CPD policy that must be dealt with independently and without reservation if the City and CPD are genuine in their efforts to have a functioning system of accountability that vindicates the rights of individuals who are abused by CPD officers.

We cannot determine the exact contours of this culture of covering up misconduct, nor do we know its precise impact on specific cases. What is clear from our investigation, however, is that a code of silence exists, and officers and community members know it. This code is apparently strong enough to incite officers to lie even when they have little to lose by telling the truth. In one such instance, an officer opted to lie and risk his career when he accidentally discharged his pepper spray while dining in a restaurant—a violation that otherwise merits minor discipline. Even more telling are the many examples where officers who simply witness misconduct and face no discipline by telling the truth choose instead to risk their careers to lie for another officer. We similarly found instances of supervisors lying to prevent IPRA from even investigating misconduct, such as the case discussed elsewhere in this Report in which a lieutenant provided a video to IPRA but recommended that the case be handled with non-disciplinary intervention rather than investigated, describing the video as only depicting the use of “foul language” and affirmatively denying that it contained any inflammatory language or that the victim made any complaints — both patently false statements as demonstrated by the video. High ranking police officials and rank-and-file members told us that these seemingly irrational decisions occur in part because officers do not believe there is much to lose by lying.

Rather than aggressively enforcing and seeking discharge for violations of CPD’s Rule 14, which prohibits making false statements, enforcement in this area is rarely taken seriously and is largely ignored. The IPRA enabling ordinance makes it discretionary for IPRA to initiate Rule 14 investigations incidental to one of its delegated mandatory investigations. Investigators rarely exercise this discretion, and it is so little used that there is much confusion even over whether BIA or IPRA would have jurisdiction over such a Rule 14 investigation. Provisions in the CBA add to the obstacles facing Rule 14 enforcement. Under the FOP contract, investigators cannot base Rule 14 charges on a video unless the officer is first allowed to view the video and correct prior false statements, regardless of their materiality.

Not only are Rule 14 investigations not encouraged, but past IPRA leadership prohibited investigators from initiating such Rule 14 investigations without obtaining approval from the IPRA Chief Administrator, sending a strong message to investigators not to expand their

investigations into collateral Rule 14 charges. Such Rule 14 requests required a *de facto* higher standard of proof and were rarely approved. One IPRA supervisor told us that while investigating an incident involving an off-duty officer in a bar, she discovered the officer lied in a police report but was denied permission to bring Rule 14 charges. In another case, an investigator sustained a Rule 14 charge for making false statements in his interview, but IPRA leadership rejected this recommendation and directed the report be changed to exonerated.

The former IPRA Chief Administrator explained his reluctance to authorize Rule 14 charges: “we don’t make Rule 14 allegations in a cavalier way, because we realize how significant it is and how devastating it can be to a police officer’s career . . . it impacts their credibility as a witness, and in so many instances can be a career killer.” Of course, no legitimate investigative body should make *any* misconduct allegations in a cavalier way. But the reason for not doing so should be based upon a firm commitment to act only based on the evidence, not undue concern about an officer’s career. After all, officers who lie cannot be effective officers, should not be testifying in court proceedings, cannot instill confidence in the community, and discredit and demoralize the many honest officers on the force.

In practice, IPRA rarely asserts Rule 14 charges when officers make false exculpatory statements or denials in interviews about alleged misconduct, even when the investigation results in a sustained finding as to the underlying misconduct. This is true even in some cases we reviewed in which video shows the accused officer lied about the underlying misconduct or tried to cover up evidence. One case we reviewed included witnesses statements and a video showing the accused officer lied in a police report about the basis for arresting the complainant, but no Rule 14 charges were made and the officer received a two-day suspension following mediation. In another case, the video shows an officer punch a handcuffed woman in a massage parlor and then shows the officer looking for the video recorder he realized had captured the abuse. IPRA failed to discipline the officer for the obvious cover-up attempt and settled the physical abuse claim in mediation for an 8-day suspension.

Nor do investigators hold witness officers responsible for covering up misconduct of others. Investigators do not diligently review the investigative records to determine whether witness officers have lied in police reports or whether supervisors have blindly approved reports without attempting to determine whether the reports are fabricated. In one case we reviewed, the complainant alleged an officer punched him while handcuffed in a hospital, which was denied by both the accused officer and his partner. A video later surfaced showing that both officers lied, but Rule 14 charges were never brought against the *witness* officer. Indeed, our investigation revealed that there were only 98 Rule 14 charges sustained over the last five years. Only one of these sustained cases was initiated by IPRA against an officer *witness* who IPRA discovered lied to cover up misconduct of another. Moreover, in many of the cases where Rule 14 charges were brought and sustained against accused officers for lying, the discipline imposed was less than discharge. Almost one-third of all the sustained Rule 14 cases had a recommended punishment of 25-day suspension or less, and some of the discharge recommendations were reduced or overturned on appeal.

Furthermore, even in the rare case where a Rule 14 charge is made and results in a sustained finding, officers face little risk that such finding will impact their ability to testify in criminal cases in support of the prosecution. We learned in our investigation that there is no

system in place to ensure that all officer disciplinary findings bearing on credibility, including Rule 14 findings, are supplied to the State's Attorney's Office and criminal defendants, even though this is required under *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

The Laquan McDonald case demonstrates that Rule 14 violations are ignored by IPRA. Neither the IPRA investigators nor the IPRA Chief Administrator considered pursuing Rule 14 charges against any of the officers who witnessed the shooting and completed reports that seem inconsistent with the video footage, nor against the supervisors who approved such reports. Not until Chicago's Office of Inspector General took over the case were Rule 14 investigations opened and sustained findings made. The point here is not to prejudge whether such Rule 14 charges arising out of the McDonald shooting should have been sustained or will survive challenge, but rather to highlight by example the reluctance of IPRA investigators to even initiate a Rule 14 investigation. IPRA's unwillingness to open Rule 14 investigations or bring Rule 14 charges, even when there is evidence that officers attempted to conceal misconduct, only perpetuates the code of silence. It is critically important that IPRA change its historical practice and pursue Rule 14 charges against officers, including witness officers, whenever there is evidence of deceit, concealment or cover up.

Finally, IPRA and BIA investigators must not just sit back and wait for a testimony-impeaching video to appear. Instead, they should be collecting all available information and assessing whether officer's stories match the evidence. A valuable source of such information includes judicial proceedings where judges occasionally make affirmative findings that an officer's testimony is not credible. This information should be critical not only to police officials who supervise those testifying officers, but also to IPRA and BIA to better evaluate credibility in pending and future investigations involving those officers. More importantly, they should be evaluating whether the circumstances surrounding a judicial credibility finding would support a sustained Rule 14 investigation. For example, in investigating the many administrative charges against one CPD officer, including a fatal officer-involved shooting, it would have been helpful for IPRA investigators to know that a judge had found this officer to have lied in court testimony in 2011. Yet prior to our investigation, there was no system in place for CPD or IPRA to collect such judicial information. Not surprisingly, none of the Rule 14 charges brought against officers in the last five years was based on false testimony in court. This indifference to judicial proceedings involving officer credibility is particularly troubling in the criminal context where IPRA and BIA should have already had a system in place to evaluate whether suppression hearings should trigger administrative investigations into 4th Amendment violations.²⁴

2. Tampering with video and audio

Real-time audio and video footage of alleged misconduct is one of the most effective tools in overcoming the code of silence and making credibility determinations. Such evidence provides direct insight into what actually took place, has been shown to deter unfounded

²⁴ After our investigation began, the State's Attorney's Office announced it had begun reviewing cases in which officers' testimony had been questioned by judges and had begun issuing "disclosure notices" notifying criminal defense lawyers that a judge has discredited an officer's testimony. This is a positive step for the CPD accountability system and the Cook County criminal justice system but will require oversight to ensure that this program is effective and that it continues when public focus turns elsewhere.

misconduct complaints, and minimizes the risk that witnesses will later give false statements about the incident, increasing accountability and the public's confidence in the accountability system. Yet, CPD has done very little until recently to ensure that police conduct is captured on audio and video.²⁵

Not until the public release of the McDonald shooting video—captured on only two of the five car cameras and excluding all related audio—has CPD made much effort to ensure that cameras and microphones entrusted to officers are working properly and are not tampered with. A January 2016 CPD report following the McDonald video release found that the audio capability of 80% of the Department's dash-cams was either not working or had been tampered with. The report stated that officers had routinely removed microphone batteries, destroyed antennae, and stashed mics in the glove compartment boxes of their squad cars.

CPD's law enforcement partners have similarly expressed frustration with the Department's failure to capture officer conduct, despite having video and audio recorders. Former Cook County State's Attorney Anita Alvarez, for example, called the lack of audio in police dash- and body-cam videos was "frustrating" and "something . . . the Police Department has to address." Similarly, our investigation revealed that officers consistently failed to check or sync their dash-cam mics with the in-car system, rendering them useless. Yet IPRA and BIA have rarely investigated whether these instances were deliberate attempts to tamper with video or audio recordings, and, if so, taken any disciplinary action.

Shortly after our investigation began, the CPD Superintendent warned beat officers that they would be disciplined for failure to follow proper dash-cam protocol. The reminder that officers should follow this policy was probably needed: prior to the McDonald case, it is hard to find any inquiry into the suspicious failure of most of CPD vehicles' dash-cams.

In the aftermath of the release of the McDonald video, the Department pledged to expand its body-worn-camera initiative, announcing in September 2016 that all CPD patrol officers will have body-cams by the end of 2018. However, in a December 2016 press release, CPD announced that the initiative was being fast-tracked and that all officers in the 22 police districts will have body-cams by the end of 2017, a year ahead of schedule. This is a positive accountability reform. But body-cams will not be any more successful than dash-cams unless CPD works with police unions and community groups on policies and protocols for body camera usage and develops better accountability measures. Currently, the CPD policy on the use of such cameras is insufficient, and in many instances directives are vague or confusing. There is no policy directing supervisors as to when or whether they regularly review recordings to ensure proper use of the cameras and identify officer training opportunities or conduct concerns. Further, current policy does not explicitly provide that an officer who deliberately fails to use his or her assigned body-cam properly will face discipline. It should therefore come as no surprise that a recent high-profile use-of-force incident in a July 2016 shooting of an unarmed teenager by an officer wearing a body camera was inexplicably not captured on audio or video. It appears that officers have become used to ignoring CPD rules requiring them to use dash- or body-cams

²⁵ CPD and IPRA also do not sufficiently gather or make use of the audio and video showing misconduct that is available. This problem is discussed separately in this Section.

because such behavior was not being investigated or punished. It will take committed effort for CPD and IPRA to undo this attitude.

Transparency tools like dash- and body-cameras have perhaps unmatched potential to simultaneously confront the Department's recognized code of silence and make the City safer for both officers and civilians. They can do neither, however, if they are not used. We are encouraged by the City's respect for and focus on the powerful accountability tools of audio and video. Strong foundational policies and long-term oversight is necessary to ensure their potential is realized.

3. Complainant and witness intimidation

We identified a significant number of incidents where the evidence supports concluding that CPD officers intimidated potential complainants or witnesses from filing or testifying regarding misconduct complaints.

We heard from numerous advocates and individual victims of police abuse that officers who engaged in force against a civilian routinely file baseless police assault and battery charges against the victim and other witnesses to the misconduct. In 2006, a patron in a restaurant claimed that after being beaten up by several off-duty officers, he and witnesses to that incident were falsely arrested for battery to cover up the incident. In another case in 2009, the City settled for \$100,000 a lawsuit alleging a CPD lieutenant falsely arrested him for battery to cover up the officer's abuse of the plaintiff. In 2014, the City settled another lawsuit for \$30,000 where a driver alleged an off-duty officer aimed his gun at him and then filed false battery charges to cover it up when other officers arrived on the scene.

Filing false assault charges not only constitutes an independent civil rights violation, but is powerful discouragement to potential complainants and witnesses regarding police misconduct. Criminal assault charges against witnesses also undermine their credibility when testifying about the misconduct, as we know from the 2006 restaurant incident mentioned above.

Failure to investigate and discipline for witness and complainant intimidation not only prevents CPD from resolving allegations of misconduct, but undermines the integrity of the system as a whole. Moreover, using complainant non-cooperation as a rationale for closing cases where the complainant explicitly alleges intimidation sends the message to CPD officers that witness intimidation can be an effective tactic. In one illustrative case in which a woman alleged that an officer had raped her, she refused to provide BIA the officer's name, and refused to sign an affidavit, telling the investigator that the officer had told her that he had "bigger power" over her and would "fuck her up" if she went to the hospital or the police. The woman alleged that the officer had also threatened her girlfriend, a possible witness to the rape. Despite providing a detailed account of the alleged rape—on two separate occasions—to the investigator, the investigator did not follow up on the results of the rape kit, did not attempt to interview a known witness, and did not canvass for witnesses at the location where the victim and the officer reportedly met. Nor does the investigator appear to have sought an affidavit override. The BIA investigator instead closed the investigation, "based on the victim's refusal to cooperate any further."

G. The City's Discipline System Lacks Integrity and Does Not Effectively Deter Misconduct

On the rare occasions when an allegation of misconduct is sustained, and the even rarer occasions when the sustained finding results in true discipline, CPD initiates a convoluted, lengthy process of determining, and revisiting, the appropriate discipline through several layers. The lack of guidance for determining the initial disciplinary penalty; the many opportunities for second-guessing and undermining the penalty; and the amount of time this process takes, has made CPD's disciplinary policy illegitimate in the eyes of officers and the public alike, and rendered it ineffective at deterring misconduct and contributing to a culture of integrity.

1. Discipline system

Once an IPRA or BIA investigator determines that an allegation against an officer should be sustained, the investigator and/or the investigator's supervisor recommends discipline. The discipline that an investigator can recommend ranges widely. Despite the sustained finding, sometimes no discipline is actually imposed, or the only discipline that is imposed is that a violation is noted on the officer's record. A "violation noted" penalty is only slightly less meaningless than a "no discipline imposed" resolution, as it will only remain on an officer's disciplinary history for one year. During the January 2011 through March 2016 time period we reviewed, 28.4% of sustained findings resulted in "no discipline imposed" or only a "violation noted." Investigators can also recommend that the officer receive a "verbal reprimand," which amounts to a supervisor addressing the officer's wrongful conduct verbally, but nothing more. Sustained findings were resolved with "verbal reprimand" in 24.8% of the closed cases we reviewed. Investigators can also recommend suspension from one to 365 days, and in certain circumstances, discharge from CPD. CPD officers received suspensions in 45.6% of sustained cases we reviewed, with an average recommended suspension of 7.8 days. However, the average is inflated by a small number of cases that resulted in lengthy suspensions. The most frequent suspension length was one day; the median suspension length was three days. Discharge occurred in nine cases, or 1.1% of the cases during the time period we reviewed. The investigator's recommendation to sustain an allegation and impose discipline is subject to review within IPRA, including review by IPRA's general counsel and the chief administrator, prior to the recommendation leaving IPRA. While CPD is currently developing a matrix of disciplinary penalties to guide this decision-making process, CPD's unions have not signed off on it, and it has significant deficiencies, as discussed below.

After the recommended discipline is finalized at either IPRA or BIA, there are many layers—up to seven—of review before it is final and can be imposed. First, except in cases where discharge is recommended, the recommendation is subject to a Command Channel Review (CCR), in which supervisors in the accused officer's chain of command review and comment on the recommended discipline. Next, the recommendation, along with CCR comments, is forwarded to the Superintendent for review. Discharge recommendations skip the CCR review and go directly to the Superintendent. The Chief of BIA makes a final disciplinary decision that is forwarded to the Superintendent for review after the BIA investigator's recommendation has gone through the CCR process.

The Superintendent has 90 days to respond to discipline recommendations by IPRA, or the discipline is deemed accepted. There is no time limit for Superintendent review of BIA disciplinary recommendations. At any point along this path, the command channel can essentially start the process over again by sending the case back to the investigative unit and asking for more investigation.

Once a disciplinary recommendation reaches the Superintendent he can approve it or, if he disagrees with it, he must meet with IPRA's Chief Administrator to attempt to resolve the dispute. If they cannot agree, a three-person panel of the Chicago Police Board will resolve the disagreement. See Section [IV.H](#). The Superintendent can also ask for more investigation to be done, possibly restarting the review process, or even overturning the sustained finding. Once the Superintendent has approved a disciplinary recommendation, it is "final" unless it must be submitted to the Police Board for a full hearing. See Section [IV.G](#). In these instances, discipline is not final until approved by the Board, a process which generally takes additional years.

CPD officers can and frequently do challenge the "final" disciplinary decision. If the recommended discipline is suspension of 10 days or less, the officer can go through a binding "summary opinion" process. If the recommended discipline is suspension for a period between 11 and 30 days, the officer may also challenge the discipline by filing a grievance, which will be decided through arbitration. Finally, if the recommended discipline is suspension between 31 and 365 days, the officer may appeal the decision to the Police Board or an arbitrator, at the officer's election. Under the grievance procedures, if the parties are unable to settle during the initial negotiations with the officer's commanding officer or in mediation, the officer is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing before a neutral arbitrator. Decisions of an arbitrator through the grievance proceedings as well as appeal decisions by the Police Board are subject to administrative review in the Circuit Court of Cook County and can then be appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court. Pursuing the grievance procedure adds an average of three extra years to the disciplinary process.

Only after these steps are completed can discipline actually be imposed on an officer. And, when a suspension finally is imposed, an officer can serve the suspension by using paid vacation or furlough days, resulting in no loss of income to the officer.

2. CPD's disciplinary system is ineffective

The outcomes of officer-conduct investigations are critical to holding officers accountable for misconduct and deterring future misconduct. See *McLin by and through Harvey v. City of Chicago*, 742 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (N. D. Ill. 1990) ("A failure to discipline officers, resulting in increased abusive behavior by police officers, has been recognized to be a policy for which municipal liability may attach."); *Sassak v. City of Park Ridge*, 431 F. Supp. 2d 810, 816 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (noting that failure to discipline allegations often support a finding of municipal liability because "a policy of condoning abuse may embolden a municipal employee and facilitate further abusive acts."). CPD's system for imposing discipline on officers who it has determined have committed misconduct suffers from systemic deficiencies that undermine its fairness, consistency, and effectiveness.

a. CPD's disciplinary process takes too long and needlessly introduces opportunities to undermine accountability

Having individuals at all levels weigh in on disciplinary recommendations, and even send cases back for more investigation, creates needless opportunity to undermine accountability. Additionally, these multiple layers of review make discipline unduly slow to be imposed. The City's current process thus leaves both victims and officers unclear how, when, or if an officer will be held accountable for misconduct the officer committed, sometimes for years after a finding has been sustained. On top of the delays that occur while an investigation is still with BIA or IPRA, once an investigative finding is made, the additional layers of review by the CCR, Superintendent, or Police Board can result in *years* of additional delay from the time when an allegation is sustained until discipline is actually imposed and served.

The City should take measures to reduce delays in this process, but should ensure that in doing so it does not introduce new problems. One example of this complicated dynamic involves the City's use of "summary opinions." An officer's right under his collective bargaining agreement to challenge imposed discipline can result in even further delays. The most recent FOP collective bargaining agreement created the "summary opinion" process, which was intended to resolve discipline grievances more quickly. This option has allowed for more speedy resolution of these matters. The Police Accountability Task Force found that, when summary opinion was used, the average time from the misconduct to the issuance of the arbitrator's opinion was 447 days, as compared to 1,049 days under the older system that did not allow for summary opinion.

In addition to these delays, CCR undermines accountability more directly. While the accused officer's supervisory chain should certainly receive notice of the disciplinary decision, which would allow them to better supervise their officers, little value is gained and much is lost in the current process. As the Mayor's Police Accountability Task Force recently stated, "Command Channel Review (CCR) provides a platform for members who are potentially sympathetic to the accused officer to advocate to reduce or eliminate discipline." The Task Force also found that arbitration decisions overturning discipline quote reviewers who not only disagreed with the discipline but opined that the allegation should not have been sustained at all. The Task Force's conclusions are consistent with our findings on this point. Indeed, we recommended to the City during the course of this investigation that it modify the CCR process, and instead have discipline decided at a disciplinary conference headed by a single individual whose decision is reviewed directly by the Superintendent. We further recommended that investigators should never recommend discipline following a sustained finding. The disciplinary conference process we recommended is used in law enforcement agencies across the country to improve accountability systems. With the latest version of the draft disciplinary matrix, discussed below, the City appears to have rejected our suggestions and decided to leave this broken process in place with only superficial changes.

By eliminating unnecessary layers of review, and holding necessary reviewers to strict deadlines, the City would be able to decrease how long it takes for a complaint to reach final resolution, and better ensure that discipline is not overturned. This, in turn, would enhance certainty and speed, increasing officer and public confidence that the complaint adjudication system is fair and efficient, and giving it far greater deterrent value.

- b. *Lack of appropriate guidance for determining discipline results in too much discretion and inconsistencies in how discipline is decided*

A lack of clear guidance on appropriate penalty ranges undermines the legitimacy and deterrent effect of discipline within CPD.

Prior to the start of our investigation, investigators' disciplinary recommendations were not guided by any formal standards. Instead, the discipline recommended following a finding of misconduct was entirely up to the discretion of the investigator and his or her supervisor. This resulted in disparities in discipline recommended both across incidents involving the same offense, and even within a single incident as it proceeds through various layers of review. For example, we reviewed one incident where investigators recommended a 150-day suspension for various misconduct violations; command channel reviewers disagreed, and recommended between six and eight days for those same violations; and the IPRA administrator finally recommended a 60-day suspension. This case is currently pending before the Police Board, and the ultimate discipline that will be imposed (for an incident that occurred in January of 2011—six years ago) is still unknown.

In recent months the City has been developing a “disciplinary matrix” that outlines presumptive penalties for misconduct violations by offense type. There are three categories of penalties for each offense type: mitigated, presumptive, and aggravated. In other words, for each offense type, there is a presumptive penalty range, but also a “mitigated” range that can be imposed if certain mitigating circumstances are presented, or a heightened “aggravated” range if there are aggravating circumstances present. The City also created a “guidelines” document to explain what each offense category encompasses, and how to use the disciplinary matrix, including the factors to consider when imposing discipline and mitigating down or aggravating up from the presumptive penalty.

During this investigation, we reviewed and provided feedback on the first draft matrix and guidelines. The City incorporated some of the changes we suggested, but did not incorporate some of the more difficult but critical modifications that we believe are necessary to ensure the disciplinary system will be fair, impartial, and transparent. For example, the current versions still remain unnecessarily vague. There are several “miscellaneous” categories that do not provide sufficient direction for what offenses are included in those categories. Another category, “failure to ensure civil rights,” is described as a violation where the “member fails to ensure that a person’s civil rights are not violated.” Because these categories are so sweeping, it is unlikely that they will be applied consistently and fairly.

The current draft matrix also still prescribes unusually low punishments for conduct that is inconsistent with constitutional, respectful policing, and allows for mitigation in circumstances where doing so would be inappropriate. For example, the latest version of the matrix allows a mitigating range for the offense of “verbal abuse-racial/ethnic,” meaning the use of language that is racially or ethnically derogatory.

Moreover, although the guidelines reference how second and third offenses should be considered, the matrix itself does not account for progressive punishment for subsequent offenses. The language in the guidance suggests only that third offenses result in a penalty “at or

near the top end of the Aggravated Penalty Range . . . except in extraordinary circumstances.” Those circumstances are not defined, leaving decision makers unclear when a subsequent offense merits harsher discipline. Without clear, well-defined guidelines for how subsequent offenses will be punished, the matrix system does not ensure sufficient accountability for repeat offenders.

Other disciplinary ranges in the matrix are so large that they provide no useful guidance. For example, for “Crime Misconduct” categories such as “Conspiracy to Commit a Crime,” “Other Misdemeanor Arrest,” and “Sex Offense, Other” the discipline range is 31 to 365 days. If the offense is “aggravated,” separation is permitted. Yet, it is difficult to imagine conduct that is serious enough to warrant discipline on the upper end of the presumptive range, yet not serious enough to warrant separation. Moreover, it is unclear why the City believes that an officer found to have engaged in some of these offenses should remain on the police force at all. In any event, the ranges provided for these types of offenses allow for too much variation and discretion, which may result in unfair disparities.

Finally, adherence to the draft disciplinary matrix is not mandatory. As currently drafted, the guidelines state that “the CR Matrix is to be used as a *set of guiding principles* in the administration of discipline. It does not prohibit the [decision-maker] from assessing a different penalty where unique and exceptional circumstances may warrant.” (emphasis added). “Unique and exceptional circumstances” is not defined, and CPD does not provide even a single example of such circumstances, or illustrate how they fairly factor into discipline. At best, this lack of specificity leaves well-meaning individuals to guess whether a given set of circumstances is unique or exceptional. At worst, this language leaves the door open for less well-disposed individuals to favor or disfavor officers according to whim. In both instances, it would be difficult to hold anyone accountable for poor decisions.

The creation of the disciplinary matrix and guidelines is an important step towards providing greater consistency and clarity in discipline for officer misconduct, but the deficiencies described above still allow for too much discretion and the imposition of discipline that is incongruent with the offense.

H. Chicago’s Police Board

The Police Board has a long history of overturning the Superintendent’s misconduct findings and proposed discipline, but this trend has changed over the past year. While this change is welcome and appropriate, our investigation indicated that there are structural challenges to the Board’s process that, unless addressed, may prevent this change from taking hold long term. We found also that the Police Board’s effectiveness is undermined by the same investigative deficiencies that render CPD’s accountability ineffective more generally. Below we discuss these challenges to assist Chicago’s efforts to ensure that the Board continues to become, and remains, a stronger component of CPD’s accountability structure.

1. Background of Chicago’s Police Board

Created in the wake of a crisis (the Summerdale Scandal of 1959), Chicago’s nine-member Police Board was expected by many Chicagoans to function primarily as an independent

accountability check on CPD. But the Police Board arguably has undermined accountability by routinely overturning or reducing the Superintendent's disciplinary decisions, often overturning sustained findings altogether, even in instances where Board members may believe the officer in fact committed misconduct. This misconduct includes the unreasonable use of deadly force and other violations for which the Superintendent and IPRA recommended termination.

To understand why the Police Board is perceived as an ineffective accountability mechanism, despite the best efforts of many of its members, it is important to recognize the Board's built-in structural conflict. Through a combination of policy and practice, the Board has evolved into an amalgam of at least three, typically separate, types of police/civilian entities.

It appears clear that, at least when it was formed, the Board was meant to serve some of the functions that *police commissions* serve in some other large cities (such as Los Angeles). That is, by its authorizing municipal ordinance, the Board is tasked with adopting "rules and regulations for the governance of the police department of the city," and with influencing the selection of Police Superintendent by nominating the names of three candidates to the Mayor, from which the Mayor is to select. As confirmed by several Board officials during our conversations with them, the Board has "never" really fulfilled its duty of adopting CPD rules and regulations.

The Police Board has instead evolved into a combination of civil service protection panel and independent-oversight backstop, but without sufficient guidance as to how to effectively navigate this difficult dual role. The Police Board in some respects acts as a *civil service commission*, part of a system meant to "protect efficient public employees from partisan political control." See *Glenn v. City of Chicago*, 628 N.E. 2d 844, 850 (Ill. App. 3d 1993). In this role, the Board has viewed itself as focused on ensuring procedural due process for any officer subject to discipline. The Board officials we spoke with emphasized, for example, the Board's role in giving the officer a robust opportunity to "confront the evidence" against him or her, and to ensure that the officer receives "due process."

The Board also appears to see itself, however, as serving the role of an *independent oversight agency*, having a responsibility to the broader Chicago community to ensure that the values and views of the public are reflected in the Department's misconduct findings and imposition of discipline. Board officials thus emphasized their role ensuring that the hearing process is "transparent," and that "ordinary citizens" have input into discipline, and that they are "not all lawyers" and that they represent people who live both in Chicago's "wealthy" and "poor" areas. Similarly, the Board's website lists "holding monthly public meetings that provide an opportunity for all members of the public to present questions and comments to the Board, the Superintendent of Police and the Chief Administrator of [IPRA]" as one of its "primary" powers and responsibilities.

There is no inherent conflict between ensuring that officers' procedural rights are protected and that the Chicago public has insight into how the police officers who serve them are held accountable for misconduct. However, as Chicago's Police Board demonstrates, it is difficult for one entity to serve as both an arbiter of appropriate discipline and a conduit for public-police discourse, and impossible without a clear mandate and a set of balanced protocols. The Police Board lacks such a mandate or protocols, so rather than balancing these two roles

effectively, has seemed to vacillate between them. The public, police officers, and Board members alike are frustrated with public meetings during which the Board does not engage with the public and has no authority to address the concerns raised by the public, and at which the Superintendent and IPRA leadership may or may not show up to address public concerns and report on what they have done to address previously raised concerns. It appears clear that the Board's civilian outreach functions would be better placed in another entity, like the Community Oversight Board that the City reports it has committed to implementing within the next six to nine months.

Moving these civilian outreach functions to another entity would allow the Police Board to focus its efforts on where its greatest focus already lies and where it has its greatest potential impact: deciding CPD disciplinary matters in which the Superintendent is recommending discharge or lengthy suspensions.²⁶

2. The Police Board's role in deciding disciplinary cases

The Police Board is required to decide disciplinary cases in which the Superintendent has recommended termination of an officer, or suspension over one year, or suspension of a supervisor (rank of sergeant or above) for over 30 days. At the officer's election, the Board also reviews officer suspensions that are between 31 days and one year.²⁷ The Board's decision is *not* subject to Superintendent approval or veto, and may not be challenged via arbitration.²⁸

a. *Past trends in Police Board discipline decisions*

The Police Board has long been known for reversing many of the Superintendent's findings of misconduct, including most of the cases in which the Superintendent proposes discharging an officer. According to the Police Board's 2014 Annual Report (the most recent available), of the 16 discharge cases the Board decided, it upheld the Superintendent's discharge in only six, or 37%. It found "not guilty" in another six cases, thus going beyond refusing to discharge to wiping the slate entirely clean in another 37% of the cases in which the Superintendent had sought to discharge an officer. In another four cases, the Board reduced the

²⁶ As part of its role deciding certain disciplinary matters, the Board is assigned the responsibility of resolving disagreements between the Superintendent and IPRA over the recommended discipline for officers found to have committed misconduct. Where there is a disagreement, the Superintendent bears the burden of overcoming the IPRA Administrator's recommendation. See CHICAGO POLICE BOARD RULES OF PROCEDURE, SECTION VI (April 16, 2015). The frequency of such disagreements has varied over time, and the Board reportedly has overwhelmingly refused to overturn IPRA's recommendations. There have been no such disagreements since 2014, and in 2014 there was only one.

²⁷ Officers and supervisors may request Board review of a suspension of 30 days or less where the union decides not to arbitrate an officer's grievance.

²⁸ The Police Board's decision can be appealed only to Cook County Circuit Court via petition for administrative review. Either party may appeal the Circuit Court's decision to the Appellate Court of Illinois. The Court will overturn the Board's findings of facts only where they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court presumes the Board's findings of fact to be *prima facie* true and will find them contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is "clearly apparent." The Court will overturn the Board's imposition of discipline only where the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable, taking into account the Board's "wide latitude" to determine what punishment was appropriate to "punish the conduct of the officer . . . and deter future conduct by other officers." *McDermott v. City of Chicago Police Bd.*, 2016 IL App (1st) 151979, ¶ 35.

Superintendent's recommendation of discharge to a suspension or reprimand.²⁹ Similarly, of the 27 cases the Board decided in 2013, the Board upheld the Superintendent's recommendation of termination in only 11, about 40%, and overturned the sustained finding in an additional two. This trend was longstanding: a 2009 study by the Chicago Justice Organization found that the Board upheld the recommended discipline for a sworn officer in only 37% of the cases it heard.³⁰

This historically high rate of overturning the Superintendent's misconduct and disciplinary determination would not have been concerning if it reflected the Board's accurate determination that the Superintendent had erred in finding misconduct or in levying heavy discipline. And certainly there appear to have been many instances where this was the case and the Board served its important function of ensuring that police officers are not unfairly or unduly harshly punished. But our investigation, including our conversations with past and current Board officials, makes clear that it too often has been the case that Board officials have overturned the Superintendent's findings of misconduct and/or the level of proposed discipline—including in cases where they firmly believe that the officer committed the alleged misconduct.

The statistics set out above, alongside a review of the type of misconduct and discipline the Board has overturned over the years, makes clear that this dynamic has had a negative impact on officer accountability and police legitimacy in Chicago. The Board has, for example, reduced a case that resulted in an in-custody death (and a \$1.3 million dollar settlement) from discharge to reprimand, and reinstated an officer, despite a criminal conviction, for falsifying a field sobriety test that led to the arrest of a citizen. The City has paid out nearly \$400,000 in five lawsuits related to this officer's DUI stops.

b. Recent changes in Police Board discipline decisions

The Board's trend of overturning the Superintendent's recommendation to discharge an officer is changing. Over the past year, the Board tended to uphold the Superintendent's discharge recommendations far more frequently. In 2016, the Board sided with the Superintendent in the eight cases in which he recommended discharge. Additionally, in two discharge cases where the Board had previously found the officer not guilty, the City appealed the Board's decision and, upon remand, the Board imposed a 31-day suspension in one case and discharge in another. In another case on remand, given instructions to impose a penalty less than discharge in a case in which it had previously agreed with the Superintendent's proposed discharge, the Board imposed a suspension of five years. The Board reduced the Superintendent's recommended discharge, to an 18-month suspension, in only one case. In the one suspension case the Board decided, it affirmed the Superintendent's 60-day suspension. In seven other cases, the officer resigned after the Superintendent filed charges with the Board.

²⁹ In another five cases the officer resigned, and one case was otherwise dismissed prior to decision. The Board was more likely to uphold the Superintendent's suspension cases in 2014, upholding two of the three cases it heard, and, in an unprecedented decision, discussed below, recommending an increase in the penalty in a third case.

³⁰ It is unclear how dependent this change is on the individuals currently on the Board. As discussed below, there are several structural changes that can be made to the Police Board to improve its functioning at an institutional level, and increase officer and public confidence that its decisions are fair and impartial.

In 2014, the Board took the unique step of increasing an officer's discipline. It ordered an officer's discharge in a case in which the Superintendent had recommended a 60-day suspension. The Appellate Court found this to be a legitimate exercise of the Board's authority. *See Lesner v. Police Bd.*, 2016 Ill. App. (1st) 150545. This is potentially an important step forward in allowing the Board to serve a valuable, unique role in ensuring appropriate officer accountability in Chicago.

c. Challenges to effective Police Board review

As discussed below, there are numerous changes the City can and should make to ensure that the Board, as an institution, garners and retains greater confidence among CPD officers and the broader public.

It is worth noting at the outset that even if the Board corrected these structural challenges, many members of the public in Chicago might still find the Board a disappointment and even question its utility. This is because the Police Board only reviews cases where IPRA *and* the Superintendent have *already* determined that the officer committed misconduct. The Police Board does not provide independent civilian input into whether officers who were *not* found to have committed misconduct should have been.³¹ Nor does the Board have any authority or ability to ensure that IPRA completes investigations more quickly or more competently, or that an officer be recommended for discharge if neither IPRA nor the Superintendent have done so. The Police Board thus does not, and was not meant to, address the broad concern in Chicago—a concern that our investigation finds to be well-founded—that the Superintendent and IPRA sustain far too few allegations of misconduct, and propose discipline that is too low in the cases they do sustain.

Nonetheless, even as the Police Board cannot make up for problems in other components of the City's accountability processes, in the past it has done great harm by exacerbating the City's accountability failings through unnecessarily overturning so many of the very few cases that the City has managed to sustain. While this trend appears to have reversed itself in the past year, the discussion below is meant to help the City ensure this remains the case.

i. Description of Board hearing process

The Board conducts hearings pursuant to Rules of Procedure, most recently amended in April 2015. These Rules provide the framework for a quasi-trial process, with pre-hearing motions practice and hearings, which can last several days, in which the rules of evidence do not apply, although hearsay evidence is not admissible. At these hearings, the City has the burden of demonstrating, through the presentation of documentary evidence and live testimony, that the Superintendent's sustained finding is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The officer has the right to cross-examine all witnesses and otherwise challenge the testimony, and offer evidence in defense and mitigation. Should the City prevail at the "liability" phase, the trial proceeds to a "penalty" phase. Contract attorneys called hearing officers, of which there are

³¹ Several Police Board officials with whom we spoke expressed concern in particular about IPRA's handling of allegations against officers of domestic violence, including IPRA's failure to sustain such allegations and to "mediate" a resolution. Both of these topics are covered elsewhere in the [Accountability](#) Section of this Report.

three, have sole authority over the hearing itself. These hearing officers are attorneys from private practice and the only requirement is that they have five years' experience as an attorney. Their main functions, according to the Board officials with whom we spoke, is to create a good record for the Board's consideration; to present the case impartially to the Board; and to write up the Board's decision. Board members are provided with transcripts and video recordings of the hearing and meet privately to confer. The Board's final vote on each case is made at a public meeting. In 2012, these Rules were amended to require all Board decisions to be supported by written findings. These written decisions are posted on the Police Board's website.

Our investigation indicated that there are several elements of the Board's hearing process, and the City's accountability processes more generally, that contribute to officers avoiding accountability when they appear before the Police Board.

ii. Information available to Board unfairly skewed in officers' favor

The hearing officer and Board do not have full access to the officer's complaint and disciplinary file: due to restrictions in the collective bargaining agreement, even sustained findings of misconduct are available to the Board only if they occurred within the past five years. Nor does the Board know the officer's disciplinary or lawsuit history at the "liability" phase, even where that history could provide powerful probative evidence of whether the officer has a history of dishonesty, or whether the officer's current alleged misconduct is consistent with misconduct the officer has repeatedly been accused of, or even found to have committed, in the past. Even as the Board is denied access to this potentially critical information, it is given the officer's complete "complimentary" history—spanning the entirety of an officer's career.

In addition, the officer is permitted to have other officers, including commanders, testify as character witnesses for the officer, *at the liability phase* of proceedings, even where the charges do not place the officer's character at issue, notwithstanding the fact that the Superintendent is recommending discipline, often termination, for the officer. While this is styled as "character witness" testimony in support of "evidence in mitigation," its inclusion at the liability phase belies this label, as do the statements of some Police Board officials that the testimony of CPD supporting officers and commanders "means a lot" and that they "give their testimony more weight" (although other Police Board officials told us they give this testimony "no weight"). The Superintendent recently filed a motion to keep this information under seal or move it to a separate post-liability hearing. Board officials told us the Board denied this motion because it would extend the proceedings one month.

The format of the Board's hearing process may also undermine the effectiveness of the Board because it deprives the Board of the ability to directly assess the evidence. Because the Board reviews transcripts and video recordings of the hearing after it is completed, it is unable to ask clarifying questions or otherwise direct the proceedings to ensure the Board, as fact-finder, gets the information it needs to make a decision. Instead, it must rely entirely on the hearing officer. The precise extent to which the Board relies upon these hearing officers is unclear. One Board official told us that the hearing officer is "not allowed" to make credibility determinations; another Board official told us that the Board will in fact ask the hearing officer for credibility determinations. Regardless, it is clear that the quality of the hearing officer impacts the Board's

ability to make a decision. In one case, the Board reported it had to send the case back because the hearing officer had done such a poor job creating a record, “we couldn’t make sense of it.”

iii. City has in the past not effectively advocated for accountability

The relative inexperience of the attorneys representing the City and Superintendent, compared to the attorneys representing the officers, has undermined accountability, although this is reportedly improving. The Board told us that they feel compelled to let off officers they are sure committed the misconduct, because “the City messed up on the evidence.” Board members and others report that attorneys for the officers, all former state’s attorneys, have extensive trial experience and, in the words of one Police Board member, “make the Superintendent have to work.” At the same time, according to Police Board members, the City’s attorneys have little trial experience, and, in the past, have had to handle the trial on their own. In the words of one Board official, there is a “big disparity in experience and effectiveness” between City and officer attorneys. Still other advocates point to the potential for conflict: the City is advocating to discharge the officer even as it may be defending the City in civil litigation stemming from the same incident. One long term observer of the Police Board and Corp Counsel’s office asserts that this problem is exacerbated because the “firewall in the Corp Counsel’s office has not been honest or effective.” The City reportedly has recently begun to outsource representation of the City at some Board hearings, and sending better prepared attorneys (and more than one attorney) to others. Board members report that the quality of the City’s representation has increased in recent months “dramatically” as a result. The City should continue to build on these efforts.

iv. Board members and hearing officers lack training

The Board’s own lack of training regarding adjudicating police misconduct further undermines its effectiveness. Board members are generally not lawyers and have no background in policing or accountability. One Board member told us of voting against a Superintendent’s sustained finding of an unlawful search, even though the Board member agreed the search was unlawful, because of the amount of drugs the officers found during this “clearly” illegal search. Hearing officers can be similarly inexperienced, with a “wide variance in quality,” and problems creating a clear record for the Board’s consideration.

For at least the past 20 years, there has been no set or required training for either group. The training as described by one Board member consists of little more than a binder of materials; a tutorial on the burden of proof; the opportunity to watch an academy class on use of force; and an offer to go on a ride-along. The Board’s Executive Director conceded that “this is one area that needs improvement.” One former Board member pointed out that Board members should have a respect for policing, but that the Board would also do well to “put [Board members] in the homes of people on the West or South Side for a day and see what they go through.”

That the lack of training impacts Board decisions appears evident from some of the decisions themselves, described above, as well as in the disagreements we heard directly from Board members about proper application of the rules, such as when an officer should be discharged for lying, or whether officers should ever be found guilty for using profanity. Poor decisions may have been avoided with better training for both hearing officers and Board members.

v. *Lack of investigative timeliness and quality undermines accountability*

Board consideration of the Superintendent's recommendations is unquestionably compromised by the poor quality and lack of timeliness of IPRA and BIA investigations discussed elsewhere in this Report. According to Board officials, among cases decided since 2010, the median time from the date of the incident to charges being filed is four years for IPRA cases and over two years for BIA cases, and our conversation with Board members and a review of Board decisions makes clear charges are sometimes filed much longer than this after the date of the incident. In one case we reviewed, charges were filed in 2014 for incidents that took place sometime between 1999 and 2003. In other cases, the Board is unable to affirm the Superintendent's charges of excessive force because the charges were brought more than five years after the incident, in violation of Illinois' statute of limitations on excessive force charges brought against officers.³² In one such case, the Appellate Court upholding the Board's decision not to affirm the Superintendent's findings based on this lack of timeliness, stated:

[W]e find it necessary to express our dismay with the unreasonable length of time the Superintendent took bringing charges in this case The Superintendent brought charges more than six years after the incident, without any explanation other than a "mix-up" occurred. A delay of this magnitude does nothing to foster the public's interest in effective oversight and supervision of police officers nor does it foster the protection of a police officer's right to due process in defending serious disciplinary charges. The passage of an unreasonable amount of time adversely affects witness availability and recollection and the officer's ability to present a meaningful and effective defense to unjustified charges.³³

Board members and accountability advocates expressed similar concerns about the impact of delays on Board hearings. As one former Board member stated, the cases before it were "so old and so stale" that it was "unfair to the police officers; unfair to the witnesses; unfair to the victims." This lack of quality and timeliness has ramifications much broader than undermining the Police Board's ability to hold officers accountable, but this impact is particularly harmful given the severe nature of the misconduct that the Board often considers.³⁴

vi. *The Police Board's lack of transparency*

The Police Board's process provides a greater window into officer discipline than is available in many police disciplinary processes; in this respect the Police Board represents an advance over accountability systems that rely solely upon opaque internal processes and arbitration. But the Board also provides less transparency than is available through most police

³² 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-1-18.1 (1992).

³³ *Castro v. City of Chicago Police Board*, 2016 IL App (1st) 142050, ¶ 42.

³⁴ The Board process itself adds significant delay to the accountability process. As per the Board's 2014 Annual Report (the most recent available), in 2013 and 2014 the median number of days from the Superintendent filing charges to Board decision was 198, or over six-and-a-half months. According to the Police Accountability Task Force Report, in 2015 this median was 209 days. In our review of 2016 cases (excluding cases in which the officer resigned) the median was 266 days, and it took the Board an average of 301 days after the Superintendent filed charges to render a decision. The Board should develop and implement a plan to reduce the length of time it takes it to resolve the cases that come before it.

civilian oversight entities, and less than it professes it should. The City and Board have both asserted that the Board is intended to provide transparency as an “essential value” to “increase the public’s and police officers’ confidence in the process for handling allegations of police misconduct.” It is thus incumbent upon the City and Board to make reasonable efforts to be as transparent as possible.

There are several steps that the Police Board can and should take to be more transparent and increase confidence in its process. First, the Board could post all materials related to its hearings on its website, including transcripts and videos. Currently, members of the public must request hearing transcripts through public records requests, and the City does not release videos of the hearings.³⁵

The Board could also increase transparency by tracking and publishing more detailed case-specific and aggregate data about its decisions, and making this information available in a timely manner. Currently, the Board provides only vague anonymized data in untimely annual reports (the most recent one was in 2014). Even the Board’s monthly reports to the Superintendent containing complaint statistics must be requested through public records requests. Some groups have requested materials and attempted to analyze and publicly report on Board statistics. But CPD officers and the public should not have to rely upon the voluntary efforts of a third party to have access to data about the Board’s work, and this system leaves the public guessing about whether publicly available data is accurate or complete.

I. The City’s Police Accountability Ordinance and Similar Efforts to Correct the Problems Our Investigation Identified

As discussed above, the City’s Police Accountability Ordinance created COPA, which will replace IPRA as the independent agency responsible for investigating serious police misconduct. Besides the name change, COPA’s main differences with its predecessor include (1) expanded investigative authority, (2) a guaranteed budget floor, (3) authority to hire independent counsel, (4) a five-year ban on former police officers serving as investigators, and (5) a modified mediation program. These changes and other recent IPRA-initiated reforms are positive steps to enhance police accountability.

But the reforms do not directly address the many problems we identified with IPRA’s deeply flawed investigative system. For example, as discussed above, it is not clear that COPA’s increased budget will be enough to satisfy both its existing investigative duties conveyed from IPRA as well as COPA’s expanded investigative obligations. And while the new law attempts to correct IPRA’s inappropriate use of mediation, it can still be used for many serious cases not appropriate for mediation and defers until later the precise policies under which the new mediation program will operate. Allowing for independent counsel and limiting new employees with police backgrounds will enhance independence, but may not be sufficient. Finally, if none

³⁵ The City’s ostensible reason for not releasing videos is that witnesses might not be willing to testify if they knew video of their testimony would be released. This argument is unpersuasive, as it ignores the availability of image-blurring technology and the ability to redact witness names, and the fact that the City currently makes no attempt to redact the names of witnesses from the transcripts it releases. It also ignores that the Board’s hearings are already open to the public.

of these changes fixes the defective investigative practices identified in the [Accountability](#) Section under IPRA, then COPA's expanded investigative authority simply exacerbates these investigative problems.

The City believes that IPRA's newly published operational rules will increase investigative oversight, facilitate coordination with the Law Department, and improve processes for affidavit overrides and officer-involved shootings. The test will be in how well these new rules are implemented. The City likewise highlights its plans for new investigator training, as discussed above, and new information technology. These plans are a positive first step. COPA is just beginning to engage consultants, who will help diagnose the training and IT problems and only then will set out to develop a plan.

COPA's success in the public eye will depend on how well it addresses the credibility crisis that IPRA faced for most of its existence. The City understands this, which in large part drove its decision to change IPRA's name to COPA. Indeed, all of new changes contained in the COPA ordinance as well as the recent programmatic reforms could have been accomplished without creating COPA. However, the City believed that IPRA's reputation in the community was so badly damaged that it needed a new name. But the City must do more than a name change to repair the broken trust that surrounds this investigative agency, particularly since most residents remember the last time the City employed this same rebranding strategy eight years ago when it replaced OPS with IPRA.

Finally, COPA's companion ordinance creates a new deputy inspector general for public safety who will be charged with initiating reviews and audits of CPD, COPA, and the Police Board. These are welcome changes from an accountability standpoint, and certainly the Inspector General's Office has a level of community support and respect that surpasses the other agencies in Chicago's police accountability network. The description of how these new duties will be interpreted and implemented has yet to be decided, and will impact this position's effectiveness. Moreover, while this new deputy inspector general has authority to make recommendations to COPA and CPD that may impact misconduct investigations, it has no enforcement power. The City has made important strides in improving accountability, but the systemic and entrenched nature of the deficiencies we identified cannot be remedied by these reforms alone.

IV. CPD DOES NOT PROVIDE OFFICERS WITH SUFFICIENT DIRECTION, SUPERVISION, OR SUPPORT TO ENSURE LAWFUL AND EFFECTIVE POLICING

A. Training

Our investigation revealed engrained deficiencies in the systems CPD uses to provide officers with supervision and training. CPD's inattention to training needs, including a longstanding failure to invest in the resources, facilities, staffing, and planning required to train a department of approximately 12,000 members, leaves officers underprepared to police effectively and lawfully. Officer errors and misconceptions that result from lack of training are not corrected in the field, because CPD has neither structured supervision in a way that will adequately support officers, nor invested in programs and systems that will detect when officers

are in need of help or exhibiting behavior that must be corrected. Officers' ability to stay safe, protect public safety, and police within constitutional standards suffers as a result.

To set and maintain a culture of policing safely, effectively and constitutionally, a law enforcement agency must provide its officers strong training both at the outset and throughout their careers. Proper training gives officers the confidence and knowledge to police safely and effectively. Training at all levels—pre-service, in-service, and in the field—should foster communication, problem-solving, and analytical skills; facilitate acceptance of community policing principles and tactics; and encourage creative thinking. Training also shows officers how effective policing is not only consistent with, but bolstered by, police tactics that abide by the law and build stakeholder trust. Effective training is delivered through meaningful content, not just hours sitting in a classroom. A solid foundation of recruit training, field training for new officers, and ongoing in-service training ensures a culture of respectful and lawful policing that is active and effective. Through the course of their careers, police officers confront stressors, discouragements, and shifting legal and policy ground. Effective training helps them navigate those challenges, and is crucial not only for the safety of the public, but also for the safety of the officers themselves.

CPD and the City of Chicago have not provided such training to CPD officers for many years, to the disservice not only of those officers but to the public they serve. CPD's Academy training and post-Academy field training program do not sufficiently prepare new CPD officers for their jobs, and the absence of meaningful, regular in-service training prevents officers from reinforcing previously-learned material and gaining knowledge of current policy, legal issues, tactical developments, and police operations.

Officers at all ranks—from new recruits to the Superintendent—agree that CPD's training is inadequate. The City has announced steps that, if properly resourced and effectively staffed, could represent critical improvements to the way that officers are trained throughout their police careers. These announcements are welcomed, but cannot be allowed to languish or to be handled in a quick, reactive manner, which is how officers characterized prior trainings that were only provided in response to a crisis of the moment. As the City's training consultant stated, "implementation will be complicated and will be a long term process." It also will be costly and involve difficult decisions. Our investigation makes clear both that this effort is well worth it, and that the City must sustain focus on its ambitious set of reforms.³⁶

³⁶ During the course of our investigation, the City acknowledged problems with CPD's training systems and sought immediate input from our investigative team on potential reforms. In response, we assisted CPD with securing immediate substantial technical assistance from another large city agency. The City also hired an independent consultant to conduct a full review of CPD's training program to identify deficiencies and potential solutions. At the City's request, our team spoke with this consultant to share our observations in order to assist his review. At the conclusion of the consultant's review, the City agreed to let us meet with the consultant to discuss his recommended reforms but did not provide a copy of the consultant's report or relate the conclusions he reached that justified the reforms he recommended.

1. CPD Academy training does not instill in new recruits a culture of service towards all Chicago communities or the tenets of constitutional policing

Academy training is foundational to building the knowledge and skills needed to protect public safety and earn community trust. Effective Academy training not only teaches recruits of their obligations under law, policy, and widely accepted law enforcement standards; it is also the first opportunity to acculturate new officers with the Department's values and priorities. Academy training should therefore instill recruits with the ethos that protecting all facets of the Chicago community, especially those that are most beleaguered by crime, is their core function and primary responsibility. This ethos is sometimes framed as a "guardian" mindset, as opposed to an inordinately fear-based "warrior" mentality.³⁷

Unfortunately, CPD's Academy does not meet these objectives. Instead, it has, for many years, suffered from severe deficiencies that impede recruits' preparedness to police constitutionally and safely. CPD's Academy provides recruits with approximately 1,000 hours of training on a variety of topics, including firearms, use of force/control tactics, gangs, vehicle stops, law enforcement driving, and report writing. However, there has been insufficient attention to whether training content matches recruit training needs; the validity of training materials; and to whether this content is effectively delivered. The Academy program relies on outdated materials that fail to account for updates in legal standards, widely accepted law enforcement standards, and departmental policies.

As just one example, a class we observed on deadly force involved officers viewing a video made roughly 35 years ago, prior to key Supreme Court decisions that altered the standards used to evaluate the reasonableness of use of force. The tactics depicted in the video were clearly out of date with commonly accepted police standards of today. Following the video, the instructor spoke for approximately thirty minutes, but did not give detailed information on justified versus unjustified use of deadly force or the standard of objective reasonableness—all essential topics for deadly force training. The training itself was inconsistent with CPD's force policies, further undermining its utility in teaching recruits their obligations under Department policy and constitutional law. Several recruits were not paying attention, one appeared to be sleeping, and there was minimal attempt made to engage the students in the lesson. In fact, the instructor arrived to the class ten minutes late and dismissed students twenty minutes early from this critical class on how CPD officers should use deadly force. The impact of this poor training was apparent. At the academy and during ride-alongs, our retained training law enforcement expert asked several PPOs to articulate when use of force would be justified in the field; only one PPO out of six came close to properly articulating the legal standard for use of force.

We observed over 60 hours of training at the CPD Academy, and found that poor delivery of Academy training was pervasive. Rather than pursue widely accepted teaching methods centered on adult learning principles, in particular scenario-based training and encouraging hands-on skills, CPD continues to employ ineffective strategies to train its new

³⁷ SUE RAHR, ET AL., FROM WARRIORS TO GUARDIANS: RECOMMITTING AMERICAN POLICE CULTURE TO DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (New Perspectives in Policing Bull., April 2015), available at <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248654.pdf>; Seth Stoughton, *Law Enforcement's "Warrior" Problem*, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225 (2015), available at <http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/04/law-enforcements-warrior-problem/>.

recruits. CPD's Academy curriculum is over-reliant on the PowerPoint/lecture model of classroom instruction, broadly acknowledged as one of the least effective ways to train new recruits. One CPD training supervisor referred to this type of training as "check-the-box" training, meaning that the emphasis is on making a record of having provided the training as opposed to actually providing effective instruction. As discussed further below, these problems with training content and delivery are compounded by significant inadequacies in staffing and facilities.

In observing one of the scenario-based trainings that was offered, we found that Academy staff seemed unfamiliar with how to properly run or evaluate role-play exercises. As part of this training, recruits were "dispatched" to a call for service inside of the training building, and all staff instructors were inside the building role-playing in the scenario. No staff instructors were on the outside of the building to watch and evaluate the approach of the recruits, nor were any instructors assigned as evaluators. If they had been outside the building, the instructors would have noticed the recruits parking in front of the location of the call—a practice that exposes them to unknown dangers and places them at a tactical disadvantage. After observing this, our expert concluded that "trainings such as this instill bad tactics and often, bad tactics lead officers into a situation that requires a use of force that could otherwise have been avoided." Our discussion in the [Force](#) Section of this Report confirms that this training may well have instilled bad tactics that have led to avoidable force.

To be sure, we did observe some scenario-based training that seemed well-done, particularly during the newly developed Force Mitigation/Mental Health training, as well as in other contexts at the Academy. We observed one instructor during a scenario give proper instruction on handcuffing and cautioning that a subject may react if he is in pain, noting the importance of not jumping to an unwarranted conclusion that the subject is resisting. The instructor conducted a solid de-brief following the exercise and ensured the students understood the material. However, we did not observe this quality of instruction in many other trainings we observed.

Many of the Department members we spoke with during ride-alongs, district tours, interviews, and small-group meetings confirmed the inadequacies described above. One officer said that Academy instructors are unable to go "off script" and deviate from the PowerPoint lectures, and that at least one Academy instructor was teaching an outdated procedure that had not been used in years. Speaking about instruction at the Academy more generally, another officer told us that "[CPD's] training was fast, sloppy, and it's getting people in trouble." A training official lamented that "CPD is using litigation to measure training effectiveness," i.e., the lack of quality training is resulting in civil lawsuits. Another officer put it more starkly, stating simply, "our co-workers are going to die because of no training."

Because training and the evaluation of its impact on new recruits is so deficient, CPD cannot properly identify which recruits need further training or even dismissal, resulting in new recruits policing Chicago communities who, despite their best intentions, from the outset are ill-equipped and perhaps incapable of policing effectively and constitutionally. Indeed, while precise figures regarding Academy attrition rates are difficult to obtain, CPD officials expressed that the attrition rate is "very close to zero" and thus well below normal levels present in police academies across the country. CPD recognizes that changes are needed. In the last few months,

CPD began to plan for potential changes to the Academy training program, including, among other things, forming a “Recruit Curriculum Working Group” to review the current curriculum and suggest changes; searching for new instructors; and creating “feedback loops” to identify trends and deficiencies where training must be improved. As stated earlier, CPD and the City’s recognition of these issues is laudable, but must be accompanied by concrete plans to implement these changes, including through additional resources and staffing.

2. CPD’s Field Training Program undermines effective and lawful policing

Similar to the Academy, CPD’s post-Academy Field Training Program is poorly structured and operates in a manner that actively undermines, rather than reinforces, constitutional policing. In a functioning field training program, once recruits graduate from the Academy, they are paired, one-on-one, with an experienced Field Training Officer (FTO) for hands-on mentorship, training and evaluation. A strong field training program is essential for reinforcing the policies and practices recruits learn at the Academy. When done correctly, FTOs serve a vital role in engraining within probationary police officers (PPOs) an ethic of effective and constitutional policing that will guide them throughout their careers. Conversely, a weak FTO program can blunt even the most effective Academy training program.

CPD’s FTO program suffers from longstanding systemic deficiencies that have disabled the program’s ability to serve this function. One high-ranking official in CPD’s Education and Training Division repeatedly referred to the Field Training Program as a “hot mess;” another official described the program simply as “terrible.” A third supervisor told us that FTOs are simply “warm butts in a seat” and that is all that matters to CPD. CPD officials also told our retained law enforcement training expert that it was common knowledge that anyone entering the field training program would make it through, meaning that, much like the Academy, the FTO program is not set up to distinguish capable recruits from ill-suited ones. Significant changes to the Field Training Program are necessary to ensure PPOs are adequately prepared to police constitutionally and safely.

CPD does not currently deploy a sufficient number of qualified FTOs to meet the field training demands of the Department. During our tours and ride-alongs in various CPD districts, we consistently observed FTOs responsible for two PPOs at a time, and were told by CPD officers that FTOs can even supervise three PPOs at a time. Three PPOs per FTO is bad practice, and even two per FTO may undermine the effectiveness of the program. When FTOs are assigned more than one PPO, they are not able to develop the rapport conducive to the sometimes difficult redirection new recruits need. Nor is the FTO able to adequately observe and provide instruction.

One reason CPD’s Field Training Program remains unsuccessful is that the selection process knowingly discourages many of the most-qualified officers from serving as FTOs and allows problematic police officers to continue acting as FTOs. CPD officers wishing to serve as FTOs must meet certain minimum qualifications to be considered. Interested officers apply in response to a vacancy announcement and sit for an exam. Officers’ leadership, mentorship, or instructional skills are not necessarily considered in selecting new FTOs. An officer’s disciplinary record bears on his or her eligibility to serve as an FTO only where the officer has sustained misconduct investigations that resulted in suspensions of more than seven days in the

last twelve months, or three or more sustained investigations resulting in suspensions of any length in the last five years. Another reason for the failures of the program is that officers working as FTOs must be willing to relinquish control of their district and shift assignments. This dis-incentivizes officers with significant experience, who because of their years of service qualify via CPD's assignment system for coveted posts and shifts, from applying for FTO positions. Additionally, being an FTO is not viewed by CPD officers as a prestigious position because unlike other departments in which serving as an FTO is a stepping stone to promotion, CPD FTOs receive no such benefit. Working as an FTO comes with a pay increase, but the amount is viewed by officers we spoke with as negligible—only a little more than \$3,000 per year. As one supervising training official described it, serving as an FTO is a “road to nowhere.”

The Department has done little to make this crucial training position more attractive, despite the fact that these problems with CPD's FTO program are not new. In 1997, the mayoral Commission on Police Integrity noted that “the FTO program is currently understaffed and in need of a complete overhaul.” More specifically, the Commission recommended that the “number of FTOs should be expanded from its current level of 67 officers to at least 200 officers.” The Commission also recommended increasing the FTO salary to attract a larger number of officers to the position and “to ensure that good patrol officers want the job.” By 2014, CPD had added some, but not many, new FTOs, and committed to building the program to at least 150 FTOs. Yet, years later, CPD has not met even this limited goal, or heeded decades of recommendations that the FTO program be substantially expanded. FTO pay was never significantly increased, and the program was never adequately expanded. Currently, there are only around 107 FTOs for the entire Department. The Deputy Chief in charge of Training estimates that the number of FTOs actually available, due to furloughs and medical absences, is closer to 60 to 75.

Further, because the City does not consider the limited number of FTOs when hiring new recruit classes, recently-graduated PPOs are often forced to wait for Field Training Program spots to become available before being assigned to an FTO. In the past, PPOs awaiting placement in the Field Training Program were assigned to “hot zones” around the city—areas of high crime – to increase police visibility. This practice, referred to by some officers as “Operation Impact Zone,” placed PPOs on foot patrol in locations where they do not have the experience or training necessary to deal with situations that may arise. Although the PPOs are just there to provide presence, and are not supposed to take any action in response to criminal activity, this type of assignment can still negatively impact PPOs' views of their job; they are justifiably unprepared and overwhelmed by these assignments, which impacts their acceptance of community policing principles, decreases their confidence, and clouds their perception of those communities. Placement of inexperienced officers as a show of force also negatively impacts those communities' views of CPD. Such placements could last up to three months while the PPO awaits placement with an FTO. Although we were told that “Operation Impact Zone” has ceased, we understand that PPOs may still be assigned to foot patrols downtown or on parade routes, without adequate supervision, while awaiting openings in the Field Training Program. No matter where they are assigned, placement of PPOs on patrols without an FTO prior to completion of the Field Training Program is dangerous, and demonstrates CPD's disregard of the training necessary for new officers to do their jobs safely, effectively, and lawfully.

When recruits are able to enter the FTO program, they do not receive sufficient supervision and guidance. In addition to supervising too many PPOs at one time, we observed that FTOs do not operate according to any uniform protocols. One more experienced FTO we spoke with reported receiving no training prior to becoming an FTO. Although there is now a five-week FTO training program in place, more senior FTOs may have not received any training at all. Even with a five-week training, we observed that there is no consistency in how FTOs teach and mentor their PPOs, meaning that the quality and content of instruction varies significantly Department-wide. Our retained law enforcement training expert observed FTOs and PPOs interacting and found that the FTOs did not provide proper redirection. For example, our expert observed a PPO driving erratically and making rude and disrespectful comments about the community in the presence of the FTO, but the FTO did not correct this behavior. And further demonstrating how problematic CPD's poor FTO instruction and overall training program can be, CPD's FTOs frequently tell PPOs to "throw out" what they learned in the Academy because the FTOs will show them how to "be the police." The quality of the supervision and training a PPO receives from his or her FTO directly impacts whether the PPO's policing will reflect the Department's values. FTOs' unwillingness to reinforce Academy training, whether because they accurately judge it to be inadequate or because they do not respect CPD's core values, sends a perilous message to recruits and undermines any improved policies or procedures intended to inculcate a culture of respectful and constitutional policing.

Finally, CPD does not evaluate the effectiveness of the FTOs or the FTO program as a whole. Although, pursuant to the hiring criteria for FTOs, an FTO may be relieved of FTO responsibilities if he or she demonstrates a lack of knowledge, skills, or abilities for the assignment, training academy personnel confirmed that FTOs are never actually evaluated in this regard. FTOs are under the command of the Bureau of Patrol, and therefore despite serving a critical role in the training of new officers, they are not evaluated or held accountable by the Education and Training Division. Neither the Bureau of Patrol nor the Education and Training Division engages in regular auditing of the Program or solicits feedback to determine areas for improvement, and the City's proposed reforms make no mention of how any of its proposed changes will address this need.

As with other aspects of CPD's training program, CPD recognizes that the FTO program is in need of a significant overhaul. CPD has acknowledged that several changes are needed, including hiring more FTOs, identifying ways to incentivize more qualified officers to apply for FTO positions, "upgrading the supervisory structure" for the FTO program so that there are supervisors in the districts who oversee the program, and putting systems in place to ensure that the FTO program is more closely coordinated with the Academy. The City also is planning on "upgrading the system for evaluating FTOs" and PPOs. These reforms, however, like the proposed reforms to CPD's Academy, are in the very initial stages, and CPD has no concrete plan for how, or by when, these goals will be accomplished.

3. CPD provides only sporadic in-service training

Once a CPD officer leaves the Academy, he or she is not required to participate in any live, regular annual training for the remainder of his or her career. Instead, CPD's mandatory in-service training consists of last-minute reactive trainings, as described below; videos played at

roll call; and “e-learning” courses provided online. One officer summarized CPD’s entire post-Academy training program as “Watch a Video.”

The impact of the lack of in-service training cannot be overstated. Without regular, mandatory training, CPD officers do not receive ongoing instruction on critically important topics, such as proper use of force, responding to persons in mental health crisis, handling domestic violence calls, or updates in the law regarding stops and searches. This prevents officers from accepting and emulating a culture of constitutional and fair policing. It also inhibits officer confidence that they know how to do their jobs safely and effectively.

CPD also does not provide regular refresher trainings on important basic skills that can help reduce the need for the use of force, including deadly force. These include proper handcuffing techniques and pursuit tactics. At a minimum, generally accepted police practices dictate at least 40 hours of continuing education per year, which usually includes roughly 24 hours of force-refresher skills. Several CPD officers reported to us that, once they left the Academy, they were not required to retrain on any basic skills. CPD officers must qualify on their firearms annually, but qualification is not training. As discussed in the [Force](#) Section of this Report, our review of CPD force, including hundreds of force incidents and several video-recorded incidents of CPD uses of force, revealed CPD officers engaging in dangerous tactics that indicate they do not remember or were never taught basic police skills. This results in officers approaching suspect vehicles in a manner that puts officers and civilians in jeopardy; firing at fleeing vehicles in inappropriate circumstances; using force unreasonably; and failing to render aid to suspects who have been shot. Consistent with our review, interviewees were unanimous in their belief that the lack of continuing training has a direct connection to the improper use of force in patrol and other field assignments.

In-service training also is necessary to teach officers about changes in law, technology, community expectations, and developments in national police practices and for presenting changes to Department policy. CPD does not use regular in-service training to meet either of these important objectives. Instead, officers reported that they do not receive sufficient training when policies change, and they worry that they will be criticized for not adhering to a policy that was never explained to them. By not providing regular in-service trainings, CPD makes it unnecessarily difficult for officers to remain aware of changes to law and policy and how to operationalize those changes.

In lieu of actual in-service training, CPD disseminates new information to Department members through roll call, using techniques that are not effective for adult learning and often not appropriate for the complexity of the material being presented. In-service training comes primarily through videos or announcements by supervisors at roll call, or videos available through e-learning modules. Supervisors acknowledge that officers do not pay attention to these trainings. CPD also more generally recognizes that this is an ineffective way to provide new material or refresh previously learned lessons, as roll-call trainings and e-learning videos do not teach skills, and it is difficult to measure learning.

CPD recognizes that providing real in-service training is necessary to build a more effective and qualified police force, and is just beginning to develop plans to institute a comprehensive in-service program. CPD informed us that, going forward, it would like to

provide 40 hours of mandatory in-service training for all Department members through a combination of Academy-based and district-based training. CPD still needs to do an assessment of what courses are needed most; create a process for developing, vetting, and reviewing those courses; and identify how and when that training could be delivered. CPD has also not considered whether additional in-service training may be necessary up front, given that there has not been any regular in-service training for years. Once again, CPD's plans for in-service training, while ambitious and potentially beneficial to the Department, are very preliminary, and it remains to be seen whether CPD's stated commitment to more in-service training will actually translate into the sustainable, effective provision of such training in the months and years to come.

4. CPD does not provide training that is proactive, organized, and tailored to Department needs

Until a few weeks ago, CPD did not have a committee tasked with identifying the Department's training needs and establishing priorities, or making sure that training is delivered efficiently, timely, and effectively. The training committee is in the first stages of developing a training plan.³⁸ The previous absence of a committee and plan has prevented CPD from providing training that is proactive and comprehensive. Currently, although most training is coordinated through the Training and Education Division, there are no protocols for the development, coordination, or delivery of training. Proper planning in this area would help CPD allocate its resources to meet the greatest departmental needs and deliver a cohesive message to Department members about the vision, mission, and culture of the agency. Developing a comprehensive training plan will help in developing trainings that give officers the ability to connect policy to practice, which, in turn, will increase officer confidence that their training as a whole has taught them how to police safely, lawfully, and effectively.

In particular, CPD has not attempted to ascertain the training needs of experienced officers or where additional training might benefit particular units or the Department as a whole. CPD does not actively solicit suggestions from Department members for future trainings, or follow through on requests from officers for training on particular topics. And, as noted elsewhere in this Report, CPD does not use data to evaluate trends of problems within the Department, including patterns of excessive force or other misconduct. CPD has recognized this failure and reports that it plans to develop "feedback loops" from various stakeholders to inform training. This prospective reform is critical; the historic failure to proactively evaluate trends has blinded CPD to understanding where additional trainings could both improve performance and community relations, and decrease harmful incidents and CPD's exposure to liability.

³⁸ Like many of the other recent training reforms noted above, the City apparently recognized the significant problems attendant to providing training without any strategic plan or guiding committee. The City recently informed us that it established a new "Training Oversight Committee" chaired by the First Deputy Superintendent. This committee is reportedly responsible for establishing, implementing, and overseeing all CPD training, creating strategic plans, and conducting periodic needs assessments. The formation of this committee is an important step. However, as discussed more fully below, additional steps are necessary to ensure the work of the committee is widely accepted and that its goals and objectives can, and will, be met.

CPD's overall lack of planning results in training that is ad hoc, disorganized, and reactive to the most recent crisis, rather than thoughtful, proactive, and demonstrably responsive to officers' training needs. Because there is no regular, mandatory in-service training, post-Academy training is offered primarily in response to crises, such as high-profile officer-involved shootings or other uses of force. City leadership is, and should be, responsive to the legitimate concerns of its constituents; but at the same time, CPD should be given time, space and resources to develop thoughtful and effective training that is sustainable.

Instead, training staff are told to "get it done" and "make it work" quickly. Such trainings are often scheduled with only a few days of notice. As a result, the Education and Training Division is not given sufficient time to identify or develop an appropriate curriculum or secure trainers with subject matter expertise. Similarly, although the Academy has a set curriculum, recruit classes often begin on short notice, leaving Division staff little time to secure qualified subject matter experts to train on the various topics. As a result, trainers are often ill-equipped to present the material they are scheduled to teach, decreasing the potential impact of the training.

This haphazard approach to training also hinders officer buy-in that the training being provided is important and valuable for their jobs. Officers feel that CPD trains only in response to crises, rather than pursuant to measured, thoughtful consideration of officers' training needs and desires.

CPD's recent experience introducing Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) underscores the consequences of CPD's approach. ISRs require officers to document their stops and searches more systematically than they had done previously. Although instituted in CPD to resolve an ACLU lawsuit,³⁹ documenting stops and searches in the manner captured by ISRs is a practice that has been in place for many years in other large-city police departments. In Chicago, the new ISR forms were quickly rolled out without a thoughtful, comprehensive training plan that took into account officers' predictable concerns and the broader context. Instead of taking the opportunity to instruct officers about how to conduct lawful and safe stops and searches, the ISR training focused only on how to fill out the new form. The training failed to anticipate or address officers' fears that filling out these forms would subject them to individual liability. Supervisors did not receive training before their subordinates did, and were therefore unprepared to provide guidance; officers found the forms onerous and confusing, and did not understand why the changes were instituted. When officers belatedly received training, they found it inconsistent and contradictory. CPD's failure to plan or deliver this training properly increased officers' frustration and fear that this change was being driven by the need for political-cover instead of as an integral part of policing the community safely and effectively. As a consequence, many officers do not support the reforms or understand how to implement them effectively. This reaction likely could have been minimized if CPD had appropriately planned this training, and delivered it in the context of a robust in-service training program that addresses connected issues, such as constitutional policing and CPD policies on stops, searches, and arrests.

³⁹ American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, *Landmark Agreement Reached on Investigatory Stops in Chicago* (Aug. 7, 2015), available at <http://www.aclu-il.org/landmark-agreement-reached-on-investigatory-stops-in-chicago/>.

Similarly, in response to the release of the Laquan MacDonald video in November 2015, the City mandated that all CPD officers be trained on Taser use by June 1, 2016. Effective training on this skill requires small class sizes so that officers have the opportunity to practice using the device in various scenarios, and engage with the instructor to ensure they understand the concepts, including when and how it is appropriate to use a Taser. It also requires a thoughtful curriculum that provides officers with direction on how to avoid the need to use force, while giving them confidence in using the weapon where necessary. CPD, however, quickly cycled large numbers of officers through poorly designed training. As a result, officers were not effectively taught how or when to use the Taser as a less-lethal force option. Many CPD officers told us the training they received did not adequately prepare them to use Tasers in the field. One officer told us that officers had been requesting Taser training for years, but those requests went unfulfilled until the City suddenly changed course. As he put it, “the City’s lack of preparation is now our emergency.”

This crisis-driven approach to in-service training does a disservice to both CPD officers and the public. Advanced planning and organization is necessary to ensure that trainings are effective in positively impacting officer safety and teaching officers the skills they need to do their jobs.

5. CPD’s Education and Training Division lacks the resources it needs to provide training that is coordinated, forward-thinking, and effective

a. CPD has insufficient and inexperienced training staff

CPD’s Education and Training Division, which runs the Academy, specialized trainings, and the FTO program, is perennially understaffed and staffed with individuals who are not sufficiently trained or prepared to teach the subject matters they are assigned. We found that many instructors are not properly prepared to teach the materials they are assigned, and are not chosen for their qualifications or abilities, but rather only on how they score on a written test. We also found that Academy curriculum is not vetted in any manner by experts in curriculum design and/or instruction, resulting in gaping omissions and gross misapplications of materials developed. We found that the person tasked with developing and teaching the instructor’s training course (where teachers are trained on how to teach) was well qualified and had expertise, but the course itself does not use sufficient evaluation instruments for CPD to determine whether, following the training, the trainees are sufficiently prepared to teach.

CPD now recognizes the need for additional training staff, but leadership must be committed—for the long term—to providing the resources necessary to ensure a sufficient number of competent, well-qualified trainers. CPD must invest in recruiting and hiring trainers and curriculum development staff who will develop and deliver progressive, effective training programs, and re-train or replace existing staff to ensure these roles are carried out successfully.

b. CPD has inadequate training space

CPD’s training facilities are in disrepair. CPD has made few physical upgrades to its main training facility since it was built in 1976. Training equipment is old and frequently breaks down. This makes conducting trainings difficult, and potentially dangerous. Poor upkeep of

CPD's training facilities also signals to those who work there, those who train there, and to the public, that training is not valued by CPD.

The current facilities used by CPD are also insufficient to meet the training needs of a department as large as CPD. The spaces CPD currently uses for outdoor drills and exercises are not secure. Features typically used to support recruit training are non-existent. CPD lacks, among other facilities, an outdoor shooting range, a driver training area, marching/drill grounds, and mock buildings for scenario-based training. Storage for firearms at the training facilities is not secure. Our expert found CPD's shooting range at the Academy to be "exceptionally substandard." Indeed, firearm training is provided indoors in a building with ventilation so inadequate that it is unhealthy for participants.

One of CPD's scenario training buildings, which houses the Training and Tactics Unit, is dangerous, both because of the dilapidated, inadequate facility, and the lack of adequate safety protocols. When we visited, this facility did not have locked main doors. The armory room—a former school office—was unlocked with loaded guns left in open, unlocked cubbies in a room left unattended. Training guns and ammunition were stored close to guns loaded with live rounds. The close proximity of these materials, without adequate controls or labels, created a serious risk that the real guns would be mistaken for training ones, or that the guns and ammunition could go missing or be stolen.⁴⁰

CPD leadership recognizes that the training facilities are inadequate. However, CPD has not dedicated adequate resources to remedying these conditions, significantly impacting the quality and breadth of trainings CPD is able to provide. The need to allocate additional resources to the Education and Training Division is especially urgent in light of the City's stated plans to hire nearly 1,000 new officers. This hiring would require the Education and Training Division to run huge classes through the Academy each month—while completing recently mandated specialized training, such as the force mitigation/de-escalation training, for the approximately 12,500 current officers. The Division does not have sufficient personnel, equipment, or space to meet these demands.

6. CPD's current plans for reform

CPD recognizes that whole-scale changes are needed to its training program, and that these changes should be guided by a comprehensive training committee and plan. CPD told us of an ambitious dashboard of changes to its Academy, in-service, pre-service, and FTO training. Currently these plans amount to verbal commitments with uncertain dates for completion. These plans should be committed to writing. Some of the changes CPD would like to make—such as limiting Academy instructor tenure, or adding new incentives to encourage quality officers to serve as FTOs—may impact the City's collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, CPD must identify the resources necessary to make these changes or obtain commitments from the City to

⁴⁰ A second facility used for scenario training is on a public street, in close proximity to an elementary school. Conducting scenario trainings in such a setting puts the public at risk.

provide what is needed. CPD should be empowered with the resources and support it needs to make changes in the best interest of the officers and the public they serve.

We commend CPD for conducting a review of its training program using an expert consultant, and for recognizing and accepting the longstanding deficiencies with the training program that this expert identified. CPD's willingness to identify these problems and work towards solutions is an important first step in bringing CPD's training program in line with national standards. However, as CPD's own expert put it, "the devil is in the details." With many of the recommendations CPD reportedly embraced, CPD has not yet worked out whether these reforms are possible given CPD's current infrastructure, resources, and personnel, and if the reforms *are* possible, precisely how they will be accomplished, and by when. As noted by CPD's consultant, significant external pressures are necessary for any organization to follow through with plans as ambitious as these.

B. Supervision

Instead of encouraging the chain of command to instill proper policing tactics and respect for constitutional policing in CPD officers, CPD provides little incentive, or even opportunity, for supervisors to meaningfully guide and direct CPD officers. CPD provides even less incentive for supervisors to hold officers accountable when they deviate from CPD policy and the law. The City has long known that CPD's direct supervision of officers is inadequate, including through the fact that multiple reports in the last two decades have highlighted deficiencies in CPD's supervisory practices. Yet, City and CPD leadership have not made the necessary reforms to CPD's supervision structure and processes, and community and officer safety suffer as a result. Providing robust, meaningful supervision would better prevent officer misconduct and would significantly help CPD police safely and effectively.

Our conversations with rank-and-file Department members, and our observations throughout each of CPD's 22 districts, illuminated the breadth and depth of CPD's failure to provide proper supervision. Our overarching impression of supervisors from officers is that, with notable exceptions, supervisors do not lead. We were told on several occasions that sergeants are "not there to ruffle any feathers." Rather than ensuring that officers under their watch are policing constitutionally, many sergeants instead focus on keeping their subordinates out of trouble when there may be reason for discipline. Supervisors do not review the personnel records of the officers they are supervising, either because they do not know how, they do not have access to the information, or they do not see the value in doing so. *See Report, Section IV.D.* Consistent with this broad sense among officers, supervisors told us they are wary of intervening to correct rule or tactical errors, because "no one wants to be the bad guy." As one commander framed the problem, "supervisors lack courage to hold officers accountable." We also heard from several Department members that supervisors, particularly sergeants and lieutenants, are more concerned with being "friends" with their subordinates than providing adequate supervision. As one deputy chief told us, "we have a culture where we [the supervisors] are people's friends rather than supervisors." Another deputy chief stated that supervisors stay "too close" to their former peers after being promoted, which is why "many of them do not step up to the task" of adequately supervising and holding accountable those under their command.

It has long been recognized that first-level supervisors, through their action or inaction, profoundly affect the performance of the officers under their command.⁴¹ In the patrol setting, sergeants are most directly involved in setting the tone of policing on the street. Sergeants who take a lax approach to supervision foster an environment in which mediocrity and misconduct flourish. As one former police manager observed,

Police officers are extremely sensitive and attuned to what fellow officers do and do not do. Officers know who files false injury claims, who the second car is on a “man with a gun” call, who steps over the line with excessive force, and who is likely to get lost for a full tour of duty. When officers in the middle of the bell curve see that these people are not dealt with, they sometimes begin to imitate their behavior. Similarly, when those in the middle of the bell curve see fellow officers take extra calls, quickly respond as backup, and testify clearly and honestly, they begin to imitate them as well.⁴²

It is readily apparent that there is a critical failure of leadership at the first line of supervision within CPD. Officers provide little documentation of their activities—particularly with respect to use of force—and sergeants consistently take a hands-off approach to the means by which officers take enforcement actions. As discussed in the [Force](#) Section of this Report, supervisors provide very little supervision of officers’ use of force. With the exception of officer-involved shootings, officers are not required to provide details of the incidents in which force was used, and little is done to investigate whether the force used was reasonable, and/or whether policies, training, or equipment should be modified to improve force outcomes in the future. Sergeants informed us that, in reviewing a use of force, their role simply is to ensure the form is filled out correctly. Our review of files confirmed this—in most of the Tactical Response Report (TRR) files we reviewed, we saw no evidence that sergeants took steps to determine what force officers had used and whether it was appropriate, lawful, or safe. Supervisors do not hold officers accountable for the force they use, and supervisors are themselves not held accountable for failing to investigate whether force used by officers under their command was proper. This failure to provide first line supervision of officers’ use of force contributed to the pattern or practice of unconstitutional force we found. CPD has not taken the necessary steps to transform supervision within CPD. As discussed further below, CPD does not provide sufficient training for supervisors. CPD also fails to hold supervisors accountable when they do not hold officers accountable or do not provide the oversight and direction that might prevent officers from committing misconduct or policing poorly. As discussed below, supervisors who do not report the misconduct of their subordinates—or worse, supervisors who cover up that misconduct—are rarely held accountable, with exceptions in a few high-profile cases. At the same time, CPD does not properly incentivize or reward the courageous and

⁴¹ See, e.g., ROBIN SHEPARD ENGEL, HOW POLICE SUPERVISORY STYLES INFLUENCE PATROL OFFICER BEHAVIOR (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, June 2003), available at <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194078.pdf> (a study of leadership styles in urban police departments that found that an active leadership style “was more likely than the others to influence officer behavior” and that this “influence can be either positive or negative; for example, it can inspire subordinates to engage in more problem-solving activities, or it can result in more frequent use of force”).

⁴² STEPHEN J. GAFFIGAN, POLICE INTEGRITY: PUBLIC SERVICE WITH HONOR 36 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice & Cmty. Oriented Policing Serv.’s 1997), available at <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/163811.pdf> (comments of former Metropolitan Police Department Captain Swope).

diligent supervisors who swim against this tide to provide close and effective supervision to officers, including through holding officers accountable for violations.

These practices, in combination, send a clear message to all ranks within CPD that close, meaningful supervision is neither valued nor rewarded, which in turn has predictably led to a lack of effective supervision throughout the Department.

1. CPD's supervisory structures and responsibilities do not provide for meaningful supervision of all officers

CPD does not demand that supervisors perform fundamental supervisory tasks, such as direct observation and meaningful evaluation of officer performance, including the quality of arrests or uses of force, or mentoring officers. Many supervisors we spoke with are committed to effective, safe, and constitutional policing within their districts; yet, systemic flaws in what CPD expects of them and the priorities that CPD sets prevent line supervisors from meeting those goals.

a. CPD requires that first-line supervisors spend too much time doing non-supervisory tasks, at the expense of providing officers supervision

CPD first-line supervisors do not engage in the supervisory tasks typically expected of their positions. Most CPD supervisors with whom we spoke appeared uncertain or reluctant about the role they can and should play in identifying and addressing positive or negative police behavior. Although there are many well-meaning supervisors within CPD's ranks, a large number do not make sufficient efforts to communicate with, observe, instruct, or mentor their subordinates. This results in missed opportunities for subordinates' learning and job improvement, and allows both lackadaisical policing and inappropriately aggressive policing to go unaddressed.

CPD sergeants generally spend their shifts on administrative tasks rather than interacting with and guiding their officers. One officer told us that in general, he would not see a sergeant after roll call. When sergeants do go into the field, too often their supervision is tentative and formalistic. One sergeant told us when he goes into the field, he spends his time "logging" his officers, that is, driving around and laying eyes on each car twice per shift. This means that the sergeant checks boxes and does administrative work instead of providing meaningful oversight or analysis of officer activity.

The lack of true supervision is in part due to the failure of supervisors to see these tasks as part of their role. It is also attributable to the myriad duties placed on supervisors that could, and should, be done by other entities. Sergeants, for example, are bogged down with tasks that would be more appropriately assigned to civilian administrative assistants. CPD employs fewer civilian employees than other large police departments, leaving supervisors to take on administrative tasks that do not involve police work. CPD leadership recognizes that the low number of civilian employees working for CPD results in officers and supervisors spending too much time doing administrative and other tasks, and that additional efforts to change this are needed to bring CPD "up to industry standards." In the last year, the City began a push towards "civilianizing" certain jobs, that is, hiring civilian staff to do work now being done by officers

and supervisors. However, during the course of our investigation, we found that the administrative demands on sergeants serve to shift much of the supervision responsibility to lieutenants, even though they too are overburdened with administrative work.

b. A too-broad span of control and lack of unity of command prevents supervisors from performing critical supervisory functions

Even if sergeants and lieutenants understood their role as supervisors and were able to dedicate their entire shift to supervision-related tasks, CPD deploys far too few patrol supervisors to ensure adequate supervision of all officers. The number of officers under a supervisor's watch, often referred to as the "span of control," must be narrow enough for supervisors to be able to interact with the officers, observe their performance, and assist when needed. Prior consultants to the City recommended no more than 10 officers assigned to each sergeant on every watch at each district. Experience in Chicago and elsewhere, however, makes clear that the ratio may need to be even smaller than this in some circumstances. A span of control of seven officers to one sergeant is a generally accepted industry standard, although the appropriate ratio will depend in part on the dynamics of the particular district and assignment. CPD frequently operates under a span of control far greater than this recommended limit, even in the busiest districts. One captain told us that sergeants *should* only supervise 8 officers at a time, and at least one sergeant told us he supervises 12 cars at a time—meaning, potentially, 24 officers, assuming two officers per car. Another officer told us that he has seen 2 supervisors in charge of 70 officers at a time. Yet another officer relayed to us an example where a single sergeant was responsible for an entire district during the day shift. The district included 25 officers on patrol, plus 14 officers stationed in 7 different high schools throughout the district. This left one sergeant in charge of nearly 40 officers spread out over a wide geographic area. In each of these examples, CPD's span of control far exceeds industry standards, which prevents sergeants from providing adequate supervision and jeopardizes the safety of the community and the officers themselves.

CPD's rotational system of scheduling also prevents supervisors from maintaining "unity of command," meaning that officers are not consistently scheduled to be supervised by the same sergeants or lieutenants, or assigned to the same beat. Currently, CPD patrol officers work pursuant to a rotational schedule, where they rotate the days off that they have each week. Officers are not assigned the same days off as their supervisors, meaning that they do not consistently interact with the same supervisor on every shift. This prevents supervisors from establishing mentoring relationships with officers and providing guidance targeted to the particular needs of each individual officer. The lack of consistency also inhibits supervisors from identifying changes in an officer's behavior that may indicate the officer is in need of assistance or disciplinary intervention. Officers complained that this prevents them from getting to know their beat well and doing their job effectively.

These issues are not new. The 2014 study of CPD's supervision and accountability structures conducted for the Safer Report, which the City commissioned, recommended changes to staffing and operational patterns to increase monitoring of officer behavior. In particular, the Safer Report strongly recommended switching from the current rotational system to a "patrol squad system," wherein each patrol sergeant is responsible for developing and monitoring a designated group of officers. It noted that the current system "limit[s] the sergeants' ability to

develop officers under their command and creat[es] inconsistencies in management styles and expectations.” The Safer Report also warned CPD that its current ratio of sergeants to police officers and lieutenants to sergeants is low, and that “maintaining a healthy ratio of supervisors to subordinates is critical to ensuring proper supervision of each officer.” CPD did not adopt the Safer Report’s recommendation and made no changes to either span of control or unity of command.

CPD leadership recently publicly recognized that reduction in span of control is needed to allow for “more hands-on guidance and direction in difficult situations.” As part of the City’s recent efforts, in late September 2016, the Superintendent announced plans to hire 112 sergeants and 50 lieutenants over the next two years to “provide valuable guidance to officers on the street.” We agree that more supervisors are needed. However, promoting additional officers alone will not resolve the span of control problems that have plagued CPD for years, especially if the City does not deploy officers and supervisors pursuant to a comprehensive staffing analysis. Notably, CPD recently pledged to develop a “fair, transparent, and objective methodology” to determine where to assign new officers and supervisors. CPD noted that the new study will be more “in-depth” than a previous 2010 study by the same group that analyzed the number of patrol officers needed each shift in each district, because it will consider more variables than just calls for service.

The City must not only plan for the effective deployment of new supervisors, but also address the more deeply entrenched problems in supervision that have previously evaded reform. CPD must actively engage in reforming its culture, the structure and scope of supervisory responsibilities, and its adherence to a rotational schedule that does not consistently place supervisors with the same subordinates. Adding additional supervisors alone will not solve the lack of meaningful supervision within CPD.

2. Supervisors are not trained to provide meaningful supervision

CPD does not adequately train its sergeants and lieutenants to provide meaningful supervision. This failure to train both reflects and contributes to CPD’s culture of lax supervision.

Out of the 165 hours of pre-service sergeant training, only 7 hours are dedicated to instruction on leadership, when most new sergeants do not have any previous experience as supervisors. For the May 2015 lieutenant training, out of 134 hours of training, there were no courses dedicated to leadership and supervision skills. Nor do the course schedules for either the sergeant or lieutenant trainings reflect courses in professional development, interpersonal relationships, or other important managerial topics.

The insufficiency of CPD’s leadership training is not a recent revelation. The Safer Report recommended adding an informal mentorship program for newly minted sergeants to provide “on-the-job” training designed to teach them how to supervise and monitor other officers for the first time. This suggestion was not adopted. The Safer Report also suggested that supervisors be given more courses in leadership, including courses in “Progressive Coaching,” and that CPD should offer these courses on a regular basis rather than only at the Academy. However, in-service training remains as irregular for supervisors as it does for other CPD

officers. CPD recently informed us that it will be “upgrading” its supervisory training to provide more training on issues relevant to supervisors, but, like other recently proposed reforms, there is no actual plan in place yet, nor information on the tangible changes CPD envisions or how those changes will be achieved.

3. Supervisors are not held accountable for failing to report misconduct

The supervision failures described above are perhaps most acute when it comes to CPD supervisors’ unwillingness to step in to correct their officers’ problematic behavior. Under CPD policy, supervisors are obligated to report information regarding misconduct by subordinate officers. Yet, CPD culture discourages supervisors from reporting the misconduct of subordinates.

As one captain told us, sergeants in particular are disinclined to report misconduct because they have to work with their officers every day, and they want to avoid conflict. A lieutenant told us that supervisors are concerned about branding a subordinate officer with a negative employment record by formally reporting their misconduct. A deputy chief told us that CPD operates under a culture “where we are people’s friends rather than supervisors,” and that “no one wants to be the bad guy.” And another deputy chief stated that the widespread supervisory failure to hold officers accountable has caused accountability to become CPD’s biggest problem.

This failure to report is particularly strong where the officer committing misconduct is regarded as having impunity because of that officer’s connections within the Department. CPD officers we spoke to referred to this as someone who “has a phone call,” meaning the officer has the protection of a powerful person in the Department who can influence assignments, promotion, and discipline. Supervisors decline to discipline these officers because any such efforts would not only be futile, but could be counterproductive to their own careers. In turn, these CPD members reportedly are able to engage in misconduct with impunity.

Moreover, IPRA and BIA fail to hold supervisors accountable consistently for their failure to report officer misconduct. Rather, one investigator indicated to us that he uses potential “failure to report” charges against a supervisor as a bargaining chip to get accused officers to mediate their misconduct complaints. In other words, if an investigator wants to encourage an officer to mediate a misconduct complaint, the investigator may tell the officer that if he or she rejects mediation, the investigator will launch a separate investigation against the officer’s supervisor for failing to report the alleged misconduct. Investigators told us that this practice was effective in resolving misconduct complaints quickly through mediation.

This failure of supervisors to report misconduct also includes the failure to accept and report complaints of officer misconduct that community members make at the districts. CPD policy requires supervisors to accept, record, and forward such complaints to IPRA, yet supervisors often do not do so. An IPRA investigator told us that individuals who call 911 or a district police station to ask for a CPD supervisor to report officer misconduct are told that their complaint will not be documented by CPD, and that they should call IPRA instead. In another example, two teenage boys and their mothers complained to a supervising sergeant at a CPD district that an officer slammed one of the boys to the ground, cuffed him, shoved a gun in his

face, and threatened to blow up the boy's house. The sergeant refused to report the complaint to IPRA as required. The mothers filed a complaint directly with IPRA, and the officer involved in the misconduct was eventually disciplined; IPRA did not, however, sustain allegations against the sergeant for failing to report the officer's misconduct. In another IPRA investigation, a complainant said that she asked a desk sergeant how she could file a complaint of officer abuse and was told to "get the fuck out of the station." This allegation in her complaint was never investigated by IPRA. In yet another file we reviewed, the complainant stated that CPD officers pulled him over, abused him, and stole his car keys, leaving him stranded. The complainant told IPRA that he went to a district to file his complaint, but the sergeant he spoke with refused to take it down.

This evidence and the statements from officers at all ranks within CPD are consistent with the findings of the 2014 Safer Report, which noted that "discovering and addressing misconduct is too often viewed as the responsibility of IPRA and BIA, and not of the offending officer's immediate supervisor and chain of command . . . this attitude is misguided and must be changed." The Mayor's Police Accountability Task Force (PATF) report two years later found the same, explaining that "CPD has fostered a culture in which supervisors turn a blind eye to misconduct and do not provide sufficient oversight to ensure that officers perform their duties with integrity." The City's recently proposed changes to CPD's accountability system do not adequately address this important facet of CPD's culture and supervision structure. More changes are necessary to ensure that supervisors hold their subordinates accountable for misconduct, and if they fail to do so, that they will be held accountable themselves.

4. CPD's "early intervention system" exists in name only and does not assist supervisors in identifying or correcting problematic behavior

Compounding CPD's supervision problems, the Department does not use long-available supervisory tools, such as a comprehensive early intervention system (EIS), to identify patterns of concerning officer behavior and prevent patterns of misconduct and poor policing from developing or persisting. A well-designed EIS would allow CPD to track officer conduct, proactively assess risk for future problematic behavior, and intervene when necessary to improve behavior through non-disciplinary corrective action, such as additional training, counseling, or other supportive programs. Currently, despite having spent significant time and resources building an EIS, CPD does not have a functioning system. Instead, there are several semi-connected data-collection, intervention, and counseling programs, each of which suffers from inefficiencies that render them essentially useless. In a positive development, the City recently began an initiative to revamp and revise its EIS once again. However, for this initiative to have the best chance of success, the City and police unions must negotiate collective bargaining agreements that enable an EIS that is accurate, complete, and that allows for meaningful support of officers by redirecting problematic behavior.

a. *Performance Recognition System*

One CPD system, an electronic "dashboard" referred to as the Performance Recognition System (PRS), is a computer data-tracking program designed to "assist[] Department Supervisors in recognizing exceptional or adverse behavior related to job performance of members under their command." Data is entered into the system by Human Resources, and supervisors are

obligated by policy to “monitor and track, on a continual basis,” the information contained in the PRS dashboard.

During conversations with district command staff, we learned that CPD supervisors do not understand how the PRS works or how to use the information it presents. In particular, supervisors do not understand what they are supposed to do when the dashboard shows that “early performance indicators” are present for an officer assigned to their district. For each officer, the various indicators are marked in the dashboard as green, yellow, or red. These indicators include data points such as the number of Summary Punishment Action Reports (SPARs) and complaints filed against the officer; the officer’s arrest and TRR numbers; the officer’s use of medical leave; and more. The dashboard also provides two ratios: the ratio of complaints to arrests, and the ratio of TRRs to arrests. The thresholds used to determine if an indicator is green versus yellow or red is apparently set by CPD’s Human Resources Office. For the TRR ratio, for example, officers with more than a certain percentage of arrests involving force are marked in red. However, at least one commander responsible for using the dashboard did not know the threshold that would turn a TRR ratio from green to yellow or red, including whether the threshold is static or relational (i.e., whether it varies, depending upon, for example, officer assignment). He opined that a straight comparison of number of arrests to number of arrests involving force would be problematic, in that it would mark in red an officer who was involved in only one arrest, but that arrest happened to involve force. Indeed, the commander showed us one officer’s record in the PRS dashboard that marked the officer in red; the officer had been involved in two arrests, one of which involved force, meaning that the officer had used force in 50% of his arrests. The commander agreed that the ratio was artificially high because the officer had been involved in so few arrests, and intervention in that case was probably inappropriate. Yet, he noted that there is no meaningful guidance given to supervisors about when “red” indicators should trigger a response. Nor does policy dictate what that response should be. Instead, the PRS policy gives examples of potential supervisory responses to “early performance indicators” in vague terms, such as “coaching,” “counseling,” “reviewing Department training tools,” and “field monitoring,” and provides little to no guidance regarding the circumstances in which each different form of response should be adopted.

The dashboard is also underused. The command staff we spoke with reported that they rarely use the PRS. Supervisors also question whether data that they enter into the PRS is actually saved. Although supervisors are supposed to review the system regularly, most do not, and CPD does not audit supervisor adherence to this or any other aspect of the PRS policy. The problems with the PRS become cyclical: supervisors do not use it because it is inaccurate, and it is inaccurate because CPD does not use it properly or consistently. As we were told by one supervisor, “the info in the PRS is not accurate[;] . . . you got garbage going in so you got garbage going out.”

b. Non-disciplinary intervention, Behavioral Intervention System, and Personnel Concerns Program

CPD also offers three separate intervention programs to which officers can be referred on the basis of certain behavioral criteria, but each of these programs suffers from shortcomings that prevent appropriate enrollment and undermine effectiveness.

First, officers may be subject to “non-disciplinary interventions” when they engage in less-serious transgressions, such as using foul language or being disrespectful. This program triggers intervention by a supervisor after multiple incidents, and the interventions available are limited. They include, among other things, speaking with the officer, reminding the officer of available counseling programs, and instructing the officer to review training videos on courtesy and demeanor. Subsequent incidents trigger increasing interventions, including additional conversations and involvement of rank further up the chain of command.

If there are four or more incidents that would otherwise qualify for non-disciplinary intervention, or if the officer is involved in more serious allegations of misconduct, CPD can refer the officer to the Behavioral Intervention System (BIS) or Personnel Concerns Program (PCP). By policy, Human Resources recommends enrollment in BIS based on the existence of several “performance data,” including sustained misconduct charges, low performance grade, or a pre-set number of instances of other misbehaviors such as tardiness, being absent without permission, or medical roll misuse. The ultimate decision of whether to enroll a member in BIS generally rests with the member’s commander, although Human Resources may override a commander’s decision not to enroll his or her subordinate. Employees enrolled in BIS undergo a physical examination, including drug testing, but are not required to undergo a psychological evaluation. Once placed in BIS, CPD may give employees counseling services or an individual performance plan.

The final option available is the PCP. CPD places Department members into PCP when they are involved in more serious transgressions, such as sustained excessive force charges, domestic violence, or five or more sustained misconduct investigations in the last five years. CPD members who fail to comply with an individualized performance plan under BIS can also be placed in PCP. PCP is essentially the “last stop” for officers exhibiting problematic behavior to correct that behavior and remain on the force.

The BIS and PCP programs are ineffective methods for identifying and remedying patterns of negative behavior. First, policy and officers’ collective bargaining agreements prevent these systems from considering the full range of behaviors that could be indicative of a problem. Policy prohibits maintaining misconduct allegations older than five years in PRS, or in some circumstances, considering them at all. With one exception, investigations of misconduct complaints that result in a “not sustained” finding are not considered, no matter how recent, even though a finding of “not sustained” indicates that the incident could neither be proven *nor* disproven.⁴³ Given the historical failures of CPD and IPRA to properly investigate and sustain allegations of misconduct, the universe of complaint and disciplinary data entered into PRS is egregiously incomplete.

In addition to the fact that policy restrictively limits eligibility for intervention, CPD also does not consistently refer for intervention the individuals who *are* identified as eligible. Pursuant to CPD policy, an officer’s chain of command, BIA, or IPRA may refer the officer for BIS. However, there are no quality checks to ensure that the appropriate officers are actually

⁴³ The one exception is that officers with three “not sustained” excessive force complaints in one 12-month period may be referred to BIS.

being referred. A high-level official in Human Resources told us that, “if a recommendation [for intervention] is not made up the chain to HR, it falls through the cracks” and an otherwise eligible officer will never be enrolled. Another official told us that the BIS program is not getting the appropriate amount of referrals. Leadership at CPD does not enforce the BIS and PCP policies; consequently, BIA, IPRA, and the chain of command do not take seriously their obligation to identify and refer problematic officers.

Our review of CPD’s data confirms that the Department enrolls very few officers in its interventional programs, especially for a department of its size. Between January 2010 and July 2016, CPD enrolled only 38 officers in BIS. An additional 60 members were referred for enrollment, but never enrolled. Notably, 56 of those members were referred to BIS because of their alleged involvement in a domestic incident. An additional nine officers were flagged as eligible for BIS, but their command staff declined to recommend them. 28 officers were referred for enrollment, but removed from the program; the data that CPD provided us did not explain why. Finally, between March and June 2016, after the start of our investigation, CPD identified an additional 50 officers as eligible for the program, but as of mid-July, their status in the program was still listed as “pending.” In 2015, only seven officers were enrolled in BIS all year, most for having too many SPARs in a single year.

Review of CPD’s complaint data compared to the BIS enrollment program also confirms that there are a significant number of Department members with lengthy complaint histories who were never referred to or enrolled in BIS. Between January 1, 2010 and March 2016, 1,627 CPD members were the subject of five or more misconduct complaints; 350 of those had 10 or more complaints. While there may be innocuous explanations for such complaint numbers for some of these officers, these numbers are high enough to indicate that substantially more than 38 officers should have been enrolled in BIS during this time period.

CPD leadership is aware that these programs are grossly underused. As noted recently by the PATE, CPD “does not use any metrics to measure or assess the effectiveness of the programs.” CPD must commit to fixing this broken system with a solution that is well thought out, capable of easy and robust implementation, and supported by all stakeholders.

- c. The lack of a functioning early intervention system, coupled with inadequate supervision, has placed officers and members of the public at risk*

These longstanding, systemic deficiencies in CPD’s early intervention systems have prevented CPD from taking two steps that are crucial to ensuring officer safety and wellness, as well as ensuring policing that is effective and lawful. First, CPD does not adequately and accurately identify officers who are in need of corrective action; and second, CPD does not consistently or sufficiently address officer behavior even where CPD identifies negative patterns. Because of these failures, CPD officers are able to engage in problematic behaviors with impunity, which can—and do—escalate into serious misconduct. This has dramatic consequences for the public. It also impacts the health and safety of officers, who either do not get the support and services they need, or are forced to work alongside individuals who are not receiving such support.

In particular, we found that the current EIS does not adequately identify patterns or trends of misconduct related to force and domestic violence. One officer, for example, was the subject of several complaints of domestic violence over the course of just a few years that CPD did not detect or act upon for a significant period of time. After the officer's ex-wife brought four separate allegations of domestic violence and harassment between 2007 and 2008, many of which were closed for no affidavit or deemed not sustained, IPRA finally disciplined the officer for domestic violence, and gave the officer a 15-day suspension. The officer then went on to engage in domestic violence on two more occasions, which resulted in serious injuries to the officer's victims.⁴⁴ Likewise, Officer Giraldo Sierra, who killed Flint Farmer in June of 2011, was involved in *three* shootings *within one year*, and three domestic violence allegations in the years prior—yet he was not listed by CPD as an individual who was even considered for enrollment in BIS at any point in 2010-2011. Our review of use-of-force files also found two egregious examples of excessive force where, in each incident, the officers involved had extensive histories of complaints of excessive force but were not on the BIS roster. See Report, Section [II.B.2](#). (discussing incident involving officers who used a baton and Taser on a girl at school, and incident involving the forcible removal of 12-year-old boy from his bike). One of the officers involved in the first incident had five separate complaints involving excessive force in the year prior to the incident described; the officer involved in the second incident had ten.

We also reviewed media reports describing a sergeant who was recently involved in his second fatal shooting in three years. This sergeant allegedly was the subject of a BIA investigation in 2004, prior to his promotion, for violating a rule prohibiting CPD employees from owning businesses that sell alcohol. Per CPD policy, this is a rule infraction that could potentially result in termination. See Employee Resource E01-11, Secondary Employment, at IV.G (noting that Department members are prohibited from engaging “directly or indirectly in the ownership . . . or operation of a tavern or retail liquor establishment,” and that “violation of this policy will result in discipline, up to and including separation.”). According to media reports, the individual went on disability leave shortly after that investigation was initiated, and the investigation went dormant as a result. The officer came off disability seven years later in 2011, but the investigation remained stagnant. CPD officials learned of the open investigation after the officer was involved in a fatal shooting of an unarmed man in 2013, but still, the original complaint remained open.⁴⁵ The officer was then promoted to sergeant through the

⁴⁴ Following the fifth and sixth separate incidents of this nature, which involved physical abuse of the officer's wife and children, CPD and IPRA sustained the complainant's allegations of domestic violence. To CPD's credit, given the severity of the misconduct, the Superintendent recommended termination from the Department. However, the Police Board reversed this recommendation and instead suspended the officer for a period of days, during which the officer was required to attend counseling and evaluation through the Employee Assistance Program. See *In re Edward Feliciano*, No. 12 PB 2824, available at https://policeboard-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/case/files/12PB2824_Decision.pdf. As noted elsewhere in this Report, the counselors who work in that program have no specialized training in domestic violence, and are ill-equipped to address these issues. See Report, [Section IV.C](#). The Police Board's ability to overturn the recommendation of the Superintendent in this case is also illustrative of how Chicago's Police Board can undermine accountability more generally. See Report, [Section III.H](#).

⁴⁵ According to CPD's chief spokesman, in response to this revelation the Superintendent ordered an audit of why the 2004 complaint was never investigated to completion. However, the spokesman noted that the audit would be conducted by Internal Affairs—the same agency that lost track of the complaint. See Jeremy Goner, *Discipline of cop involved in 2 fatal shootings fell through the cracks*, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2016, available at

merit promotion process, despite the open investigation, and later was involved in his second fatal shooting of an unarmed man. Had there been a functioning, effective EIS system in place, the open investigation could have been caught much earlier—before the officer received a merit promotion, and perhaps before he was involved in his second lethal shooting of an unarmed man.

Finally, we reviewed one investigative file that is emblematic of both supervisors' unwillingness to directly supervise their officers *and* CPD's failure to have a comprehensive EIS. In this incident, a young man was stopped by a CPD officer when he was walking through an alley. After questioning the individual, the CPD officer handcuffed the individual and placed him against the officer's vehicle. In cell-phone video capturing the incident, the officer is seen pushing the individual against the vehicle, as the individual complains repeatedly, in a calm voice, that the handcuffs are too tight and causing pain. The officer repeatedly calls the individual "motherfucker," curses at him, and threatens him, saying "make a move like that at me again, I will fucking show you exactly what I can do." The officer appears to be deliberately provoking the man to "make a move" to give the officer an excuse to use more force. When the individual says that he was not moving, that he had been previously injured in the arm, and the handcuffs were digging into his bones, the officer appears to deliberately push down on the handcuffs, causing additional pain, and continues to repeatedly use profanity while speaking to the man. The individual sought medical attention for injuries he sustained as a result of the incident. An unknown individual eventually filed a complaint with IPRA, and the cell-phone footage of this interaction was posted on Facebook. When the officer involved in the incident saw the Facebook footage, he alerted his lieutenant of the incident and the existence of the video. The lieutenant reviewed the video and, despite the aggressive nature of the interaction and overtly hostile attitude of the officer, sent a letter to his commander saying that he thought the appropriate response would be non-disciplinary intervention. The lieutenant justified this recommendation by saying that the incident did not involve "racially offensive or otherwise inflammatory language" and that the "subject makes no known complaints which are visible in the video"—two statements that are patently false.

This is a clear example of a CPD supervisor neglecting to hold an officer accountable for obvious misconduct. Moreover, if CPD had a functioning EIS at the time of this incident, the supervisor would have seen that the officer had three prior excessive force complaints, some involving similar allegations of the use of profanity and threats, in the prior year-and-a-half. The officer was a clear candidate for BIS, yet no referral was ever made. The IPRA investigation remains ongoing.

- d. The City's past reform efforts have been unsuccessful and more is needed to ensure the success of present efforts*

The City needs to take a new approach to reforming its EIS system. The City is currently making another attempt to establish a functional EIS system; this effort is described below. But without a focused, determined plan that builds on lessons learned from past unsuccessful reform attempts, it will be difficult for this new effort to succeed.

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-shootings-john-poulos-met-20161212-story.html>.

Previous efforts to create a data-informed, well-structured EIS within CPD have been unsuccessful. For example, in 1994, the City purchased a promising EIS software program called BrainMaker, designed to analyze data points and pick out patterns indicative of problematic behavior and identify officers at risk of being fired from the Department. Use of this program would have put CPD on the cutting edge of EIS technology nationwide. Union leadership felt this system unfairly targeted officers and subjected them to unfair, adversarial questioning from Internal Affairs. The City stopped using BrainMaker after only two years and all the data and reports it produced “went missing.”

The City chose instead to rely on the system that CPD still uses today, despite repeated warnings of its shortcomings. The current system came about following the 1997 Report of the Mayor’s Commission on Police Integrity. In that report, the Commission urged CPD to implement a meaningful EIS, noting that “small problems become big ones if left unattended.” The Commission also recommended that CPD look at unit-wide trends, rather than analyzing only individual officers, and analyzing civil liability judgments in addition to misconduct complaints. At the time, the Commission was hopeful that expanding the behavioral intervention programs would result in more officers being involved in the programs and improved outcomes. According to the PATF’s final report, following a grievance filed by the Fraternal Order of Police challenging the inclusion of certain officers in the BIS program, the City agreed to remove them from BIS, and the program was never expanded as suggested.

More recent studies of CPD’s systems reaffirmed the need for reform. A 2007 study noted that nearly 90% of individuals with multiple complaints were never flagged by the EIS, including officers who amassed more than 50 abuse complaints within five years. This study also discussed how, of the 33 officers with 30 or more complaints between 2001-2006, fewer than half had been flagged for intervention. Seven years later, the City was again informed, via the Safer Report, that CPD needed to revise its BIS and PCP programs, including updating the data collection systems to make them more user friendly. In particular, the Safer Report recommended integrating the command staff PRS with systems used by investigative agencies into a single, streamlined case management system. Doing so, according to the study’s authors, would eliminate a significant shortcoming of the current system: “the inability to track an officer’s conduct throughout her career.” Despite these repeated criticisms, the City has not successfully made the changes necessary to improve supervision and accountability in the Department. The PATF Report also highlighted these deficiencies, recommending that CPD develop a structured, tiered EIS system that utilizes appropriate data, supports supervisor training on its use, and provides for evaluation of the program’s efficacy.

The City is currently engaging in a promising effort to study and reform the system, but, despite the best intentions of all involved, there are indications that this attempt may not be any more fruitful than past attempts, unless the City lays the necessary groundwork and stays focused until the EIS is fully integrated into CPD culture. The new project is managed by researchers from the University of Chicago, who successfully developed a new EIS system for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department in North Carolina,⁴⁶ and the University of Chicago Crime Lab.

⁴⁶ University of Chicago, Center for Data Science and Public Policy, *Building Data-Driven Early Intervention Systems for Police Officers*, available at <http://dsapp.uchicago.edu/public-safety/police-eis>.

The City launched this partnership in the spring of 2016 to study CPD's data systems and develop a comprehensive EIS tool based on predictive data unique to Chicago. The effort represents an ambitious and potentially transformative approach for the Department. However, CPD has not fully addressed concerns that prevented the success of prior reform efforts. For example, there are plans to involve union representation in the development of the system, but the project managers are taking guidance from the City on how and when to do so—and union involvement has not yet occurred. There is no evidence that the City or CPD engaged with the unions early on, before beginning this new effort, to determine whether CPD's unions will support the new effort.

The City should commit itself to improving its supervision efforts on all fronts: in the systems and management that supports direct, front-line supervisors, and in the data collection and intervention programs that give CPD a high-level view of potential negative behavior patterns. Until both of these areas are meaningfully and permanently addressed, officer morale and efficacy will continue to suffer, and a culture of constitutional policing will never take root.

C. Officer Wellness and Safety

Policing is a high-stress profession. Law enforcement officers often are called upon to deal with violence or crises as problem solvers, and they often are witnesses to human tragedy. In Chicago, this stress is particularly acute for several reasons. CPD officers are confronted with increasing levels of gun violence in some of the neighborhoods they police. Gun violence and neighborhood conditions take their toll on both residents and officers alike. At the same time, the relationship between CPD officers and the communities they serve is strained; officers on the street are expected to prevent crime, yet they must also be the face of the Department in communities that have lost trust in the police. This makes it particularly difficult to police effectively. These stresses animate the interactions officers have with the communities that they serve—both positively and negatively. As one CPD counselor explained, it is the “stress of the job that’s the precursor to the crisis.” The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing put it well, noting that “the ‘bulletproof cop’ does not exist. The officers who protect us must also be protected—against incapacitating physical, mental, and emotional health problems as well as against the hazards of their job. Their wellness and safety are crucial for them, their colleagues, and their agencies, as well as the well-being of the communities they serve.”⁴⁷

All of these stressors can, and do, play out in harmful ways for CPD officers. CPD officers grapple with alcoholism and suicide, and some engage in domestic violence. And as explained elsewhere in this Report, CPD officers are part of a Department that engages in a pattern or practice of using force that is unjustified, disproportionate, and otherwise excessive. Although the pressure CPD officers are under is not an excuse for violating the constitutional rights of the citizens they serve, high levels of unaddressed stress can compromise officer well-being and impact an officer’s demeanor and judgment, which in turn impacts how that officer interacts with the public. Some officers are able to manage the stress by shifting their focus to working even harder to do their jobs well. For others, it is more difficult. As these officers

⁴⁷ FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 62 (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, May 2015).

struggle with the stress of the job, they can close off and push away those they serve and those who want to help. For precisely these reasons, law enforcement agencies can and should do everything they can to support officers' physical and psychological well-being.

Officer wellness in CPD is not an integral part of the Department's operations. Given how officer wellness impacts officer behavior and the especially tense circumstances facing CPD officers each day, CPD officers need greater support. CPD does not have an overarching officer-wellness plan that includes robust counseling programs, comprehensive training, functioning equipment, and other tools to ensure officers are successful and healthy. The resources CPD provides are insufficient to meet Department needs, both because the programs are not robust and because the programs do not account for the needs of the increasing diversity of the officers that make up the Department. Furthermore, Chicago currently lacks an integrated platform of inter-related services—such as integrated training, counseling, and intervention programs—designed to enhance both the Department's organizational health as well as the wellness of personnel.

The Department should reinforce the value of wellness and support a culture that encourages officers to seek assistance when needed. CPD can then better prepare its officers for success, which in turn, will help prevent officers from posing harm to themselves and the communities they serve.

1. CPD must commit to providing officers necessary wellness support

a. *CPD must dedicate more resources to support officers*

CPD's support for officers' physical and mental wellness is provided almost entirely through its Professional Counseling Service/Employee Assistance Program (EAP). EAP provides vital services to the Department, but is understaffed and under-resourced. In contrast to similar-sized departments using the in-service model, which provides professional counseling services through on-staff counselors rather than contracting with independent professional counselors, CPD has devoted fewer resources to support EAP's growth. The ratio of trained counselors available to CPD personnel is considerably less when compared to other departments of comparable size and with similar service delivery models. CPD's EAP is staffed by three clinicians to serve the Department's roughly 13,500 sworn and unsworn personnel.⁴⁸ In

⁴⁸ This is approximately a 1:4,000 counselor-to-officer ratio, and does not account for family members or retired officers who are also entitled to EAP's counseling services. See E06-01, III (D): CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T, EMPLOYEE RESOURCE (Chi. Police Dep't, Feb. 21, 2016), available at <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12aaf135-2a912-aaf1-37fbc7d8d466f49f.html> ("All of the services offered by the Professional Counseling Service/EAP are available to Department members, a member's immediate or extended family, and retired sworn members."). While we found no published guidelines for the appropriate ratio in the police context, the Employee Assistance Professionals Association's (EAPA) standards and guidelines state: "EAP staffing patterns, and the number of professionals, vary according to the type of program and the scope of services provided. Whether the EAP is internal or delivered by external contractors, the number and qualifications of EAP professionals should match program needs." EAPA Standards and Professional Guidelines for Employee Assistance Programs at 14 (2010). EAPA recommends considering the size and distribution of the workforce, the diversity of the employees, and the scope and design of the EAP, among other factors when determining the necessary staffing levels for an EAP. See *id.*

comparison, the Dallas Police Department also staffs three full-time counselors to provide services for a force that is a quarter of CPD's size (3,400 sworn officers). The Miami-Dade Police Department, while also considerably smaller than CPD with approximately 2,900 sworn officers and 1,700 civilians, has six counselors and one graduate student intern to provide counseling services to its employees. The Los Angeles Police Department, the third largest department in the country, has thirteen counselors available to provide counseling to their roughly 10,000 officers and 3,000 civilian personnel. While CPD does have four certified substance abuse counselors, as well as officers trained to provide peer support services,⁴⁹ this staff is insufficient to meaningfully address the needs of a department the size of CPD.

Although the number of professionals necessary for a successful EAP will vary according to the type of program and scope of services provided, the officer wellness consultant we retained to assist with our review of CPD's program found the number of staff dedicated to Chicago's EAP too low to support the programs CPD currently offers. This is especially true given that the EAP in Chicago is intended to provide counseling services to both Department members *and* their families. Indeed, we found that EAP counselors are overextended. EAP reports its accomplishments and activities to the Bureau of Support Services on a monthly basis. At the end of 2015, EAP's three clinicians had provided 7,498 mental health consultations/appointments to Department and family members, including 4,074 clinical interviews, 1,560 informal interviews, and 1,847 telephone interviews. This is laudable, but EAP officials recognize that they could do more, and better, with more resources. One counselor explained that "the problem really is there are so few of us and so much to be done." Every day, counselors check the phones and "triage," many times having to rearrange scheduled appointments, shorten meetings to fit in more people, or cancel others, to address more serious crises. The unmet need is perpetual: EAP offers a one-day stress management program that teaches officers how to manage stress, depression, anxiety, PTSD, and other issues, but according to counselors, there is always a waitlist. The significant strain on the scant resources CPD allocates to officer wellness prevents officers from accessing these services in a timely, meaningful fashion.

b. CPD should better encourage and facilitate the use of available employee support programs

CPD should embrace the concept of officer wellness and support as integral to officer *and* Department well-being. By failing to fully integrate and normalize participation in EAP, CPD risks reinforcing the stigma surrounding seeking help and discouraging officers from using the limited resources currently available.

Even though EAP's small staff is consistently inundated with work, the number of officers who should or could use EAP's services is greater than the number who actually do, primarily because of cultural resistance to accessing these services. Internal CPD culture casts seeking assistance for personal issues as a sign of weakness. As described by one official, "there's still a stigma" associated with going to EAP. Indeed, officers told us that some

⁴⁹ CPD's Peer Support Program has 300 volunteer members who do not offer counseling, but will offer support to officers in times of need and will also refer officers to clinicians or drug and alcohol counselors.

Department members believe that seeking counseling is a sign of weakness. For the vast majority of officers in need of support, the onus is on them to seek it out, but many will not do so, even in times of need, for fear of being ostracized. Coworkers who see that an officer is in need are equally hesitant to contact EAP on the officer's behalf. One sergeant told us that the burden is on partners to report an officer in crisis, but they will not because they do not want to be seen as "rats." We collected anecdotal evidence from officers who were involved in traumatic incidents such as shootings, and from supervisors, that there is not adequate support from CPD after these incidents.

A former CPD officer who fatally shot an individual, and was shot himself in the incident, told us that his gun was taken away from him after the shooting but was given back to him after his mandatory furlough without any discussion of whether he was ready to carry it again. The officer said that he had also sought assistance from CPD headquarters because he wanted to talk with a psychologist about his experience, but CPD told him that they had no one to recommend. This former officer did not believe that CPD provided him adequate support even though he openly sought help. Beyond shootings, officers have difficult jobs in which they routinely place themselves in danger to help others, and may become witnesses to incidents that cause them to need additional support, such as the death or catastrophic injury of a child. Officers should be provided support services when they experience trauma, whatever the cause.

CPD should better emphasize the importance of officer wellness programs and the value to officers of such programs before, or entirely independent of, being involved in an incident that would result in a mandatory referral. Our investigation found that CPD could better emphasize the importance of officer wellness in several ways. First, CPD does not proactively communicate to officers the services that are available and how using those services can benefit both the officer and the Department. CPD does not provide officers with sufficient information regarding the support services available to them and their families, the practical benefit these services may have, or how to access them. Similarly, CPD misses opportunities to integrate officer wellness principles into existing trainings and promote use of CPD's existing programs. For example, probationary police officers attend stress management training and professional counseling services training. However, the stress management training we observed did not offer any information about EAP or its services.

Relatedly, CPD also does not reinforce the importance of officer wellness through readily available avenues *outside* of the EAP. For example, themes of police legitimacy, procedural justice, and officer wellness could, and should, be woven into all CPD trainings. Trainings on use of force, tactics, and other aspects of CPD operations should capitalize on the opportunity to instruct officers in how to deal with the stressors they will encounter on the job, such as hostile reactions from community members, observing violence or its aftermath, interacting with victims of crime, and policing in communities made up of people with backgrounds that are different than the officers' backgrounds. Likewise, CIT and de-escalation trainings teach officers to identify dangerous behaviors and how to interact with individuals in crisis, which they too can use in their personal life and in identifying coworkers who may be in crisis. CPD does not currently have a template for how these topics should be addressed through trainings.

This lack of cohesive messaging about the services that are available also results in officers misunderstanding how seeking help for stress, including participating in the employee support programs CPD offers, will impact their careers. For example, officers are concerned that if they seek counseling through EAP, they will automatically have their Firearm Owner Identification (FOID) Card taken away, which will prohibit them from having a gun, and therefore working anything other than a desk position in CPD. This is not the case; under Illinois state law an individual's FOID card will be taken away if the person is committed for *in-patient* psychiatric services. An officer's FOID will not be taken away merely for using EAP's services, but CPD's failure to correct this misconception may result in officers not seeking help when needed. Officers also expressed concerns that they would be punished for using EAP or that they would be reported to the Department by the counselors. Union representatives told us that CPD officers need a "safe place to talk out issues" without repercussions, but that is precisely the purpose of EAP. CPD is not publicizing EAP or encouraging its use in a way that would minimize misconceptions and maximize officer participation.

CPD could also develop and implement programs other than EAP that would assist with behavioral intervention. As discussed above, CPD should be monitoring officer conduct to flag officers who might be experiencing personal issues and could be candidates for one of the Department's intervention programs. With a properly functioning EIS that identifies officers who would benefit from the support systems, CPD might be able to provide the assistance necessary to avoid crises, especially in cases where the officers would not seek the help on their own. This, in turn, would increase officer wellness and overall Department health.

In each of these areas, CPD leadership could seize upon critical opportunities to advocate for officer health and wellness, and encourage and guide officers to appropriate and necessary supports. Without prioritizing and planning for officer wellness, officers receive the message from leadership that officer wellness is not valued, which discourages officers who want to succeed but feel overburdened and unsupported in that goal.

c. CPD should adapt its current officer wellness programs to CPD's female workforce

CPD's current EAP, in addition to being under-resourced, has also not adjusted to the changing nature of policing, or of CPD's police force. The system is set up to provide counseling for CPD members, but the expertise of the current counselors is limited. As currently structured, with only three clinicians with limited expertise, not all officers will be able to access services that are appropriate, tailored, and attuned to their specific needs. Although EAP clinicians make referrals to outside providers, without a more robust, comprehensive counseling program, CPD can and should do more to ensure that all officers in the Department are supported and capable of using CPD's officer wellness programs.

Women officers we spoke with during our investigation noted that they feel particularly unsupported in the Department, both because of its culture and because the available support systems do not take into account the particular needs of female officers. To adequately provide support to all members and their diverse needs, CPD should expand and improve its program to ensure that services provided are culturally appropriate, sensitive to differing circumstances, and attentive to the issues facing all officers.

- d. *CPD should improve other areas of its operations to improve officer wellness, safety, and morale*

While officer support programs are critically important, the protection of officer wellness, safety, and morale depends upon a wide range of practices within the Department, many of which are currently not adequately supportive of officers. We heard from union representatives that restrictions on when and how officers may use vacation and elective leave time hurts morale. Also, CPD sends a negative message to its officers via the Department's deteriorating equipment. Several officers we spoke with described how outdated, malfunctioning equipment not only prevents them from doing their jobs safely and effectively, but makes them feel that the Department is not sufficiently concerned about their safety, efficiency, or professionalism. In particular, officers mentioned that their in-car cameras and computers frequently broke down, making it difficult to complete reports and enter data from the field, or look up information necessary to police their beat. One officer told us that in his district, 11 of the 14 in-car police cameras were broken, and that CPD does not have the sufficient staff to fix the cameras as they break. This impairs the value that cameras provide as a policing tool, and makes officers' jobs more difficult. Others noted problems with CPD's squad cars, saying that there were often not enough cars for a shift, which forces officers to ride three to a car at times. And many of the cars CPD does have are old and run down. A supervisor described CPD's cars as "dangerous and an embarrassment" to the force. These problems with CPD's equipment contribute to officers feeling unsupported in their work, and negatively impact officer safety, effectiveness, and morale, and in turn, community safety.

2. The unaddressed stress that CPD officers face harms officers, their families, and the public

During our investigation we heard that officer suicide and suicide threats are a significant problem in CPD. In fact, when we met with officials from EAP in May 2016, they had just handled an officer suicide threat the night before. One CPD official told us that CPD's rate is 22.7 suicides per 100,000 Department members. The FOP shared figures showing that CPD's suicide rate between 2013 and 2015 was 29.4 per 100,000 based on available information. This would mean that CPD's officer suicide rate is more than 60% higher than the national average of 18.1 law enforcement suicides per 100,000. As a CPD official noted, "in police work, we consider the bad guys the enemies and we have got to change that because it's destructive" and ignores that more officers die of suicide than in the line of duty. Recognizing the prevalence of officer suicide in CPD could help move the Department toward providing better interventions for officers in crisis. Indeed, the FBI credited "an increase in peer support programs, a decrease in resistance to personal assistance, and improvement in proactive mental health checkups" for the decrease in officer suicides nationally in 2012.⁵⁰

Many CPD members also struggle with alcohol and substance abuse. Indeed, EAP served more Department and family members (8,565 consultations) for alcohol and substance

⁵⁰ Brian R. Nanavaty, *Addressing Officer Crisis and Suicide: Improving Officer Wellness*, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Sept. 8, 2015), available at <https://leb.fbi.gov/2015/september/addressing-officer-crisis-and-suicide-improving-officer-wellness>.

abuse than it did for other mental health issues (7,498 consultations). While EAP is serving those officers who seek the help, the Department could do better to alleviate the stresses that may lead to these destructive behaviors, and that implicate public safety, by making wellness central to CPD's culture, from the moment a recruit enters the training academy through an officer's entire time on the force.

Finally, as discussed elsewhere in this Report, IPRA handles many complaints of domestic violence filed against CPD officers. Despite this, CPD does not address officer-involved domestic violence in CPD policies or academy trainings, or proactively inform officer family members how to get help and support if they need it. CPD employs one civilian who serves as a "domestic violence advocate," who can serve as a support person within the Department for victims of officer-involved domestic violence. Moreover, EAP seems particularly ill-suited to deal with domestic violence problems, as EAP officials do not have adequate specialized training or expertise in domestic violence, notwithstanding the fact that this is a known problem at CPD. Nor does CPD offer other robust intervention programs to detect, prevent, and appropriately respond to domestic violence by officers. CPD must institute reforms and dedicate adequate attention and resources to issues of officer wellness so that these and other officer personal and inter-personal issues are addressed appropriately.

D. Data Collection and Transparency

Deficiencies in how the City and CPD collect, analyze, and publish data regarding police activities contribute to the Department's failure to identify and correct unconstitutional policing. These deficiencies also inhibit transparency regarding CPD's practices. For decades, Chicago has failed to develop a comprehensive, integrated system to track and make public basic information about its police force. Instead, information is siloed, inaccurate, and incomplete. In addition, by failing to analyze and use important data, and by not reporting on that data publicly, the City is missing an opportunity to improve public transparency, and in turn, the relationship between CPD and the public.

1. CPD's data collection systems are siloed and disconnected

CPD uses an enormous and cumbersome data collection system to try to document policing activity. The system contains numerous "modules," which are comprised of thousands upon thousands of data-entry fields. When thousands of people (IPRA, BIA, officers, command staff, Human Resources, and more) are inconsistently filling out a few data fields, let alone thousands, the quality of data to support policing services is compromised. And, when police contacts are not properly documented, supervisors are not able to properly review activity, command staff are not able to properly discern patterns and deficiencies, and oversight bodies are not able to properly monitor activity and complaints.

CPD's data collection tools are filled with inefficiencies. CPD primarily relies on a system called CLEAR for its data collection, but there are several discrete, disconnected modules within that system, and information is generally not accessible across these modules. For example, several years ago, CPD used a program called CRMS to collect information about personnel investigations. CPD then migrated to use a program called AutoCR to track complaints against officers; but the rollout of AutoCR was never completed, and now both

AutoCR and CRMS contain largely duplicative data, with one system used by IPRA and another by BIA. Both modules remain in CLEAR. Additionally, the TRR and AutoCR modules in the system do not communicate with each other. As discussed elsewhere in this Report, TRRs are supposed to be filled out every time an officer is involved in a reportable use of force. A portion of these force incidents result in a complaint being filed with IPRA; yet, because the TRR and AutoCR modules are siloed, CPD does not automatically match up TRRs with subsequent complaints. In fact, even though the TRR database includes a field for “CR number obtained,” indicating that the TRR is the subject of an IPRA complaint, that field often does not accurately reflect the existence of an IPRA investigation.

Moreover, personnel within CPD often lack access to the data that would help them perform their duties. Commanders reported being able to view only the complaint/disciplinary histories of officers if they are entering a Summary Punishment Action Report (SPAR); otherwise, they believe they do not have the ability to know the histories of their officers and take those histories into consideration when making assignments. Similarly, when an officer is assigned to a new district, the officer’s new commander is unable to access the officer’s personnel record, complaint record, or other relevant information that would assist the commander with providing appropriate assignments and supervision.

This approach to data collection and maintenance undermines the utility of the data that CPD stores. Command staff are not currently using this data to support or inform officer supervision or officer activity. CPD needs to create a single case management system that will easily allow it to track and share the data it collects. Under the accountability rubric, this data would include CRs, SPARs, TRRs, NDIs, furloughs, medical absences, and related information. Without a streamlined, easy to use data platform, the data CPD collects will remain largely unused, which will continue to impede effective policing and CPD’s ability to provide close, well-informed supervision or promote accountability within the Department.

2. The City provides the public with data that is incomplete, inaccurate, untimely, and insufficient to allow the public to determine if CPD is policing constitutionally and effectively

In addition to insufficiently tracking and analyzing data for CPD and the City’s own benefit, the information provided to the public regarding the activities of CPD is also woefully inadequate. The City does not consistently provide its constituents with data regarding crime trends, arrests made, case clearances, or other common police metrics. Nor does the City publish sufficient meaningful information regarding officer misconduct. Data that is published is often outdated or incomplete. These deficiencies are impediments to the public’s understanding of, and trust in, CPD’s ability to detect misconduct, including the use of unreasonable force, and hold officers accountable for misconduct.

CPD has not published an annual report since 2010. In fact, public reporting on crime trends city-wide has not occurred for years; the most recent report covered murder crime trends from 1998-2007. Some statistical reports were historically provided more frequently, but reports have not been issued for the last few years. For example, the most recent “Domestic Violence Quarterly Statistical Report” was released in June of 2014; prior to that, the reports were indeed quarterly. CPD publishes daily crime statistics through a “data portal,” but this data is limited to

criminal activity. There is no other data published on the website that relates to police-community interactions. Pursuant to a settlement agreement with the American Civil Liberties Union, CPD is required to track and report data regarding investigatory “stop and frisk” practices to a court-appointed monitor, who will issue a public report twice each year. Once this agreement terminates, however, CPD will be under no obligation to report this data, and CPD policy does not mandate data collection and public reporting more broadly. CPD recently stated that it would resume issuing annual reports in 2017, and that the first report would include data for the previous six years when reports were not published. In addition, the Mayor recently issued an end of year “progress report” highlighting the status of Chicago’s police reform efforts. These are helpful steps towards greater transparency, but they are not entrenched in policy or otherwise permanent reforms.

The City also should improve public transparency regarding officer misconduct investigations. To be sure, transparency regarding misconduct investigations has greatly improved in recent months, to the credit of the current Chief Administrator at IPRA. Prior to the start of our investigation, until a complaint was fully investigated, the City did not make available the actual allegations filed against officers; police reports that are associated with allegations of criminal misconduct; investigative testimony; or audio or video of incidents where misconduct was alleged. Moreover, until recently, IPRA published only abstract summaries of sustained cases. These abstracts, which were essentially summaries of summaries, did little to illuminate the course of an investigation or the evidence considered. The summaries also covered only sustained cases, leaving the public to wonder how conclusions were reached in the vast majority of cases. Prior administrations also posted redacted summary reports, but only of officer-involved shootings. Under the current administration, IPRA now publishes redacted summary reports, within 30 days of closing the case at IPRA, of all cases, not just shootings, regardless of the investigation’s outcome—a positive step towards better transparency. The City also publishes aggregate complaint and investigation data mainly through quarterly reports from IPRA. The reports provide various counts of investigations initiated and completed, such as the number of complaints filed by incident type and the number of complaints that were closed, but this does not provide the public with an accurate picture of police misconduct in Chicago. For example, the reports address only the total number of complaints; they do not account for the total number of *allegations* made against CPD officers. Each complaint could contain several distinct allegations.

IPRA’s recent changes to its reporting are improvements, but the City can and should do more to ensure the public has access to as much complete and accurate information as practicable.⁵¹ Indeed, the City’s investigative agencies could better report on the types of cases they handle, including the volume, issues involved, and outcomes of those cases. The IPRA quarterly reports also do not provide relevant demographic information of complainants or accused officers. IPRA breaks down the number of incidents filed against each district and specialized unit, but does little else to identify patterns or trends among its data. More specifically, IPRA does not analyze complaint data to identify racial, ethnic, gender, or other

⁵¹ In the past, IPRA also produced Annual Reports. However, IPRA has not released an Annual Report since 2012. See IPRA, *Publications: Annual Reports*, available at <http://www.iprachicago.org/category/annual-reports/> (last accessed Jan. 12, 2017).

disparities that may be present. This prevents the public from seeing how policing is affecting certain communities, and impedes the City's ability to address patterns and root causes of misconduct.

There are also questions about the accuracy, and therefore the usefulness, of the limited data that is reported by IPRA. For example, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) recently concluded that public reporting by IPRA on CPD's use of force prior to 2015 "was inaccurate and incomplete." In particular, the OIG found serious deficiencies and discrepancies in IPRA's reporting of weapons discharges, noting that IPRA's data reported in its quarterly reports "did not match the number of actual incidents in any category during the time periods reviewed." As noted in the [Accountability](#) Section of this Report, we found issues with IPRA's investigations that would prevent accurate reporting of misconduct occurring within CPD. Specifically, IPRA consistently miscategorizes complaints and fails to separately investigate all allegations of misconduct that are raised by a complainant. These and other errors in IPRA's data collection and reporting therefore render the quarterly reports useless.

Even where accurate, the limited information given in IPRA's quarterly reports gives an incomplete picture of how misconduct investigations are resolved. IPRA findings can be, and frequently are, challenged by the chain of command and/or set aside by the Superintendent. The information provided by IPRA represents only the first step in resolving a misconduct allegation—the findings of IPRA. However, there is no additional public reporting on how often investigators' recommendations are overturned, or what discipline is ultimately imposed. Additional layers of review, including arbitration and involvement of the Police Board, may change the ultimate findings and the discipline that is imposed. As discussed elsewhere in this Report, annual reports from the Police Board provide some of this information in aggregate form, but no information is given regarding individual cases. Further, the last report was published in 2014. The information made public by IPRA is therefore misleading, as it does not tell the public how a misconduct complaint was ultimately resolved and what discipline was imposed.

The lack of transparency regarding officer misconduct complaints is not confined to IPRA. BIA and supervisors at the district level barely report publicly *any* information regarding misconduct investigations under their purview, even though, combined, they investigate roughly 70% of all misconduct allegations filed against officers. BIA only publishes a short annual report, consisting of a list of complaint log numbers. It does not publish summary reports or abstracts of any cases it investigates. District command staff publishes nothing on the investigations conducted at the district level—in fact, all of their investigations are conducted and tracked on paper, rather than electronically, thereby making it difficult for command staff to collect, analyze, and publicly report on those investigations. Community members seeking information about the outcome of a particular investigation at BIA or the district are forced to obtain that information through other channels, such as public records requests. The lack of transparency regarding BIA and district investigations leaves broad gaps in the information that is publicly available regarding misconduct investigations.

Complainants themselves are often kept in the dark about the status of their cases. Individuals complaining of officer misconduct do not receive periodic updates from investigators. Several complainants told us that they were left unaware of what was happening

with their complaint for months, or even years—and some never heard back at all. At the conclusion of an investigation, complainants typically receive only a form letter stating the finding, i.e., whether the allegation of misconduct was sustained, not sustained, unfounded, or exonerated. No additional explanation is given. Complainants are not told what steps were taken to investigate their claims, leaving them to wonder whether the investigation was sufficient. Chicago also does not tell complainants the discipline imposed as a result of the complaint. And, as discussed elsewhere in this Report, if “mediation” is used to resolve a complaint, the complainant is not involved or consulted before or during that process; they are merely informed at the end that their complaint was resolved. Chicago’s failure to meaningfully communicate with complainants at all stages of the investigative process undermines complainants’ confidence that their allegations are taken seriously and that appropriate steps are being taken to resolve their concerns.

Finally, as discussed elsewhere in this Report, the City frequently settles civil rights lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and loses such cases at trial. In addition to not internally analyzing these lawsuits to identify trends, CPD also keeps the details of these settlements from the public, thereby avoiding public scrutiny of CPD’s deficiencies. For most cases, the only transparency provided is a spreadsheet of all judgments and settlements handled by the City’s Law Department; this spreadsheet lists complaints against the police, but contains only the plaintiff’s name, the amount of the settlement, and a vague description of the claim settled (e.g., “excessive force,” or “false arrest”). Until the Chicago Reporter created its database, based on court records and material requested through public records laws, little information about these settlements was publicly available. The City’s limited release of information regarding settlements further contributes to public distrust and the perception that the City wishes to keep officer misconduct concealed from public scrutiny.

3. Recent reforms to improve transparency are positive steps, but more is required and changes must be sustained

The City and CPD have taken steps during the course of our investigation to increase transparency, but these changes—both actual and promised—must go further to ensure transparency is permanently supported and encouraged within CPD and IPRA.

The City recently instituted or committed to institute certain measures intended to increase transparency. These welcome reforms are in the initial stages. For example, CPD announced it would resume publication of annual reports, and the IPRA website now contains significantly more information regarding the results of misconduct investigations. CPD and IPRA should continue to publish this type of information regularly. As another example, in early 2016, the City announced a new “transparency policy” at the request of the Police Accountability Task Force. This policy, which was published in draft form, mandates the release of video and audio footage associated with certain incidents of police misconduct within 60 days of their occurrence, “unless a request is made to delay the release.” The policy applies to incidents where an officer “discharges his or her firearm, stun gun, or Taser in a manner that strikes, or potentially could strike, an individual, even if no allegation of misconduct is made” and “those where the death of, or great bodily harm to, a person occurs while that person is in police custody.”

This policy represents a significant step towards improving the transparency of investigations into CPD misconduct. Pursuant to this new policy, IPRA recently posted materials from 150 open investigations, including videos, case incident reports, tactical response reports, and officer battery reports. While the policy covers incidents that clearly are of heightened public interest, it is nonetheless limited in scope, and the City should apply it to other categories of force and civil rights violations as well. IPRA's website notes that the Mayor has adopted the policy, but a final version of the policy is not posted anywhere on CPD or the City's website, and is not part of CPD's directives system; the IPRA website only links to the policy as recommended by the Task Force. This policy should be finalized and permanently adopted.⁵²

Perhaps as importantly, providing true transparency means not just increasing public access to information about problems, but encouraging public involvement in crafting solutions to those problems. The City should continue to meaningfully involve the community in developing proposed reforms. This is particularly important given the potentially monumental changes on the horizon for the City's transparency and accountability systems. We applaud the City's recent efforts to seek public input on proposed reforms, such as the COPA ordinance and CPD's new use-of-force policies. The City should engage in similar efforts for other anticipated reforms, and ensure that the public comments solicited are genuinely considered and addressed. Involving the community in this way will increase public confidence in and cooperation with CPD, which will improve CPD's ability to police safely, constitutionally, and effectively.

There is no dispute that more work is needed to restore the public's faith in CPD. Some of that work may be accomplished through improvements to CPD's data collection, analysis, and publication practices. Above all, to instill meaningful change in this area, any reforms instituted by CPD and the City must be formalized and permanent, so that they survive changes in leadership in CPD and City government.

E. Promotions

Dedicated, competent leaders are essential to ensuring that CPD promotes safe, effective policing tactics while valuing and respecting the rights of all community members. In Chicago, a lack of transparency around promotional systems and decisions, and years of litigation regarding CPD's promotion process, have created a narrative among the rank-and-file that CPD does not value good leadership, and that current leaders are unqualified to lead. Despite attempts at reform, officers we interviewed continue to view the promotions system with skepticism, which has decreased officer morale and undermined effective supervision. CPD's promotions system should be regularly reviewed, and revised if necessary, with the aim of increasing transparency and ensuring the promotion of candidates who will make CPD better able to police effectively and respectfully, while continuing to abide by court orders put in place to ensure that candidates are not unlawfully excluded from promotions on the basis of race or sex.

⁵² It is also worth noting that on June 6, 2016, CPD's officer union filed an "unfair labor practice charge" with the Illinois Labor Relations Board, challenging IPRA's release of video as a violation of the union's collective bargaining agreement. The dispute is set for a hearing in early 2017.

1. CPD's current promotions system

Under CPD's current promotions system, candidates interested in a promotion to detective, sergeant, or lieutenant take a two-part test. The first test consists of multiple choice questions testing job knowledge regarding policies and procedures, and is graded on a pass/fail basis. Candidates who pass this qualifying exam then move on to a second part of the exam, which is designed to evaluate the skills and application of knowledge consistent with the promotion position. The second part of the exam is scored and candidates are ranked based on their score on the second part of the exam and placed on a list of individuals eligible for promotion.

Candidates who appear on the list of individuals eligible for promotion to detective, sergeant, or lieutenant, may be promoted in one of two ways. First, candidates are ranked by their score on the second part of the exam, and candidates may be promoted based purely on that rank. At least 70% of promotions for sergeant and lieutenant are made from the individuals who complete both tests and are ranked highly on the lists; at least 80% of the promotions to detective are made this way.

Second, candidates who pass the qualifying exam may be nominated for a "merit" promotion regardless of their score or rank on the second part of the exam. CPD has used a merit system for lieutenants starting as early as the mid-1990s, and for sergeants as early as the late 1990s. The system was created to identify CPD members with supervisory potential who do not necessarily score well on promotional exams, given that previous promotional exams had an adverse impact on minority eligibility for promotions.

Notably, CPD adopted a hiring plan (Hiring Plan) regarding merit promotions in 2011—and readopted a revised Hiring Plan in 2014—pursuant to the Settlement Agreement in *Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, et al.*, a lawsuit alleging politicized hiring and promotions in several City agencies, including CPD.⁵³ The *Shakman* orders also gave the City's Office of the Inspector General the authority to audit and monitor compliance with the Hiring Plan. Concurrently, CPD revised its Merit Board to match the requirements laid out in the Hiring Plan, and to provide more structure for the merit selection process.

Under the hiring plan and related CPD policies, for the rank of lieutenant and below, merit nominations can come from chiefs, deputy chiefs, commanders, and directors. A Merit Board consisting of five deputy chiefs and the Director of Human Resources interviews and evaluates the merit nominees. In considering which nominees to recommend to the Superintendent for merit promotions, the Merit Board can review the nominee's complimentary history and performance evaluations, but they can only consider the nominee's disciplinary history as permitted by the nominee's collective bargaining agreement. The Superintendent retains discretion to ultimately select the nominees receiving merit promotions, and is not bound by the recommendations of the Merit Board in making the final decision.

⁵³ See City of Chicago's Unopposed Motion for Entry of an Order Approving a City of Chicago Police Department Hiring Plan for Sworn Titles, *Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook Cnty.*, Case No. 69-C-2145 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2011).

In contrast to this dual-track promotions system for detectives, sergeants, and lieutenants, captains are promoted exclusively by a board and do not sit for an exam. Individuals interested in being selected for promotion to the rank of captain submit application materials in response to a job announcement, are screened by Human Resources to determine eligibility, and then, if eligible, evaluated by the “Captain Screening Board.” Individuals who pass the screening board are then evaluated by the Merit Board, similar to the Merit Board’s evaluation of candidates for the rank of lieutenant and below.

2. CPD’s promotions system, as a whole, is regarded as unfair

a. *CPD’s tests have been challenged as discriminatory and unfair*

The promotional examinations for CPD have been subject to legal challenges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, *et seq.* (Title VII) for decades.⁵⁴ Title VII prohibits an employer from using a neutral employment practice that results in disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, unless such practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity,” and there exists no alternative employment practice that would result in less disparate impact and equally serve the employer’s legitimate interests. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).

The legal challenges of discriminatory impact and allegations of improper exam procedures⁵⁵ underscore the continuing need for careful review of the examination’s content and procedures. We find the Seventh Circuit instructive in its emphasis of “the City’s responsibility to re-examine the promotional process for currency.” *Allen*, 351 F.3d at 315. We urge CPD to review its promotional exams and procedures for continued compliance with Title VII in order to ensure the lawful promotion of the best possible candidates in a transparent and fair environment. Ensuring fairness and non-discrimination in promotional testing will help CPD promote the best candidates, which in turn, will ensure that CPD has a cadre of supervisors who are willing and able to provide officers with adequate supervision, guide them on how to police

⁵⁴ Several of these lawsuits claimed that CPD’s promotional exams discriminated against African-American officers, Latino officers, and female officers, and were not consistent with Title VII requirements. *See, e.g., Banos v. City of Chicago*, 398 F.3d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 2005) (minority sergeants challenged 1998 promotions to lieutenant); *Allen v. City of Chicago*, 351 F.3d 306, 307 (7th Cir. 2003) (minority officers challenged 1998 promotions to sergeant); *Bryant v. City of Chicago*, 200 F.3d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir. 2000) (minority sergeants challenged 1994 promotions to lieutenant); *United States v. City of Chicago*, 549 F.2d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 1977) (plaintiffs alleged discrimination against African-American, Latino, and female officers in hiring and promotions). White officers have also sued, claiming the tests discriminate against them. *See, e.g., Majeske v. City of Chicago*, 218 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2000) (non-minority officers challenged 1989 detective promotions); *Barnhill v. City of Chicago*, 142 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (white male officers challenged 1998 promotions to sergeant).

⁵⁵ Separate from, and in addition to, litigation concerning the tests’ discriminatory impact, promotional examinations also have been tainted with allegations of cheating or cronyism in the exam’s preparation or administration. A 1998 promotional exam was heavily criticized when groups of officers allegedly conferred with one another during bathroom breaks and subsequently changed their exam answers, and some test takers were given exams that were copied poorly, leaving portions of the questions unreadable. The City Inspector General is also currently investigating allegations that three recently promoted lieutenants were coached by a high-ranking official who helped develop the August 2015 lieutenant exam. Although the investigation is ongoing, allegations of improper exam procedures make CPD officers doubt the fairness of the exam process.

effectively and constitutionally, and hold them accountable when necessary, all of which are critical to preventing, detecting, and appropriately responding to unreasonable uses of force.

b. CPD's merit promotions are viewed as political and lack transparency

One of the major complaints from officers we interviewed is that CPD's promotions system lacks transparency regarding the nomination and qualification process for merit promotions. This has led many officers to believe that merit promotions are a reward for cronyism, rather than a recognition of excellence that was overlooked by the testing process. Many of the officers we spoke with—minority and non-minority alike—told us that they feel merit promotions are not truly based on “merit,” but rather the “clout” you hold in the Department or “who you know.” In other words, officers believe that CPD leadership gives merit promotions to individuals who are unqualified to serve as leaders, merely because those individuals have connections up the chain of command or have advocates in positions of power outside of CPD who call in favors or lobby on their behalf. Female officers in particular feel that they are frequently overlooked for merit promotions. This belief undermines officers' faith in CPD supervisors and their acceptance of CPD's systems of accountability and supervision.

In reality, there are documented instructions and guidance for merit promotion nominators and decision makers, but this information is not widely known. Nominators are required to attend “nominator training” in order to be eligible to make nominations, and are instructed by policy to follow the “Merit Selection Assessment Dimensions” contained in the “Nominator Manual” for the rank being filled. However, CPD has not proactively informed the rank-and-file of those dimensions or the content of the nominator training. The nominator and merit selection manuals are apparently posted on CLEAR, but typically officers we spoke with did not know this information was accessible, and remain unaware of the assessment dimensions used to evaluate potential merit nominees. This leaves officers to speculate about what criteria nominators consider when nominating individuals for merit promotions, which, in turn, increases officer skepticism that truly meritorious criteria are used at all. Finally, although the Superintendent must fill out a written justification memorandum explaining the basis for his or her merit selections, nothing about the reasoning is made public, the justification is often cursory, and candidates who were eligible but did not receive merit promotions are never provided an explanation for why they were not selected.

CPD has moved in a positive direction by establishing the Hiring Plan, allowing oversight by the Office of the Inspector General, and introducing new policies and manuals that, in part, describe the information that may be considered by the Merit Board. However, some of these new policies are written in vague terms that would allow problematic promotions to go undetected, and indeed, we know of at least one example where an individual received a merit promotion based on “clout” rather than merit, even after the new procedures outlined in the Hiring Plan were in effect: a recent inquiry from the City's Inspector General found that, as part of the 2013 sergeant merit promotion process, an officer assigned to the then-Superintendent's security detail was inappropriately promoted to sergeant.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ The officer was, in fact, ineligible for a merit promotion, because the officer had failed the sergeant's exam. The officer was nominated by a commander who had worked for CPD for only two weeks, after the Superintendent's

The OIG's current role providing oversight of this process is important to ensuring that the process operates as intended. CPD should also itself continuously review the current nominator manuals, policies, and other materials to ensure the systems are working properly. CPD should also review ways in which it can increase transparency surrounding the process. Given the skepticism expressed to us during our investigation, despite several notable areas of progress, CPD has not sufficiently communicated the details of the merit promotion policies to the rank-and-file.

c. Promotional exams are not offered with sufficient frequency

Numerous officers noted that they lack the chance to be promoted because CPD does not schedule promotional exams with sufficient frequency. For example, the last sergeant's exam was completed in January 2014. Before that, the sergeant's exam was last administered in March of 2006—nearly eight years prior. The last lieutenant exam was given in 2015; prior to that, the last exam was in 2006. Officers reported to us that they had been on the force for nearly a decade without being given an opportunity to make detective; indeed, no detective exam was offered between September 2003 and May 2016. The lack of regular promotional tests increases the frustration and lack of confidence in the promotional system as highly qualified and enthusiastic candidates are forced to wait to take promotional exams for years after they reach eligibility.

The City has recognized this problem and pursuant to the City's new Hiring Plan, eligibility lists must be retired after six years, "unless there is a lack of available funds for testing," in which case the list will be retired "as soon as practicable." City consultants highlighted this problem in 2014, and recommended that the Department administer promotional tests at least every four years. Although the six-year limit contained in the Hiring Plan is an improvement over past practices, CPD should continue to evaluate whether scores on previously administered tests accurately reflect current knowledge and skills, and whether more frequent testing, through validated testing instruments, would result in promotion of the most qualified candidates.

Chief of Staff requested that the commander make the nomination, even though the commander had no knowledge of the officer's qualifications. Human Resources staff did not verify that the officer was eligible for promotion, and despite his failing score, included him on the list of eligible candidates that was forwarded to the Merit Board. The Merit Board nevertheless voted not to recommend promotion, but the Superintendent overrode that recommendation. The Superintendent never submitted a justification memo for this decision, as required by the new policy, but CPD's Human Resources still processed the promotion. The error was not discovered until the newly-promoted sergeant completed supervisor training and the City's own Human Resources department reviewed the hiring materials and discovered that the sergeant was ineligible for that position. The sergeant was then demoted, but the City is now facing a lawsuit over the controversy. The OIG found that, at several steps in the promotional process, the merit promotion policies were either ignored, or there were not enough safeguards in place to catch errors. The OIG recommended several changes based on its review of this incident.

3. CPD must review and revise its promotional exams and merit system as necessary to ensure that the best-qualified candidates are promoted in a fair, lawful, and transparent manner

Despite the long history of litigation and the myriad litigation-initiated reforms, including the addition of the merit promotions system, there remains a broad officer sense that CPD does not promote people fairly. Prior reform efforts have not convinced officers that CPD's promotions system is fair and that the City values strong, quality leadership. Concerns remain about whether the promotion structure as a whole ensures that CPD is promoting the most competent, effective, and dedicated officers to supervisory positions. CPD should engage in regular and careful review of its procedures to ensure that they are fair and sufficiently frequent to result in the promotion of effective, ethical, and otherwise highly qualified officers.

Further, as noted above, CPD should take concrete steps to enhance the transparency of the promotions system. Some recent efforts, including the expansion of the OIG's role, are laudable, and should be expanded and sustained. We note that previous attempts to create transparency in the merit promotion process were scaled back or rescinded following changes in leadership. For example, one former Superintendent published a list of command staff who nominated officers for merit promotions alongside the names of the individuals they nominated. This measure was intended to increase accountability; officers would be aware of whether or not they were nominated, and command staff who nominated individuals for political rather than meritorious reasons could not hide those nominations from public scrutiny. However, the policy of publishing this information was rescinded immediately when the next administration took over. It is imperative that steps taken towards transparency through the 2014 changes be maintained and built on, rather than reversed.

V. CPD MUST BETTER SUPPORT AND INCENTIVIZE POLICING THAT IS LAWFUL AND RESTORES TRUST AMONG CHICAGO'S MARGINALIZED COMMUNITIES

True community policing is an overarching ethos that creates both direction and space for officers and communities to treat each other with respect and with trust. This relationship serves as the foundation for working together to establish crime prevention priorities and develop solutions to public safety problems. Implemented correctly, community policing helps people feel neither over- nor under-policed, and incentivizes and empowers many people to work with the police—and others to at least not work against them. To be successful in this way, community policing must be supported not just by an entire police department, but by an entire city.

Within the past several months CPD and the City have announced ambitious plans to revive community policing in Chicago. Superintendent Johnson has formed a Community Policing Advisory Panel, comprised of national experts, police command staff, and local community leaders, to develop strategies for enhancing community policing within CPD. The Superintendent has pledged to remake the Department's Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), the formerly robust CPD community policing initiative. The Department also recently issued a directive establishing the "Bridging the Divide Program," focused on improving youth-police relationships, in eight districts, with further expansion planned. As part of this

approach, Superintendent Johnson has said that “the job of every officer is to reduce crime and help restore trust.” CPD has several additional community policing related initiatives underway.

We commend CPD for its renewed emphasis on community policing. This policing approach, when implemented with fidelity to all its tenets, has been shown to be effective at making communities safer while incentivizing a policing culture that builds confidence in law enforcement. As such, it is a promising path that can lead to eliminating the patterns of unlawful conduct our investigation found, increasing community trust in CPD, and reducing crime in Chicago.

The importance of community trust in reducing crime can be seen in homicide clearance rates. In 2016, CPD was able to identify a suspect in only 29% of all homicides, which is less than half the national rate for 2015. Identifying suspects in homicides is recognized as an important factor in preventing future homicides. And there is broad consensus, including throughout Chicago, that increasing community trust and confidence in CPD is necessary for CPD to be able to clear more homicides. As Superintendent Johnson recently stated, “The first thing we have to do is improve our trust with the community—especially the minority community and CPD—that will help raise the clearance rate, because those individuals will be more comfortable in coming to us and giving us the information we need to hold these individuals accountable.” We heard this same message during many of our conversations with residents of Chicago’s high-violence neighborhoods. As one woman told us, “You can get a lot of things done if I have a relationship with you and I can trust you, then I can tell you some stuff. But if I can’t trust you, I can’t tell you anything . . . [CPD] need[s] to build relationships with the people in the community.”⁵⁷

Chicago was formerly a leader in advancing community policing and continues to recognize the promise of this approach. As the Mayor has stated, “Chicago is where the whole idea of community policing began. . . . It remains the best and most comprehensive approach we have in changing the everyday conditions that breed crime and violence and then breed mistrust.” CPD’s Superintendent Johnson has repeatedly called community policing his “core philosophy.”

Notwithstanding this recognition, community policing as a true CPD ethos and driving force fell away many years ago, and past attempts to restore it have not been successful. To be successful this time, CPD must build up systems throughout the Department, to support and bolster this community-focused approach to policing. Community policing will struggle to be successful in Chicago if it remains a series of disconnected initiatives, no matter how well-meaning and well-executed. As stated in the report from the Task Force on 21st Century Policing, community policing must be “infused throughout the culture and organizational structure” of a police department.

⁵⁷ Our discussion of the importance of trust in clearing homicides is not meant to diminish the importance of other factors. Many other factors, including the number of detectives assigned to the unit investigating homicides, and to each homicide case, as well as the timeliness of detective response to the scene of a homicide, are important factors in increasing clearance rates. Further, as discussed below, how CPD handles homicides is itself an important factor in building community trust and confidence in law enforcement.

A. CPD's Move to Restore True Community Policing Will Be Difficult But Is Promising

Infusing community policing throughout City and police systems—from training and supervision to transparency and accountability—while dismantling practices that undercut this effort, will be a lengthy endeavor requiring sustained commitment and focus. Once achieved, however, this trust-building approach to policing will better promote both public safety and respect for constitutional rights.

1. CPD has many officers who are already policing in a community-focused manner

CPD has the officers to make community policing work. During our investigation we observed many instances of diligent, thoughtful, and selfless policing, and we heard stories of officers who police this way every day. While on a ride along, we observed officers patiently talk to a troubled young man until they convinced him to remove a belt from around his neck. During an interview with a patrol officer, we learned that he had paid for and installed a koi pond at the school where he works because he “wanted to do something for the kids here.” This same officer volunteered to coach the girls’ cross-country team at a local school when no one else would take the role.

Chicago residents provided us with story after story of officers who care deeply about the community, are affected by the violence they see individuals commit against each other, and work hard to build trust between the community and the Department. We heard about officers who are well-respected and beloved in the neighborhoods they patrol. We were told about a district commander who knew and interacted with all of the community groups in his district and handed out his personal cell-phone number to residents. We know there are many more like him. Many of the officers with whom we went on ride-alongs took the time to stop and talk with kids or shopkeepers who obviously knew them and were happy to see them. We saw a field training officer and his probationary police officer walk around the neighborhood frequently during our ride-along with them, taking the time to visit with children at a community center and shop. We spoke to officers who organized and secured officer attendance for a CPD-sponsored daddy-daughter dance, to step in for those fathers who, for whatever reason, were absent from their children’s lives. We spoke with “Purpose over Pain,” an advocacy and support group committed to ending gun violence. The group—run by one of its founders who began the group with her then-husband, a CPD officer—related to us that CPD officers attend its events and are deeply involved in its mission. We were impressed by the attitude and efforts of the CPD officer who led the “Building the Divide” program, a program that promises significant strides in humanizing officers and residents to each other. The Department is currently planning to restart this program in eight districts.

Another of the many examples of such policing that we observed personally occurred while on a ride-along with an officer in the Fifth District. The officers we were with responded to a call in one of Chicago’s public housing projects. We observed an officer deal with a potentially volatile incident with skill and patience. By treating both parties with dignity, compassion, and respect, the officer was able to resolve the incident successfully rather than having it escalate, which might have occurred had the officer approached the situation differently, as we have seen from other CPD officers. This officer told us that the resolution was

not atypical for him, and that he believed most situations like that could easily be defused with patient and respectful interactions by police officers. Throughout our time with this officer, it was clear he had a warm rapport with the people in the neighborhood he patrolled. He had grown up in the area and knew many people in the neighborhood. It was clear that this officer knew the importance of connecting, on a real and personal level, with residents. He told us that he considered establishing those relationships as one of the keys to success for an officer working his or her beat. As a result of Chicago's requirement that officers live within the City, many officers talked to us, with pride and concern, about policing in the same neighborhoods they grew up in.⁵⁸

From these observations and others, it is clear that many Chicago police officers help community members every day in meaningful and tangible ways. Most of these efforts never make the news because they are part of an officer's daily routine: watching carefully to detect wrongdoers before they can do wrong, diligently patrolling, notwithstanding the disrespect and cold stares that are too often part of the job, and risking their lives to protect complete strangers.

2. For community policing to be successful it must be infused throughout CPD's policing strategies and tactics

Of course, the realities of police work can create challenges to policing with care for even the most well-meaning and dedicated officer. For community policing to be successful within CPD, the Department and City will need to take a holistic approach that will translate the discrete programs and initiatives currently underway into a department-wide ethos that resets the CPD culture. This will require both a sustained shift of resources to systems and initiatives consistent with a community-based policing focus, and a transformation of many of the CPD systems discussed elsewhere in this Report, including Training, Supervision, and Accountability.

Inculcating community policing throughout CPD will also require a remaking of CPD's existing community policing structure. Examining the shortcomings of these current community policing efforts may be helpful in bringing about greater success moving forward.

From 2000 to 2010, Chicago's commitment to community policing waned. Even as CPD's overall budget went up, its budget for CAPS was cut. Community policing within CPD began to be implemented half-heartedly and superficially to the point where, today, community policing is largely seen as illegitimate by many officers and community members.

In recent years, community policing in Chicago has been relegated to a small group of police officers and civilians in each district. CAPS typically has a sergeant, two police officers,

⁵⁸ Media reports of course include many additional accounts of officer dedication to the community, as well as officer heroism. For example, CPD officers operate a youth baseball league in one of the most challenged neighborhoods in Chicago, with several officers volunteering their time to coach 9-12 year olds in the league. CPD's "Shop With a Cop," an established annual event that occurs every holiday season, gives children the opportunity to spend a day shopping, eating, and bowling with police officers. News stories also recount stories of officers assisting people changing flat tires in the middle of the night; buying groceries for elderly neighbors; pulling people and dogs from building fires; pulling a teenage boy from the bottom of a pool and saving him from drowning; and many instances of officers assisting individuals with gunshot wounds—sometimes being credited with saving their lives.

and a civilian in each district responsible for setting forth a community policing agenda and coordinating community policing activities in the entire district. The officers receive little training on how to accomplish their mandate, and there is little to no involvement by patrol officers or commanders in planning and implementing community policing strategies. Community policing efforts are also poorly funded. Districts receive approximately \$9,500 a year to carry out all of CAPS' work if the district is in a high crime area, and \$8,000 if not. Approximately half of the money is budgeted for community meetings and events while the other half is budgeted for youth programs and events. This money is far less than what is needed to cover the expenses staff incur in organizing events, so CAPS staff either rely on donations from businesses or pay out of their own pockets. We were told by community policing staff that funding was an "enormous challenge" in developing community policing strategies and events.

Given the lack of resources and emphasis put on community policing, CAPS for the most part focuses on hosting community meetings. But these meetings are not effectively advancing community policing within CPD. Effective community policing is responsive to residents' input regarding community needs, and seeks residents' insights into the best way police can help address those needs. At its core, community policing "takes seriously the public's definition of its own problems." Chicago has attempted to meet this tenet of community policing by sponsoring regularly scheduled meetings in each of CPD's districts. But as currently run, these meetings generally are not an effective way for CPD to learn about neighborhood problems or the concerns of the spectrum of residents who make up each neighborhood. According to some residents, the meetings "are not a place to go if you have an agenda other than what the police want to discuss." This was consistent with our observations. From our interviews with community policing staff and observations of several meetings, it became clear that the purpose of the meetings was to discuss neighborhood criminal activity to the exclusion of broader issues involving the police that are also of importance to the community. One community policing staff person said that community meetings are not meant to address citizen concerns about officer use of force or explain Department policy, telling us that residents should "raise it with someone else." For example, complaints received by community policing officers at the meetings were frequently referred to the saturation, tactical, and gang teams for enforcement—teams by whom some in these communities felt victimized and dehumanized. In one CAPS meeting we saw, an officer was actively antagonistic to community members, responding with hostility after misinterpreting an attendee's statement, and getting increasingly louder and more aggressive as the attendee tried to defuse the situation.

Not surprisingly, CAPS meetings are not generally well-attended and do not reflect a broad spectrum of residents. Although several CAPS sergeants stated that the community meetings were well attended, at the meetings we observed, there were usually only a handful of residents attending. Given other priorities such as jobs, school, and child care, as well as transportation challenges and concerns about possible retaliation, these meetings may not attract large numbers of residents every week. There is a need for CPD to be more creative in finding ways to more meaningfully connect with those who will likely rely on its services the most. The Department has a long way to go in this respect: one young man told us that one CPD officer's reaction upon recognizing him while he was working at the young man's church internship this summer was to say, "You're one of those motherfuckers who sits in CAPS meetings and complains." Statements like this, particularly alongside the conduct of officers described elsewhere in this Report, reinforce the broadly held view among some in Chicago that CPD's

approach to community policing is not genuine, and mostly operates as a “surveillance” tool to assist the Department in executing its enforcement strategy.

To be successful moving forward, CPD also must better recognize, reward, and encourage positive community policing efforts. Most community policing officers we spoke to told us that their work is given low priority within the Department. We were mostly met with amused smiles when we asked if their work was recognized by CPD. One community policing officer told us, “We acknowledge the work that we do.” CPD officers outside CAPS with whom we spoke were generally dismissive of CAPS and community policing, calling it “not effective.” One patrol officer told us he makes an effort to go to CAPS meetings “when he can;” another officer told us that, due to constant enforcement initiatives, officers didn’t have time to attend community events. In addition to being disheartening—officers should make the time to connect with residents in the neighborhoods they patrol—the many comments like this that we heard reflect officers’ understanding of the Department’s priorities. Similarly, the Department’s “Bridging the Divide” program was very popular with community members when it was launched, but suffered from poor participation by officers. The Department recently issued a directive requiring participation in this program in eight districts. This effort is laudable, but will not likely be successful if CPD cannot tap into and incentivize the many good officers who are eager to build genuine positive connections with Chicago’s youth and families.

B. CPD Must Change Practices to Restore Trust and Ensure Lawful Policing

To turn around policing in Chicago, CPD and the City must focus their efforts on improving relationships within neighborhoods that have Chicago’s highest rates of crime, poverty, and unemployment, and with communities that are otherwise marginalized. These efforts include recognizing that Chicago’s policing practices have had an unnecessarily negative impact on these communities, and working to change practices to increase police legitimacy and community trust.

Chicago recognizes that it must focus on changing the way it polices, particularly in these communities, and that it must rebuild trust in light of past experiences of both community members and police officers. As Superintendent Johnson has stated publicly, “We recognize that we did treat certain parts of this City inappropriately. And that was our fault. So we have to correct that.”

We commend Chicago for recognizing the critical importance of this effort, and urge them to continue and redouble their efforts.

1. CPD must do more to ensure that officers police fairly in neighborhoods with high rates of violent crime, and in vulnerable communities

Any effort to restore trust and ensure lawful policing in Chicago must focus on Chicago’s predominantly black and Latino neighborhoods, especially those with high rates of violent crime. Many individuals in these communities experience policing in a fundamentally different way than do white individuals and white communities. Restoring trust and bringing about effective policing will be difficult unless CPD eliminates unnecessary, harmful differences in how people

in these communities are treated, and takes affirmative measures to demonstrate its dedication to treating the residents of these neighborhoods fairly.

a. CPD must ensure it is responsive to victims of crime in Chicago's high-crime neighborhoods and other vulnerable communities

Strikingly, residents of Chicago's most challenged communities consistently expressed concern to us about their treatment when they or their family members are the victims of crime. An oft-repeated concern was that officers do not put sufficient emphasis on solving more significant crimes, or at least do not convey their concern to victims of such crimes.

Black and Latino residents in particular told us of feeling disregarded by CPD when they tried to get help after being victimized by crimes. One middle-aged man told us that after being assaulted and having his nose broken outside a store, he reported the crime and told the police there was video footage, but the police told him to go to the store himself to retrieve the video. An Englewood resident told us that a CPD sergeant told him flatly she would not help him get rid of a drug house on his street. One student we met with told us how he once tried to flag down an officer for help, but the officer just drove by. Many residents in predominantly black or Latino areas complained about response times when they call the police for assistance.

The many family members of homicide victims with whom we met similarly expressed a lack of confidence in CPD because of how they had been treated. Their experience with CPD, after a family member had been murdered, had made them feel that CPD does not genuinely care about the murders of young black men and women, and do too little to investigate and resolve those homicides. A young man told us how, after his brother was killed, he would go to the station to talk to someone about the investigation and officers would roll their eyes and say dismissively, "we're working on it." Families told us of detectives not interviewing key homicide witnesses or suspects, declining to obtain relevant video footage, and failing to update parents on the status of investigations, or even return their calls. One woman said that the Department switched the detective who was handling her son's homicide investigation without telling her. Another woman stated that she has to resort to getting information "on the street" about her son's case instead of from the detective, who told her that she "calls too much." This same woman told us that it took a week after her son was killed before anyone at CPD reached out to her. One mother told us that she felt CPD did not think her child was worthy of having his homicide solved. Yet another mother complained that police did not investigate the murder of her son, but sent her a bill for the cleanup of his body. Undoubtedly, many CPD detectives, like many other CPD officers, including those who helped start and participate in the aforementioned support group for those affected by gun violence, care deeply about victims of homicides. Our conversations with scores of family members of homicide victims made clear that CPD needs to do more to convey their commitment and care to these communities.

We also heard many concerns regarding CPD's investigation of potential hate crimes or hate incidents. CPD's Civil Rights Unit is charged with investigating all hate crimes and hate incidents in Chicago, yet has only two investigators.⁵⁹ Under CPD's current policy, officers are

⁵⁹ The New York City Police Department's Hate Crimes Task Force has 26 officers (including 20 detectives plus additional supervisory staff) and two civilians assigned to it.

to notify the Civil Rights Unit when there appears to have been a hate crime or other criminal or quasi-criminal incident motivated by hate. An official familiar with the investigative process explained that the Civil Rights Unit must be notified before the Unit can run a parallel hate crime investigation. This official told us that front line officers need better training to recognize potential hate crimes, or these crimes will go uninvestigated. Indeed, the Civil Rights Unit did not learn about a rash of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim graffiti in the Rogers Park neighborhood over the summer until there was a televised news report. We were also told that the Unit sometimes has to push to investigate crimes that appear to be hate-motivated because detectives minimize the seriousness of such crimes, saying things like, “a crime is a crime,” or “so they got called a name.”

Advocates and members of the Latino, Muslim, and transgender communities each separately raised concerns with us about Chicago’s response to potential or apparent hate crimes against members of their communities. For example, a Latino church in the Pilsen neighborhood was vandalized numerous times over the past year with anti-immigrant messages stating “Rape and Kill Mexico” and drawings of swastikas. While CPD eventually investigated the incidents as a hate crime, church members were distressed that the church was vandalized six times before CPD acted. The church had installed a security camera after the fifth incident, and it was not until there was a video of the perpetrator that CPD seemed to take the incidents seriously. The church told us that it had been a “struggle . . . to get anyone in authority to hear us and to do work to protect us. We fear we won’t be heard until a tragedy occurs.” Advocates from the Muslim community voiced similar concerns and frustrations, telling us that in their view CPD is “reticent about looking at potential hate crimes.” A Muslim advocacy organization told us that they receive around 200 discrimination complaints per year, and estimates that up to 30% could be hate-related. Yet, CPD reported only three hate crimes against Muslims between 2013 and 2015. Leaders in the transgender community are likewise concerned by the investigations of the murders of several transgender women in recent years. The Civil Rights Unit was not asked to open a hate crime investigation into any of these murders. Not only are members of this community upset that these crimes were never investigated as hate crimes, but they are also concerned that CPD’s failure to solve any of the murders reflects a lack of commitment to these cases.

Indeed, CPD needs to work harder and more effectively to address concerns of all Chicago communities, including Chicago’s transgender residents who voiced concerns about their treatment by CPD officers. CPD updated its General Order governing interactions with transgender individuals in December 2015, which is commendable. However, the community has expressed concerns about the policy, including that it fails to ensure that transgender individuals are classified by their gender identity and does not require officers to ask an individual their preference regarding the gender of the officer to conduct a search. CPD might have more effectively addressed these concerns had CPD’s outreach to the transgender community been more extensive. For example, the Department only has one LGBT liaison, which is insufficient to ensure collaboration and ongoing partnership with this community.

Several CPD officers told us that some people in these neighborhoods and communities seem accustomed to crime. These officers seemed not to recognize the role that police can play in normalizing crime if they fail to respond vigorously to violent crime no matter how often it occurs. The high incidence of violent crime in these neighborhoods and the effects that it has on

entire communities make it more important, not less important, that CPD respond seriously to these events. Failing to do so creates the perception for some that crimes committed against those living in these areas are not important to CPD. Indeed, we heard from other officers that CPD leadership responds with greater interest to crimes in some parts of the City, with one commander telling us that he will “catch holy hell” if a “white woman has her iPhone stolen” in the wealthy part of Chicago he commands. CPD must ensure it consistently makes clear to officers that crime does not matter more if it is committed in more advantaged communities.

b. Many residents of Chicago’s high-crime neighborhoods experience policing as overly harsh and unfair

Proactive policing is an important part of public safety, when implemented consistently with constitutional and community-oriented policing principles and as part of a thoughtful public-safety plan. However, where proactive tactics are used in a manner that seems dismissive of community concerns, such tactics erode community trust, endanger citizens and officers, and encumber crime solving, particularly over time, as distrust creates an intractable unwillingness to aide investigations.

Even as many residents feel that CPD is not sufficiently concerned when they are victims of crime, they often feel that CPD polices too harshly in their neighborhoods, and too often assumes that they are the perpetrators of crime. This sense may be due in part to CPD’s reliance on specialized units to conduct “hot spot” type policing in these neighborhoods, rather than beat officers. These specialized teams, such as the tactical (TACT), gang, saturation, and narcotics units, do not answer service calls, but aggressively seek out problematic activity by conducting traffic stops, making contacts, and effecting arrests. Many of these officers drive unmarked vehicles and do not wear the traditional police uniform. They instead wear either plainclothes or a uniform consisting of a black shirt, khaki pants, and black boots. This attire sends the message that these officers are not meant to be neighborhood police officers, but instead operate outside CPD’s normal police channels. As CPD officers put it, the saturation teams “are jump out squads.” Officers also told us of a policing “tactic” of randomly stopping their police vehicle and opening one door: if anyone runs, an officer will get out and give chase; if no one runs, they will close the car door and drive on. In addition to the unnecessary, dangerous situations this approach can get officers into, discussed in the [Force](#) Section of this Report, policing like this does little to promote community confidence or efficiently address crime. As one of our police experts put it, in some respects, Chicago’s policing strategy in these neighborhoods seems to involve little more thought than having officers go out and “stir stuff up.”

CPD incentivizes this tactical-oriented policing approach by elevating members of specialized units to special status. According to officers, being a member of a specialized unit or team carries prestige, and is considered as a “step up” for those uninterested or unable to obtain promotions to sergeant or other command positions. A TACT sergeant told us that officers are selected for TACT teams based on their “aggression, hustle, and effort,” and “a patrol officer who rides around and just answers calls is not aggressive. Aggressive officers seek out crime between their radio assignments.” This officer told us that his TACT officers “like to hunt” for offenders. One TACT officer we spoke to proudly touted the 1,300 arrests he had made in 11 years. The quality, impact, or even legitimacy of those arrests appeared generally unimportant to most of those that we spoke with throughout CPD. At one COMPSTAT meeting we observed,

officers were told to go out and make a lot of car stops because vehicles are involved in shootings. There was no discussion about, or apparent consideration of, whether such a tactic was an effective use of police resources to identify possible shooters, or of the negative impact it could have on police-community relations.⁶⁰

While people in Chicago's downtown areas only rarely see this type of policing, this is how residents in certain segments of the City experience policing on a daily basis. As a result, many residents in those neighborhoods feel, as we were told often in conversations with community members, as if CPD is an occupying force. One youth told us that the nature of the police presence in his neighborhood makes him feel like he is in "an open-air prison." One resident told us, "they patrol our streets like they are the dog catchers and we are the dogs." One officer told us that the law is unquestionably enforced differently in some neighborhoods: when "kids" on the North Side of Chicago get caught with marijuana, they get a citation; kids on the South Side get arrested. This officer's commander confirmed this approach when he told us that his policing philosophy in areas with violence is to make arrests because that was how he "was brought up."

In addition to feeling unduly harsh to residents of these neighborhoods, this type of policing has resulted in many residents, especially young people, feeling unfairly targeted and stereotyped by police. Young people we spoke with individually and during community meetings told us many stories of officers who, while unwilling or unable to help them when they needed help, followed and "harassed" them as they went about their daily lives. Young people told us of being stopped and searched by police, handcuffed, and having background checks conducted before being let go, while doing everyday things like walking to the store. A young woman told us of being stopped and frisked on her way to her father's funeral. People also told us that even programs nominally put in place to protect them, such as CPD's Roadside Safety Checks and DUI Saturation Checks, are conducted in ways that make the programs feel like excuses to search residents and their cars.

Young black residents told us they are commonly stopped and suspected of engaging in criminal activity, or of being gang members, based solely on their appearance. As one resident told us, "they see you with [certain types of clothing] and they think you are a criminal. Wear dreads and you get stopped." A young girl stated that "[they are] always think[ing] [we're] gangbangers." Residents with whom we spoke were very concerned about the presumption of gang affiliation, not only because of the assumptions it made about people, but because it also provides a false narrative that can follow these individuals in future interactions with the police and the criminal justice system.

Latino residents of these communities voiced similar concerns. As one Latino resident stated, "there is guilt by association." Latinos stated that there is a tendency for officers to "lump everyone together." One Latino outreach worker told us that he was pulled over multiple times, mostly by TACT teams or non-uniformed officers. During these stops, officers would search the vehicle, and after finding nothing, would let the outreach worker and any passengers in the car

⁶⁰ CPD is currently working on a relaunch of COMPSTAT that is intended to improve its utility and reputation within CPD. We encourage CPD to ensure that COMPSTAT incorporates integrity and constitutional policing components, as well as community insights, into its use.

go. These stops became so prevalent that the outreach worker's employer eventually had several conversations with CPD to try to stop these needless intrusions.

Of particular concern to us were officers who did not appear to recognize when profiling was unlawful. One *sergeant* told us that "if you're Muslim, and 18 to 24, and wearing white, yeah, I'm going to stop you. It's not called profiling, it's called being pro-active." CPD's own officers, especially, but not only, its black officers, acknowledge profiling and harassment by CPD. A lieutenant told us, "I'm a black man in Chicago, of course I've had problems with the police." Black CPD officers shared stories of being profiled by their own Department. One black officer said that he has been stopped many times by police in the Englewood neighborhood for no reason other than he is a black man in a nice car. Another black officer told us that when she lived in Englewood, she was profiled and stopped many times by officers. Another officer acknowledged that sometimes officers harass youth, but stated that sometimes what looks like harassment may on occasion be officers interjecting themselves out of concern, such as officers who try to "clear a corner" out of concern for kids when they have information that the corner may be targeted for a shooting. Officers recognize the impact this type of policing has on residents and their perceptions of CPD. We were informed that when officers encounter black men on the street, men sometimes lift their shirts without being asked.

During our meeting with members of Chicago's Arab American Police Association, officers raised similar concerns about cultural sensitivity and the treatment of Muslims in particular. They explained that many times non-Muslim CPD officers will offend cultural norms unintentionally because of "ignorance and lack of training."

This may not be how CPD intends policing to be conducted or perceived in these neighborhoods, but these experiences offend and humiliate people and diminish residents' willingness to work with law enforcement. Nor can these consequences be excused by the rates of violence in some of these communities. As it endeavors to better partner with the residents of these communities, CPD must do a better job—*especially* in these communities—demonstrating that it presumes community residents to be allies rather than suspects, absent individualized evidence to the contrary. Practices that facilitate and support officers gaining close familiarity with the people and dynamics of the neighborhoods they police is an important aspect of encouraging this mindset. More broadly, CPD must ensure that it is incentivizing and rewarding conduct by all personnel—whether specialized units, beat officers, or CAPS staff—that builds community trust.

2. The City must address serious concerns about systemic deficiencies that disproportionately impact black and Latino communities

CPD's pattern or practice of unreasonable force and systemic deficiencies falls heaviest on the predominantly black and Latino neighborhoods on the South and West Sides of Chicago, which are also experiencing higher crime. The impact of these widespread constitutional violations, combined with unaddressed abusive and racially discriminatory conduct, have undermined the legitimacy of CPD and police-community trust in these communities. Many low-income black neighborhoods suffer the greatest harm of violent crime in Chicago, and therefore have more police contacts. As a result, residents in these neighborhoods suffer more of the harms caused by breakdowns in uses of force, training, supervision, accountability, and

community policing. Our investigation also found that CPD has tolerated racially discriminatory conduct that not only undermines police legitimacy, but also contributes to the pattern or practice of unreasonable force. As CPD works to restore trust and ensure that policing is lawful and effective, it must recognize the extent to which this type of misconduct contributes to a culture that facilitates unreasonable force and corrodes community trust. We have serious concerns about the prevalence of racially discriminatory conduct by some CPD officers and the degree to which that conduct is tolerated and in some respects caused by deficiencies in CPD's systems of training, supervision and accountability. In light of these concerns, combined with the fact that the impact of CPD's pattern or practice of unreasonable force fall heaviest on predominantly black and Latino neighborhoods, restoring police-community trust will require remedies addressing both discriminatory conduct and the disproportionality of illegal and unconstitutional patterns of force on minority communities.

a. The pattern or practice of unreasonable force disproportionately burdens minority communities

As described throughout this Report, our investigation found that Chicago's black residents collectively have a very different experience with CPD than do Chicago's white residents. Many low-income black and Latino neighborhoods suffer the greatest harm of violent crime in Chicago. Residents in these neighborhoods, not surprisingly, have more frequent police interactions. With these interactions come the harms of unreasonable force that arise from CPD's systemic deficiencies outlined here and throughout this Report. The result is that Chicago's black and Latino communities experience more incidents of unreasonable force. These are the very communities who most need and call on the police to fight violent crime, and where police and community trust and cooperation is most important.

Blacks, Latinos, and whites make up approximately equal thirds of the population in Chicago, but the raw statistics show that CPD uses force almost ten times more often against blacks than against whites. For example, of all use-of-force incidents for which race was recorded between January 2011 and April 18, 2016, black individuals were subject to approximately 76% (19,374) of the uses of force, as compared to whites, who represented only 8% (2,007) of the force incidents. In some categories of force, blacks were even more overrepresented: black individuals were the subject of 80% of all CPD firearm uses and 81% of all Taser contact-stun uses during that time period. CPD's data on force incidents involving youth also showed stark disparities: 83% (3,335) of the incidents involved black children and 14% (552) involved Latino children.

These data strongly support what we repeatedly and consistently heard from both law enforcement and community sources: Chicago's black and Latino communities live not only with higher crime, but also with more instances of police abuse. Starting from a young age, black and Latino people, especially those living in Chicago's most challenged neighborhoods, have a vastly different experience with police than do white people. These negative, often tragic, interactions form the basis of minority communities' distrust of police.⁶¹

⁶¹ Devon W. Carbado, *From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence*, 1 CAL. L. REV. 102 (forthcoming 2017) (discussing how police interactions expose people "not

b. Recurrence of unaddressed racially discriminatory conduct by officers further erodes community trust and police effectiveness

Our investigation found that this pattern or practice of misconduct and systemic deficiencies has indeed resulted in routinely abusive behavior within CPD, especially toward black and Latino residents of Chicago's most challenged neighborhoods. Black youth told us that they are routinely called "nigger," "animal," or "pieces of shit" by CPD officers. A 19-year-old black male reported that CPD officers called him a "monkey." Such statements were confirmed by CPD officers. One officer we interviewed told us that he personally has heard co-workers and supervisors refer to black individuals as monkeys, animals, savages, and "pieces of shit."

Residents reported treatment so demeaning they felt dehumanized. One black resident told us that when it comes to CPD, there is "no treating you as a human being." Consistent with these reports, our investigation found that there was a recurring portrayal by some CPD officers of the residents of challenged neighborhoods—who are mostly black—as animals or subhuman. One CPD member told us that the officers in his district come to work every day "like it's a safari." This theme has a long history in Chicago. A photo from the early 2000s that surfaced years later shows white CPD officers Jerome Finnegan and Timothy McDermott squatting over a black man posed as a dead deer with antlers as the officers hold their rifles. Finnegan was later sentenced to 12 years in prison for being part of a corrupt group in the Department's Special Operations Section that carried out robberies and home invasions in predominantly black neighborhoods, while McDermott was fired when the photo surfaced. This mindset has desensitized many officers from the humanity of the people of color they serve, setting the stage for the use of excessive force.⁶²

We reviewed data related to complaints of racially discriminatory language and found repeated instances where credible complaints were not adequately addressed. Our review of CPD's complaint database showed 980 police misconduct complaints coded as discriminatory verbal abuse on the basis of race or ethnicity from 2011 to March 2016. Thirteen of these complaints—1.3%—were sustained. We found 354 complaints for the use of the word "nigger" or one of its variations. Four, or 1.1%, of these complaints were sustained.

Generally, these complaints were sustained only where there was audio, video, or other irrefutable evidence. One of the four sustained complaints was sustained because the officer admitted using the racial slur; another was sustained because there was an audio recording of the officers using the slur. The third sustained complaint was sustained because the victim's husband was a police officer in a neighboring municipality who took extraordinary measures to document the incident. In that case, the officer was suspended for 15 days for the incident, which involved an altercation with the victim at a dog park that involved the officer telling her: "Fuck you, you fucking nigger, you should keep your big mouth shut." When the woman's husband told the officer that the officer should not speak that way to the woman, the officer

only to the violence of ongoing police surveillance, contact, and social control but also to the violence of serious bodily injury and death").

⁶² See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., *The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children*, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 526 (2014).

responded: “Why? Because she’s pregnant? I don’t care if she’s pregnant. I’ll beat her fuckin’ ass too.” As a police officer himself, the woman’s husband knew to call the police, request contact cards, get witnesses’ information, and go directly to the district station to file the complaint.

The fourth sustained complaint had been generated internally by a lieutenant when she learned of a recording of a police officer yelling, “Don’t move nigger!” at a man he was chasing during a foot pursuit. The slur had been broadcast over the police radio. The allegation against the officer was sustained, as were allegations of failing to report misconduct against a lieutenant and another officer. These results are the exception, rather than the rule; most racially charged language used by CPD officers is neither recorded nor directed towards another member of law enforcement who knows how to respond in a way that will ensure the officer is held accountable.

Chicago has settled several lawsuits that alleged racially discriminatory treatment by CPD officers. In one suit, the victim asked the officers why he was under arrest to which they responded, “We got something for big mouthy niggers like you” before beating him. In 2013, a CPD officer arrested a Chinese-American citizen working at a massage parlor and used excessive force. A video of the incident captured an officer screaming, “I’ll put you in a UPS box and send you back to wherever the fuck you came from,” and another officer hitting her in the head while she was on her knees.

Finally, we found that some Chicago police officers expressed discriminatory views and intolerance with regard to race, religion, gender, and national origin in public social media forums, and that CPD takes insufficient steps to prevent or appropriately respond to this animus. While CPD policy prohibits Department members from using social media to convey “any communications that discredit or reflect poorly on the Department, its missions or goals,” this policy is apparently not well-enforced, even against supervisors. For example, one officer posted a status stating, “Hopefully one of these pictures will make the black lives matter activist organization feel a whole lot better!” with two photos attached, including one of two slain black men, in the front seats of a car, bloodied, covered in glass. Several CPD officers posted social media posts contain disparaging remarks about Arabs and Muslims, with posts referring to them as “7th century Islamic goat humpers,” “Ragtop,” and making other anti-Islamic statements. One CPD officer posted a photo of a dead Muslim soldier laying in a pool of his own blood with the caption: “The only good Muslim is a fucking dead one.” Supervisors posted many of the discriminatory posts we found, including one sergeant who posted at least 25 anti-Muslim statements and at least 43 other discriminatory posts, and a lieutenant who posted at least five anti-immigrant and anti-Latino statements. Given these statements, our observations and conversations with officers during the course of our investigation, and other publicly available commentary, such as the comments posted anonymously on popular CPD officer blogs, it appears that more CPD officers have made similarly derogatory statements, often without repercussion.

Even when CPD learns of overtly discriminatory statements, its response reflects a lack of sufficient concern about such conduct. For example, in June 2015, Chicago learned about an officer who had posted racist comments and had called for a race war on social media forums after a reporter from ABC 7 News contacted IPRA and sent the agency the posts. The investigative file indicates that the case was still pending as of December 2016. Indeed,

underscoring both the inadequacy and impact of CPD's response to overtly racist behavior, we found nearly 100 troubling public posts made by the same officer as recently as June 2016, many exhibiting racial animus.

In response to our question about what changes he would like to see among Chicago police officers, one black teen responded, "act as if you care." This simple request from a young Chicago resident encapsulates the kind of policing we heard people asking for in the hundreds of conversations we had, and in the scores of community meetings we attended during our investigation. People living in Chicago's marginalized neighborhoods want policing that demonstrates that CPD has genuine concern about the safety and well-being of all Chicago residents, no matter where they live or what they look like.

The conduct of those officers who have engaged in the racist and abusive behaviors described here, unchecked due to the systemic and cultural failings described in this Report, hurts the many well-intentioned officers. CPD will not be able to convince residents in these neighborhoods that it cares, no matter how earnestly it launches community policing initiatives, if it does not take a stronger, more effective stance against unnecessarily demeaning and divisive officer conduct.

3. CPD must stop using dangerous practices, such as "guns for freedom," to coerce people into providing information

During our investigation, we heard allegations that CPD officers arrest individuals and attempt to gain information about crime using methods that undermine CPD's legitimacy and may also be unlawful. In some instances, we were told that CPD will attempt to glean information about gang activity, the locations of weapons, or drug activity, and refuse to release the individual until he provides that information. In other instances, CPD will take a young person to a rival gang neighborhood and either leave the person there or display the youth to rival members, immediately putting the life of that young person in jeopardy by suggesting he has provided information to the police. Our investigation indicates that these practices in fact exist.

We commend the CPD officers who are working *with* community members to protect the public from gun violence, including by removing illegal guns from the streets. However, when officers use unlawful arrests and detentions or improper intimidation tactics to coerce information, they erode community trust and undermine the work of CPD and the community to rid the City of violent crime.

We were told by many community members that one method by which CPD will try to get individuals to provide information about crime or guns is by picking them up and driving them around while asking for information about gangs or guns. When individuals do not talk, officers will drop them off in dangerous areas or gang territories. We reviewed a publicly available video that appears to capture one instance of an officer displaying a youth in police custody to a group of individuals gathered in a rival gang territory. The video shows CPD officers standing around a marked CPD vehicle with the back doors wide open and a young male detained in the rear. Officers permit a crowd of male youths to surround the car and shout at the adolescent. The crowd can be seen flashing hand gestures that look like gang signs and

threatening the cowering teenager in the backseat. One of the males in the crowd appears to have freely recorded the interactions all while CPD officers stood beside the open vehicle doors. The video does not show any legitimate law enforcement purpose in allowing the youth to be threatened.

Residents told us that this has happened for years, with several individuals recounting their personal experiences. A young black man told us that when he was 12 or 13 years old, he and his friends were picked up by CPD officers, dropped off in rival territory, and told to walk home. Another black teen told us that his brother was picked up in one location, dropped off in another location known for rival gangs, and told: “Better get to running.”

We also talked with several individuals who gave credible accounts of being detained by CPD officers for low-level offenses (for example, failure to use a turn signal) or on false pretenses, and then were told that they would not be released until they brought the officers guns. We heard community members refer to this practice as “guns for freedom.” One man told us of an incident that happened within the past few months, in which he was arrested for driving on a suspended license and told by officers that “everything would go away” if he brought the officers two guns. Officers released him on bond and told him he had one week to bring the officers the guns. They warned him that if he did not bring the guns they would put him away “forever.” This person told us of a friend who had a similar experience several years ago. Other individuals with whom we met during community meetings told us similar stories of CPD officers offering to release them from custody if they provided officers with a weapon. A pastor at a Latino church told us that his congregants reported being picked up by CPD officers seeking information regarding guns or drugs, but when they either could not or would not provide such information, the officers removed the congregants’ shoelaces and dropped them off in rival neighborhoods. Another man told us that he saw officers surround his seven-year-old niece seeking information about who sold drugs and which gangs were running in their neighborhood.

A recording from November 2015 appears to capture part of a “guns for freedom” incident on video. The video is part of a case in which an individual alleges that police coerced him into producing weapons to gain his own release and the release of a friend. According to the individual who produced the gun, police first required him to tell them where guns were located, and then demanded that he bring them a gun. The man claims he had to buy the gun he brought to the police. The video recording appears to show the man placing the gun in a trash bin and police officers retrieving the gun later that day. The officers’ incident report does not mention any arrest and instead claims that the man directed them to “the location of multiple firearms being hidden in the 5th and 22nd district.”

In addition to the likely illegality of this conduct, its impact on community trust cannot be overstated. The fear and anger created by these practices was obvious when we talked with individuals who reported these experiences. As the attorney for the man in the November 2015 incident noted during a media interview, “if there was any trust that’s built up by officers on the street, that trust is clearly and quickly destroyed.” His words underscore what we found more broadly throughout our investigation: when practices like this are allowed to persist, CPD allows abusive officers to set the culture, undermining the hard work of CPD’s many good officers.

Our review of CPD's misconduct investigations revealed more than 100 complaints of similar conduct; these complaints were only very rarely sustained, even when internally generated complaints arising from the same incident were sustained. In other cases, investigators failed to follow through on the investigation despite possible corroborating evidence.

Through the publicly available videos noted above, the conversations we had with community members, and the hundreds of complaints that have been made about this conduct over the past few years alone, it is clear that this is a concern CPD should address. Indeed, CPD TACT officers complained to us that while supervisors' direction now is to stay out of trouble, previously the guidance from supervisors was: "If you get me a gun, we'll take care of you."

There may be circumstances in which giving an arrestee who is lawfully arrested based on probable cause leniency or even immunity in exchange for recovering illegal firearms is appropriate. Such practices should be pursued, however, under policy and supervision to ensure they are safe, effective, and within constitutional limits. CPD must ensure that officers consistently police in a manner that builds and preserves police legitimacy.

C. A Trust-Building, Community-Focused Approach to Policing Will Better Promote Lawful Policing and Public Safety

When community policing was more fully supported and broadly implemented in Chicago in the 1990s, studies found it had a substantial impact on public safety and community confidence in CPD. Researchers found, for example, that blacks experienced a 22% decrease in fear of crime in their neighborhoods, and a 60% decrease in perceived social disorder. At the same time, blacks, Latinos, and whites all reported better relationships with police officers.

In the last decade, community-focused policing has worked to bring down crime and rebuild trust in other cities—including big cities and cities with high rates of violent crime. New York has reduced its crime rate while at the same time lowering the number of stops and arrests it makes. Community policing can also be instrumental in bringing about the relationships that are helpful in bringing up homicide clearance rates, one of the most critical problems currently facing Chicago.

No police department is perfect, but other police departments, and Chicago's own history, have shown that it can better support lawful policing, gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and more effectively address crime, if it roots out unlawful and divisive practices and infuses its systems with a community-focused approach.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout this Report, we make several recommendations to the City and CPD related to our findings. These recommendations are gathered and offered in more detail below. Through the changes we have identified, CPD will be better poised to police constitutionally and effectively, and improve trust between officers and the communities they serve. We look forward to working cooperatively with the City and CPD on how to best craft and implement these recommendations.

A. Use of Force

CPD should re-orient officers' approach to the use of force to avoid using force except when necessary, and should provide officers with the policy guidance and training to develop and maintain proficiency in de-escalation. CPD should also implement a system of force reporting and investigation to better detect and respond to instances of unreasonable or unnecessary force. Additionally, providing officers with the tools and training to better respond to persons in physical or mental health crisis and those with intellectual disabilities will help avoid injuries, increase community trust, and make officers safer. CPD should:

1. Adopt use of force practices that minimize the use of force.

- a. CPD has begun the process of revising its force policies to better reflect the sanctity of human life, the need to avoid the use of force, and de-escalation and force mitigation consistent with officer safety. CPD should continue this process to ensure these concepts are incorporated throughout CPD's force policies, including its canine and Taser policies, and that policies provide sufficient guidance to officers;
- b. CPD has begun training officers in safely using de-escalation methods so that force may be avoided. CPD should continue this process and should incorporate these concepts throughout CPD training;
- c. Develop, train and implement a foot pursuit policy that makes clear that foot pursuits are dangerous and that sets forth guidelines for foot pursuits that balance the objective of apprehending the suspect with the risk of potential injury to the officer, the public, and the suspect. The policy also should address unsafe foot pursuit tactics to ensure the risks of foot pursuits are not increased;
- d. Ensure that officers are trained in sound tactics to avoid unnecessarily exposing officers to situations in which deadly force may become necessary;
- e. Revise and reinforce policies against shooting at or from a moving vehicle, and provide additional training on avoiding dangerous vehicle maneuvers;
- f. Revise Taser policies consistent with best practices, including implementing restrictions on the use of Tasers in drive-stun mode; limitations on Taser use in situations that pose inordinate risk to the suspect; limitations on Taser use on vulnerable people (e.g., the elderly, pregnant women, people in mental health crisis); restrictions on Taser use to situations in which it is necessary and proportional to the threat or resistance of the subject; and discouragement of the use of Tasers in schools and on students, and requiring officers to factor into their decision to use a Taser a child's apparent age, size, and the threat presented for proportionality and appropriateness. CPD should emphasize in training that Tasers are weapons with inherent risks that inflict significant pain and should not be viewed as tools of convenience;
- g. Prohibit the use of retaliatory force, force used as punishment, force used in response to the exercise of protected First Amendment activities (e.g., filming), and force used in response to speech only rather than in response to an immediate threat;

- h. Equip officers with appropriate first-aid supplies, train them in their use, and require officers to render aid to injured persons consistent with the officer's training;
 - i. Equip all patrol officers and supervisors, and officers who regularly interact with the public, including tactical officers, with body cameras, and develop a body camera policy delineating officers' responsibilities regarding the consistent and appropriate use of body cameras and the retention and review of body camera footage.
- 2. **Change the reporting and review of force to accurately capture the totality of the circumstances in force incidents.**
 - a. Develop and implement use-of-force reporting requiring officers to complete a narrative force report that describes with particularity the force used and the circumstances necessitating that level of force, including the reason for the initial stop or other enforcement action. Witness officers should also complete reports for serious uses of force (e.g., firearms discharges and other forms of deadly force). Injuries to officers and persons against whom force was used should be photographed;
 - b. Develop and implement supervisory review of force that requires the supervisor to conduct a complete review of each use of force, including gathering and considering evidence necessary to understand the circumstances of the force incident and determine its consistency with law and policy, including statements from individuals against whom force is used and civilian witnesses;
 - c. Develop and implement a system for higher-level, inter-disciplinary review of incidents involving all types of firearms discharges, successful canine deployments, Taser uses, use of chemical weapons, and force resulting in injury to the person against whom force was used;
 - d. Discipline or otherwise hold accountable officers who fail to accurately report their own uses of force, officers who fail to accurately report another officer's use of force when policy requires it, and supervisors who fail to conduct adequate force investigations;
 - e. Collect and analyze data on uses of force to identify racial and other disparities in officer uses of force.
- 3. **Revise the initial response to officer-involved shootings to prevent collusion and the contamination of witnesses.**
 - a. Adopt a policy requiring that IPRA investigators participate in the preliminary assessment during the immediate aftermath of an officer-involved shooting to the same extent as the CPD commander in charge and CPD investigators conducting administrative or criminal investigations;
 - b. Adopt policies and practices that preclude involved and witness officers from speaking with one another, or with civilian witnesses, about the shooting incident until after they have been interviewed by IPRA investigators, except to the extent necessary to ensure public safety. To that end, require that, where possible, involved officers, witness officers, and civilian witnesses be transported to the station

separately and their conversations be monitored to avoid contamination prior to interviews;

- c. Except to the extent necessary to ensure public safety, prohibit involved officers and witness officers from using cell phones before they speak with the on-scene commander;
- d. Consider prohibiting involved officers, witness officers, and civilians from viewing footage from dashboard cameras, body cameras, surveillance cameras, or cell phones before their interview with IPRA. In all cases, inquire of witnesses and officers whether they have viewed any recordings prior to the interview;
- e. Require that interviews with involved officers and witness officers be recorded and IPRA investigators be present (except that an officer may speak with his or her attorney in private) and that interviews with civilian witnesses be recorded unless it would interfere with investigation. In cases where interviews are not recorded, the reason for failing to record the interview should be documented;
- f. Revise CBA provisions or other restrictions on how soon officers may be interviewed following an officer-involved shooting; and
- g. CPD and IPRA should develop appropriate protocols to conduct concurrent, bifurcated investigations with specific measures to ensure that the integrity of criminal investigations is not compromised.

4. Implement policies and develop training to improve interactions with people who are in crisis.

- a. Devote appropriate resources to improve CPD's existing CIT program. Develop and implement policy and training to better identify and respond to individuals with known or suspected mental health conditions, including persons in mental health crisis and those with intellectual or developmental disabilities ("I/DD") or other disabilities;
- b. Screen and designate volunteer officers who have expressed an interest in becoming CIT specialists and are well-suited to this work. CPD should continue to offer CIT training for officers who wish to develop crisis intervention skills, but reserve participation in the CIT program to the selected officers;
- c. Provide crisis intervention training to CIT-designated officers, who will respond to critical incidents involving persons in crisis. This training should include how to identify and respond to common medical emergencies that may at first appear to reflect a failure to comply with lawful orders (e.g., seizures, diabetic emergencies);
- d. Ensure that there are enough CIT officers on duty throughout the City and throughout the day to help ensure a CIT officer is available to respond to calls involving an individual in crisis;
- e. Require that, wherever possible, at least one CIT officer will respond to any situation concerning individuals in mental health crisis or with I/DD where force might be used;

- f. Improve the quality of the current CIT 40-hour training program, which will in turn require obtaining sufficient CIT training staff and resources so that training can focus on requiring CIT candidates to demonstrate competency in the necessary skills;
- g. Collect data on CIT calls to allow CPD to make informed decisions about staffing and deployment so that a CIT officer is available for all shifts in all districts to respond to every CIT call;
- h. Develop a CIT reporting system (apart from the use-of-force reporting system) so that each deployment of a CIT officer is well documented. CIT officers should submit narrative reports of their interactions with persons in crisis so the appropriateness of the response can be evaluated in an after-action analysis; and
- i. Implement an assessment program to evaluate the efficacy of the CIT program as a whole and the performance of individual CIT officers. A portion of a CIT officer's performance review should address skill and effectiveness in CIT situations.

B. Accountability

A well-functioning accountability system (in combination with effective supervision) is the keystone to lawful policing. The City and CPD must create impartial, transparent, and effective internal and external oversight systems that will hold officers accountable in a timely manner for violations of law, CPD policy, or CPD training. To that end, the City and CPD must:

1. Improve the City and CPD's accountability mechanisms for increased and more effective police oversight.

- a. Work with police unions to modify practices and procedures for accepting complaints to make it easier for individuals to register formal complaints about police conduct;
- b. Adopt practices to ensure the full and impartial investigation of all complaints, and assessment of patterns and trends related to those complaints;
- c. Revise IPRA/COPA mediation policies and procedures to: 1) require complainant notification of and participation in mediation; 2) incorporate principles of restorative justice; 3) create clear, objective standards for referring cases to mediation; and 4) prohibit mediation for resolving certain categories of complaints, including use of force and domestic violence complaints;
- d. Revise BIA policies and procedures to require that investigators record interviews and include transcripts of all interviews with victims, witnesses, or suspect officers in every file. CPD policy should dictate that summaries of interviews will be accepted only where obtaining a recorded or transcribed interview is not feasible;
- e. Enforce CPD policies prohibiting officers from falsifying reports and providing false information or testimony during interviews by providing strict disciplinary penalties, up to and including termination, for those officers who violate them; and
- f. Put systems in place that ensure administrative charges are fully and timely investigated, even where CPD and the State's Attorney's Office are investigating

potential criminal charges, or have decided not to pursue criminal charges, for the same conduct.

2. Ensure investigative agencies have the appropriate resources, training, and structure necessary to conduct investigations thoroughly, efficiently, and fairly.

- a. Conduct a staffing analysis, and create a staffing plan based on that analysis, to ensure that both BIA and IPRA/COPA have the staffing and resources to perform their responsibilities effectively;
- b. Improve the timeliness and quality of BIA/IPRA/COPA investigations through the creation of case management protocols, including streamlined procedures and target deadlines for the completion of investigations; and
- c. Develop and implement mandatory and comprehensive training for BIA/IPRA/COPA investigators, Police Board members, and hearing officers on police practices, civil rights law, evidence collection and assessment techniques, interview techniques, and other pertinent issues. The training for IPRA/COPA investigators should also include training on implicit bias and proper witness interviewing techniques. Investigators tasked with investigating domestic violence and sexual misconduct complaints should receive specialized training on the dynamics of those incidents and interview techniques for domestic violence and sexual misconduct victims.

3. Implement changes to the City's discipline and discipline review systems, including the Chicago Police Board, to ensure disciplinary decisions are fair, timely, and transparent.

- a. Revise how disciplinary decisions are made, including streamlining the number of disciplinary decision makers and the layers of review of disciplinary recommendations, to facilitate quicker final resolution of complaints;
- b. Revise CPD's disciplinary matrix to ensure that it provides meaningful guidance to those making disciplinary recommendations and findings;
- c. Consider moving the Police Board's police commission and civilian oversight duties to another entity (such as a Community Oversight Board), to allow the Police Board to focus on its critical function of reviewing Superintendent/IPRA misconduct and disciplinary findings;
- d. Create a cadre of trained and experienced attorneys within IPRA/COPA to advocate before the Board;
- e. Modify CPD and IPRA policy, and address related provisions in the CBAs, to ensure that the Board has access to the information necessary to make a fair and informed decisions;
- f. Ensure selection criteria for Police Board members and hearing officers include requisite competence, impartiality, and expertise;
- g. Post all Police Board materials, including video recordings of hearings, on the Board's website in a timely manner; and

- h. Track and publish more detailed case-specific and aggregate data about Police Board decisions, and make this information available in a timely manner.

C. Training

Training is the foundation for ensuring that officers are engaging in effective and constitutional policing. To that end, CPD should:

1. **Provide training that is comprehensive, organized, based on adult-learning principles, and developed with national best police practices and community policing principles in mind.**
 - a. Revise Academy curricula and lesson content to ensure consistency with CPD policy and current law, particularly with respect to the use of force, and revise lesson-delivery methods to include lessons that are consistent with adult learning principles and include more scenario-based trainings;
 - b. Revise end-of-course Academy evaluations to ensure recruits graduate the Academy with sufficient knowledge and skill to police safely and lawfully;
 - c. Revitalize CPD's Field Training Program by increasing incentives provided to FTOs in order to ensure a sufficient number of high-quality FTOs; improving the training provided to FTOs and, in turn, the quality of supervision and guidance that FTOs provide; creating a standardized curriculum for each FTO to use when training PPOs; increasing the rigor of FTO evaluation of PPOs; creating better supervision of FTOs and regularly evaluating the Field Training Program to identify areas in need of improvement; and
 - d. Implement a mandatory in-service training program, based on a comprehensive evaluation of Department needs, that includes high quality training through live, scenario-based trainings; provides updates on law and Department policy; and presents officers and supervisors with opportunities to refresh important skills and tactics.
2. **Take steps to ensure the creation of a well-planned, comprehensive training program that is carefully tailored to Department needs and is properly resourced.**
 - a. Formalize CPD's creation of a training committee in CPD policies, including outlining the committee's goals, membership, responsibilities, and deliverables;
 - b. Recruit, hire, and train additional instructors, and develop and implement rigorous testing, evaluation, and training of all instructors to ensure subject-matter competency and skill in instruction; and
 - c. Improve CPD's physical training facilities and equipment.

D. Supervision

Patrol officers must receive proper supervision and guidance in order to ensure that they are engaging in constitutional and effective policing and that they are held accountable if they

engage in misconduct. This requires that patrol supervisors receive the tools, training, and support they need to perform their supervisory duties effectively. To that end, CPD should:

1. Reform CPD's supervisory structures and incentives to provide all officers with meaningful direction and oversight.

- a. Develop and implement policies that establish clear requirements and provide specific guidance to ensure the appropriate supervision of all officers;
- b. Ensure that supervisors closely monitor officers under their command, review officer uses of force, and direct and guide officers to use force only where necessary, in a manner that is safe, and that comports with the principles and values set forth in CPD's revised force policies;
- c. Hold supervisors accountable if they fail to report misconduct that they observe, fail to accept and refer to IPRA a misconduct complaint, or otherwise fail to take appropriate steps to ensure officer accountability;
- d. Implement appropriate span-of-control ratios in all districts and reform shift scheduling to allow for unity of command;
- e. Re-examine the responsibilities of supervisory staff at districts to allow supervisors to maximize time spent providing mentorship, oversight, and accountability of officer activities;
- f. Provide new supervisors with adequate training on supervisory skills, including leadership and management, and provide all supervisors with regular training on issues relevant to their supervisory responsibilities; and
- g. Incentivize and reward supervisors who provide close and effective supervision.

2. Ensure CPD supervisors have the appropriate tools and information necessary to provide meaningful supervision.

- a. Commit to putting in place a new and fully integrated EIS system that will allow for early identification of problematic behavior trends and appropriate interventions, and involve all relevant stakeholders in the process early on to ensure its ultimate success; and;
- b. Ensure that data collection and tracking systems are adequate Department-wide to support this effort, and audit their use to ensure that these systems are used consistently and appropriately.

E. Officer Wellness and Safety

Officers must receive the support they need from the Department to perform their policing responsibilities well and safely, and to address the stressors related to their work. To better support its officers, CPD should:

1. Evaluate and respond to the needs of CPD officers.

- a. Conduct a needs assessment to determine what additional resources officers desire or need to reduce the stressors of their jobs;
- b. Expand the Employee Assistance Program by hiring additional counselors, substance abuse specialists, and other staff with specialized training and skills in certain topics, including post-traumatic stress disorder, domestic violence, women's issues, and depression;
- c. Coordinate a communication strategy to inform all CPD members of the services available through the Employee Assistance Program and ensure that references to the range of available counseling and support services are included in Academy trainings, including the stress management and wellness trainings;
- d. Explore alternative methods for providing officer support, including anonymous support hotlines and group meetings; and
- e. Revise and implement new protocols for evaluation and treatment of officers involved in, or who witness, traumatic events, not limited to officer-involved shootings.

2. Incorporate officer wellness principles into all facets of CPD operations.

- a. Explore and evaluate other methods to increase officer access to employee supports and services, including how using those services can benefit CPD officers, and encourage officers to use these programs; and
- b. Conduct a Department-wide technology and equipment audit to determine what equipment is outdated, broken, or otherwise in need of replacement, and develop a plan with timelines for repair or replacement of equipment as needed.

F. Data Collection and Transparency

To increase transparency and community trust, it is critical that the City improve its data collection systems and publicly report and release information relevant to its policing and accountability efforts. Accordingly, the City, through CPD and IPRA/COPA, should:

1. Improve City data collection systems.

- a. Examine and evaluate current data collection mechanisms and technology to determine where there are gaps and inefficiencies;
- b. Create a plan to improve and synthesize City and CPD data collection systems by dates certain; and
- c. Develop systems to ensure that data is appropriately and timely analyzed to identify trends or patterns in policing activities, including officer use of force and police misconduct complaints. The City and CPD should use data collection systems to track and identify patterns or practices of constitutional violations, so that corrective action can be taken where necessary.

2. Increase transparency regarding CPD and IPRA/COPA activities.

- a. Seek input from community members regarding the type of data and information they believe is important for CPD and IPRA to disseminate;
- b. Develop and implement policies mandating regular public reporting of crime trends and CPD policing activities;
- c. Develop and implement policies mandating regular public reporting of misconduct investigations, including investigations handled not just by IPRA or COPA, but also BIA and the districts. These policies should cover regular reporting on complaint patterns and trends, investigation outcomes, and discipline (both recommended and imposed);
- d. Finalize and formally adopt, as part of CPD and IPRA policy, the video release policy, with consideration of expanding the universe of complaints the policy covers; and
- e. Develop and implement policies that would increase transparency related to City settlements of police misconduct complaints.

G. Promotions

To ensure constitutional and effective policing, CPD must promote competent, capable leaders, and ensure confidence amongst officers that deserving, well-qualified candidates will be selected for promotions. CPD must review its promotions systems to ensure all qualified candidates have a chance to be promoted, and improve transparency around the promotions process to better inform officers of how promotional decisions are made. To that end, CPD should:

1. Ensure promotions are fair.

- a. Continue to review promotional exams to ensure they are valid and fairly administered;
- b. Schedule promotional exams with sufficient frequency to allow qualified candidates frequent opportunity for promotion throughout their careers; and
- c. Review and revise, as necessary, the merit promotion process, to ensure that policies and procedures are followed, and that the system is working as intended.

2. Increase transparency around the promotions process.

- a. Devise and implement mechanisms for teaching officers about the policies and procedures guiding the merit promotion process;
- b. Develop mechanisms for improving transparency regarding those who receive merit promotions, and the reasons those candidates were selected; and
- c. Continue, and potentially increase, oversight of the merit promotions process through the Chicago Office of the Inspector General, and ensure that the OIG's role in overseeing this process is communicated to both officers and the public.

H. Community Policing

CPD should adopt, and incorporate in its policing approaches, an ingrained and permanent community policing philosophy that humanizes officers and residents to each other and builds trust between the community and the police; incentivizes police-community partnerships; and effectively uses these partnerships to solve crime and address community concerns. To that end, CPD should:

- 1. Develop community policing as a core component of CPD's policing strategies, tactics, and training.**
 - a. Develop and implement, with the help of community members from Chicago's diverse groups, comprehensive recruit and in-service training to officers on how to establish formal partnerships and actively engage with diverse communities, to include understanding and building trust with minority communities, Muslim communities, immigrant and limited English-proficiency communities, persons with disabilities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities;
 - b. Incorporate community policing and problem-solving principles into Academy training, and require regular in-service training on topics such as procedural justice, de-escalation, bias-free policing, diversity and cultural sensitivity;
 - c. Create liaison officers in each district that will be responsive to, and specifically address, the concerns of minority communities, including LGBTQ individuals, Muslims and other religious or ethnic minorities, individuals with limited English-proficiency, and individuals with disabilities. District liaison officers should have monthly meetings to coordinate Department-wide outreach efforts and strategies;
 - d. Develop systems that encourage and facilitate opportunities for officers to actively engage with communities while on patrol and gain more familiarity with residents through one-on-one interactions;
 - e. Increase opportunities for officers to have frequent, positive interactions with people outside of an enforcement context, especially groups and communities that have expressed a high level of distrust of police; and
 - f. Measure, evaluate, and reward individual, supervisory, and agency performance on community engagement, problem-oriented-policing projects, and crime prevention.
- 2. Ensure that officers police fairly and compassionately in all neighborhoods, including in those with high rates of violent crime and in minority communities.**
 - a. Develop and implement a policy that specifically and comprehensively addresses and prohibits discriminatory policing and biased-based policing;
 - b. Provide initial and recurring training to all officers that sends a clear and consistent message that bias-based profiling and other forms of discriminatory policing are prohibited, and ensures that officers are capable of interacting with and providing services to all communities;

- c. Provide training to supervisors and commanders on detecting and addressing bias-based profiling and other forms of discriminatory policing;
- d. Provide safeguards for officers who report bias-based profiling and other forms of discriminatory policing;
- e. Provide training to supervisors, detectives, and officers on how to detect and report potential hate crimes or hate incidents;
- f. Work with community members from Chicago's diverse racial, religious, ethnic, gender, and disability groups to create and deliver cultural awareness training in partnership with CPD, and to inform and suggest the development of additional measures that may improve police-community relations;
- g. Enforce Department rules regarding appropriate language, respect, and social media use;
- h. Collect and analyze enforcement data (including use of force data) to identify patterns of unequal enforcement on the basis of race or ethnicity, and devise and implement operational changes based on this analysis. Publish stop, search, arrest, and force data bi-annually with the analysis of trends, and the steps taken to correct problems and build on successes; and
- i. Capture and track complaints alleging racial and other bias-based profiling or discrimination, along with characteristics of the complainants. Analyze this data to identify and correct any patterns of discrimination.

EXHIBIT 100

POLICE **ACCOUNTABILITY** **TASK FORCE**

Recommendations for Reform:

Restoring Trust between the Chicago Police
and the Communities they Serve

REPORT

April 2016



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Acknowledgements

This report reflects the contributions of hundreds of people. The Task Force is grateful for everyone's support in this collaborative effort. While we have tried to capture everyone here and in the appendices to this report, we have inevitably missed some, and apologize for any omissions.

WORKING GROUPS

Forty-six men and women from diverse backgrounds volunteered their time and expertise to serve on our Working Groups. They conducted research, interviewed experts and developed and drafted recommendations. Working Group members are listed in Appendix 2.

INTERVIEWS

The Task Force and Working Groups interviewed more than 100 national and local experts, as well as citizens of Chicago young and old. The interviewees provided invaluable insight to the Task Force's work. Their names and affiliations are found in Appendix 3.

EMPLOYERS

The Task Force members would like to thank their employers and staff who gave them the time and support necessary to do this work. At Mayer Brown LLP, Paul Theiss, Chairman, and Rebecca Eisner, Partner in Charge of Mayer Brown's Chicago office, allocated a significant amount of staffing resources and in-kind contributions; Abigail M. Bartine, Matthew Sostrin and Gail Tang spent countless hours researching, drafting and formatting the report. At Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Kevin Burke, Chairman, and Robert Shannon, Managing Partner, assigned three attorneys and a paralegal to participate in working groups. At DePaul University, Nichole Pinkard, Associate Professor in the College of Computing and Digital Media, supported Sybil Madison-Boyd's participation as a Task Force member. The leadership of NAMI Chicago, John F. Kennedy, NAMI Chicago Outside General Counsel and Vice President Board of Directors, Eddy Eisenberg, Board President, and Jennifer Koehler, Board of Directors, supported Alexa James in her role as Task Force member and provided in-kind contributions.

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FORUM HOSTS

More than 750 people attended one of the Task Force's four community forums, sharing their experiences and ideas. The forums were hosted by Reverend Jonny L. Miller with Mt. Vernon Baptist Church, Rose Joshua with the South Side NAACP, Maria Socorro Pesqueira with Mujeres Latinas en Acción and Principal Juan Carlos Ocón of Benito Juarez Community Academy, and Charles Hardwick with the Howard Area Community Center and Principal Chad Adams of Sullivan High School. The forums were moderated by Darryl Denard and Matt McGill with iHeart media and Sol Flores, Executive Director of La Case Norte.

Glossary of Terms

ACT	Assertive Community Treatment
BIA	Bureau of Internal Affairs
BIS	Behavioral Intervention System
CAPS	Chicago's Alternative Police Strategy
CBA	Collective Bargaining Agreement
CDPH	Chicago Department of Public Health
CEED	Community Empowerment and Engagement Districts
CIT	Crisis Intervention Team
CLEAR	Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting
CPD	Chicago Police Department
CPIA	Civilian Police Investigative Agency
CPS	Chicago Public Schools
CR	Complaint Register
CRU	Crisis Response Unit
CSMP	Comprehensive Stress Management Program
CSU	Crisis Stabilization Unit
EIS	Early Intervention System
FOP	Fraternal Order of Police
FTO	Field Training Officer
IAD	Internal Affairs Division
IPP	Individualized Performance Plan
IPRA	Independent Police Review Authority
MEU	Mental Evaluation Unit
MHCRU	Mental Health Critical Response Unit
OEMC	Office of Emergency Management Communications
PC	Personnel Concerns
PPO	Probationary Police Officer
SPAR	Summary Punishment Action Request
TRR	Tactical Response Report

Executive Summary

“The police need to know who they work for – the community. The authority that they have belongs to the people.”¹

A painful but necessary reckoning is upon us. That is what these times demand.

The Police Accountability Task Force arose amidst a significant and historic public outcry. The outcry brought people into the streets, on social media and on other venues to say in a very clear voice that they had reached a breaking point with the entire local law enforcement infrastructure. People were and are demanding accountability and real and lasting change. The outcry was not localized in any particular neighborhood or demographic, although communities of color and those ravaged by crime added some of the most poignant commentary.

The Task Force immediately understood that one of our most important responsibilities was to actively seek out, listen and respond to voices from all over Chicago who had much to say about their personal and often painful experiences with the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”), the Independent Police Review Authority (“IPRA”) and other parts of the local policing infrastructure, as well as their frustrations and lack of confidence in political actors. What we have heard has been humbling. As we dug deeper into the complaints of so many about the callous and disrespectful way in which they had been treated by some officers, we also understood that we had an important duty to lay bare the systemic and sanctioned practices that led to the deaths of fellow citizens and the deprivation of the rights of so many others. We have borne witness to many hard truths which have profound and lasting impacts on the lives and hopes of individuals and communities. Our recommendations are intended to be responsive to the people, empower the people and to specifically identify a range of changes that are essential to building trust, accountability and lasting change.

As part of our work, the Task Force heard from many current and former CPD officers who are dedicated public servants, committed to performing their duties lawfully and making Chicago a safer place for all of its residents. Serving as a police officer is a challenging and often dangerous job. The police face an increasingly daunting challenge in crime fighting. Illegal guns flood the streets of the same neighborhoods that are devastated by crime, poverty and unemployment. We as a society cannot expect the police to cure every ill in Chicago’s neighborhoods. Yet we put significant pressure on them to solve and prevent crime, as well as to address the manifestations of a number of other daunting social and economic challenges beyond their charge and capacity to manage, let alone solve. Still, a keen appreciation of and sensitivity to these broader issues is critical to effective law enforcement and positive community-police relations.

The findings and recommendations in this report are not meant to disregard or undervalue the efforts of the many dedicated CPD officers who show up to work every day to serve and protect the community. The challenge is creating a partnership between the police and the community that is premised upon respect and recognizes that our collective fates are very much intertwined. Simply put, a more professional, engaged and respectful police force benefits us all. We cannot and have not shied away

from identifying systemic problems or challenges that undermine the efforts of those officers who are sincerely committed to doing their jobs the right way. To be sure, individual officers must own responsibility for not merely their actions each day, but also the reverberating and sometimes corrosive and lingering effect of those actions on citizens. And ultimately, the responsibility for setting the correct course lies with CPD leadership itself.

The City and in particular CPD would do well to embrace the necessary changes to address the systemic problems in CPD and not simply hope that this storm will pass. It will not and ignoring this opportunity will exacerbate an already volatile set of circumstances. CPD in particular must face the problems in order to fix them.

The Tipping Point

On the night of October 20, 2014, the too short and very tragic life of Laquan McDonald ended when Chicago Police Officer Jason Van Dyke shot him. One of the last officers to arrive at the scene of a call about someone damaging cars, Van Dyke came out of his vehicle, gun raised and immediately fired off 16 shots. The first shot hit McDonald and he immediately fell to the ground. While he lay motionless, Van Dyke continued to unload his clip, firing 16 shots in all into McDonald's body. All of this was captured on police videotape.

Initial reports of the shooting were superficial and false. The false narrative about the shooting originated with comments from the scene by former Fraternal Order of Police spokesperson, Pat Camden. Camden claimed to reporters that:

"Officers got out of their car and began approaching McDonald, again telling him to drop the knife." "The boy lunged at police, and one of the officers opened fire."²

"[O]fficers were forced to defend themselves."³

"[McDonald] is a very serious threat to the officers, and he leaves them no choice at that point but to defend themselves."⁴

The next day CPD put out a statement that said McDonald "refused to comply with orders to drop the knife and continued to approach the officers." Camden later acknowledged to the Washington Post that his information was "hearsay, . . . basically." "I have no idea where it came from. It was being told to me after it was told to somebody else who was told by another person, and this was two hours after the incident."⁵

Also, other on-scene officers repeated the same false narrative. These officers uniformly said that McDonald posed an imminent threat immediately before Van Dyke shot him:⁶

From P.O. Jason Van Dyke:

"McDonald was holding the knife in his right hand, in an underhand grip, with the blade pointed forward. He was swinging the knife in an aggressive, exaggerated manner. Van Dyke ordered McDonald to 'Drop the knife!' multiple times. McDonald ignored Van Dyke's verbal direction to drop the knife and continued to advance toward Van Dyke. When McDonald got to within 10 to 15 feet of Officer Van Dyke, McDonald looked toward Van Dyke. McDonald raised the knife across his chest and over his shoulder, pointing the knife at Van Dyke. Van Dyke

believed McDonald was attacking Van Dyke with the knife, and attempting to kill Van Dyke. In defense of his life, Van Dyke backpedaled and fired his handgun at McDonald, to stop the attack. McDonald fell to the ground but continued to move and continued to grasp the knife, refusing to let go of it. Van Dyke continued to fire his weapon at McDonald as McDonald was on the ground, as McDonald appeared to be attempting to get up, all the while continuing to point the knife at Van Dyke.”

From P.O. Joseph Walsh, Van Dyke’s partner:

“Walsh ordered McDonald to ‘Drop the knife!’ multiple times as McDonald approached the officers.... McDonald ignored the verbal direction given by both Walsh and Officer Van Dyke, and continued to advance toward the officers. When McDonald got to within 12 to 15 feet of the officers he swung the knife toward the officers in an aggressive manner. Van Dyke opened fire with his handgun and McDonald fell to the ground. Van Dyke continued firing his weapon at McDonald as McDonald continued moving on the ground, attempting to get up, while still armed with the knife.... Officer Walsh said he believed McDonald was attacking Walsh and Officer Van Dyke with the knife and attempting to kill them when the shots were fired.”

From P.O. Dora Fontaine:

“Fontaine heard the officers repeatedly order McDonald to ‘Drop the knife!’ McDonald ignored the verbal direction and instead, raised his right arm toward Officer Van Dyke, as if attacking Van Dyke. At this time Van Dyke fired multiple shots from his handgun, until McDonald fell to the ground and stopped moving his right arm and hand, which still grasped the knife.”

From P.O. Ricardo Viramontes:

“Viramontes heard Officer Jason Van Dyke repeatedly order McDonald to ‘Drop the knife!’ McDonald ignored the verbal direction and turned toward Van Dyke and his partner, Officer Joseph Walsh. At this time Van Dyke fired multiple shots from his handgun. McDonald fell to the ground but continued to move, attempting to get back up, with the knife still in his hand.”

From P.O. Daphne Sebastian:

“Officers Joseph Walsh and Jason Van Dyke exited their vehicle and drew their handguns. McDonald turned toward the two officers and continued to wave the knife. Sebastian heard the officers repeatedly order McDonald to ‘Drop the knife!’ McDonald ignored the verbal directions and continued to advance on the officers, waving the knife. Officer Sebastian heard multiple gunshots and McDonald fell to the ground, where he continued to move. Sebastian did not know who fired the shots....”⁷

IPRA referred the investigation of the shooting to the Cook County State’s Attorney in November 2014. Thereafter, by early December 2014, the case had been referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The federal grand jury investigation remains pending.

Not until thirteen months later—after a pitched legal battle doggedly pursued by local investigative journalists resulted in the court-ordered release of the dash-cam video of the shooting—did the public learn the truth: McDonald made no movements toward any officers at the time Van Dyke fired the first shot, and

McDonald certainly did not lunge or otherwise make any threatening movements. The truth is that at the time Van Dyke fired the first of 16 shots, Laquan McDonald posed no immediate threat to anyone.

The civic outrage that followed gave voice to long-simmering anger not just about McDonald, but the deaths of others at the hands of the police, including Rekia Boyd, Ronald Johnson and, more recently, Quintonio LeGrier, Betty Jones and Philip Coleman. The deaths of numerous men and women of color whose lives came to an end solely because of an encounter with CPD became an important rallying cry. That outrage exposed deep and longstanding fault lines between black and Latino communities on the one hand and the police on the other arising from police shootings to be sure, but also about daily, pervasive transgressions that prevent people of all ages, races, ethnicities and gender across Chicago from having basic freedom of movement in their own neighborhoods. Stopped without justification, verbally and physically abused, and in some instances arrested, and then detained without counsel—that is what we heard about over and over again. Many of those voices came from young people who are on the frontlines of daily encounters with the police whether on the streets or in schools. Far too many of our residents are at daily risk of being caught up in a cycle of policing that deprives them of their basic human rights.

McDonald's shooting became the tipping point for long-simmering community anger. The videotape was painful, horrific and illuminating in ways that irrefutably exemplified what those in communities of color have long said, and shocked and stirred the conscience of those in other neighborhoods. The videotape itself, the initial official reaction, which but for the efforts of the journalist community likely would have relegated McDonald's death to less than a footnote in the over 400 police-involved shootings of citizens since 2008, coupled with the 13-month delay in the release of the videotape—all underscored and exposed systemic institutional failures going back decades that can no longer be ignored. These failures manifest themselves in various ways:

- Death and Injury at the Hands of the Police
- Random But Pervasive Physical and Verbal Abuse By the Police
- Deprivation of Basic Human and Constitutional Rights
- Lack of Individual and Systemic Accountability

The Work of the Police Accountability Task Force

This moment that we are in requires each of us to ask difficult but necessary questions. Questions that reject the status quo, the accepted way of doing business, and which look beyond an individual incident to the larger systemic policies, practices and procedures that spawn, support and protect the kind of corrosive behavior played out every day by the police on the streets.

The Task Force took on this challenge. We heard the chorus of voices from all over Chicago who demanded answers, accountability and change. In conducting our work, the Task Force has been guided by a mission adopted early on:

To lay the foundation for the rejuvenation of trust between the police and the communities they serve by facing hard truths and creating a roadmap for real and lasting transparency, respectful engagement, accountability and change.

The Task Force formed five Working Groups consisting of people from all over Chicago to address the following topics:

Community Relations, focusing on the need to bridge the gulf in relations between the police and the communities they serve, beginning with a review of the CPD's policies, procedures and practices with respect to addressing racism and racial bias, training, community policing, protecting human and civil rights and accountability and transparency.

Legal Oversight & Accountability, examining impediments to true accountability in the legal infrastructure, such as state statutes, collective bargaining agreements, general orders and other policies and procedures, and comparing Chicago's police oversight system with national best practices and models in other cities.

Early Intervention & Personnel Concerns, designing a personnel management system that identifies, rewards and models exemplary conduct while flagging problem behaviors and intervening at the earliest possible stage.

De-Escalation, addressing how police officers should de-escalate situations to minimize the use of force, including de-escalation and related issues where officers encounter citizens experiencing mental health crises.

Video Release Policies, developing a commonsense policy for the release of video, audio and other evidence related to serious police actions that balances the public's right to know with law enforcement's need to investigate these incidents without compromising critical evidence.

The Working Groups were made up of a broad and diverse range of 46 Chicagoans that included professionals and subject matter experts, such as those in police training, civil rights and mental health, as well as elected officials, faith leaders and community activists.⁸ The collective and individual contributions have been significant and have enriched the work in innumerable ways. Through its Working Groups, the Task Force conducted more than 100 discussions with organizations and individuals with subject matter expertise, experience and relevant information and perspectives to share.⁹ These conversations included current and former CPD officers and supervisors, police and other government officials in other cities, judges and civil rights lawyers, professors, researchers and community activists.¹⁰

The Task Force is deeply grateful to all those who participated in this process. The voices of those who joined us in interviews and discussions, sent comments, letters and position papers, and turned out at community forums provided the foundation for this work.

Community Engagement

Based on the belief that real and lasting change is possible only when the people most affected by policing have a voice, community engagement was central to our work. In order to lay the foundation for building trust between the police and the communities they serve, the Task Force engaged in a robust community engagement process. That process included:

- Community members as active participants in our Working Groups.
- Individual and small group discussions with subject matter experts.

- Four community forums for residents to speak directly with the Task Force.
- Reading comments submitted by mail, through the website, by social media and at the forums.

The forums took place on the West, South, and North Sides and in Pilsen and were attended by over 750 residents. In planning the forums, the Task Force reached out to 95 community groups, 63 elected officials and 83 religious institutions. We also hosted three youth forums with high school students from throughout the City and discussed their perspectives on interactions with the police, both in their schools and in their neighborhoods.

How did we get to this point? Some Overarching Findings.

“If you are not severely and wholeheartedly dealing with racism, you are not going to get to the bottom of this issue.”¹¹

We arrived at this point in part because of racism.

We arrived at this point because of a mentality in CPD that the ends justify the means.

We arrived at this point because of a failure to make accountability a core value and imperative within CPD.

We arrived at this point because of a significant underinvestment in human capital.

RACISM

The Task Force heard over and over again from a range of voices, particularly from African-Americans, that some CPD officers are racist, have no respect for the lives and experiences of people of color and approach every encounter with people of color as if the person, regardless of age, gender or circumstance, is a criminal. Some people do not feel safe in any encounter with the police. Some do not feel like they have the ability to walk in their neighborhoods or drive in their cars without being aggressively confronted by the police. The consistent theme of these deeply-held beliefs came from a significant cross-section of people: men and women, young, middle-aged and older, doctors, lawyers, teachers and other professionals, students, and everyday workers. Regardless of the demographic, people of color loudly expressed their outrage about how they are treated by the police.

These encounters leave an indelible mark. Long after the officer moves on to chase the next call or make the next stop, the citizen involved remains affected and if the encounter involved physical or verbal aggression, even if there was no arrest, there is a lasting, negative effect.

The linkage between racism and CPD did not just bubble up in the aftermath of the release of the McDonald video. Racism and maltreatment at the hands of the police have been consistent complaints from communities of color for decades. And there have been many significant flashpoints over the years—the killing of Fred Hampton (1960s), the Metcalfe hearings (1970s), federal court findings of a pattern and practice of discriminatory hiring (1970s), Jon Burge and his midnight crew (1970s to 1990s), widespread disorderly conduct arrests (1980s), the unconstitutional gang loitering ordinance (1990s), widespread use of investigatory stops and frisks (2000s) and other points. False arrests, coerced confessions and wrongful convictions are also a part of this history. Lives lost and countless more

damaged. These events and others mark a long, sad history of death, false imprisonment, physical and verbal abuse and general discontent about police actions in neighborhoods of color.

THE ENDS JUSTIFYING THE MEANS

There are too many neighborhoods in Chicago that are devastated by crime and abject poverty. In those areas, aside from a recommitment to investments in jobs, education and many other important community anchors, those residents need the protection of the police. However, CPD's own data and other information strongly suggests that CPD's response to the violence is not sufficiently imbued with Constitutional policing tactics and is also comparatively void of actual procedural and restorative justice in the day-to-day encounters between the police and citizens.


CPD's own data gives validity to the widely held belief the police have no regard for the sanctity of life when it comes to people of color.

Police Officers Shoot African-Americans At Alarming

Rates: Of the 404 shootings between 2008-2015:¹²

- 74% or 299 African Americans were hit or killed by police officers, as compared with
- 14% or 55 Hispanics;
- 8% or 33 Whites; and
- 0.25% Asians.


For perspective, citywide, Chicago is almost evenly split by race among whites (31.7%), blacks (32.9%) and Hispanics (28.9%).¹³



Police Officers Disproportionately Use Tasers

Against African-Americans: Of the 1,886 taser discharges by CPD between 2012 and 2015, African-Americans were the target of those discharges at a very high rate¹⁴:


- 76% or 1,435 African-Americans were shot with tasers;
- 13% or 254 Hispanics;
- 8% or 144 Whites; and
- 0.21% or 4 Asians.




Beyond the use of force with guns and tasers, CPD's dependence on investigatory stops as an essential part of its policing strategy has only served to worsen already fractured community relations.

Traffic Stops: In 2013,

- 46% of 100,676 traffic stops involved African-Americans;
- 22% involved Hispanics;
- 27% involved Whites.¹⁵




Moreover, black and Hispanic drivers were searched approximately four times as often as white drivers, yet CPD's own data show that contraband was found on white drivers twice as often as black and Hispanic drivers.




Other Street Stops: In the summer of 2014, CPD stopped more than 250,000 people—93.6 for every 10,000 City residents—in encounters not leading to arrests.¹⁶ (This figure dwarfs the number of stops by New York City police, which from 2011-2014, stopped anywhere between 1.6 and 22.9 people per 10,000.)

Of those 250,000 people stopped by CPD in the summer of 2014,

- 72% were African American;
- 17% were Hispanic;
- 9% were White; and
- 1% were Asian.



A 2015 survey of 1,200 Chicago residents, ages 16 and older, also found significant racial disparities in the number of police-initiated stops and the perception of abusive police behavior.¹⁷ The survey found that **almost 70%** of young African-American males reported being stopped by police in the past 12 months, and 56% reported being stopped on foot.¹⁸



The survey found that “[m]ost people stopped by Chicago police are not ticketed, arrested or taken to a police station.”¹⁹ In addition, the survey established “large racial disparities in the use of force reported by respondents.”²⁰ The survey revealed that “15% of Blacks and 17% of Hispanics reported being shoved or pushed around, in contrast to 6% of Whites. [Blacks] were twice as likely as whites to be threatened by a weapon. Compared to whites, all other groups were at least twice as likely to have been subjected to some form of force before being released.”²¹

The overuse of investigatory stops has left a lingering, negative perception of the police in communities of color, in part because for people of color, a significant number of those stops also involved actual or threatened physical abuse.²²

FAILURE TO MAKE ACCOUNTABILITY A CORE VALUE AND IMPERATIVE

Going back years, and continuing to the present day, CPD has missed opportunities to make accountability an organizational priority. Currently, neither the non-disciplinary interventions available nor the disciplinary system are functioning.


The public has lost faith in the oversight system. Every stage of investigations and discipline is plagued by serious structural and procedural flaws that make real accountability nearly impossible. The collective bargaining agreements provide an unfair advantage to officers, and the investigating agencies—IPRA and CPD's Bureau of Internal Affairs—are under-resourced, lack true independence and are not held accountable for their work. Even where misconduct is found to have occurred, officers are frequently able to avoid meaningful consequences due to an opaque, drawn out and unscrutinized disciplinary process.

Complaints go uninvestigated. From 2011-2015, 40% of complaints filed were not investigated by IPRA or BIA.




Arbitrators reduce or void disciplinary recommendations.

In 2015, arbitrators reduced disciplinary recommendations in 56.4% of cases and eliminated any discipline in 16.1% of cases. In total, arbitrators reduced or eliminated discipline in 73% of cases.



No risk management regarding lawsuits. There continues to be an unacceptably high number of lawsuits filed against the City and individual police officers every year. Despite this persistent problem, which results in the outlay of tens of millions of dollars every year, CPD does not employ a systematic tool for evaluating risk issues identified in lawsuits.



High number of CPD officers with significant CRs.

The enduring issue of CPD officers acquiring a large number of Complaint Registers ("CRs") remains a problem that must be addressed immediately. From 2007-2015, over 1,500 CPD officers acquired 10 or more CRs, 65 of whom accumulated 30 or more CRs. It is important to note that these numbers do not reflect the entire disciplinary history (e.g., pre-2007) of these officers.

Any one of these metrics in isolation is troubling, but taken together, the only conclusion that can be reached is that there is no serious embrace by CPD leadership of the need to make accountability a core value. These statistics give real credibility to the widespread

perception that there is a deeply entrenched code of silence supported not just by individual officers, but by the very institution itself. The absence of accountability benefits only the problem officer and undermines officers who came into the job for the right reasons and remain dedicated to serving and protecting. Sadly, CPD collects a significant amount of data that it could readily use to address these very troubling trends. Unfortunately, there is no systemic approach to addressing these issues, data collection is siloed and individual stakeholders do virtually nothing with the data they possess. Simply put, there is no ownership of the issue within CPD leadership or elsewhere, and thus there have been no substantive efforts to address these problems which continue to cost taxpayers tens of millions of dollars each year. These figures demand immediate change.



SIGNIFICANT UNDERINVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL

The problems that the Task Force has identified have their origins in systemic failings going back many years. These failings touch:

- Recruitment of Young Officers.** Chicago remains one of the most segregated cities in the country. CPD recruits from those segregated neighborhoods, but has fallen woefully short in acknowledging and addressing the fact that for many young recruits, the Training Academy may be their first substantive experience with someone who is of a different race or ethnicity.
- Training Officers To Address Conscious and Unconscious Bias in the Daily Discharge of Their Responsibilities.** While CPD has made significant strides in addressing cultural literacy in the Academy's Procedural Justice training and Crisis Intervention Team ("CIT") training, much more needs to be done. Fundamentally, there needs to be a real commitment to Constitutional policing strategies and tactics that strike the appropriate balance between keeping our communities safe without trampling on basic Constitutional and human rights. This important value must be embedded into all training, on an annual basis. Serving and protecting cannot mean that the rights of certain communities or individuals must be sacrificed.
- Absence of Other Investments.** If there is a real commitment to cultural change within CPD, the balance will shift when there are adequate resources devoted to training. Currently, aside from annual firearms certification and sporadic training sessions, there is no mandatory training on any other topic.

This means that after an officer leaves the Academy, he can serve his entire career without ever receiving any annual, mandatory training of any kind. An astounding fact, particularly in light of recent sea changes in policing strategies and technology.

What limited post-Academy training happens is primarily delivered through roll-call videos. Roll call was derisively described by one officer as “day care,” meaning that officers slept, checked their smartphones or otherwise paid little attention to what was happening. Compounding this problem is that there are no metrics used to determine the level of comprehension or retention of the topic reflected in the video training. What also seems certain is that the level of attention given to the videos is not required to be reinforced with any training materials for the roll-call commander and rarely are officers afforded an opportunity to ask follow-up questions or otherwise access FAQs or other materials to reinforce the training. Also, CPD has a large portfolio of training videos that officers can access through a web-based portal, but no effort is made to even track the number of times officers access those training videos. And in recent memory, there has been no effort to survey officers to assess the areas in which they need training.

Right now, the community has no role in any of the training done either in the Academy or thereafter. Cities across the country recognize that community involvement in training is an important element and yet another way to bridge the gap between the police and the communities they serve.

Also, service as an Academy instructor is not sufficiently valued within CPD and some instructors are teaching while under investigation for a range of alleged offenses. The Academy's physical space is also woefully inadequate to meet current and future needs. For example, the recent mandatory Taser training is being conducted in the hallways of the Academy because there is simply no other space available. The physical structure that houses the Academy is antiquated, cramped and cannot accommodate even current needs, let alone the increased training that will be necessary to make real cultural change. The constraints of the physical space negatively impact the effectiveness of training.

Other Key Findings By Working Group

COMMUNITY-POLICE RELATIONS

The community's lack of trust in CPD is justified. There is substantial evidence that people of color—particularly African-Americans—have had disproportionately negative experiences with the police over an extended period of time. There is also substantial evidence that these experiences continue today through significant disparate impacts associated with the use of force, foot and traffic stops and bias in the police oversight system itself.

CPD is not doing enough to combat racial bias. Policies need further clarification, as it is not clear whether and when officers may use race as a factor when initiating stops. While CPD collects a fair amount of data, little is reported to the public. CPD still has significant work to do to diversify its ranks, especially at supervisory levels. And more needs to be done to train officers to acknowledge and address their biases and deploy officers who are culturally competent and have a proper understanding of the communities they are assigned to serve.

Historically, CPD has relied on the Community Alternative Policing Strategy (“CAPS”) to fulfill its community-policing function. The CAPS brand is significantly damaged after years of neglect. Ultimately,

community policing cannot be relegated to a small, underfunded program; it must be treated as a core philosophy infused throughout CPD.

CPD officers are not adequately equipped to engage with youth. The existing relationship between CPD and youth—particularly youth of color—is antagonistic, to say the least. Children in some areas of the City are not only being raised in high-crime environments, but they are also being mistreated by those who have sworn to protect and serve them.

Finally, CPD is not doing enough to protect human and civil rights. Providing arrestees access to counsel is a particular problem. In 2014, only 3 out of every 1,000 arrestees had an attorney at any point while in police custody. In 2015, that number “doubled” to 6. The City’s youth are particularly vulnerable and often lack awareness of their rights.

LEGAL OVERSIGHT & ACCOUNTABILITY

Chicago’s police accountability system is broken. The system is supposed to hold police officers accountable to the people they serve and protect by identifying potential misconduct, investigating it and, when appropriate, imposing discipline. But at every step of the way, the police oversight system is riddled with legal and practical barriers to accountability.

IPRA is badly broken. Almost since its inception, there have been questions about whether the agency performed its work fairly, competently, with rigor and independence. The answer is no. Cases go uninvestigated, the agency lacks resources and IPRA’s findings raise troubling concerns about whether it is biased in favor of police officers. Up until recently, the agency has been run by former law enforcement, who allowed leadership to reverse findings without creating any record of the changes. IPRA has lost the trust of the community, which it cannot function without.

Imposing discipline on officers guilty of misconduct has also been a challenge. Existing policies and the woefully inadequate oversight regarding how discipline is imposed have allowed far too many officers to receive little or no discipline even after a complaint is sustained. Discipline is not handed down evenly, and there are several layers in the process where discipline is often reduced.

The collective bargaining agreements between the police unions and the City have essentially turned the code of silence into official policy. The CBAs discourage reporting misconduct by requiring affidavits, prohibiting anonymous complaints and requiring that accused officers be given the complainant’s name early in the process. Once a complaint is in the system, the CBAs make it easy for officers to lie if they are so inclined—they can wait 24 hours before providing a statement after a shooting, allowing them to confer with other officers, and they can amend statements after viewing video or audio evidence. In many cases, the CBAs also require the City to ignore or even destroy evidence of misconduct after a certain number of years.

The community has long been shut out of Chicago’s police oversight system. Meaningful engagement with the community—and giving the community power in the oversight system—is critical to ensuring that officers are held accountable for misconduct.

Finally, in the current system, there is no entity to police the police oversight system itself. There is no way to know if existing entities are performing their jobs with rigor and integrity, and no entity is equipped to identify and address systemic changes regarding patterns and practices of misconduct or bias, or to

analyze policies and procedures to prevent future problems. Police inspectors general—often called auditors—have emerged nationally in response to a growing belief that traditional oversight agencies would benefit from having a second set of eyes to ensure that they perform as they should.

EARLY INTERVENTION AND PERSONNEL CONCERNS

The community is rightfully skeptical that enough is being done within CPD to adequately supervise and identify officers whose actions are falling short of expectations. There is a general absence of a culture of accountability within CPD, largely because no one in top leadership has taken ownership of how to identify and handle problem officers.

CPD currently collects a variety of data on issues related to officer performance—including complaints and lawsuits—but does little to holistically analyze officer performance and intervene when troubling patterns emerge. Data collection is incomplete. Distribution, analysis and follow-up is limited.

Although supervisors have potentially-invaluable tools for managing each of the officers under their charge through a Performance Recognition System and a dashboard program, this monitoring and intervention system is not working. There are no mandatory requirements that supervisors use the system to analyze data or intervene in officer misconduct. Review of the data is entirely discretionary—or it is at least treated that way. Supervisors are not required to input information to explain the data or take any action in response to the data they receive. As a result, there is no way to know if supervisors are even using the dashboard, much less how they are using it. There do not appear to be any enforcement mechanisms to ensure supervisors use the program and, according to our interviews, the system is considered far from mandatory. In fact, our interviews with officers and supervisory personnel indicate that the dashboard has not been functional so far in 2016.

In recent years, CPD's two formal early intervention programs—the Behavioral Intervention System ("BIS") and Personnel Concerns ("PC")—have rarely been used. In 2007, 276 officers were included in either BIS or PC. Participation quickly dropped off after FOP filed a grievance against CPD for certain officers' inclusion. CPD and FOP settled the grievance by agreeing to remove officers from the programs. By 2013, **zero** officers were being actively managed through either of those programs. In 2014, only 7 officers were enrolled in the program. In 2015, 13 officers were enrolled.

There are many national models to design a more effective early intervention system, including systems mandated by Department of Justice consent decrees. Chicago has a lot of catching up to do. Advances in technology and data analysis allow police departments to identify officers who may be in need of interventions and to respond appropriately. It is imperative that CPD have a system in place that allows for a 360-degree view of the activity and conduct of its officers. The system should allow CPD to identify problematic behaviors at the earliest possible instance so that it can get officers back on track or, if necessary, manage them out of the department before it is too late. This is an essential component in re-establishing legitimacy with the community.



DE-ESCALATION

Unfortunately, there have been many examples of CPD encounters with citizens in routine situations that have gone tragically wrong. There are also widespread reports from people all over Chicago that some officers approach these same routine situations with an overaggressive and hostile demeanor, using racially charged and abusive language. It is critically important that each officer approach every encounter with a citizen with respect and a commitment to the sanctity of life.

In addition, there have increasingly been situations in which police response to calls involving persons experiencing mental health crises ended with devastating results. OEMC must be able to identify calls and encounters that are mental-health related and respond with appropriate resources.

Emergency calltakers and dispatchers are a critical component of mental health crisis response, but they are ill-equipped to identify mental health calls and dispatch appropriate resources. OEMC personnel receive only one hour of annual training about crisis intervention and mental health, and their (understandable) focus on speedy dispatches often hinders accurate identification of mental health calls and the quality of response.

In 2005, following a series of highly publicized shootings of persons with mental illnesses, CPD established a CIT program to train officers on addressing individuals in mental health crises. Officers can take a 40-hour course to become CIT-certified. The CIT program has had a number of positive outcomes, but only 15% of CPD officers are CIT-certified. This is not enough to ensure that there are enough CIT-certified officers to respond to mental health calls.

Even when officers have CIT training, they have limited options to divert those living with mental illness to healthcare providers instead of jail. Currently, the only diversion option is the emergency room at various hospitals. More often, officers take individuals to Cook County Jail, which has become one of the largest mental health treatment providers in the nation. When officers do transport individuals to designated emergency room drop-offs, they often see the same person back in their beat hours or days later, with no change in their behavior. This is a poor use of manpower and resources.

Police officers are too often the first responders to those living with mental illness and experiencing a crisis. Most people living with mental illness do not receive treatment, in large part due to the shrinking mental healthcare safety net. The mental health system focuses on chronic care management for people who are living with severe, disabling mental illnesses. It does not address early intervention that might encourage recovery and avoid long-term disability. Without these less intensive, recovery-promoting services, persons living with mental illness fail to get timely treatment until their symptoms are so severe as to require costly crisis management.

VIDEO RELEASE

On February 16, 2016, the Task Force released on an expedited basis a policy for the public release of video and audio recordings of certain critical incidents involving police officers. The Mayor immediately adopted the policy. Before the adoption of the policy, the practice in Chicago was generally to withhold from public release any video recording of a police incident until investigations, whether criminal or merely disciplinary, were concluded. The absence of a clear, written policy led to inconsistencies, confusion and mistrust on the part of the public, as well as a proliferation of expensive and time-consuming litigation conducted under the Freedom of Information Act. In many cases, it also left the public in the dark about matters of serious public interest.

Where do we go from here?

Task Force Recommendations. The Task Force's Report contains observations and findings about a range of issues that likely have never been seen before by the public, or at least never been addressed so openly. The recommendations, if adopted, will fundamentally change the way in which the public engages with the police, create more effective oversight and auditing, and create a transparent system of accountability and responsibility for all stakeholders. We have not solved all problems, but we have created a blueprint for lasting change.

Our recommendations are designed to address the root causes of the issues facing CPD, IPRA and other stake holders.

How We Propose to Empower People.

- Create a **Community Safety Oversight Board**, allowing the community to have a powerful platform and role in the police oversight system.
- Implement a citywide **Reconciliation Process** beginning with the Superintendent publicly acknowledging CPD's history of racial disparity and discrimination, and making a public commitment to cultural change.
- **Replace CAPS with localized Community Empowerment and Engagement Districts (CEED) for each of the city's 22 police districts**, and support them accordingly. Under CEED, district Commanders and other leadership would work with local stakeholders to develop tailored community policing strategies and partnerships.
- **Renew commitment to beat-based policing and expand community patrols** so that officers learn about and get to know the communities they serve, and community members take an active role in partnering with the police.
- **Reinvigorate community policing as a core philosophy and approach** that informs actions throughout the department.
- **Evaluate and improve the training officers receive with respect to youth** so that they are prepared to engage in ways that are age-appropriate, trauma-informed and based in a restorative justice model.

- Require CPD and the police oversight system to be more **transparent** and release to the public incident-level information on arrests, traffic and investigatory stops, officer weapon use and disciplinary cases.
- **Host citywide summits** jointly sponsored by the Mayor and the President of the Cook County Board to develop and implement comprehensive criminal justice reform.
- Encourage the Mayor and President of the Cook County Board to work together to develop and implement programs that address **socioeconomic justice and equality, housing segregation, systemic racism, poverty, education, health and safety**.
- Adoption of a citywide protocol allowing arrestees to make **phone calls to an attorney and/or family member(s) within one hour of arrest**.
- Implementation of citywide **"Know Your Rights" training** for youth.

How We Propose to Address the Inadequate Emphasis on Accountability.

- Create a dedicated **Inspector General for Public Safety**, which would independently audit and monitor CPD and the police oversight system, including for patterns of racial bias.
- **Replace the Independent Police Review Authority with a new and fully transparent and accountable Civilian Police Investigative Agency**, which will enhance structural protections, powers and resources for investigating serious cases of police misconduct, even in the absence of sworn complaints. The new CPIA should ensure an accessible, professional and supportive complaint process.
- Implement a data-driven, best-in-class **Early Intervention System for CPD to identify officers with problems** before they become problems for the community.
- Fundamentally **change provisions in the collective bargaining agreements** that are impediments to accountability, such as allowing for anonymous complaints, eliminating the ability to change statements after reviewing video and removing the requirement to destroy complaint records.
- Fully **implement the first-in-the-nation written video release policy** for officer-involved shootings.
- **Expand CPD's body cam** pilot program.
- Require that **all disciplinary information be provided online** so that citizens can track complaints and discipline histories.

How We Propose to Address Other Systemic and Longstanding Problems.

- Establish for the first time in Chicago a **Deputy Chief of Diversity and Inclusion in CPD**.
- Implement policies to **dismantle the institutionalization of the police “code of silence,”** including substantial changes to the collective bargaining agreements between the police and the City, ending command channel review, reforming the role of CPD supervisors and pattern and practice analysis.
- **Establish a smart 911 system** for OEMC, allowing residents to pre-enter information on mental health or other issues that would be instantly available to OEMC operators.
- **Create a multi-layer co-responder system** where mental health providers work with OEMC and CPD to link individuals to treatment.
- **Expand significantly the Crisis Intervention System** for CPD and other first responders.
- **Create a “Mental Health Critical Response Unit”** within CPD that is responsible for mental health crisis response functions, training, support, community outreach and engagement, cross-agency co-ordination and data collection.
- **Create a hotline for CPD members**, whether civilian or sworn, to lodge complaints, and develop a third-party system for the processing and follow-up of all comments and complaints reported to the hotline.

While we address some statistics regarding the use of force by CPD officers, in deference to the U.S. Department of Justice’s ongoing pattern and practice investigation, we did not conduct a detailed analysis of CPD’s use of force practices. But as statistics on police shooting of civilians, taser discharges and other troubling practices like shooting at cars, at the backs of fleeing suspects and the range of off-duty incidents involving weapons discharges all make plain, there must be a fundamental re-thinking of the current use-of-force policies. The Task Force heard over and over: just because you *can* use force, does not mean you *should* use force. The community must also be at the table for this conversation. The primary guiding principle of CPD’s use of force policies and practices must be sanctity of all lives.

The full list of recommendations can be found throughout the Task Force Report as well as in stand alone recommendation checklists in the appendices.

Next Steps

The publishing of this Report is a point of departure for the next phase of work in fixing the system of policing in Chicago. This report is just a blueprint of the work necessary to reform structures that have for too long gone on unchecked and fundamentally unchanged. The citizens, elected officials and others in public life in Chicago now must take this report and act on it. We have outlined many steps that will require decisions, planning and action from many different actors, including the Mayor, City Council and CPD. Moreover, to make fundamental change, a broad range of stakeholders—including Cook County bodies, State legislators, community and faith organizations, advocates, philanthropic organizations and the community—all need to embrace the need for change and do their part.

For the Mayor and City Council, we expect that policies, ordinances and procedures will be adopted in the next 90 to 180 days to take aggressive steps to implement the recommendations within this Report. We hope that someone within each branch of government will lay out a timeline for delivering what we have outlined as necessary, and set up an accountability structure for ensuring that action is taken and changes are implemented. For CPD, there is much that can be done immediately and it will only inure to the benefit of the new leadership to adopt as many changes—including both policies and practices—described here, as quickly as is practicable. We encourage Cook County and State legislators to join the effort, as policing reform in Chicago impacts both the region and state, and many of our recommendations affect other areas of Illinois.

The challenge is broader but no less important for advocates, community and faith organizations, philanthropy and the broader community. From this moment we hope that these individuals and groups will push for and demand that the police accountability system in Chicago change, whether they agree with our recommendations or not. We further hope that all who have labored over or otherwise been affected by these issues will continue to ensure that their voices are heard in this debate and that this moment for change does not pass. Finally, we hope that these bodies will think about and consider a design for the path ahead. The Task Force cannot say exactly what should happen next in this debate. It is to the government and the people of Chicago—through the bodies outlined above and others—to determine where we go from here.

Is Real Reform Possible?

Reform is possible if there is a will and a commitment. But where reform must begin is with an acknowledgement of the sad history and present conditions that have left the people totally alienated from the police, and afraid for their physical and emotional safety. And while many individuals and entities have a role to play, the change must start with CPD. CPD cannot begin to build trust, repair what is broken and tattered unless—from the top leadership on down—it faces these hard truths, acknowledges what it has done at the individual and institutional levels and earnestly reaches out with respect. Only then can it expect to engage the community in a true partnership.

Endnotes

¹ Comment from Sullivan High School Community Forum (Feb. 25, 2016).

² Quinn Ford, Cops: Boy, 17, Fatally Shot by Officer After Refusing to Drop Knife, Chicago Tribune (Oct. 21, 2014), *available at* <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-chicago-shootings-violence-20141021-story.html>.

³ *Id.*

⁴ CBS2 Chicago, Marissa Bailey reporting (Oct. 21, 2014); ABC7 Chicago, Tanja Babich reporting (Oct. 21, 2014).

⁵ Mark Berman, Why Did Authorities Say Laquan McDonald Lunged at Chicago Police Officers? Washington Post (Nov. 25, 2015), *available at* <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/11/25/why-did-authorities-say-laquan-mcdonald-lunged-at-chicago-police-officers/>.

⁶ As reported by Detective David Marsh who interviewed the various responding officers, including Van Dyke. *See* Case Supplementary Reports, *available at* <http://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/Laquan-McDonald-Police-Report-Dashcam-360644211.html>.

⁷ All of these officers and others are the subject of an investigation being conducted by the City's Office of Inspector General.

⁸ The Working Group members are identified in Appendix 2.

⁹ The Civic Consulting Alliance provided invaluable staffing to support the Task Force. The research team disseminated hundreds of law enforcement policies from across the nation, consent decrees involving other cities and research reports from a variety of leading experts and organizations. As part of its work, the Task Force also made over 100 data and document requests to the City of Chicago. Many are available on the Task Force website at <https://chicagopatf.org/resources/research-documents/>

¹⁰ The individuals interviewed by the Working Groups are identified in Appendix 3.

¹¹ Comment from Pamela Hunt, Mt. Vernon Baptist Church Community Forum (Feb. 2, 2016).

¹² Data provided by IPRA.

¹³ United States Census Bureau, QuickFacts, Chicago, Illinois, *available at* <http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/1714000>.

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ CPD Traffic Stops and Resulting Searches in 2013, ACLU of Illinois (Dec. 2014), *available at* <http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Report-re-CPD-traffic-stops-in-2013.pdf>.

¹⁶ Stop and Frisk Practices in Chicago, ACLU of Illinois (Mar. 2015), *available at* http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf.

¹⁷ Wesley G. Skogan, Chicago Community Survey, Preliminary Survey of Findings (Dec. 29, 2015). The survey respondents were "selected from randomly chosen residential addresses throughout the city. They were questioned in their homes by professional interviewers from the Survey Research Laboratory of the University of Illinois-Chicago.

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.*

Context

Before addressing the Task Force's findings and recommendations, it is important to set the context for our work. While we were doing our work, the U.S. Department of Justice was investigating CPD as well. We are also not the first "task force" to evaluate CPD, which has a history of great accomplishment as well as scandal resulting in reform efforts. Moreover, many of the issues discussed in this report are not unique to Chicago, as issues of race and policing have received significant national attention in recent years. At the same time, policing in Chicago involves several overarching challenges that must be taken into account. Finally, a basic understanding of CPD's current structure, training and promotion system is important to contextualize the issues addressed in this report.

U.S. Department of Justice Investigation

On December 7, 2015, six days after Mayor Emanuel appointed the Task Force, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it had opened a civil pattern or practice investigation into CPD. By statute, it is unlawful for police "to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct ... that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States."²³ The Department of Justice can bring civil suits for relief "to eliminate the pattern or practice."²⁴ The Department of Justice notified CPD that its investigation "will focus on CPD's use of force, including racial, ethnic and other disparities in use of force, and its systems of accountability."²⁵ Given the Department of Justice's focus, the Task Force has not conducted a detailed analysis of CPD's use-of-force practices.

A pattern or practice proceeding is a powerful tool, but the process "typically takes years" from start to finish.²⁶ From 2009-2015, the Department of Justice opened 23 pattern or practice investigations. Of the larger police departments investigated, the first stage of the process alone—investigating and issuing findings—took anywhere from eight months to three plus years: Cleveland Division of Police (19 months); Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (8 months); Miami Police Department (20 months); New Orleans Police Department (10 months); Newark Police Department (38 months); Seattle Police Department (9 months); and Baltimore Police Department (11 months and counting). The implementation of remedies takes more time. And CPD is far larger than any of these departments.

The Task Force views its findings and recommendations as complementary to the Department of Justice's ongoing investigation. Given the likely length of the federal process, the Task Force's report presents an opportunity to begin immediately the process of improving transparency, respectful engagement and accountability. Since early December, the Department of Justice has been well aware of the scope of the Task Force's work. With the issuance of this report, the Department of Justice can decide whether and how to take the Task Force's findings and recommendations—and the City's and CPD's efforts to implement them—into account when it releases its own findings.

Prior Task Forces

CPD dates back to 1835, when the Town of Chicago was first authorized to establish its own police force. The City of Chicago was incorporated two years later. Since then, CPD has not been immune to the corruption that has often plagued City government.

We are at least the sixth “task force” to recommend reforms to CPD. These reform efforts typically occurred in response to corruption-related scandals. Though some of these reforms led to the police oversight system that is in place today, few if any prior task forces have been charged with broadly reviewing community-police relations and the patchwork oversight system that has developed over time. Nonetheless, there are a number of issues and themes associated with these prior reform efforts that resonate today. This Task Force has a unique opportunity to ensure that CPD and its oversight system are structured to ensure that the core values of respectful engagement and accountability are given the priority they deserve.

The first body commissioned to review CPD that we identified dates back to 1898. At that time, Governor Tanner appointed the “Berry Committee” to examine the City’s compliance with a civil service law that was supposed to ensure that positions in CPD were filled based on merit.²⁷ The Berry Committee concluded that “the administration now in force in Chicago is unalterably opposed to the merit system and has done everything in its power to destroy the law and nullify its provisions and has made it a mockery, a byword and a sham.”²⁸ The administration “remove[d] from office competent and capable men without any cause, in order to appoint their own friends to office,” leading to the appointment of “many men of unsavory reputation and mental and physical unfitness.”²⁹ The Berry Committee found that CPD “should be removed ... as far as possible[] from politics” and that police officers should “be retained alone upon their merits and discharged only for cause.”³⁰

In 1911, Mayor Harrison directed the Chicago Civil Service Commission to investigate connections between CPD and “various criminal classes,” including gamblers.³¹ The Commission found that “there is, and for years has been, a connection between [CPD] and the various criminal classes in the city of Chicago.”³² Because gambling was so widespread, CPD’s “Gambling Squad itself was not above suspicion, either on account of palpable stupidity or deliberate collusion with the gambling fraternity.”³³ The Commission also noted lax discipline throughout CPD, finding that “[i]f there is one great fault in [CPD], it is the fact that to a large extent the sergeants do not exercise that degree of authority and responsibility which their title and increased pay demands.”³⁴ The Commission recommended a number of actions to address its findings. Among them, it recommended that “the Police Pension Law be revised so as to prevent payment of pensions to persons discharged from the force.”³⁵

In 1960, Mayor Richard J. Daley appointed a committee to recommend ways to modernize and professionalize CPD in response to what was then described as “the mother of all scandals.”³⁶ A group of eight CPD officers from the Summerdale District on Chicago’s North Side had been caught operating a large-scale burglary ring.³⁷ (Unfortunately, calling Summerdale the “mother” of all scandals proved prophetic as other officers have been caught engaging in criminal conduct over the years.) The head of the committee was Orlando Wilson, the Dean of the School of Criminology at the University of California.

The Summerdale scandal brought about a significant reorganization and transformation of CPD into a “professional” police force.³⁸ The committee nominated Wilson to serve as Superintendent of Police, a position he held for seven years. Wilson promptly turned over the top command and made CPD more independent of partisan political influences. The committee also recommended the establishment of a five-member Police Board to nominate candidates for superintendent vacancies, adopt rules and regulations for CPD, prepare budgets and address recommendations for officer discipline in serious cases. This body would ultimately become today’s Chicago Police Board.

In the early 1970s, CPD faced increasing allegations of police brutality, particularly in African-American communities. In response, Congressman Ralph Metcalfe convened a “Blue Ribbon Panel” to report on “The Misuse of Police Authority in Chicago.”³⁹ The panel heard testimony concerning “many instances of grossly abusive conduct on the part of Chicago policemen,” which “poison[] police-community relations.”⁴⁰ The panel found that CPD used fatal force more frequently than in other big cities, and that 75% of those killed were black.⁴¹ It also noted “the false arrests, the illegal searches or the more common kind of psychological violence that occurs daily, especially in exchanges between police and minorities and young people. Very few young Blacks and Browns have been spared the experience of having to swallow their pride and take a bullying insult from a police officer.”⁴²

And yet, the Metcalfe panel found, “complaints from citizens of abusive conduct by police are almost universally rejected by [CPD’s] self-investigation system.”⁴³ Excessive force complaints were sustained in only 1.4% of cases.⁴⁴ This led the panel to recommend that “an entirely new independent investigating agency, reporting its factual findings to the Police Board for imposition of discipline ... should be created.”⁴⁵ The panel’s recommendation led to the establishment of the Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”) in 1974. (In 2007, OPS was replaced by the Independent Police Review Authority.) The panel also recommended increasing the size of the Police Board from five to fifteen to promote “genuine, representative public participation.”⁴⁶ The board was ultimately enlarged to nine members.

In 1997, Mayor Richard M. Daley appointed the Commission on Police Integrity to examine the root causes of police corruption, review how other urban police departments approach the issue and propose changes to CPD policies and procedures. Prominent attorney Dan Webb headed the commission, and served along with then-Assistant State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez, Sharon Gist Gilliam, former CPD Superintendent Fred Rice and Brian L. Crowe. The mayor appointed the commission after a group of seven CPD officers from the Austin District (15th) on Chicago’s West Side were indicted for robbing and extorting money and narcotics from drug dealers. Another three officers from the Gresham District (6th) were indicted for conspiracy to commit robbery and sales of illegally confiscated narcotics.

The 1997 Commission on Police Integrity made a number of recommendations. The recommendations included: (1) increasing the minimum requirements for new recruits to a bachelor’s degree and one year of work history; (2) overhauling the field training officer program and extending the probationary period for new officers from 12 to 18 months; (3) establishing an “early warning” system to alert command personnel when an officer may be involved in a pattern of misconduct; (4) implementing a range of management improvements, including emphasizing supervisor accountability and expanding training for new Sergeants; and (5) implementing continuing education or in-service training for officers.⁴⁷ Some of these recommendations were implemented. Unfortunately, other recommendations were not addressed and still need attention, as we discuss in more detail below.

National & Local Conversation on Policing

In a large urban environment like Chicago, race matters in policing. In recent years in particular, race and policing have received significant public attention, often in response to officer-involved shootings and other tragic incidents affecting people of color. Information about these incidents can spread quickly over social media, especially if part of the incident is captured on video, an increasingly frequent occurrence. These incidents have sparked national attention and discussion, sometimes leading to violent protests.

In Ferguson, Missouri, Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown, 18.

In Cleveland, Ohio, Officer Timothy Loehmann shot and killed Tamir Rice, 12.

In Baltimore, Maryland, Freddie Gray died after sustaining spinal cord injuries while he was transported in a police van after his arrest for possessing an allegedly illegal switchblade.

In New York City, Eric Garner died after Officer Daniel Pantaleo put him in a chokehold while arresting him on suspicion of selling loose cigarettes.

In the wake of Ferguson and other events, President Obama appointed a Task Force on 21st Century Policing. The 21st Century Policing Task Force was charged with identifying best practices and offering recommendations on how policing practices can promote effective crime reduction while building public trust. The 21st Century Policing Task Force made a variety of recommendations organized around six “pillars”: building trust and legitimacy, policy and oversight, technology and social media, community policing and crime reduction, officer training and education and officer safety and wellness.⁴⁸ These recommendations address many of the same topics at issue in this report, and will be discussed in more detail later.

Chicago has had its own share of officer-involved shootings. While these shootings have declined over the past five years, of the 404 shootings by police officers between 2008 and 2015,⁴⁹ 299 or 74% of the victims shot or killed were black. Thus, little has changed since the early 1970s when the Metcalfe panel found that 75% of those killed by CPD were black.

IPRA investigated all of these shootings and deemed nearly all of them justified. The justifications for these historic shootings have been repeatedly called into question. IPRA recently announced the hiring of outside experts to “audit ... closed officer-involved shooting investigations . . . to assess the quality of the investigative process and the accuracy of the findings and outcomes.”⁵⁰

Some of these shootings—in addition to Laquan McDonald—have raised significant public concern. On March 21, 2012, Rekia Boyd, 22, was shot and killed by off-duty CPD detective Dante Servin. After warning a group of people about talking too loudly, Servin fired at them from his car as they turned to walk away. Boyd was struck in the head and killed. Servin claimed that he thought he saw a gun, but it turned out to be a cell phone. Servin was charged with involuntary manslaughter, which applies in cases of recklessness. In an odd twist, the court dismissed the involuntary manslaughter charge because it deemed Servin’s alleged conduct *intentional* (not reckless) and suggested that Servin could have been charged with first-degree murder. Proceedings are underway to terminate Servin’s employment with CPD, and the City paid \$4.5 million to settle a lawsuit by Boyd’s family.⁵¹

On December 26, 2015, Quintonio LeGrier, 19, made three 911 calls seeking help concerning a fight with his father. Officers were dispatched only after LeGrier's father made his own 911 call reporting that LeGrier was threatening him with a baseball bat. LeGrier had a history of mental illness that went undetected by 911 operators. What happened next when police arrived on the scene is not clear. But Officer Robert Rialmo shot and killed LeGrier. A neighbor, Betty Jones, 55, was also struck and killed. In one final twist, Rialmo has responded to a civil suit filed against him by counterclaiming against LeGrier's estate for assault and infliction of emotion distress. Rialmo asserts that "forc[ing] Rialmo to end LeGrier's life" and Jones's as well caused "Rialmo to suffer extreme emotional trauma."⁵²

Broader Challenges Facing Chicago

Diversity and Segregation. Chicago is one of the most diverse cities in the nation. Citywide, Chicago is almost evenly split by race among whites (31.7%), blacks (32.9%) and Hispanics (28.9%). Chicago has a significant Asian population (5.5%) as well.⁵³ Chicago is also home to a wide variety of ethnic groups from across the globe. Chicago's great cultural diversity is often considered one of its greatest strengths.

At the same time, many of Chicago's neighborhoods are heavily segregated. This segregation dates back a century or more, as segregation enforced by law gave way to de facto segregation.⁵⁴ While at least certain neighborhoods are gradually integrating, Chicago still consistently rates as one of the most segregated big cities in the United States.⁵⁵ For example, 19 of Chicago's 77 "community areas" are at least two-thirds white, 26 are at least two-thirds black and 10 are at least two-thirds Hispanic. Many of Chicago's black citizens remain particularly isolated. Twenty community areas are at least 90% black, and 12 are at least 95% black (led by Burnside at 99.4%, Auburn Gresham at 98.5% and Washington Park at 98.1%).⁵⁶

Because many neighborhoods are predominantly white, black or Hispanic, residents are often largely isolated from other races and ethnic groups. This segregation poses particular challenges for younger police officers, whose early assignments to certain neighborhoods may be their first significant experience interacting with different racial and ethnic groups and understanding the culture of communities different from their own.

Poverty and Unemployment. Citywide, 22.1% of Chicagoans live in poverty, 10.1% live in extreme poverty and 12.9% are unemployed. These figures are roughly in line with other big cities. Not surprisingly, however, Chicago's highest-crime neighborhoods have even higher rates of poverty and unemployment. In Austin, which is 86.4% black, 30.6% live in poverty, 13.0% live in extreme poverty and 22.6% are unemployed. In North Lawndale, which is 92.5% black, 45.3% live in poverty, 25.4% live in extreme poverty and 21.2% are unemployed. In Roseland, which is 96.6% black, 23.3% live in poverty, 12.7% live in extreme poverty and 20.3% are unemployed. And in West Englewood, which is 95.1% black, 39.8% live in poverty, 19.1% live in extreme poverty and 35.9% are unemployed.⁵⁷

These same neighborhoods are ravaged by violent crime. In Austin (population 98,162), in 2013 and 2014, there were 3,341 violent crimes, including 67 homicides, 219 non fatal shootings and 725 armed robberies with guns. In North Lawndale (population 36,074), there were 1,859 violent crimes, including 27 homicides, 110 non fatal shootings and 315 armed robberies with guns. In Roseland (population 45,285), there were 1,586 violent crimes, including 27 homicides, 119 non fatal shootings and 376 armed

robberies with guns. And in West Englewood (population 35,294), there were 1,831 violent crimes, including 48 homicides, 175 non fatal shootings and 316 armed robberies with guns.⁵⁸

Chicago has many neighborhoods where there is an alarming lack of jobs as well as a dearth of basic community services and anchors like decent schools, day care, churches, community centers, parks or grocery stores. As a result, many of these communities lack hope or the tools to break the vicious cycle of poverty and crime. Given the myriad social problems plaguing these neighborhoods, police officers are often ill-equipped to address many of these communities' needs. Yet they are frequently expected to do so.

Illegal Guns. Chicago also has a significant gun violence problem. In recent years, CPD has recovered significantly more guns used in crimes *per capita* than New York City and Los Angeles combined. In 2012, Chicago recovered 27.7 crime guns per 10,000 residents, compared to 12.2 by Los Angeles and 3.9 by New York City.⁵⁹ The number of gun recoveries is even more striking in Chicago's highest-crime neighborhoods. In 2013 and 2014, CPD recovered 58.9 crime guns per 10,000 residents in Austin, 115.2 in West Englewood, 111.4 in Roseland and 120.6 in North Lawndale.⁶⁰

These differences in gun recoveries cannot be explained by superior policing strategies or the devotion of more resources in Chicago compared to Los Angeles and New York City. Chicago simply has more guns used in crimes. In 2011, while Chicago, Los Angeles and New York City had similar non-gun homicide rates (between 1.90 and 2.67 per 100,000 residents), Chicago significantly outpaced Los Angeles and New York City for gun-related homicides: 13.39 per 100,000 residents compared to 5.93 and 3.84, respectively.⁶¹ And while Chicago has strict gun laws, certain areas of the City are literally ringed by suburban gun shops, and guns can easily be procured in neighboring states like Indiana and Wisconsin, as well as through an entrenched pipeline of illegal guns coming from southern states.

The proliferation of guns inevitably raises the stakes for police-citizen encounters and fundamentally changes the dynamic of policing.

Basic Facts About CPD's Structure

A Chicago police officer's job is also affected by the internal structure and operations of CPD itself. A police officer must interact not only with members of the community, but also with his or her supervisors, subordinates and colleagues. Below, we provide a brief overview of CPD's structure and its hiring, training and promotion processes. This overview provides further context to the findings and recommendations later in this report.

CPD is the second-largest police department in the United States, with 12,500 budgeted sworn officers. It trails only New York City's (34,454 sworn officers). After Chicago, the next largest police departments are in Los Angeles (9,920), Philadelphia (6,515), Houston (5,295), Washington DC (3,865), Dallas (3,478), Phoenix (2,952), Baltimore (2,949) and Miami-Dade (2,745).⁶²

The Superintendent of Police, along with his First Deputy Superintendent, are in charge of administering and directing CPD's operations. The Superintendent and First Deputy manage four Bureaus—Patrol, Detectives, Organized Crime and Support Services—each of which is commanded by a Chief and between one to six Deputy Chiefs.⁶³

Patrol is by far the largest Bureau in CPD. It is responsible for general field operations, including the protection of life and property, apprehension of criminals and enforcement of traffic laws and ordinances. Within Patrol, Chicago is divided into 22 districts, organized into three Areas (North, South, and Central). Each Area is commanded by a Deputy Chief, and each district is run by a Commander.⁶⁴ Within each district, under the Commander, there are Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants and Police Officers.

Every few years, CPD accepts applications for entry-level officers. The process begins with a written exam. Applicants who pass the test are then placed in a lottery for further consideration, with preferences for certain groups (e.g., military veterans, Chicago Public School graduates). If selected, applicants are subjected to a physical fitness test, drug screening, medical exam, background investigation and psychological evaluation. If an applicant makes it through the screening process, he or she then enters the Police Academy. A year or more can pass between the time an applicant takes the written exam and the start of the Academy, depending on the availability of Academy slots. This lengthy lag time can defeat recruitment efforts to diversify Academy classes.

Overall, about 15% of applicants who start the hiring process make it to the Academy, at which point they become Probationary Police Officers ("PPOs"). In the Academy, PPOs receive six months of formal training (between 900 and 1,000 hours). The Academy graduates 70-75 person classes every few months. At the time of hire, new officers must be 21 years old and have at least 60 semester hours from an accredited college or university (with exceptions for military service). Thus, the typical Academy graduate is in his or her early-to-mid 20s and has at least some college education, if not a degree.

After graduating from the Academy, CPD recruits remain PPOs for another 12 months (18 months total). During that time, PPOs remain "assigned" to the Academy. The PPOs are assigned to work with field training officers ("FTOs") for training in three cycles (often 28 days per cycle) in varying districts. The PPOs are then detailed to particular districts to complete their probationary periods. The starting annual salary when a PPO begins the Academy is \$46,668. After 12 months, PPOs are paid \$66,606. After 18 months, when the probationary period ends, newly-minted officers receive an annual salary of \$70,380.⁶⁵

After the probationary period, a new officer is assigned to a particular district for permanent assignment. A small number of officers who achieved academic and other distinctions in the Academy get to choose their initial district assignment. Upon assignment to a district, the Commander assigns officers to particular watches and beats. After the initial assignment, an officer may transfer to another district pursuant to a bidding process.

Non-supervisory officers and detectives are represented by the Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP") and are covered by FOP's collective bargaining agreement with the City. The agreement governs watch and beat assignments, as well as the bidding process for transfers. Under the agreement, these processes are generally based on seniority, which means that new officers often end up in high-crime beats and the most difficult watches.

Officers are supervised by Sergeants. According to their job description, Sergeants are expected to prepare officers for duty and roll call, monitor officer activity, provide guidance on how to handle incidents, monitor adherence to procedures and ensure that officers are carrying out assigned responsibilities. Sergeants are also responsible for reviewing and evaluating officers' performance and administering counseling, development and corrective action. Sergeants must report significant incidents

up the chain of command and conduct activities related to internal and complaint investigations and employee grievances.⁶⁶

As of January 1, 2016, CPD had 1,094 Sergeants. Sporadically, CPD takes applications for Sergeants. Officers are eligible for promotion based on the results of a written exam and assessment exercise. Up to 30% of Sergeant promotions can be made through a merit selection process as well. At the time of promotion, Sergeants must have served at least five years as officers. Notably, an officer's disciplinary record is not considered in the Sergeant promotion process.⁶⁷ In addition, the promotion criteria does not include an assessment of an individual's ability to mentor or otherwise manage the health and well-being of officers or other accountability measures like citizen or administrative complaints or interventions. Sergeants are represented by the Policemen's Benevolent & Protective Association of Illinois, Unit 156-Sergeants, and have their own collective bargaining agreement with the City.

Sergeants are supervised by Lieutenants. According to their job description, the Lieutenant serves as the officer in charge of a unit or section during an assigned tour of duty. Among other things, Lieutenants are expected to (i) ensure that Sergeants evaluate, guide and instruct officers as needed, (ii) coach and mentor subordinates, (iii) maintain an environment in which clear standards exist for acceptable behavior and performance and (iv) monitor and ensure compliance with investigative guidelines regarding complaint, disciplinary and summary punishment procedures.⁶⁸

As of January 1, 2016, CPD had 187 Lieutenants. Sporadically, CPD takes applications for Lieutenants. Sergeants are eligible for promotion to Lieutenant based on the results of a written exam and assessment exercise. Again, up to 30% of Lieutenant promotions can be made through a merit selection process as well. At the time of promotion, Lieutenants must have served at least three years as a Sergeant. They also must have a bachelor's degree. Notably, a Sergeant's disciplinary record (and the disciplinary record of the officers he or she supervises) is not considered in the Lieutenant promotion process.⁶⁹ Lieutenants are represented by the Policemen's Benevolent & Protective Association of Illinois, Unit 156-Lieutenants, and have their own collective bargaining agreement with the City.

CPD also has 31 Captains, who supervise the Lieutenants.⁷⁰ A Captain is the second in command of a district (beneath the Commander), or may serve as an executive officer of another unit. Among other things, Captains assist the District Commander in operations, administration, planning, identification of emerging crime trends and preparing strategic plans to address crime and disorder issues impacting the community.

The Superintendent is responsible for selecting Captains. To be eligible, a candidate must have at least two years' experience as Lieutenant at the time of promotion. A candidate also must have "an acceptable disciplinary record" at the time of application, meaning that the record "cannot include any sustained Complaint Register ("CR") investigations for misconduct resulting in suspensions of more than 7 days during the prior 12 months, or 3 or more sustained CR investigations resulting in suspensions of any length during the past 5 years."⁷¹ This is the only instance in which disciplinary records are considered during the promotion process. Captains are represented by the Policemen's Benevolent & Protective Association of Illinois, Unit 156-Captains, and have their own collective bargaining agreement with the City.

After an officer leaves the Academy, aside from annual firearms certifications, there are no mandatory annual training requirements for the rest of that officer's career. To be sure, occasional trainings are sometimes put in place, such as the recent Taser training, but those kinds of trainings appear to be reactive and not part of a regular regime of in-service mandatory training. In addition, years ago CPD started a series of streaming video training to be used during roll calls. Some of these videos are well produced and provide excellent content. However, there is no program in place to ensure that they are consistently used.

Endnotes

²³ 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a).

²⁴ *Id.* § 14141(b).

²⁵ U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Opens Pattern or Practice Investigation into the Chicago Police Department (Dec. 7, 2015), *available at* <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-opens-pattern-or-practice-investigation-chicago-police-department>.

²⁶ U.S. Department of Justice, How Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Conducts Pattern-or-Practice Investigations (May 8, 2015), *available at* <https://www.justice.gov/file/how-pp-investigations-work/download>.

²⁷ Journal of the Senate, Special Session of the Fortieth General Assembly of the State of Illinois, 136-52 (1898).

²⁸ *Id.* at 140.

²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ *Id.* at 152.

³¹ H.M. Campbell, Flynn, Lower, Chicago Police Report of the Chicago Civil Service Commission, 3 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 62 (May 1912 to Mar. 1913), *available at* <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1153&context=jclc>.

³² *Id.* at 81.

³³ *Id.* at 64.

³⁴ *Id.* at 77.

³⁵ *Id.* at 83.

³⁶ Police Forum, Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Police Section, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Oct. 1994) ("Police Forum").

³⁷ See Richard C. Lindberg, The Babbling Burglar and the Summerdale Scandal: The Lessons of Police Malfeasance (2002).

³⁸ See generally Police Forum, *supra* note 36; see also Municipal Reference Collection, Chicago Public Library, A Chronological History of Chicago: 1673- (last updated Aug. 1997); Wesley G. Skogan, Police and Community in Chicago, Ch. 9 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006).

³⁹ The Misuse of Police Authority in Chicago, A Report and Recommendations based on hearings before the Blue Ribbon Panel convened by the Honorable Ralph H. Metcalfe, Representative, First Congressional District of Illinois, on June 26, July 17, July 24, and July 31, 1972.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 29.

⁴¹ *Id.* at 30.

⁴² *Id.* at 31.

⁴³ *Id.* at 32.

⁴⁴ *Id.* at 33.

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 42.

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 58.

⁴⁷ Report of the Commission on Police Integrity (Nov. 1997).

⁴⁸ Final Report, President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing (May 2015) ("21st Century Policing Task Force Report"), *available at* http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.

⁴⁹ Jeremy Gerner, Chicago Police Shot Fewer People in 2015, Chicago Tribune (Jan. 2, 2016), *available at* <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-shootings-2015-met-20160101-story.html>.

⁵⁰ IPRA Press Release, The Independent Police Review Authority to Conduct Historical Review of Officer-Involved Shooting Investigations (Mar. 23, 2016), *available at*

http://www.iprachicago.org/content/dam/ipra/Documents/Press_Releases_and_Statements/March_23_2016_IPRA_Historical_Review.pdf.

⁵¹ See, e.g., Jeremy Gorner, McCarthy Moves to Fire Detective Dante Servin in Fatal Off-Duty Shooting of Rekia Boyd, Chicago Tribune (Nov. 24, 2015), available at <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-mccarthy-moves-to-fire-detective-dante-servin-after-fatal-off-duty-shooting-20151123-story.html>.

⁵² See, e.g., David A. Graham, Why the Officer Who Killed Quintonio LeGrier Is Suing Him, *The Atlantic* (Feb. 8, 2016), available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/02/why-the-officer-who-killed-quintonio-legrier-is-suing-him/460443/>; Jeremy Gorner & Annie Sweeney, Quintonio LeGrier Called 911 Three Times Before a Chicago Cop Shot Him, Chicago Tribune (Jan. 26, 2016), available at <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-quintonio-legrier-bettie-jones-911-calls-met-20160125-story.html>.

⁵³ United States Census Bureau, QuickFacts, Chicago, Illinois, available at <http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/1714000>.

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case For Reparations, *The Atlantic* (June 2014), available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/>.

⁵⁵ Edward Glaeser & Jacob Vigdor, The End of The Segregated Century: Racial Segregation in America's Neighborhoods, 1890-2010, Manhattan Institute, (Jan. 22, 2012), available at <https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/end-segregated-century-racial-separation-americas-neighborhoods-1890-2010-5848.html>; John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, US2010 Project, The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis: New Findings from the 2010 Census (Mar. 24, 2011), available at <http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report2.pdf>; William H. Frey, Brookings Institution, Census Shows Modest Declines in Black-White Segregation (Dec. 8, 2015), available at <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2015/12/08-census-black-white-segregation-frey>; Nate Silver, The Most Diverse Cities Are Often the Most Segregated, *FiveThirtyEight* (May 1, 2015), available at <http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-most-diverse-cities-are-often-the-most-segregated/>.

⁵⁶ Jennifer Clary, Social Impact Research Center, A Heartland Alliance Program, Chicago Community Indicators (2012) (analyzing data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2000 Decennial Census and 2008-12 American Community Survey 5-year estimates program) ("Chicago Community Indicators"), available at http://www.ilpovertyreport.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Chicago%20Community%20Area%20Indicators,%202000-2012_140321.pdf.

⁵⁷ *Id.*

⁵⁸ Data provided by the University of Chicago Crime Lab.

⁵⁹ City of Chicago – Office of the Mayor, Chicago Police Department, Tracing the Guns: The Impact of Illegal Guns on Violence in Chicago, Figure A (May 27, 2014) ("Tracing The Guns"), available at <http://www.chicagobusiness.com/Assets/downloads/20151102-Tracing-Guns.pdf>.

⁶⁰ Data provided by the University of Chicago Crime Lab.

⁶¹ Tracing The Guns, *supra* note 59, Figure B.

⁶² U.S. Department of Justice, Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, and Practices, Appendix Table 2 (May 2015), available at <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf>.

⁶³ CPD, General Order G01-02, Department Organization for Command, Attachments 1-6 (Jan. 21, 2015).

⁶⁴ CPD, General Order G01-02-03, Organization and Functions of the Bureau of Patrol (Jan. 21, 2015).

⁶⁵ CPD, 2016 Position & Salary Schedule, available at <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/forms/CPD-61.400.pdf>.

⁶⁶ See generally CPD, Police Sergeant Job Announcement (2013).

⁶⁷ *Id.*

⁶⁸ CPD, Lieutenant Job Announcement (2014).

⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁰ CPD, Captain – Senior Executive Service (SES), Employee Resource E05-05 (Apr. 3, 2013).

⁷¹ *Id.* at 2.

Community-Police Relations

“The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police existence, actions, behavior and the ability of the police to secure and maintain public respect.”

Sir Robert Peel, Principles of Law Enforcement, 1829

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.”

Martin Luther King, Jr., 1963

“When you have police officers who abuse citizens, you erode public confidence in law enforcement. That makes the job of good police officers unsafe.”

Mary Frances Berry, 1999

How have CPD’s actions created mistrust in communities of color?

The lack of trust between the police and the communities they serve—especially communities of color—is one of the most significant issues facing CPD today. At each of its community forums, the Task Force heard a large and diverse group of Chicago residents express their deeply held view that racism, or at least racial bias, is the root cause of the lack of trust between CPD and minority communities. People of color articulated instance after instance in which police officers interacted with them in disrespectful and sometimes outright racist ways. The forums provided a window into the intense sadness, pain and frustration the community feels as a result of their first-hand experiences with CPD. Indeed, recent polling suggests that only 20% of Chicagoans—including just 6% of African-Americans—believe CPD treats all citizens fairly.⁷²

The community’s lack of trust in CPD is justified. There is substantial evidence that people of color—particularly African-Americans—have had disproportionately negative experiences with the police over an extended period of time. There is also substantial evidence that these experiences continue today through enforcement and other practices that disproportionately affect and often show little respect for people of color. CPD’s long history and current practices are at the root of the deep distrust of the police and remain a significant impediment to improved community-police relations.

RACISM & RACIAL BIAS IN POLICING – HISTORY

In recounting the history of race and policing, it is difficult to pick a starting point. We could go back a century or more. Between 1910 and 1940, Chicago's black population increased from 40,000 to 278,000 as many black families moved to Chicago as part of the Great Migration.⁷³ Many families moved to Chicago to escape increasing racism and violence in the South, undoubtedly taking scars and distrust with them.

Chicago had its own race issues. In 1919, race riots broke out after white men threw rocks at black swimmers at a South Side beach for violating the unofficial segregation of Chicago's beaches, causing the death of Eugene Williams, 17. The police's refusal to arrest a white offender sparked weeks of violence, leaving 38 dead, over 500 injured, and 1,000 black families homeless.⁷⁴ By the 1930s, 90% of Chicago's black residents were confined to a narrow four-block strip on the South Side known as the "Black Belt."⁷⁵ Blacks who tried to move elsewhere were often met with vandalism, arson and other acts of violence.⁷⁶ This violence would not have been possible without at least tacit support of the police.

While acknowledging this older history, we focus below on some salient events and trends in Chicago policing over the past 50 years. This review captures some of the key incidents and practices which many of today's residents experienced or witnessed first hand, directly shaping their views of CPD. Some are examples of intentional mistreatment of people of color. Others are examples of well-intentioned practices that nonetheless had a significantly disparate impact in Chicago's minority neighborhoods.

Fred Hampton. One of the most notorious flash points in the racial dynamics between the police and communities of color was the shooting of Fred Hampton. At 4:45 a.m. on December 4, 1969, 14 CPD officers attached to the Cook County State's Attorney's Office executed a search warrant at an apartment where nine members of the Illinois Black Panther Party were staying. After seven minutes of gunfire, Hampton, 21, and another Panther, Mark Clark, 22, were dead. Hampton was the charismatic and controversial Chairman of the Illinois Black Panthers. To many in the black community, the raid was little more than a pretext to kill Hampton.

The events of that morning were hotly disputed. A federal grand jury ultimately found that the raid was "not professionally planned or properly executed."⁷⁷ The grand jury was also troubled by an "irreconcilable disparity" between officers' accounts of the raid and the physical evidence.⁷⁸ While officers claimed that the Panthers fired at them at least 10-15 times, ballistics showed that all but one of the 80-100 shots fired that morning came from the police.⁷⁹ The grand jury did not indict the officers (largely because the surviving Panthers had not cooperated in its investigation), though it concluded that the officers' performance "gives some reasonable basis for public doubt of their efficiency or even of their credibility."⁸⁰

A state grand jury later indicted State's Attorney Edward Hanrahan and the raiding officers for obstruction of justice based on their actions and statements after the raid. They were ultimately acquitted in a bench trial, but Hanrahan lost re-election in 1972 and would not hold public office again. Hampton's and Clark's families and several Panthers who survived the raid filed a federal civil rights suit. After many years of litigation, including an 18-month trial,⁸¹ the City agreed in 1982 to settle the plaintiffs' claims for \$1.85 million (the equivalent of roughly \$4.5 million in today's dollars, a not-insubstantial sum).

Disorderly Conduct Arrests. In the early 1980s, a *Chicago Reporter* investigation found that CPD was making approximately 150,000 “disorderly conduct” arrests each year, predominantly in minority communities. What constituted disorderly conduct was often vague, and few cases were prosecuted because officers routinely failed to appear in court. In 1980, 89,382 blacks were arrested for disorderly conduct, compared to 33,270 whites and 17,931 Latinos. The arrests constituted almost half of all arrests by CPD and therefore became one of the primary ways police interacted with minority communities.⁸²

The ACLU filed suit to stop CPD’s practice of making disorderly conduct arrests with no intention of prosecuting. A reportedly “outraged” and “irate” federal judge declared the practice unconstitutional after the City repeatedly failed to participate in the case (a sadly ironic failure, given the underlying problem of officers failing to appear in court).⁸³ As part of its order, the court directed the City to expunge more than 800,000 disorderly conduct arrests over the prior five years where the arresting officer failed to appear for court hearings.⁸⁴ The ACLU and the City ultimately entered into a consent decree requiring officers who make disorderly conduct arrests to appear at all court hearings until a case is resolved.⁸⁵

By the early 1990s, disorderly conduct arrests dropped to approximately 60,000 per year, but racial disparities remained. In 1993, CPD arrested approximately 40,000 blacks for disorderly conduct, compared to approximately 10,000 Hispanics and 8,000 whites. By the 2000s, disorderly conduct arrests dropped significantly, to approximately 10,000 per year. Even then, the black/white ratio for disorderly conduct arrests was 10:1.⁸⁶

Jon Burge. From 1972 to 1991, CPD detective and commander Jon Burge and others he supervised tortured and abused at least 100 African-Americans on the South and West sides in attempts to coerce confessions. Burge’s methods included administering electric shocks to victims’ genitals, suffocating them with typewriter covers, threatening them with loaded guns and burning them on radiators. For years, Burge and the City denied allegations of torture, reinforcing community beliefs in a police “code of silence.” Burge was eventually suspended in 1991, and the Chicago Police Board fired him in 1993. After Burge’s firing, the FOP attempted (unsuccessfully) to enter a float in the South Side Irish Parade honoring him.⁸⁷

In 2006, after a four-year investigation, special prosecutors concluded that there was enough evidence to bring criminal charges against police officers in three cases of torture (Andrew Wilson, Phillip Adkins and Alfonzo Pinex), but the statute of limitations had already run out.⁸⁸ While it was too late to bring criminal charges for the torture itself, federal prosecutors later charged and convicted Burge for obstruction of justice and perjury after he lied about the torture in a civil case. Burge served 54 months in federal prison, far less time than that served by the innocent men he helped convict through coerced and false confessions.⁸⁹ As discussed later in this report, Burge was allowed to keep his pension.⁹⁰

The fallout from Burge’s actions was substantial. Many convictions where Burge had played a role were reversed, remanded or overturned.⁹¹ In 2003, Governor Ryan pardoned four African-American inmates on death row who had long maintained that Burge tortured them to confess to murders they did not commit.⁹² Numerous civil suits were filed. To date, the City has spent upwards of \$100 million on Burge-related settlements, judgments and legal fees.⁹³

In 2013, Mayor Emanuel apologized for this “dark chapter” in the city’s history.⁹⁴ Two years later, the Mayor and City Council “acknowledge[d] and condemn[ed], as evil and reprehensible, any and all acts of

torture and abuse inflicted upon the Burge victims” and “apologize[d] to the Burge victims for these horrific and inexcusable acts.” Along with the apology, the City agreed to pay \$5.5 million in reparations and provide other city services to Burge victims and to educate future CPS students about the Burge case and its legacy.⁹⁵

Gang Loitering Ordinance. In 1992, Chicago enacted a “gang loitering ordinance” in response to complaints that gang members were intimidating law-abiding citizens. The ordinance prohibited individuals believed to be “criminal street gang members” from “loitering” in a public place after they had been ordered to disperse. From 1992 to 1995, CPD issued over 89,000 dispersal orders and arrested over 42,000 individuals. While precise statistics are not available, the ordinance was predominantly enforced against people of color.⁹⁶

In 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process rights because it was unconstitutionally vague.⁹⁷ The Court held that the ordinance “lef[t] the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits” because it “fail[ed] to distinguish between innocent conduct and conduct threatening harm.”⁹⁸ The Court further held that the ordinance created a “potential for arbitrary enforcement” because it “afford[ed] too much discretion to the police” and “reach[ed] a substantial amount of innocent conduct.”⁹⁹


After the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling, the City amended its gang loitering ordinance to make it more specific. However, the ordinance is still predominantly enforced against people of color. In the summer of 2014, CPD officers issued 4,842 dispersal orders—4,100 against blacks (84.7%), 673 against Hispanics (13.9%) and 66 against whites (1.4%).¹⁰⁰

RACIAL BIAS IN POLICING – CPD’S CURRENT PRACTICES


Racial bias is not a thing of the past. Rather, data establishes that CPD’s use of force disproportionately affects people of color. The same is true for foot and traffic stops. These enforcement actions have deepened a widespread perception that police are indiscriminately targeting anyone and everyone in communities of color without making individualized determinations of reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Racial bias extends to other areas as well, including the police oversight system itself.

Use of Force. For both officer-involved shootings and Taser discharges, citizens on the other end of use of force by CPD are predominantly African-American.

From 2008 through 2015, there were 404 officer-involved shootings resulting in injury or death. Of those 404 shootings, 299 (74%) of the persons killed or injured were black, 55 (14%) were Hispanic, 33 (8%) were white and 1 (0.25%) was Asian.¹⁰¹




From 2012 through 2015, there were a total of 1,886 officer-involved Taser discharges. Of those 1,886 discharges, 1,435 (76%) of the persons subjected to Taser discharges were black, 254 (13%) were Hispanic, 144 (8%) were white and 4 (0.21%) were Asian.¹⁰²





Investigatory Stops. Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in *Terry v. Ohio*,¹⁰³ an officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop upon “reasonable suspicion”—based on “specific and articulable facts”—that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. An officer also may conduct a limited search or pat down for weapons upon reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous. While the Court granted police officers these powers in appropriate cases, it also acknowledged that investigatory stops and frisks “must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.”¹⁰⁴

CPD’s data raises serious questions about whether it abides by *Terry* and its progeny. In the summer of 2014, CPD stopped more than 250,000 people in encounters not leading to arrests. These investigatory stops amounted to 93.6 per 10,000 people. (In contrast, New York City, from 2011-2014, stopped between 1.6 and 22.9 per 10,000 people.)¹⁰⁵


Notably, out of the 250,000 investigatory stops in the summer of 2014, 72% of those stopped were black, compared to 17% Hispanic and 9% white.¹⁰⁶



African Americans have been particularly targeted in predominantly white neighborhoods. In District 18, which covers the Near North Side and part of Lincoln Park, only 9.1% of the population is black, yet blacks accounted for 57.7% of all stops. Meanwhile, 75.5% of the district's population is white, yet whites accounted for only 28.6% of all stops. Similarly, in District 19, which covers parts of Lincoln Park, Lakeview, Uptown and Lincoln Square, only 6.6% of the population is black, yet blacks accounted for 51.1% of all stops. 75% of the district's population is white, yet whites accounted for only 29.2% of all stops.¹⁰⁷




Investigatory stops have accumulated in striking numbers among young black males. A survey of Chicago residents in 2015 found that 56% of young black males reported being stopped on foot by CPD one or more times during the prior 12 months. When traffic stops were included, almost 70% of young black males reported being stopped by the police in the past year, a number far exceeding any other demographic.¹⁰⁸ In addition, the survey established “large racial disparities in the use of force reported by respondents.”¹⁰⁹ The survey revealed that “15% of Blacks and 17% of Hispanics reported being shoved or pushed around, in contrast to 6% of Whites. [Blacks] were twice as likely as whites to be threatened by a weapon. Compared to whites, all other groups were at least twice as likely to have been subjected to some form of force before being released.”¹¹⁰




We heard many personal accounts corroborating this data. For example, in a youth forum at the Mikva Challenge, we spoke with a high school student who reported being stopped by CPD and placed in squad cars six or seven times. Each time, he reported, officers tersely kicked him out of the car when they were finished without explanation or apology. Similarly, in a youth forum at Precious Blood Ministries, a young Latino man reported being stopped by the police on his way home from work. He had just cashed his paycheck, and an officer suggested that he “had a lot of money for a Mexican.”

These stops—and how they were conducted—had clearly left a deep mark on how youths and young adults view the police. The stops were also traumatizing, and rendered the youths involved powerless and voiceless. Multiply these experiences by the hundreds of thousands if not millions of investigatory stops in recent years, particularly in the black community, and the indelible mark left on the City is deep and will continue to reverberate for years.


Traffic Stops. CPD's traffic stop data also raise significant concerns regarding racial bias. In 2013, 46% of CPD's 100,676 traffic stops involved black drivers, even though only 32% of the City's population is black. White and Hispanic drivers were stopped at rates lower than their representation in the City's population.¹¹¹




TRAFFIC STOP (2013)
INVESTIGATORY (2014)
CHICAGO POPULATION (2014)



For both blacks and Hispanics, the disparity widens significantly when it comes to vehicle searches. In 2013, CPD was over four times more likely to search *with* consent vehicles of black and Hispanic motorists, compared to white motorists (4.74 and 4.09 times, respectively). CPD was also more likely to search *without* consent vehicles of black and Hispanic motorists, compared to white motorists (3.42 and 4.82 times).¹¹²




CONTRABAND FINDS
SEARCHES (WITH OR WITHOUT CONSENT)



Given these numbers, one might expect that CPD finds contraband in vehicles of black and Hispanic motorists at higher rates. That is not the case. In fact, the opposite is true. In consent searches, CPD found contraband when officers searched white motorists **twice as often** compared to black and Hispanic motorists. The "hit rates" were 12% for black motorists, 13% for Hispanic motorists and 24% for white motorists. The same pattern held for searches without consent. The hit rates were 17% for black motorists, 20% for Hispanic motorists and 30% for white motorists.¹¹³ These numbers appear to suggest that black and Hispanic motorists are subject to a high number of vehicle searches even though CPD's own data suggest that, relative to whites, they are less likely to have contraband.

The disparate impact on minority motorists is not limited to routine traffic stops. From 2008 through 2013, CPD set up 84% of DUI checkpoints in predominantly black or Hispanic police districts.¹¹⁴ Moreover, between March and August 2015, CPD set up 14 DUI checkpoints: nine in majority-black police districts, four in majority-Hispanic districts, and only one in a majority-white district. Some majority-white police districts have more alcohol-related car crashes than many of these minority districts, raising significant questions about how CPD selects the locations for these DUI checkpoints.¹¹⁵

Police Oversight System. The police oversight system itself is not immune to racial bias. From March 2011 through September 2015, CPD's Bureau of Internal Affairs and IPRA examined about 17,500 complaints of police misconduct with named complainants. Of those 17,500 complaints, 61% were filed by African-Americans, 21% were filed by whites and 12% were filed by Hispanics. And yet, the rates of sustained cases looked very different. Of the misconduct complaints sustained, 25% were filed by African-Americans, compared to 58% by whites and 15% by Hispanics.¹¹⁶ In short, allegations of police misconduct by whites "are nine times more likely to be upheld than those by blacks and almost three times more likely than those by Hispanics."¹¹⁷



Racial bias may also come into play on the officer side. Some reports suggest that black officers are disproportionately found guilty of offenses, and black officers with sustained findings are punished more than twice as often as white officers.¹¹⁸

Recommendations

The City should engage the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice to implement a “Reconciliation Process” in Chicago. Critical elements of the process involve the Superintendent publicly acknowledging CPD’s history of racial disparity and discrimination in police practices and making a public commitment to cultural change required to eliminate racial bias and disparity.

Early in the Task Force’s work, a South Side minister told one of its members, “If you don’t face it, you can’t fix it.” This prescient comment captures the emerging best practice for acknowledging and attempting to repair fractures in community-police relations.

The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended that police departments “acknowledge the role of policing in past and present injustice and discrimination and how it is a hurdle to the promotion of community trust.” The President’s Task Force heard from police chiefs who described what they were doing to “recognize and own their history” and “change the culture within both their police forces and their communities.”¹¹⁹

Similarly, the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (“COPS”) has acknowledged the importance of reconciliation, which requires “frank engagements” between minority communities and the police “in order to reset relationships.” As an initial step in the reconciliation process, COPS observed, “high-level police executives have been willing to make powerful public statements acknowledging history and seeking to foster reconciliation efforts.” In particular, COPS cited recent remarks by NYPD Police Chief William Bratton that “[s]ome of the worst parts of black history would have been impossible without a perverted, oppressive law and order,” and that “our history follows us like a second shadow. We can never underestimate the impact these had . . . As police, we must fix what we’ve done and what we continue to do wrong. It’s ours to set right.”¹²⁰

To oversee a truth-telling and reconciliation process, the Task Force recommends that the City engage the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice (the “National Initiative”). The National Initiative has developed a detailed reconciliation process and is already implementing the process working with police departments in Birmingham, Fort Worth, Minneapolis and Pittsburgh, as well as in Gary, Indiana and Stockton, California.

The National Initiative’s process begins with a public acknowledgment of past harms, including the role of police in pre-civil-rights-era wrongs, harms during the civil rights era, some degree of racist or biased policing and outright illegality since then, disrespectful treatment by police officers and overuse of particular tactics like stop and frisk.¹²¹ After publicly acknowledging past harms, the National Initiative process then calls for (1) sustained listening to community constituencies and stakeholders, (2) an explicit commitment to changing policing in specific ways, (3) fact-finding, (4) the identification of key experiences and narratives on both sides, (5) specifying concrete changes in policies and practices that will move toward new practices and relationships and (6) a mechanism for driving changes.¹²²

The Mayor and the President of the Cook County Board should work together to co-sponsor quarterly summits of key stakeholders and community leaders to develop and implement comprehensive criminal justice reform.

The Mayor and the President of the Cook County Board should work together to develop and implement programs that address socioeconomic justice and equality, housing segregation, systemic racism, poverty, education, health and safety.


CPD is not the cause of, nor the solution to, all of the significant problems facing many of Chicago's minority communities. At the same time, in these communities, CPD is the public face of the broader criminal justice system, which is badly broken and need of significant reform. Through its daily contacts in underserved communities, CPD is also often the public face for government more broadly. While reforming CPD is vitally important, those changes will only accomplish so much unless we meaningfully address broader issues facing Chicago's disadvantaged communities.

Poverty and high unemployment are endemic in many of the Chicago communities that experience the highest levels of violent crime. Chicago is one of the most racially-segregated big cities in America, but Chicago's racial segregation is not the only issue. Chicago is socioeconomically unequal as well. People of color are disproportionately poor. Many black and Hispanic residents have been trapped for multiple generations in poor neighborhoods with little or no economic mobility and, as a result, no geographic mobility.

Both informal and formal local and national laws and policies have been identified as factors in contributing to racial and economic segregation, including discriminatory housing policies, barriers to healthcare services, inequity in the criminal justice system and unbalanced public school funding.¹²³ In effect, these long-standing practices have resulted in the creation and preservation of poor and isolated neighborhoods where minorities have been denied equal socioeconomic opportunity. The impact of these policies persists today, and the cumulative effects of poverty and isolation make it extremely difficult to break the cycle of poverty.¹²⁴

In addition, minority teens and young adults experience the highest rates of being out of school and unemployed. In a recent study of Chicago, 41% of African-Americans between the ages of 20 and 24 were out of school and out of work, compared to 19% for Hispanics and 7% for whites.¹²⁵ Young African-Americans fared significantly worse in Chicago (41% out of school and unemployed) than in Los Angeles (29.3%) or New York (27.3%).¹²⁶

Many of the City's policing problems could be avoided altogether by ensuring that African-American and Hispanic teens and young adults have adequate opportunities through education and employment. When people are in school or employed their self-esteem increases, their time



becomes more structured, they use energy in a constructive manner and, in the case of employment, they gain a legal means of providing for themselves and their families. Employing teens and young adults reduces crime and recidivism rates.¹²⁷

There are no easy fixes to these problems. But our public officials must work together to study these problems and develop and implement meaningful solutions. Efforts are underway now, but they are often fragmented and do not lead to any real, significant change.

The Task Force therefore recommends that the Mayor and the President of the Cook County Board co-sponsor quarterly summits of criminal justice stakeholders, community leaders, faith-based organizations, businesspeople, legal and government organizations, civil and human rights organizations, academics and other leaders to develop and implement criminal justice reform. The Task Force also recommends that the Mayor and the President of the Cook County Board co-sponsor community-based programs that address socioeconomic justice and equality, segregation, systemic racism, poverty, education, health and safety.

Is CPD doing enough to combat racial bias?

POLICIES

The City and CPD each have antidiscrimination policies in place, which they have worked to improve over time. On paper, these policies generally say the right things. The challenge of course is ensuring that these policies translate to practice.

Chicago's human rights ordinance provides that "[i]t is the policy of the City of Chicago to assure that all persons within its jurisdiction shall have equal access to public services and shall be protected in the enjoyment of civil rights, and to promote mutual understanding and respect among all who live and work within this city."¹²⁸

The ordinance declares that "prejudice, intolerance, bigotry and discrimination ... threaten the rights and proper privileges of the city's inhabitants and menace the institutions and foundation of a free and democratic society," and that "behavior which denies equal treatment to any individual because of his or her race, color, sex, gender identity, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge status, source of income, or credit history (as to employment only) undermines civil order and deprives persons of the benefits of a free and open society."¹²⁹

Similarly, CPD has a general order on human rights acknowledging that while Chicago "encompasses a variety of communities, each with its own distinctive cultures, lifestyles, [and] customs," "all persons in each area of the City share the common need for protection and service through objective and impartial law enforcement."¹³⁰

The order requires that officers “respect and protect each person’s human rights,” “treat all persons with the courtesy and dignity which is inherently due every person as a human being,” “not exhibit a condescending attitude or direct any derogatory terms toward any person in any manner,” and “not exhibit any bias or prejudice against any individual or group because of race, color, gender, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge status, or source of income.”¹³¹

CPD also has a general order specifically prohibiting “racial profiling or other bias-based policing.” In January 2016, CPD updated the order to provide that officers “may not use race” in making routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions unless race is part of a specific suspect description.¹³² The new language is taken nearly word-for-word from Department of Justice guidance to federal law enforcement agencies, which directs that race may not be used “to any degree” in making routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions.¹³³ However, CPD’s revised order does not include the “to any degree” language and still retains older language prohibiting officers from using race “as the sole basis” for developing grounds for a traffic or street stop—seemingly suggesting that race may be used as *a* basis.

Recommendations

CPD should clarify in its general order prohibiting racial profiling and other biased-based policing whether race may be used to any degree in developing grounds for a stop, other than where race is part of a specific suspect description.

CPD’s general order prohibiting racial profiling or other bias-based policing (G02-04) is unclear—and somewhat contradictory—on the role race may play in developing reasonable suspicion or grounds for a traffic or street stop. On the one hand, it says that officers “may not use race.” On the other hand, it says that officers may not use race “as the sole basis” for a traffic or street stop, implying that race may be used as one of multiple factors taken into account. CPD should clarify whether race may be used to any degree in street and traffic stops, other than in cases where race is part of a specific suspect description. If there are circumstances where CPD believes race is an appropriate factor for officers to consider, it should spell out those circumstances both for officers and for the public.

DATA COLLECTION, REPORTING AND TRANSPARENCY

Data collection, reporting and transparency provides a crucial check against racially-biased policing. The City is already subject to heightened requirements under state law and the terms of a settlement agreement with the ACLU, but more needs to be done.

By law, foot and traffic stops are each tracked to guard against racial bias. These requirements have increased in recent years. Since 2004, the Illinois Traffic Stop Statistical Study Act has required the collection of certain data—including on race—for traffic stops, even where no citation or warning is issued.¹³⁴ As of January 1, 2016, the law was revised to require that officers collect detailed information on pedestrian stops as well.¹³⁵

In August 2015, CPD also reached an agreement with the ACLU concerning investigatory stops and protective pat downs.¹³⁶ In the agreement, CPD agreed to collect data through “Investigatory Stop Reports.” The reports replaced the old “contact card” system and collect the same information now required to be collected under state law.¹³⁷ CPD also revised its policies on stops and pat downs and is

training its officers accordingly.¹³⁸ Moreover, CPD agreed to establish policies for continuous district-level supervisory review and quarterly or semiannual department-level audits of its stop and pat-down practices.¹³⁹

As part of its agreement, the City agreed to provide data and other information to a retired federal magistrate judge who will review its stop and pat-down practices for substantial compliance with the agreement and other legal requirements. The judge will issue a public report twice a year. The agreement will terminate only when the judge finds that CPD has been in substantial compliance for at least a year (in mid-2017 at the earliest).

CPD's public reporting of many types of data is limited. While CPD reports detailed crime incident data on a daily basis through a "Data Portal,"¹⁴⁰ it provides little other information allowing the public to assess its performance. The "Statistical Reports" section of CPD's website does not contain *any* information since 2010. Rather, it provides Annual Reports for 1965 through 2010, monthly index crime reports for 1999 through 2010, crime trend reports from 1991 through 2007, beat-level data for 2007 through 2010, murder reports from 1999 through 2008 and juvenile reports from 1991 through 2008.¹⁴¹

Recommendations

Through its Data Portal, CPD should regularly release incident-level information on arrests, traffic stop reports, investigatory stop reports and predecessor contact cards and officer weapon use (firearm and nonlethal). To facilitate trend analysis, the incident-level data should reach back at least to January 1, 2010.

For traffic stop reports, investigatory stop reports and predecessor contact cards, the incident-level information should include all collected information, including on each subject's apparent race. For arrests, the incident-level information should include the date, detailed arrest category, drug type (if applicable), central booking number, all text arrest description fields, FBI code and a linking crime incident number, if any. For officer weapon use, the incident-level data should include dates and beat locations, and cover Tasers, pepper spray or other chemical weapons, impact munitions, and firearm discharges of all kinds.

CPD should resume publishing annual reports.

After the ACLU agreement terminates, CPD should continue supervisory review and audits of investigatory stop and pat-down practices, with oversight by the new Community Safety Oversight Board and Inspector General for the Public Safety.

RECRUITMENT, HIRING AND PROMOTION


A diverse police department is critical for policing a diverse city and reducing bias-based policing. In our community forums, residents often associated poor treatment with biases that officers held about them and their communities. And in both the community forums and our panels with youth, many individuals expressed a desire that more officers “look like” them and have deeper connections to their communities.

Minority recruitment, hiring and promotion has been a challenge for CPD. In the early 1970s, CPD was 83% white, 16% black and 1% Hispanic.¹⁴² The Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, other black and Hispanic officers and the United States sued alleging racial discrimination. A federal court found that CPD’s patrolman’s exam, background investigation and Sergeant’s promotion exam were all racially biased.¹⁴³ In a later lawsuit, a federal court found that the Lieutenant’s exam was racially biased as well.¹⁴⁴





Though there was no finding of intentional discrimination, the substantial disparate impact on black and Hispanic applicants and officers led one federal court to conclude that CPD had “knowingly discriminated” against blacks and Hispanics.¹⁴⁵ To remedy these impacts, the court imposed quotas for hiring and promotions.¹⁴⁶ Over time, the quotas were reduced and eventually eliminated.¹⁴⁷ (Today, the use of racial quotas would be impermissible.)

By the mid-1990s, CPD was 65% white, 25% black and 9% Hispanic.¹⁴⁸

Since then, Hispanics have seen significant gains within CPD, while blacks regressed slightly. In 2014, CPD was 52% white, 23% black and 21% Hispanic.¹⁴⁹ CPD is generally moving in the right direction, but it still has a ways to go to approach the racial makeup of the City.



The CPD has particular work to do when it comes to promotions. As of March 10, 2016, CPD Sergeants were 67% white, 14% black and 16% Hispanic. Lieutenants were 78% white, 11% black and 11% Hispanic. Captains were 70% white, 15% black and 9% Hispanic. And detectives were 64% white, 18% black and 16% Hispanic.¹⁵⁰



In its most recent hiring sequence, which began in late 2015, CPD launched a recruitment drive aimed specifically at minorities.¹⁵¹ In an interview with the Task Force, CPD's Director of Human Resources reported that, of the applicants who signed up for the test, approximately 40% were black, 40% were Hispanic and 20% were white. While these initial numbers are encouraging, minorities have been at greater risk of either dropping out or being screened out at various stages of the hiring process (e.g., the written exam, psychological exam or background check). More work on diversity still needs to be done.

Recommendations

CPD should develop and use recruitment, selection and promotion strategies that increase diversity and the likelihood that officers will be culturally competent, fair and impartial, especially when policing communities of color.

The Task Force recommends that CPD develop and use recruitment, selection and promotion strategies geared to increasing diversity. As part of this work, CPD should analyze root causes for failing to attract minority candidates historically and assess the barriers to those candidates making it through the hiring and promotion process. Other departments have addressed these issues by strategically recruiting outside the city, reviewing cutoff scores for psychometrics exams and fitness tests, collaborating with local workforce development agencies and having a long-term strategy for mentoring youth of color.¹⁵²

CPD should also seek to identify officers who have had exposure to diverse communities, are willing to reflect on their own behavior and inherent biases and have a desire to serve vulnerable populations. Officers certainly do not need to be of a certain race to effectively operate in communities of color, but CPD needs to do a better job of identifying officers who are likely to thrive in these communities and screening out officers who will not.

CPD should hire a Deputy Chief of Diversity and Inclusion.

Almost every large company or organization today has a diversity and inclusion program, typically overseen by a director or committee whose specific job is to manage diversity and inclusion efforts. CPD should be no exception. CPD should create a new Deputy Chief of Diversity and Inclusion position, with sufficient support staff. In addition to overseeing minority recruitment and promotion efforts, the Deputy Chief should be charged with overseeing the implementation of the Task Force's recommendations with respect to race, as well as overseeing how CPD's actions affect its minority "customers" in the community.

TRAINING

Training is another important component to reducing racial bias. Everyone has biases. Police officers must learn to acknowledge and address their own.

In the Academy, probationary officers receive 24 hours of training in "Diversity Management," including "police citizen relationships, bias, prejudice, and hate."¹⁵³ Additionally, CPD reports that cultural competence is addressed at various points during training, as appropriate.¹⁵⁴ CPD generally teaches about bias and cultural competence through internal trainers. Often, police departments do not have a deep capacity for conducting training on fair and impartial policing and cultural competence issues. When the Task Force interviewed some of the trainers who deliver cultural-related content, not surprisingly, there seemed to be some lack of comfort in instructing officers on sensitive cultural topics and related issues.

CPD started, but has not completed, training on procedural justice. Procedural justice is a key component of 21st-century policing models. It is based on decades of research and practice showing that "people are more likely to obey the law when they believe that those who are enforcing it have the legitimate authority to tell them what to do. But the public confers legitimacy only on those they believe are acting in

procedurally just ways.”¹⁵⁵ Procedurally just behavior is based on four principles: (1) treating people with dignity and respect; (2) giving individuals “voice” during encounters by listening to what they have to say; (3) being neutral and transparent in decision making; and (4) conveying trustworthy motives.¹⁵⁶

In July 2012, CPD rolled out a first round of “Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy” training. Nearly all officers have completed this 8-hour course.¹⁵⁷ In February 2015, CPD rolled out a second round of “Procedural Justice: A Tactical Mindset” training. So far, only approximately 2,500 officers—out of the more than 12,000 sworn officers in CPD—have completed this second 8-hour course.¹⁵⁸ CPD is currently in the process of developing a third round of procedural justice training that will specifically address implicit bias. CPD introduced the topic of implicit bias in the first two rounds, but the topic will be more fully developed in the third round. This training must not be allowed to stall.

Recommendations

CPD should adopt and promote a clear, progressive policing philosophy grounded in core values such as respect, protecting the sanctity of all life and protecting civil and human rights.

Mission-driven organizations organize their cultures around core values that convey organizational aspirations, determine important outcomes and metrics, inform budgetary decisions and guide behavior. In organizations with a strong, mission-driven culture, these core values are made visible in numerous ways, including literally displaying them visually in words and images around the organization. Core values are then made “real” and “living” through practices and processes that shape the organization’s employees, including through recruitment, selection, training, recognition and other incentives.

The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended that law enforcement embrace a “guardian” mindset to build public trust and legitimacy.¹⁵⁹ Historically, police have been trained more like soldiers, with a “warrior” mentality. But police officers are not soldiers. The President’s Task Force observed that while “[s]oldiers come into communities as an outside, occupying force,” “[g]uardians are members of the community, protecting from within.”¹⁶⁰ The President’s Task Force recommended that police departments adopt procedural justice as the “guiding principle” for the guardian mindset.¹⁶¹

Similarly, the Police Executive Research Forum (“PERF”) has stressed the importance of a police culture of protecting “the sanctity of *all* human life.”¹⁶² Thus, rather than “think[ing] solely about their own safety,” police officers should take “a broader approach designed to protect everyone’s lives.”¹⁶³ A number of police departments—including in Las Vegas and in Northern Virginia—have adopted use-of-force policies based on this broader approach.¹⁶⁴ The shift to a guardian model has many potential benefits for both communities and the police. Many police leaders believe that the approach increases police legitimacy, which ultimately results in more community collaboration and, in turn, decreases in crime.

CPD should adopt and promote a 21st-century model of policing where officers act as “guardians” of the community, not soldiers. This must be more than just a catchphrase. This philosophy must be promoted throughout the department, and at all stages of an officer’s career—from recruitment to Academy training, field training and the field. This approach should be apparent not just to officers, but to the community as well.

CPD should bring in experts and credible trainers to deliver comprehensive training on cultural competence and implicit bias for all recruits, officers and supervisors.

CPD should expand its approach to teaching recruits, officers and supervisors about implicit bias and cultural competence. Because these are often uncomfortable topics and involve specialized knowledge, best practice is to bring in subject matter experts to teach this content and facilitate meaningful discussion. These trainers can also establish a “train the trainer” approach to build capacity within CPD. It is critically important that this training is provided from the “top down,” signaling to the entire CPD that new approaches to building cultural competence and engendering fair and impartial policing are being taken. The Diversity People, Fair and Impartial Policing, Center for Police Equity and The Center for Human Diversity all have experience training police departments on these critical issues.

CPD should involve the community in officer training that includes being trained by and partnering with community leaders, organizations and youth.

Throughout its community engagement process, the Task Force heard from numerous community members about missed opportunities for CPD to leverage the strengths of communities. In its Academy and field training, as far as we can tell, CPD makes little effort to engage with communities in ways that enable them to educate officers about their strengths and assets. The Task Force recommends that CPD take an asset-based community development approach to training by bringing in members of the community to educate new officers on the assets that exist in the community, to discuss the roles that communities can play in helping to reduce crime and to partner with officers to achieve mutual goals.¹⁶⁵

For example, CPD should consider integrating in its training: (1) youth panels, so that youth can talk to trainees and dispel negative stereotypes often held about youth of color and discuss how they would prefer to be engaged; (2) videos and other training materials created by community members that provide district-assigned officers with specific knowledge of the unique history and strengths of their communities; (3) youth- and community-led tours for district-assigned police officers that enable community members to highlight the assets in their neighborhoods; (4) tasking district-assigned officers with identifying key community leaders, institutions and organizations and developing relationships with these partners; (5) visits to neighborhood schools and regular roundtables with high school youth; and (6) participation in community service and other volunteer opportunities.

DEPLOYMENT

CPD’s current officer deployment strategies do little to reduce the potential for racially-biased policing. Because the deployment system is largely seniority-based, as mandated by collective bargaining agreements, younger and less experienced officers are often assigned to high-crime neighborhoods and the most difficult watches and beats. Many of these officers are placed in these high-stress situations with little to no experience or familiarity with the neighborhoods they will be policing. This is a recipe for trouble.

Recommendations

CPD, including the Deputy Chief of Diversity and Inclusion, should analyze deployment strategies to ensure officers are culturally competent and have a proper understanding of the neighborhoods where they are assigned.

As part of its analysis, CPD should also consider deploying more mixed race patrol teams whenever possible, particularly in communities of color.

Where possible, CPD should assign more experienced officers to high-crime districts, beats and shifts. If new officers are given these difficult assignments, they should be partnered with experienced officers with exemplary disciplinary histories and the proven ability to work with diverse populations.

How should CPD involve the community in its policing efforts?

In the early 1990s, Chicago's Alternative Police Strategy ("CAPS") was designed to promote positive police interactions and engagement with the community as a key to long-term crime reduction. Its original architects were then-Deputy Chief of Patrol Charles Ramsey (recently retired Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department and co-chair of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing) and the civilian Director of CPD's Research and Development Division, Barbara McDonald. CAPS was tested in five police districts beginning in April 1993 and was rolled out City-wide in spring 1995.

As initially conceived, CAPS was based on five key features. First, CAPS adopted a problem-solving model. Rather than responding to individual calls, officers were expected to employ a proactive, prevention-oriented stance to neighborhood problems. The problem-solving model focused on chronic concentrations of related incidents, which could then be addressed by identifying and prioritizing problems, analyzing them, designing response strategies, implementing those strategies and assessing their success.¹⁶⁶

Second, CAPS focused on turf orientation so that police would become more acclimated to the communities they served. Officers were supposed to stay in one place long enough to develop partnerships with and trust among community members and spend more time working with the community and less time answering radio dispatches. This was accomplished by assigning officers to particular beats, ideally for at least a year.¹⁶⁷

Third, CAPS reorganized police to enhance communication and consultation with neighborhood residents. Community policing relies on active citizen engagement concerning the needs of the community, and it creates opportunities for resident involvement. This was accomplished through beat meetings between residents and police who work in the neighborhood and district advisory committees to advise Commanders in each police district.¹⁶⁸

Fourth, CAPS expanded the police's role by allowing them to mobilize other city services to solve problems in particular neighborhoods (e.g., graffiti, abandoned vehicles and buildings, malfunctioning street lights and other signs of neighborhood disorder).¹⁶⁹

Finally, CAPS relied on new tools to address chronic problems. These tools included crime maps and data to identify chronic problems, a roving task force to enforce housing ordinances and cooperation with

prosecutors, who would also get out into the community and work with beat officers on problem buildings.¹⁷⁰

Over its first 5-10 years, CAPS had successes and failures. On the positive side, community involvement increased substantially. Beat meetings were held monthly, and nearly 390,000 Chicagoans attended beat meetings through the end of 2000.¹⁷¹ Positive public perceptions of CPD increased, as measured in community surveys.¹⁷² Crime dropped, though the extent of CAPS' contribution is not clear.¹⁷³ At least in the black community, surveys showed that neighborhood problems, such as physical decay, had dropped significantly.¹⁷⁴

The results were mixed, however. CAPS never succeeded in involving youths.¹⁷⁵ Integrating Hispanic residents into the program was difficult.¹⁷⁶ The beat meetings were well attended but often failed to produce noticeable results, and few district advisory committees carved out a meaningful role.¹⁷⁷ Turf orientation proved difficult, as officers were called away on 911 calls, stretched too thin to spend significant time interacting with the communities and often transferred between districts or beats.¹⁷⁸ Similarly, it was difficult for officers to focus on problem-solving, as they dealt with large numbers of service calls.

CAPS also failed to tailor community outreach efforts to particular districts and instead relied on a uniform "cookie cutter" approach to community engagement.¹⁷⁹ Similarly, while beat meetings were well attended, CAPS did not succeed in consistently developing deep, genuine and lasting partnerships with local stakeholders.

By the late 2000s, funding for CAPS had been cut considerably.¹⁸⁰ Many CAPS personnel were based downtown, and civilian staff had been significantly reduced, resulting in fewer community outreach programs. Beat meetings were held less frequently (every two-three months instead of monthly) and often combined multiple beats at more distant locations. Attendance dropped off significantly after 2000.¹⁸¹

In early 2013, Mayor Emanuel tried to revitalize CAPS by shifting resources to individual districts, with each Commander responsible for tailoring the program to the neighborhood. Each district was assigned a CAPS Sergeant and two officers, along with a community organizer and a youth services provider. The overall budget for CAPS did not change, however.¹⁸² The CAPS Sergeant and two officers in each district were still less than the Sergeant and six officers in each district at the height of CAPS.¹⁸³ The new initiative has not reversed the trend of decreased community participation, and public confidence in CAPS remains low.¹⁸⁴

As the fate of CAPS sadly attests, community policing techniques are not self-sustaining. Unless it is thoroughly incorporated into the organizational structure of the police department at every level and continually rejuvenated with personnel, funding and other resources, community policing runs the risk of being marginalized and forgotten.¹⁸⁵ "Until community policing becomes the business-as-usual approach to policing—something that has probably been accomplished in relatively few departments—there is the grave possibility that it will vanish, even as it continues to be heralded as a sterling idea."¹⁸⁶

Recommendations

CPD should adopt community policing as a core philosophy.

National best practices are clear—community policing must be treated as a core philosophy throughout CPD. Community policing cannot be relegated to a small, underfunded program. As the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended, community policing “should be infused throughout the culture and organizational structure of law enforcement agencies.”¹⁸⁷

Similarly, the Department of Justice's Office of Community Orientated Policing Services recommends that police departments “adopt[] community service as the overarching philosophy of the organization” and make “an institutional commitment to community policing that is internalized throughout the command structure.”

CPD should replace CAPS with localized Community Empowerment and Engagement Districts (CEED) and support them accordingly.

The CAPS brand is significantly damaged and should be replaced. To promote community policing principles based on local community engagement, CPD should designate each of the City's 22 police districts as a “Community Empowerment and Engagement District.” Within each CEED, district Commanders and other leadership should make a sustained effort to engage local stakeholders and develop strategies and partnerships for reducing crime. These CEED strategies should be individually tailored to each particular district.

Moreover, the CEED strategy should focus on developing a unified approach in each district, drawing from a variety of community programs that are already being pursued throughout the City. The CEED strategy should include training and developing officers on proven community empowerment and engagement approaches like Restorative Justice, Advanced Youth Development and Asset Based Community Development. These practices are currently being implemented by a variety of groups, including Bridging the Divide, Community Justice for Youth Institute, Alternatives, Inc., EMBRACE, RJ HUBS, FOUS Youth Development Services and the World Cafe.

CPD should expand the methods it uses to communicate and work with neighborhood residents.

As part of CAPS, CPD often relied on a formulaic menu of methods for engaging the community. Those methods largely focused on beat meetings and district advisory committees. Especially as attendance dropped, those methods proved insufficient to consistently reach and engage members of the community. CPD should pursue alternative and flexible avenues for communicating and working with neighborhood residents. While it will not reach everyone, social media is a promising and largely untapped resource.¹⁸⁸ As part of a CEED strategy, district leadership should also proactively identify and contact key community stakeholders to develop strategies and partnerships for reducing crime.

CPD should reinvest in civilian organizing staff.

One of the reasons CAPS is failing is because its civilian staff has dwindled to the point of ineffectiveness. As part of the CEED approach, CPD should invest in civilian staff to assist district leadership in organizing and mobilizing residents to address significant issues. CPD should ensure that the civilian staff has community organizing, restorative justice, advanced youth development

and other community development skills. While there will undoubtedly be a cost to building and maintaining this civilian staff, an effective community engagement strategy will pay dividends on the back end by reducing crime and increasing safety.

CPD should renew its commitment to beat-based policing and work to expand community patrols.

Beat-based policing is a critical component to any community policing approach. Officers must have time to get to know the communities they serve. The Task Force heard from many residents frustrated by frequent turnover of both officers and supervisory personnel in their neighborhoods. As the CAPS experience showed, it is very easy for beat-based policing to fall by the wayside as officers are pulled away on 911 calls or transferred between beats or districts. CPD must make a conscious effort to renew its commitment to beat-based policing and develop strategies that allow officers to truly learn their beats.

The community has a role to play as well. In addition to beat-based policing, community-led patrols have shown promise in reducing crime rates, increasing community safety and empowering the local community. For example, the City has successfully partnered with CPS and community-based organizations in the “Safe Passage” program, which creates routes where students can walk to school with safe passage workers.¹⁸⁹ Community-led patrols have also shown promise dealing with outbursts of violence, particularly during warmer weather. Police and community residents have also worked together to ensure the safety and success of community-wide events, such as midnight basketball and cultural-based community celebrations held in local public spaces. For these efforts to work, there must be strong, open communication between community patrols and the police, along with a clear shared decision-making structure at the local levels guided by both police and community residents.

CPD should include information about how the public is being involved and how effectively neighborhood concerns are being addressed in CompStat.

To show that community policing matters, CPD should include measures of community policing performance in CompStat. Before the recent Superintendent change, CPD was exploring a new “RespectStat” system, which would “analyze[] data on the quality of police-citizen interactions to provide constructive feedback to command-level personnel about performance in specific geographic areas.”¹⁹⁰ The RespectStat proposal was based on community satisfaction surveys managed by the University of Illinois at Chicago.¹⁹¹ CPD should integrate this data as part of CompStat. Also, as part of CompStat, CPD should gather and report information about how the public is being involved in each district.

Are CPD officers adequately equipped to interact with youth?

The existing relationship between CPD and youth—particularly youth of color—can be described as antagonistic, to say the least. Children in some areas of the City are not only being raised in high-crime environments, but they are also being mistreated by those who have sworn to protect and serve them.¹⁹² Throughout our community engagement efforts, including during our youth panels, we heard story after

story of officers treating youth with disrespect, humiliating them or worse. Overuse of stop and frisk practices, without any individualized reasonable suspicion, appears to be a particular problem.

The troubled relationship between CPD and youth is a significant missed opportunity. During our youth panels, we also heard positive stories from youth about police officers at their schools who had taken the time to get to know them, helped them solve problems and coached and mentored them. Many students had developed strong relationships with officers in their schools. Other youth talked about positive interactions with officers at a local station that hosted community events. However, the stories shared by local youth were overwhelmingly negative and painted a dark view of police-youth interactions.

Most CPD officers are not adequately trained or equipped to interact with youth. In the Academy, recruits receive 8 hours of training on juvenile law and processing and another 2 hours of training on intergenerational police-community relations. CPD has developed an advanced 40-hour “CIT-Youth” training for officers who have completed the basic 40-hour CIT training. Approximately 800 officers have completed “CIT-Youth” training.

In schools, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, CPS enforced a strict zero tolerance policy for misconduct by students. The zero tolerance policy merely accentuated a school to prison pipeline. Since then, CPS has undergone a shift from a “we need to get the bad apples out” approach to an approach of “we need to support student success and keep them in school,” wherever possible. 75 schools now have officers assigned to the building, with an average of two officers per school. That number is down from 125 schools four years ago.¹⁹³

CPS trains officers who will be assigned to schools and works closely with district Commanders to address and resolve concerns. These officers are generally expected to contribute to a culture and climate of calm by building relationships with students, supporting problem-solving and engaging in restorative justice practices. However, there does not appear to be a specific job description for officers in schools that provides a clear and shared understanding of their role. Based on our interviews, this lack of guidance leads to some inconsistency in what officers actually do from school to school.

Recommendations

CPD should evaluate and improve the training officers receive with respect to youths to ensure that all officers are prepared to engage with youth in ways that are age-appropriate, trauma-informed and based in a restorative justice model.

Training police officers with respect to youth should have at least three key components. First, officers must learn age-appropriate treatment. Officers should work with an understanding of the fundamental differences between adolescents and adults and recognize that youth are biologically susceptible to impulsive, risk-taking and peer-influenced behavior. Officers should also know that youth possess a unique capacity for positive change. Youth are not miniature adults and should not be treated the same as the worst adult offenders.

Second, engagement with youth must be trauma-informed. Ultimately, police should protect the most vulnerable (children), even when they have done something wrong. To be trauma-informed means recognizing that most children who encounter the law—either as victims or offenders—tend to be some of the most abused, neglected and traumatized children in our society. Therefore,

officers should treat children with the utmost sensitivity to potential past trauma and do everything possible to not cause further harm. Subject matter experts are needed to train officers to respond appropriately and effectively to children who might have experienced trauma. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration and the International Association of Chiefs of Police offer resources on these issues.

Finally, officers should be ready to use restorative justice models in appropriate cases. Arrest and detention should be reserved for the most violent youth offenders. Otherwise, diversion to community-based resources should be the first priority when working with youth. Restorative justice models have shown significant promise and typically involve inclusion of all parties (offender and victim), encountering the other side, making amends for the harm and reintegrating the parties into their communities. Again, CPD should bring in subject matter experts to develop a strategy for using restorative justice practices with youth.

CPD and CPS should ensure that officers who are assigned to schools have clear job descriptions and expectations that are shared by CPS and CPD, receive extensive and ongoing training on how to engage with youth and crisis intervention and are swiftly reassigned if they fail to meet expectations.

Is CPD doing enough to protect human and civil rights?

Under the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *Miranda v. Arizona*, criminal suspects must be advised of their constitutional rights before statements they make to the police under interrogation can be used against them.¹⁹⁴ *Miranda* requires that the defendant be informed "that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."¹⁹⁵ In addition to being advised of his rights, a defendant is also guaranteed the right to have counsel present at all "critical" stages of the criminal proceedings.¹⁹⁶ This constitutional right to counsel attaches at the defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer.¹⁹⁷

Illinois law supplements these constitutional safeguards with additional requirements for earlier access to legal counsel. State law provides that arrested individuals "shall have the right to communicate with an attorney of their choice and a member of their family."¹⁹⁸ Communication with counsel must be permitted by the police "within a *reasonable* time after arrival at the first place of custody."¹⁹⁹ A CPD general order also requires that individuals in custody be permitted to telephone a lawyer "within a reasonable period of time" after being taken into custody.²⁰⁰ Finally, state law requires that all police stations advise persons in custody of their right to communicate with a lawyer by "post[ing] in every room, other than cells ... in conspicuous places where it may be seen and read by persons in custody and others, a poster" that explicitly outlines a defendant's right to counsel.²⁰¹

And yet, few Chicagoans arrested by CPD consult counsel while in police custody. Based on our interviews, CPD generally provides phone access only at the end of processing, after interrogation and charging, while arrestees wait in lockup to be released or transferred to county custody. Remarkably, in 2014, only 3 out of every 1,000 arrestees had an attorney at any point while in police custody.²⁰² In 2015, the City reports that out of a total of 113,018 arrests, only 702 Attorney Visitor Request Forms were filled

out by counsel—about 6 out of every 1,000 arrestees. The rates for filling out these forms varied widely by Area. In the North and Central Areas, there was 1 counsel visit for every 168 and 125 arrestees, respectively. In the South Area, there was 1 counsel visit for every 227 arrestees.²⁰³

Throughout our work, we have heard from community members that their rights are not protected. Individuals who have been taken into police custody frequently report being denied phone calls and access to an attorney. The police do not provide contact information for legal aid to arrestees. When individuals in custody attempt to invoke their legal rights to counsel, they report facing hostility from police. And counsel report that CPD often has difficulty telling them where an arrestee is being held at any given moment.

The City's youth are particularly vulnerable. Youth often lack awareness of their basic constitutional rights. CPS does not require instruction on this subject as part of the school curriculum. Further, as far as we can tell, CPD has not made the legal rights of juveniles a priority. We have heard that police frequently tell lawyers working on behalf of juveniles that their clients do not have a right to counsel or that the juvenile's guardian must approve a visit by a lawyer. Youth should be receiving more, not less, protection.

Recommendations

Train the community in Know Your Rights and Responsibilities, including by:

- (a) *Creating a CPS policy and City Ordinance requiring that students receive instruction on how to exercise 4th, 5th and 6th Amendment rights; and*
- (b) *Create a technology platform to assist with a public service announcement campaign and informational videos in police stations.*

Everyone should know their rights. The Task Force recommends that CPS develop a compendium to teach all students their constitutional rights and how to exercise them when in contact with the police at some point between the 6th and 10th grades. The City should also create a technology platform to assist with a public service announcement campaign and informational video, to be broadcast at police stations, that will ensure that arrestees are made aware of their constitutional rights.

The City should enact an ordinance, and CPD should promulgate general orders:

- (a) *Mandating that arrestees be allowed to make phone calls to an attorney and/or family member(s) within one hour after arrest, allowing only for limited exceptions in exigent circumstances;*
- (b) *Mandating that a legal aid or other provider be contacted within 30 minutes of the arrest of any juvenile, and that CPD wait for legal representation to arrive before any questioning of a juvenile occurs; and*
- (c) *Confirming that CPD will prominently post information concerning rights to counsel, as already required under state law, and include any willing legal aid provider's name and 24-hour contact information.*

The City and CPD should promulgate an ordinance and general order, respectively, expressly stating what time is “reasonable” for allowing arrestees to make calls to an attorney and/or family member(s). Several states, including California, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island and Tennessee, require that an individual be able to telephone counsel within a specific time frame after arrest—ranging from one to three hours.²⁰⁴ The Task Force recommends that arrestees be allowed to make calls within one hour of arrest. The ability for arrestees to call on counsel and to understand their constitutional rights “protects people at a time when they are most vulnerable, and is a key safeguard against ... ill treatment.”²⁰⁵

The Task Force recognizes that there may be limited instances where exceptions are warranted. The ordinance and general order should provide for exceptions where allowing arrestees to make phone calls within one hour would pose a clear and immediate threat to public safety, or where doing so would be impractical, such as if an arrestee is incapacitated due to a serious medical condition. If CPD invokes the exception in a given case, it should be required to explain and document the specific grounds in a particular case.

When CPD arrests a juvenile, the ordinance and general order should require that CPD contact a legal aid provider within 30 minutes of arrest, absent the same exigent circumstances as with an adult. CPD should then be required to wait for legal counsel to arrive and meet with the juvenile before any questioning occurs. This practice is consistent with Senate Bill 2370, which is currently pending in the Illinois Senate. That bill would require that all juveniles in police custody have legal representation before interrogation.

In addition, CPD should ensure that it complies with all laws—including existing state law—requiring posting of rights to counsel and that every reasonable attempt is made to ensure that detainees understand their rights. Postings should include any willing government or non-profit legal aid provider’s name and 24-hour contact information.

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Legal Oversight & Accountability


Chicago's police accountability system does not work. The system should identify and investigate police misconduct and then impose appropriate punishment. But at every step, there are enormous barriers. There are barriers that discourage citizens or police officers from reporting misconduct. There are barriers that make it difficult for CPD to identify misconduct. Once misconduct has been identified, there are barriers to investigating it fairly and thoroughly. Even in cases where there is some investigation, there are barriers to imposing discipline—including numerous ways to negate or dilute findings of misconduct that undermine real accountability. Standards are not clear for imposing discipline, so punishment is often arbitrary. And there is very little transparency, which further breeds mistrust.

The Task Force has repeatedly heard the frustrated conclusion of the community that the current system is a sham, and that it allows misconduct—including criminal behavior and other abuse—to go largely or entirely unpunished. The concerns are justified. Of the 28,567 allegations of misconduct filed against CPD officers between March 2011 and September 2015, only 2% of allegations result in actual discipline, after what was frequently a multi-year process.²⁰⁶

When case after high-profile case results in punishment that does not match the gravity of the misconduct, it sends a message that the police can act with impunity. It gives victims reason to question whether there is any point in reporting misconduct. It also leaves those who break the rules emboldened to continue doing so. Meanwhile, well-meaning officers are left to wonder why the system does not reward good behavior. The police oversight system must be fundamentally reformed in order to remove impediments to bringing complaints, identifying troubling behavior, investigating misconduct, intervening and, where necessary, imposing discipline. The system must operate in a timely manner, fairly and entirely without bias and with full transparency and accountability.

In this section, we begin by outlining the police oversight system as it currently exists. We then discuss fundamental questions that have been posed in the wake of high-profile police-involved shootings and how flaws in the current oversight system caused these realities to come into existence and continue unchecked. We then address specific recommendations, including the creation of a Community Safety Oversight Board, an Inspector General for Public Safety and a Civilian Police Investigative Agency ("CPIA"). The Community Safety Oversight Board and the Inspector General for Public Safety would be new and vital additions to Chicago's police oversight system, while CPIA would replace IPRA.

POLICE OVERSIGHT SYSTEM



Overall, these reforms are intended to improve the transparency, independence and quality of the police oversight structure in Chicago. More technical details about recommended reforms are set forth in appendices at the end of this report.

How does the existing police oversight system work?

The current police oversight system in Chicago developed piecemeal over time, without significant consideration of the whole. As a result, it is a tangled patchwork, involving hundreds of people in multiple entities, often working without any real oversight of their own work or coordination with each other. As a result, complaints can and often do take years to resolve, and frequently result in little or no discipline for the officer.

IPRA. The best-known piece in the current police oversight system is IPRA. IPRA is a 83-person civilian agency formed in 2007 and run by a Chief Administrator appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council.²⁰⁷ IPRA is responsible for taking in all complaints against CPD members. Of the complaints it

receives, IPRA investigates many of the most serious types of officer misconduct such as excessive force, domestic violence, violent coercion or verbal, bias-based abuse.²⁰⁸ IPRA also investigates any time an officer discharges a firearm or deploys a Taser, and any time a citizen is injured or dies in police custody. Over the past five years, IPRA has received 5,400 to 9,000 complaints per year, and opened another 1,300 to 3,000 investigations per year itself.²⁰⁹

BIA. Though IPRA serves as the initial intake point for all misconduct complaints, by law most are matters beyond its jurisdiction which it must therefore refer to the Bureau of Internal Affairs (“BIA”), within the CPD itself.²¹⁰ In 2015 BIA had a staff of 108 (though recent reports indicate a reduction to 93)—predominantly sworn CPD officers.²¹¹ The complaints investigated by BIA typically include criminal misconduct, corruption, operational violations, substance abuse and off-duty incidents that warrant department oversight. The head of the BIA is a sworn CPD officer selected by the Superintendent. On average, BIA investigates approximately 3,000 complaints each year.²¹²

BIA forwards complaints alleging lesser offenses—typically those that could result in a five-day suspension or less—to the 22 individual police districts. Over the past five years, on average, the police districts investigated approximately 2,200 complaints per year. While the police districts do not receive much attention in the public debate over the police oversight structure in Chicago, a significant number of cases land there.


CPD Review. If an IPRA or BIA investigation results in a sustained finding and the recommended discipline is not termination, the case is forwarded for review within the CPD by members of the accused officer’s chain of command (“Command Channel Review”), and then to the Superintendent. If IPRA or BIA recommends termination, the case goes straight to the Superintendent. If the Superintendent agrees with the sustained finding and the recommended discipline, IPRA or BIA serve notice on the officer.

Arbitration. An officer can challenge sustained findings and disciplinary recommendations in arbitration. The specific procedure depends on an officer’s rank and the level of discipline recommended. The arbitrator’s decision is final.


Police Board. The Chicago Police Board is made up of nine civilians appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council. The Board’s primary function is the adjudication of disciplinary cases where the recommended penalty is termination, as well as suspensions over 30 days for Sergeants, Lieutenants and Captains.²¹³ A contracted hearing officer presides over an evidentiary hearing, similar to a trial. The Board members review the record, and decide by majority vote whether the officer is guilty and, if so, what the penalty should be. The Board’s decisions are appealable to the Circuit Court.

CURRENT COMPLAINT TRIAGE, INVESTIGATION & DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDATION STAGES

Independent Police Review Authority




CPD Bureau of Internal Affairs



CURRENT REVIEW, GRIEVANCE & ADJUDICATION STAGES


Chicago Police Department



Arbitration



Chicago Police Board



Why does the community not have a role in the police oversight system?

At the Task Force's community forums, public comments repeatedly converged on two central themes: many residents across the City have lost trust in the current system of police accountability, and many will not trust an oversight system in which they do not play a meaningful role. The message is clear that substantial community involvement is an absolute necessity to build trust in the police accountability system.

The Task Force agrees that the police oversight system would benefit greatly from increased community involvement. A community oversight body is an increasingly common element of effective police accountability systems around the country. This would fill a gaping hole in Chicago's current system—one that would likely be required by the Department of Justice regardless of this Task Force's recommendations.

Recommendations

The City should create a Community Safety Oversight Board, allowing the community to have powerful involvement in the police oversight system.

The Community Safety Oversight Board would be comprised entirely of community representatives and would have power to oversee CPD, the new CPIA and all police oversight mechanisms. The Community Board would ensure that CPIA and all components of the police oversight system are held fully accountable, operate with maximum transparency and perform their roles in a manner that is informed by community needs.

If the Community Board is to earn the legitimacy it requires and deserves, its precise powers and makeup should not be set by the Task Force, but should be developed with broad public input. The Mayor and the City Council should hold full and robust public hearings on the topic and fully vet the design and implementation of this critical body. Nonetheless, the Task Force does suggest that the Community Board's powers and authority include:

- Selecting the Chief Administrator of the new CPIA and conducting public hearings to make the selection.
- Requesting that the Inspector General for Public Safety perform specific audits and analysis of the policies, procedures and practices of CPD, CPIA and the Police Board that the community does not believe are being adequately addressed, and issuing recommendations based on the findings to which CPD or the relevant agency must respond.
- Requesting that the Inspector General for Public Safety perform specific audits of CPIA and BIA investigations of serious cases of alleged police misconduct or use of force to promote the quality and integrity of the investigations.
- Directing CPD, CPIA and the Police Board, through requests to the Inspector General for Public Safety, to collect and share data to facilitate community oversight.

- Analyzing all sustained findings and discipline recommended by CPIA, BIA or the Police Board to assess disciplinary trends, determine whether discipline is consistently applied and fair, and determine whether final disciplinary decisions are being executed.
- Conducting public hearings on any and all matters related to the CPD and its oversight entities.
- As representatives of the broader community, holding frequent public meetings.

In selecting Community Board members, it will be critical to establish a process that maximizes the Board's independence, ensures transparency and provides accountability to the public. The Task Force considered five methods for selecting Board members, which are summarized in Appendix 6. In sum, the Task Force considered elections, City Council or Mayoral appointment, a third-party application process and hybrid versions of these options.

Ultimately, each option has advantages and disadvantages, but a model that populates the Community Board solely through elections, or solely through Mayoral appointment, would undermine the Board's effectiveness and legitimacy at the outset.

The election model in particular has not been successfully implemented elsewhere, and brings a host of challenges. These include cooption by pre-existing power structures (e.g., well-funded groups could run slates of candidates and take over the Board), use by individuals looking for a political springboard, and a potential lack of diversity. Further, the cost and political nature of elections lead the Task Force to disfavor this method.

As part of any selection process other than direct election, the system should build in protections against manipulation. For example, qualifications should be established for the job, a screening committee could, after reviewing applications, select three people for every vacancy, and all could be required to participate in a series of public hearings to present their credentials and answer questions from a selection committee and the public. The Mayor, City Council or third party would then select or vote for one of three nominated candidates for each open position, or a selection committee could approve them.

What are the barriers to identifying police misconduct? The Code of Silence and beyond.

The police cannot be held accountable for misconduct that is hidden. Yet there are many ways in which the current system serves to make it more difficult to identify potential misconduct. For years, people have talked about a "blue code of silence," an unwritten rule that says that a police officer will not report on another police officer's misdeeds.

In December 2015, Mayor Emanuel was asked if there is a "code of silence" that exists among Chicago police officers. "The short answer is yes," he said. Referring to the shooting death of Laquan McDonald, Mayor Emanuel conceded that "this isn't the first shooting where maybe there hasn't been honest reporting by officers who were there."²¹⁴ As he then explained in a December 9, 2015 speech to the City Council:

This problem is sometimes referred to as the Thin Blue Line. Other times it is referred to as the code of silence. It is the tendency to ignore, deny or in some cases cover-up the bad actions of a colleague or colleagues. . . . We cannot ask citizens in crime-ravaged neighborhoods to break

*the code of silence if we continue to allow a code of silence to exist within our own police department.*²¹⁵

Current and former CPD officials have also increasingly acknowledged a “code of silence.” Former Superintendent Richard Brzeczek (1980-83) has said that a code of silence “has always existed in the police department.”²¹⁶ Eugene Williams, the current Chief of the Bureau of Support Services, and former Chief of the Bureau of Patrol, stated that:

*[S]ix months of academy training cannot stand up to a career of “on the streets influence” by veteran officers who are all too anxious to show the rookies how things are really done on the streets. The way it is done on the streets is to protect and cover for your partner at all cost, even at the expense of sacrificing every ounce of one’s integrity. This culture has been all too evident when we investigate thousands of allegations where the partner of the accused never sees, or hear[s] of any inappropriate conduct although they work in very close proximity of each other during their entire tour of duty. Yet, within this culture it is considered righteous to cut corners and embellish on the facts in a case report or arrest report to win a case in court.*²¹⁷

The Task Force has found that the code of silence is not just an unwritten rule, or an unfortunate element of police culture past and present. The code of silence is institutionalized and reinforced by CPD rules and policies that are also baked into the labor agreements between the various police unions and the City. These impediments to identifying potential misconduct must be eliminated if CPD and the City are to end this persistent challenge.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS MAKE IT HARDER TO IDENTIFY MISCONDUCT

Police officers are often called upon to take great risks, and in order to protect themselves and the public, they are authorized to use force.²¹⁸ Any time an officer is alleged to have used excessive force, they are afforded all the due process protections the law provides. However, the Task Force found that in the interest of protecting police officers from unfair or unfounded allegations, the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) between the four police unions and the City create unnecessary barriers to identifying and addressing police misconduct. Many provisions are out of step with national trends or pose impediments to accountability that are not sufficiently justified by the needs of due process.

Union leadership defends these CBA provisions, noting that they are the product of arm’s length negotiations. But their members’ foremost duty is to serve and protect the public. Any provision of the CBAs that impedes or obstructs accountability undermines that primary duty and violates the public trust. Eliminating or amending these provisions will allow valid complaints to be reviewed and make it easier to uncover patterns of abuse.

The CBAs discourage citizens from coming forward with complaints.

The CBAs state that disciplinary proceedings cannot be brought against an officer unless they are based on complaints accompanied by a signed affidavit—a legal document in which the person filing a complaint swears that everything in the complaint is true and acknowledges that there are legal consequences for lying.²¹⁹ That may sound like a commonsense way to ensure that people do not bring false claims. But many citizens lack faith in the oversight structure or broader legal system and may think

that even if their complaint is justified, signing an affidavit could put them in legal jeopardy. The affidavit requirement keeps people from bringing complaints and helps some police misconduct remain hidden from view.

Without a signed affidavit, there is generally no investigation at all. Over the past five years, BIA closed an average of 537 complaints per year for lack of an affidavit. IPRA closed an average of 618 cases per year—or nearly 40% of investigations—over the past five years due to the absence of affidavits. Moreover, an analysis of CPD records from a four-year period ending in mid-December 2014 found that fully 58% of the 17,700 complaints of police misconduct filed with IPRA were tagged as having “no affidavit” and were therefore not investigated.²²⁰ The amount of unsigned complaints leaves the City, and CPD, unable to fully understand the nature and challenges underlying these allegations of misconduct.

The CBAs allow for the Chief Administrator of IPRA and the BIA to in effect override the affidavit requirement after reviewing “objective verifiable evidence” and affirming that based on that evidence, “it is necessary and appropriate for the investigation to continue.”²²¹ This provision is rarely used, and not to the extent it could and should be.

The CBAs also prohibit most anonymous complaints.²²² Like the affidavit requirement, this may discourage some people from bringing perfectly legitimate complaints. Indeed, more and more cities are recognizing that the cost of forbidding anonymous complaints greatly exceeds the benefits. Today there is a strong trend toward accepting them, including as part of court-enforced Department of Justice consent decrees (in New Orleans and Cincinnati).²²³ Accepting anonymous complaints also allows a police department to use an additional set of data as a management tool for proactively addressing performance problems.

The CBAs also state that before an officer is questioned about alleged misconduct, he or she must be notified of the complainant’s name.²²⁴ If officers are put on trial for breaking the law, they clearly have a right to confront their accusers. And in an internal disciplinary hearing, if a complaint is sustained, fundamental fairness may warrant disclosure of the complainant, especially in cases in which the complainant is the primary witness. But there is a danger to enforcing this requirement while an investigation is still pending: it may invite an officer to intimidate a complainant, or even to seek retribution. Where many citizens already do not trust the police, this provision may provide one more reason not to come forward.

The CBAs make it easy for officers to lie in official reports.

Under the CBAs, officers involved in shooting incidents cannot be required to provide a statement to IPRA until after at least a 24-hour period.²²⁵ Critics contend that the waiting period provides officers time to protect themselves by agreeing on a false story they will all tell when they have their official interviews with investigators.²²⁶ Chicago is not alone in providing this buffer of time and there is an argument that the memories of those involved in traumatic events are clouded by recent experiences. As scholars have noted, the evidence on the impact of stress on memory is very complex, with contradictory findings.²²⁷ While the science is unsettled, the critics’ view has gained support as evidence has emerged from more and more cases—including the shooting of Laquan McDonald—where police officers gave remarkably similar reports of incidents and later evidence made clear that the reports were simply not true. This makes it difficult to identify misconduct, especially where an incident was not captured on video.

Similarly, the FOP contract includes a provision that can be used to protect officers whose statements are contradicted by video or audio evidence. The contract provides that an officer cannot be charged with a false statement if the CPD, IPRA or BIA is in possession of video or audio evidence and (a) did not provide the officer an opportunity to review it prior to giving a statement, or (b) after giving a statement, the officer was not provided an opportunity to clarify and amend the original statement. This provision does not seem to serve any valid purpose. When an officer's report differs from the video or audio evidence, we should not assume that the officer knowingly made a false statement. But at the same time, we should not make it impossible to discipline an officer when there is evidence that a statement was knowingly false.

The CBAs further constrain investigations by dictating and micromanaging how interrogators may ask questions. For example, the FOP contract provides that: "Generally, the secondary interrogator will ask follow-up questions for clarification purposes. The primary interrogator will not ask any questions until the secondary interrogator has finished asking questions and invites the primary interrogator to ask follow-up questions."²²⁸ Of course, CPD officers and detectives are not similarly constrained when they interrogate suspects.

As a result of the collective bargaining process, IPRA and BIA are also required to give officers highly specific notice of allegations, which threatens the efficiency and efficacy of the investigation.²²⁹ For example, arbitrators have found that if an officer lies to investigators, IPRA must present the officer with a new set of allegations that specifically addresses the lie, or else IPRA cannot charge the officer with making a false statement.²³⁰

The CBAs require officials to ignore and destroy evidence of misconduct.

Under some circumstances, the CBAs require that evidence of misconduct be ignored. For example, the CBAs forbid the investigation of complaints older than five years without permission of the Superintendent.²³¹ There is certainly a place for consideration of an applicable statute of limitations, as it is harder to prove or disprove events that happened long ago. And it is reasonable to require good proof before disciplining an officer. It is not reasonable to impose strict limitations on what matters can even be investigated. Misconduct may never come to light, and patterns may be more difficult to uncover. Principles of procedural due process, the application of evidentiary standards and consideration of mitigating factors better serves just outcomes consistent with the public interest than do absolute prohibitions on investigation.

Similarly, the CBAs require that in some cases where there is a finding that an officer engaged in misconduct, but the finding did not result in significant punishment, the information cannot be used against the officer after a short amount of time and must be removed from the officer's record entirely in a few years.²³² There is no compelling reason for these provisions. The CPD and the various police oversight entities should be able to draw on any relevant evidence and findings to identify potential patterns of misbehavior.

The CBAs also mandate the destruction of most disciplinary files after five years.²³³ While the City has, in practice, not implemented the requirement for many years because it contradicts Illinois law, the language in the contract should be eliminated. Expunging records contradicts best practices, impedes the development of early intervention systems and deprives the public of information that is rightfully

theirs.²³⁴ As noted above, it also deprives police oversight bodies of evidence of potential patterns of bad behavior. Moreover, it may also deprive wrongfully convicted persons of exonerating information.

Finally, the CBAs provide that CPD can only restrict secondary employment based on the nature of the employment or if the hours interfere with job duties.²³⁵ Even that limited constraint is based on a system of officers policing themselves; unlike other City workers, police officers are not currently required to disclose secondary employment to CPD. The CPD is missing a key tool for identifying red flags that can be indicators of corruption, such as unexplained income, or addressing potential conflicts of interest and emotional stressors that may adversely impact performance that otherwise would not come to light.

The CBAs make it harder to encourage officers to report misconduct.

The single best source of information about police misconduct is police officers themselves. Officers work extremely closely with other officers. Sometimes they are the only people who see what their fellow officers do. Officers have a duty to report misconduct,²³⁶ though it seems clear that they routinely fall short of fulfilling that duty. The CBA disserves and arguably encourages noncompliance with this critical public duty by expressly prohibiting the CPD from rewarding officers who come forward as whistleblowers.²³⁷

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES TO IDENTIFY MISCONDUCT

No dedicated system exists to identify and address patterns or practices.

While they are charged with investigating police misconduct, IPRA and BIA historically have not engaged in efforts to identify officers whose records suggest repeated instances of misconduct or bias. They also historically have not engaged in efforts to identify broader patterns or practices either of misconduct or racially biased policing within CPD. The persistent failure of IPRA and BIA to examine pattern and practice evidence substantially contributes to the police accountability vacuum in Chicago.

Effective police oversight means not just examining individual incidents, but also information in the aggregate—identifying troubling trends and making sure that patterns of abuse or malfeasance are identified and prosecuted. That means identifying officers whose records suggest repeated instances of misconduct or bias, and exploring why a disproportionate number of complaints are concentrated in certain units.

Since its inception, IPRA has had the power to examine patterns of complaints when investigating police misconduct, but has not exercised it.²³⁸ The tragedies and scandals involving CPD officers have consistently involved individuals and groups of officers who had amassed patterns of complaints that went unchecked and underinvestigated by CPD and the City. IPRA is positioned to function as a feedback loop to inform and improve CPD policies, practices and training. IPRA's failure to effectively analyze and apply its expansive knowledge of policing is a lost opportunity that perpetuates the status quo by shielding ineffective and illegal practices from scrutiny, and puts citizens at risk by allowing abusive officers to remain in the field.

Police officers have no method to report misconduct confidentially.

In recognition of the inherent difficulties in reporting misconduct by coworkers, many organizations including corporations, federal agencies and—in a few instances—police departments, have implemented whistleblower hotlines to allow anonymous reporting of unethical or improper conduct.

The Task Force is aware of at least one police department that has established a hotline. San Diego established an anonymous, confidential hotline in 2011 with 24/7 availability.²³⁹ The hotline received over 100 calls in the first month and then a total of 300 calls in the 18 months that followed. Calls are recorded as messages, and the Chief of Police conducts an initial review of messages on a daily basis before forwarding them for follow-up.

Information from outside lawsuits is not used.

Additionally, police oversight bodies have not used valuable information from outside lawsuits to generate investigations. The civil rights and criminal defense bars in Chicago have, through decades of litigation, developed rich data regarding CPD policy and practice. This information has largely been untouched by the various oversight entities. This represents a significant missed opportunity to ensure accountability.

Recommendations

When the CBAs are renegotiated in 2016 and 2017, the Mayor and the Law Department should seek to eliminate or revise provisions that perpetuate the code of silence and make it more difficult to identify misconduct.

The following CBA provisions should be removed or revised:

- The affidavit requirement should be removed so that investigators can identify additional cases of police misconduct.
- Anonymous complaints should be allowed to encourage reporting by those who fear retaliation, including whistleblowers.
- Officers should not be informed of the complainant's name prior to interrogation. There is little need for the officer to know the name of a complainant prior to interrogation if it is later disclosed during the resolution of the case.
- The provisions delaying interviews in shooting cases for at least 24 hours should be revised to ensure that officers are separated and remain separated from other officers until all officers have given statements. The Department of Justice's Consent Decree with the Los Angeles Police Department contains such a requirement.²⁴⁰ When formal questioning begins, the inquiry will start with a recitation of any and all conversations that the officer has had with law enforcement between the shooting and the commencement of the interview.
- Officers should no longer have a right to amend statements if they have not been provided with the audio or video evidence, and reviews of the footage should not be pre-conditions to charging a Rule 14 violation.

- Investigations of complaints known to the CPD for five years or more should not require Superintendent permission. This is an unnecessary rule, as the statute of limitations will apply for criminal matters and, for administrative matters, the nature and severity of the conduct should determine whether the complaint should be investigated. Should an individual continue to make such decisions, the authority should be vested in someone outside of the CPD, such as the Chief Administrator of IPRA (or its successor, CPIA).
- The provision requiring destruction of records should be eliminated. The rule is in tension if not outright conflict with general principles of public record-keeping, and deprives the public of important information that is rightfully theirs and may include the destruction of information that serves numerous operational and public policy objectives.
- The provision that forbids the CPD from rewarding officers who act as whistleblowers should be removed.
- The CBAs should be amended to require police officers to disclose secondary employment, as other City workers are required to do.
- The FOP contract dictates the manner in which interrogators can ask questions, which presents an unnecessary burden on interrogators and potentially sets them up to violate the CBA for a technicality. The policy does not appear to comport with any best practices, and should be eliminated.
- Officers must be informed of the nature of the allegation prior to interrogation. This provision is presently interpreted very specifically to mean a detailed recitation of the facts that support all possible charges. Moreover, if the officer lies to investigators during the investigation, new allegations must be presented to the officer. This provision should be amended to allow for more general recitation of allegations.

The Mayor and the City Council should create an Inspector General for Public Safety, to be housed within the City of Chicago Office of the Inspector General.²⁴¹

The creation of an Inspector General for Public Safety will greatly enhance the transparency, accountability and quality of Chicago's police oversight structure. The Inspector General for Public Safety should have a broad grant of authority so that it is empowered to examine and make recommendations regarding the full scope of police department-related activity. Effective execution of its duties will require new, dedicated funding and specialized personnel.

Over the past few decades, the number of police inspectors general has grown substantially and a consensus has emerged that these auditors play a unique and essential role. In sum, this role will police the police as well as the entire police oversight system in Chicago. While there is need for police oversight bodies that focus on investigating individual allegations of misconduct, the Inspector General for Public Safety would go farther and work to identify and address patterns of police misconduct or racial bias. In its ideal form, it will review past acts within the system to uncover what is not working, monitor ongoing actions to improve the system of today and recommend policy changes to ensure systemic improvements for the future.

The Inspector General for Public Safety should be empowered to identify misconduct and racial bias and their sources by auditing and monitoring patterns of police activity and complaints. The pattern analysis should include, but not be limited to: officer use of force; police-involved shootings; use of any weapon used to inflict pain and/or gain compliance; allegations of warrantless searches, theft or other criminal activity; and potential bias including but not limited to bias in policing related to race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, gender-identity and geography. The pattern analysis could also include analyses of lawsuits and other relevant data to identify individuals and groups of officers who may be engaged in a pattern of misconduct.

Analyzing patterns can be incredibly powerful. Many individual complaints are not sustained because the complainant tells one story and the officer tells another, and there is no independent evidence to support either side. But evidence that an officer may have a pattern of bad behavior, particularly a pattern of a specific kind of bad behavior, can identify problems that an investigation into a single “he said, she said” incident could not.

This kind of pattern analysis can also identify underlying management problems that are likely to lead to misconduct. Investigation of individual incidents places the focus on an individual bad actor, when the bigger problem may be the organizational culture that either promotes, acquiesces in or fails to address bad behavior or their indicators. Similarly, pattern analysis, focusing on police department policies and procedures may help to uncover the underlying causes of chronic misconduct, like when an outdated policy or a lack of training leads multiple officers to make bad decisions or engage in misconduct.

The Inspector General for Public Safety would also review policies and practices of CPD and the police oversight bodies in order to identify systemic problems and propose changes in policies and procedures, training and supervision. Further, the body should use complaint history for purposes of identifying patterns and share these results with CPIA and BIA. In this way, the Inspector General for Public Safety would help prevent future misconduct, criminal behavior and biased policing. In all areas, the Inspector General for Public Safety would also be authorized to follow up to determine whether changes have been implemented and are effective.

Pattern and practice analysis should not only be the job of the Inspector General for Public Safety. The new CPIA (discussed below) and BIA must conduct pattern and practice analysis both proactively and reactively as part of their disciplinary investigations. CPIA should conduct regular and systematic analysis of citizen complaints, civil rights lawsuits, uses of force, hearings on criminal motions to suppress, judicial findings, incidents where individuals were charged with offenses commonly believed to cover up police misconduct and other relevant evidence. When CPIA identifies potential patterns of abuse, it should launch disciplinary investigations as appropriate and refer its findings to the Inspector General for Public Safety for possible broader program analysis and recommendations.

The new CPIA and BIA should also be required by law to share specified information with the Inspector General for Public Safety in order to identify potential misconduct or sources of misconduct. This could include information uncovered through pattern and practice analysis. For example, CPIA and BIA should be required to report monthly to the Inspector General for Public Safety any problems and deficiencies relating to CPD’s operations, policies, programs and practices

that would reasonably be expected to adversely affect the effectiveness of CPD, public safety, the exercise of civil liberties and civil rights or the public's confidence in CPD. New York City and Denver have similar requirements.

Within the Inspector General for Public Safety, there should also be a Diversity and Inclusion Monitor specifically charged with reviewing CPD's actions for potential racial and other bias, along with reviewing CPD's anti-discrimination policies and procedures and tracking the consequences for violations of these policies and procedures. The Diversity and Inclusion Monitor would make bi-annual reports to the new Community Safety Oversight Board on CPD's performance by race, any racial disparities or discrimination and the consequences administered for policy violations and other race-related misconduct.

Some key features of the new Inspector General for Public Safety are discussed in the remainder of this section, and are addressed in further detail in Appendix 6.

CPD should create a hotline for department members, whether civilian or sworn, to lodge complaints, and develop a third-party system for the processing and follow-up of all comments and complaints reported to the hotline.

Hotlines are well documented in the private sector and federal government, and research into their experiences provides further guidance. Keeping hotlines open outside of normal work hours is important for facilitating reports from employees that feel more comfortable when they are able to report outside of the workplace.²⁴² Anonymity and explicit procedures for the protection of a whistleblower from retaliation are important to fostering the trust in the program.²⁴³ Employees often trust third-party hotline services more than internally-operated hotline services, suggesting that a fellow police department colleague (or supervisor) should not be the one answering the phone.²⁴⁴

Why are investigations ineffective and biased?

Citizens have little to no faith in police misconduct investigations. Officers, likewise, are not forced to take the existing system seriously. From start to finish, investigations are riddled with structural, cultural and procedural problems that cast doubt on the intentions and integrity of the investigating agencies and the larger oversight system. Misconduct goes uninvestigated despite the availability of information about these incidents; investigations are hampered by unreasonable and unjustified procedures; and the investigative agencies lack the resources and support to be effective, and show troubling signs of bias.

THE MEDIATION PROCESS UNFAIRLY PREEMPTS INVESTIGATIONS

IPRA and BIA preempt full inquiry into potentially serious misconduct and abuse allegations through what they call a "mediation" process. In reality, this process functions as a form of plea bargaining. It requires that an officer admit to alleged misconduct in exchange for reduced punishment. IPRA and BIA then close the case without a complete investigation. This mediation process was originally intended as an efficient way to address complaints about minor infractions for which multi-year investigations were unwarranted.

The mediation process is now used in cases involving serious misconduct that could warrant lengthy suspensions or even termination. This is especially troubling given the fact that CPD oversight agencies

have been using mediation more frequently. IPRA's use of mediation has increased considerably in recent years, going from just 15 cases in 2011 to over 100 in 2013 and 68 in 2015.²⁴⁵ BIA reported performing an average of 11 mediations per year since 2012. In the first few months of 2016, BIA has performed 12 mediations.

IPRA has historically had no criteria or limitations to determine which complaints are eligible for mediation. In cases mediated in 2015, officers agreed to accept IPRA's sustained findings for: slapping, punching and directing profanities at a victim; striking a victim in the head while she was handcuffed and on her knees; hitting a victim/girlfriend multiple times, fracturing her nose; striking a victim's head on concrete and failing to render assistance; and strip-searching a minor without justification, authorization or completing documentation.²⁴⁶ Closing cases like these without complete investigation deprives the City of important information about potentially criminal conduct and officer fitness and, as some reasonably argue, furthers CPD's code of silence.²⁴⁷

BIA has developed some standards and criteria regarding what types of complaints it will consider mediating—yet none of these standards are formalized in writing. At best, before approving mediation for an investigation, BIA reviews the case for appropriateness, especially when the request for mediation comes from the union.

This standardless plea bargaining system is an impediment to appropriate investigation and true accountability. However, a true mediation program can be a valuable part of an effective police accountability system. Other cities take a very different approach than Chicago. Unlike Chicago's program, mediation programs in many other cities involve face-to-face meetings between citizens who brought complaints and the police who are the subject of the complaints. In model programs, these meetings are facilitated by a neutral third party.²⁴⁸ Such an approach both meets with best practices and, more importantly, is aligned with the objectives of restorative justice that is an important missing element of community-police relations.

Studies show that mediation programs that involve citizens produce positive outcomes for citizens as well as police. A study of the Denver mediation program found that almost 60% of complainants were satisfied with the outcome and 75% were satisfied with the process; officers' rates of satisfaction were high as well—68% were satisfied with the outcome and 79% with the process.²⁴⁹ Additionally, in at least one study, mediation was found to correlate to fewer complaints in the follow-up period included as part of the evaluation, suggesting that mediation may have an impact on future officer behavior. Officers who engaged in mediation had statistically fewer discourtesy and improper procedure complaints following the mediation, compared to the control group officers.²⁵⁰

High satisfaction rates may be largely explained by the fact that traditional police misconduct investigations do not focus on providing what most complainants actually want. Studies of complainants' goals indicate that few want to see the officer punished, but many instead just want to report the incident, desire an apology or explanation from the officer or would like to meet in person and express themselves to the officer.²⁵¹

INVESTIGATIONS ARE COMPROMISED BY REAL AND PERCEIVED BIAS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Early on in its tenure, IPRA enjoyed relative independence from City Hall and spoke to the media freely, without prior approval of either timing or content. In contrast, the tragic fatal shooting of Laquan McDonald exposed levels of collaboration between the administration and IPRA with regard to messaging.

Personnel and staffing practices pose an unacceptable risk of producing biased investigations. IPRA is a civilian entity and therefore is intended to be free of bias in favor of the police. However, IPRA's leadership as recently as 2014 was comprised entirely of former law enforcement officials, which throws serious doubt upon the agency's ability to be independent and lends credence to concerns that bias pervades IPRA's findings. Additionally, the fact that candidates for certain IPRA positions must be reviewed by City Hall further compromises the independence of its staff.²⁵²

Shooting investigations show an institutional bias toward police. Of the 400 officer-involved shootings from 2007 (when IPRA was created) through 2014, less than 1% have been found unjustified.²⁵³ This number appears to be particularly troubling in light of the fact that Chicago tops big cities in fatal police-involved shootings.²⁵⁴ The legitimacy of these findings is further questioned by allegations that IPRA maintained a highly problematic policy permitting the Chief Administrator to order investigators to change findings without creating a record of the disagreement.²⁵⁵

Moreover, where investigations are carried out at the district level, an officer's direct supervisor is involved. That can easily create a conflict of interest for a number of reasons, including where the supervisor may have given orders that led to the officer's alleged misconduct. Additionally, the district investigations are structured inconsistently depending on the district—some have Sergeants and Lieutenants rotate doing investigations, others dedicate one specific person to this function—which poses an obstacle to oversight and accountability.

RESOURCE AND STAFFING CONCERNS IMPEDE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS

IPRA's budget is insufficient and unprotected. IPRA's budget in recent years has not adequately supported the needs of the agency, and any increases are subject to the political process like most other agency budgets. For IPRA, a watchdog, this poses an inherent conflict of interest, as IPRA should not be at the mercy of the Mayor and City Council for its funding.

BIA struggles to recruit qualified sworn personnel, and both BIA and IPRA do not provide adequate training, which directly affects the quality of investigations. The ability to recruit a motivated and talented staff is critical to the success of any organization. It is difficult for BIA to attract qualified department members, as investigating misconduct is a politically challenging and often thankless task. For those staff it does have, BIA has been unable to secure sufficient funding for training, despite making requests. IPRA likewise has an inadequate non-personnel budget to meet, in addition to basic office needs, training and information technology needs critical to a high-functioning investigative agency.

Outdated, inadequate and fragmented technology systems are also a significant obstacle to effective investigations. IPRA and BIA use a computer case management system, CLEAR, a database CPD operates. IPRA's reliance on CLEAR hinders its effectiveness and transparency, and potentially compromises its independence in appearance and fact. However, IPRA lacks the technology, infrastructure and staff

expertise to manage its own data systems. As a result, IPRA lacks robust access to CPD information and data. The limited functionality of CLEAR needlessly causes challenges when IPRA attempts to carry out basic core functions, such as uploading and viewing video, and does not facilitate data analysis.

Case management at the district level is not done in CLEAR, but rather using a paper-based system. This poses an obstacle to coordination and timeliness of investigations, as BIA cannot systematically track the status of the investigations.

UNNECESSARY INVESTIGATION DELAYS

IPRA investigations have consistently been suspended while the Cook County State's Attorney's determined whether or not it would move forward with criminal charges under the same set of facts IPRA was investigating. The practice led to long delays in investigating and resolving IPRA's cases after the State's Attorney's Office closed its investigation. This need not be the case. While it may sometimes make sense for an IPRA investigator to pause an investigation to preserve the integrity of the criminal matter, this rule should not be applied universally in all cases, particularly where a delay is adverse to the City's and the public's interests in administrative justice.

INSUFFICIENT TRANSPARENCY IMPEDES OVERSIGHT OF INVESTIGATIONS

Overall, IPRA lacks transparency in both its processes and data, which makes it more difficult for independent entities or the public to assess the quality of its work. The data that IPRA does provide is confusing, incomplete and challenging to use. IPRA has not published an annual report since 2012, and is under no legal obligation to do so. While IPRA does post summaries of de-identified sustained investigations, the agency does not provide any substantive information related to other investigation dispositions. IPRA does not post any information about the final disposition of its investigations, which can occur years after IPRA's sustained finding and often result in different discipline. There are several critical activities IPRA engages in that are not sufficiently governed by written, thoughtful or transparent policies. Key among these are the affidavit override process, mediation criteria, early warning policies, discipline criteria and the litigation review process.

Investigations and discipline from BIA and the districts are not transparent in almost every respect. There is no way for the public to follow a complaint through the process. The only information BIA posts is contained in a single, 2-3 page annual report, listing the number of "complaint logs received by initial category" for the most recent and previous year. The report also includes basic Police Board data for the year. This information is difficult to locate on CPD's website. The report for 2015 is not yet posted as of April 2016. BIA and the districts do not provide the following information: the investigating entity (district or BIA), complaints closed for lack of affidavit, average duration of investigation, recommended discipline for sustained complaints, and summaries of sustained or not sustained investigations.

Recommendations

IPRA should be replaced with a new Civilian Police Investigative Agency. The City Council should enact legislation that ensures CPIA is established in accordance with the principles described in the report.

There is little doubt that IPRA is badly broken. The more difficult question is what to do about it. The Task Force carefully considered whether IPRA should be allowed time to implement reforms, or if it

is simply beyond repair. The Task Force does not take this question lightly. Like CPD, IPRA undoubtedly has many employees who perform their job every day trying to do the right thing and are dedicated public servants. And IPRA's current leadership appears dedicated to enacting necessary reforms. They have done admirable work in a short amount of time, all while facing uncertainty over the agency's future.

Nonetheless, it is clear that IPRA has lost the public trust. IPRA has failed to perform its duties as a civilian police monitor and oversight agency fairly, competently, with rigor and independence. IPRA's record of incomplete and botched investigations, such as that reflected in public reports of court findings in the recent excessive force trial involving Commander Glen Evans, coupled with its dubious track record of finding virtually every police-involved shooting of civilians to be justified—all of these factors and more have seriously undermined IPRA's effectiveness and impaired its ability to build trust in the community. Without the public trust, IPRA cannot fulfill its critically important police oversight functions.

Recently appointed Chief Administrator Sharon Fairley has initiated substantial reform efforts at IPRA that should be applauded. However, the perception that IPRA is irretrievably broken remains widespread and profound. A police oversight body charged with investigating the most severe misconduct, abuse and brutality cannot fulfill its most basic function in the face of such widespread mistrust. According to a recent poll, 64% of all Chicagoans believe that cover-ups and a code of silence are widespread problems in CPD.²⁵⁶ The Task Force believes that this view of policing is fueled by the clear message that bad police officers are able to act with impunity—that police oversight bodies, the most well-known of which is IPRA, do not hold police officers accountable.

For these reasons, the Task Force recommends that IPRA be stood down and replaced with a new, more independent and well-resourced CPIA. CPIA will serve the same core function as IPRA—taking citizen complaints and investigating serious cases of police misconduct. CPIA will not be the same body with a different name, however. The Task Force recommends reforms to create a true culture of accountability and transparency.

To provide greater independence and accountability to the community, the Chief Administrator of CPIA should be selected by the new Community Safety Oversight Board. The selection of this position should be insulated from politics, transparent and widely inclusive. Moreover, the City should establish hiring standards for CPIA investigators to avoid bias, or the perception of bias. Previous sworn CPD employees (and non-sworn if they have worked for CPD in the past five years) and employees of the Cook County State's Attorney Office should be prohibited from serving as investigators and/or the Chief Administrator. Individuals who hold these positions must reflect the city's diversity.

Additionally, CPIA's independence would be protected by giving it sufficient resources and powers to conduct prompt, unbiased and independent investigations. CPIA's funding would be set as a percentage of CPD's budget so that the office cannot be defunded. This funding should provide CPIA with sufficient resources and powers to conduct prompt, unbiased and independent investigations into police misconduct. Best practices within the field indicate that the budget should be tied to a minimum floor of 1% of CPD's budget and/or a ratio of at least one CPIA investigator for every 250 sworn CPD officers.

In order to further ensure CPIA's independence, CPIA should be able to retain its own counsel and represent itself in legal proceedings. It should have the power to collect evidence, conduct prompt interviews, subpoena witnesses and enforce subpoenas through its counsel. CPIA should be allocated technology and infrastructure resources sufficient to manage its own data systems, tracking software and case management capacity so that it does not need to rely on CPD for technology that might bring into question its independence.

CPIA's jurisdiction would be increased to include unlawful searches and seizures, false arrests and denial of access to counsel. At the end of CPIA's first year of operation, an independent entity will evaluate whether further expanded jurisdiction is appropriate or achievable. CPIA would also have jurisdiction to conduct follow-up investigations in any case where it has original jurisdiction—e.g., if an officer files a false police report.

CPIA should also be empowered to investigate any incidents that fall under its jurisdiction, even in the absence of sworn complaints. No credible allegation should be ignored because of technical complaint submission requirements. CPIA should be able to launch investigations based on any credible source, including media accounts, a review of use-of-force reports or referrals from other oversight entities.

CPIA should gather and leverage data generated by civil litigation and criminal motions to suppress to investigate potential police misconduct. CPIA should be charged with investigating all civil lawsuits, which if submitted as a complaint, would fall under its jurisdiction. Further, to determine if an investigation is warranted, CPIA should develop a process to analyze all criminal motions to suppress that allege facts, which if submitted as a complaint, would fall under its jurisdiction. As mentioned previously, CPIA should also be expected to play a role in investigating policies and practices and using the findings to inform its investigations. In addition, CPIA (along with BIA) should examine officers' complaint histories and relevant complaint investigative files as standard, required parts of every disciplinary investigation into police misconduct.

CPIA should ensure an accessible, professional and supportive complaint process. Victims should be able to file complaints via the internet, over the phone and in their communities. Practices should be informed by national models, such as the New York City's Civilian Complaint Review Board, which has developed a model of hosting meetings within city neighborhoods on a posted rotating basis to take and verify complaints. CPIA should also provide support services to complainants, including regular updates regarding investigations, information about the process and outcomes, and referrals to outside service providers when needed. CPIA should conduct community education and engagement campaigns to educate the public about the complaint/investigative process and their rights. All CPIA investigators should be trained to work with victims of trauma, and taught to conduct victim/trauma-sensitive interviews.

Finally, CPIA should operate with complete transparency. At present, there is simply no way for a citizen to easily track a complaint. In contrast, the New York City Citizen Complaint Review Board allows tracking of all cases via its website.²⁵⁷ Chicago is behind the times and needs to catch up to sufficiently serve its citizens. CPIA must also prioritize keeping the general public informed by posting summary reports of each completed investigation; publishing comprehensive annual reports

on its work; and by establishing a transparent process to make training, policy and procedure recommendations to the CPD.

The Inspector General for Public Safety should be given express authority to audit, monitor and review investigations of individual cases of police misconduct.

The Inspector General for Public Safety should be authorized to audit, monitor and review the quality and integrity of individual investigations and findings. This may include reviewing a completed investigation or monitoring an ongoing investigation. It should be empowered to request that individual investigations be expanded or reopened and, if the investigating agency refuses, to conduct the investigation itself. When investigations into serious uses of force do not result in sustained findings, the Inspector General for Public Safety should be required to work with CPIA and CPD to conduct Force Analysis Panels to determine if the incident revealed any systemic deficiencies in training, policy, supervision or equipment.

If CPIA and BIA continue “mediating” complaints alleging officer misconduct, they should develop clear standards for mediations and implement new processes.

The Task Force understands that the current mediation system has some benefits, particularly when investigating cases that allege minor infractions, which may not warrant the use of limited resources to investigate fully, and domestic violence cases, which are notoriously difficult to prove. We recommend that if CPIA and BIA continue alternative dispute mechanisms such as “mediation,” the process should be reformed to proceed on the basis of formal, jointly developed eligibility criteria that take into consideration, at a minimum, the severity of the allegations, the officer’s disciplinary history and the quality and quantum of evidence. The criteria should (1) be informed by national best practices; (2) prohibit pleas in complaints concerning conduct that, if sustained, would result in serious discipline; (3) be tied to a discipline matrix; (4) be made publicly available; and (5) involve the complainant where appropriate.

Reasonable limits should be placed on the use of alternative dispute resolution to prevent potential abuse. For example, the policy could provide that officers cannot participate in plea bargaining more than once in any two-year period. Further, consideration should be given for banning the use of mediation in cases of significant physical harm.

As part of the mediation process, CPIA and BIA should invite citizens and officers to engage with one another to promote dialogue and understanding. Establishing a mediation program based on national best practices by involving citizens in the process could produce many potential benefits to complainants, police and the state of community-police relations in Chicago. This change might require amending the CBAs, which defines mediation as a method for agreeing on discipline.

Civilian oversight should run concurrently with criminal investigations absent compelling criminal justice needs expressly stated by prosecuting authorities.

It is better practice to presume that investigations should run concurrently. Prosecutors and the new CPIA should meet regularly to determine if one or the other’s investigation should be paused or whether both matters can be investigated at the same time.

BIA should be given the resources and staff it needs to conduct effective investigations, exercise more oversight over district investigations and increase the transparency of investigations.

To ensure that BIA is staffed by qualified personnel and CPD personnel understand the important role BIA plays, anyone who wants to rise in the ranks should be required to rotate through BIA before being eligible for promotion to Commander.

BIA (and the new CPIA) should receive a dedicated training fund to provide sufficient training for its staff. BIA and the police districts should purchase a single, integrated case management system off the shelf, and sufficiently train their employees on it.

BIA should exercise more oversight over individual districts to ensure consistency throughout the districts with regard to the structure of investigations. BIA should institute an automatic process whereby once an officer receives a third complaint, the investigation at the district level would be led by the Deputy Chief in order to ensure greater independence from the officer's daily chain of command.

Finally, BIA and the districts should post all investigative data in a manner that is accessible and user-friendly, as well as summaries of all investigations, and should be held to the same transparency standard as the new CPIA.

Why is it so hard to impose discipline on an officer?

A true police accountability system requires that individual officers who engage in misconduct face real consequences commensurate with the nature of the offense and any mitigating and aggravating circumstances. In its current form, Chicago's police oversight system is essentially structured to prevent this from happening in a meaningful way.

THERE ARE NO CLEAR STANDARDS TO DECIDE THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE

IPRA, BIA, the Superintendent, the Police Board and arbitrators all make decisions at various points in the process regarding what the appropriate discipline should be for an officer who engaged in misconduct. At present, none use a discipline matrix, a national best practice that determines a fixed set of penalties for behavior and history, and takes into consideration any mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Instead, most of the entities turn to past precedent when making decisions about the level of discipline to impose. A discipline matrix not only helps to ensure an officer receives the appropriate level of discipline and therefore is held accountable, but it makes the oversight system more effective by sending the message that actions have real consequences because discipline is fair, predictable and consistent.

CPD POLICIES AND PRACTICES CAN WEAKEN DISCIPLINE

Options

When a CPD member is suspended, he or she is not necessarily required to miss work or lose pay. "Options" to suspension may be granted by the Superintendent to a member who has been ordered suspended for a specified number of days.²⁵⁸ Subject to some limitations, the Superintendent may permit the member to satisfy all or part of the suspension by forfeiting leave time, such as vacation days, or working regular scheduled days off without compensation.

The ability to serve the suspension using options lessens the impact of the discipline on both CPD and the member. This reduces CPD's incentive to prevent misconduct and its consequences because CPD does not lose the member's services to a suspension. Similarly, the member feels no effect on his or her paycheck at the present time, if ever. It also disincentivizes the reporting of misconduct when an officer found to have engaged in serious misconduct has almost no disruption to time in duty and sends a signal to the rank and file generally that the disciplinary system lacks rigor and bite.

Command Channel Review

When IPRA or BIA recommends suspension, the case goes through Command Channel Review, a process in which multiple members of an officer's chain of command review the investigative file and the appropriateness of the discipline recommendation.²⁵⁹ Command Channel Review provides a platform for members who are potentially sympathetic to the accused officer to advocate to reduce or eliminate discipline.

Command Channel reviewers have an opportunity to influence the Superintendent's discipline decision, and also that of the arbitrator, who frequently makes the final decision. Some arbitration decisions reference the recommendations of CPD supervisors who participate in Command Channel Review.²⁶⁰ For example, in an arbitration decided in 2015 the arbitrator quoted multiple officers who participated in Command Channel Review and recommended finding the case not sustained or unfounded.²⁶¹

The CPD review process overall can add considerable time to the process, which weakens the quality of the record and delays holding officers accountable. When IPRA recommends discipline, CPD is required to respond within 90 days. When BIA recommends discipline, there is no limit and the process can take up to a year.²⁶² There are no guidelines regarding how much time each of the Command Channel reviewers should spend with the case, or any triggers built into the review process to move it along.²⁶³ After the Command Channel Review, the case goes before the Superintendent.²⁶⁴ There is no amount of time given for the Superintendent's review.²⁶⁵

THE CBAS CREATE A GRIEVANCE SYSTEM THAT WEAKENS OR OVERTURNS DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS

Even after a misconduct complaint is sustained, the collective bargaining agreements provide a grievance procedure that can minimize the severity of the punishment or overturn it completely. The CBAs leave much of the final decision-making about discipline to arbitrators, who frequently reduce the discipline.²⁶⁶ There are different processes to challenge the discipline, depending on the rank of the CPD member and the amount of recommended discipline. The most recent FOP CBA introduced a form of arbitration called the Summary Opinion process, intended to produce faster results. The arbitrator's decision is final, often results in reduced discipline and is not subject to oversight.²⁶⁷

The Task Force reviewed all 62 discipline-related grievances decided via arbitration in 2015—59 decided through a streamlined process and 3 through a full arbitration.²⁶⁸ In 42 out of the 59 grievances decided via the streamlined process (more than 70%), the arbitrator reduced or eliminated the discipline. The three full arbitrations were decided in a single case, in which the arbitrator reversed IPRA's sustained finding. This pattern of arbitrators reducing discipline is not a new phenomenon. A review of 328 CPD arbitration cases decided from 1990-1993 found that discipline was "routinely cut in half by arbitrators."²⁶⁹

The decisions also varied dramatically from one arbitrator to another. One arbitrator upheld the full discipline in the majority of cases by dismissing two-thirds of the grievances presented to him. Another arbitrator upheld the discipline in only 20% of cases, reduced the discipline in 70% of cases and eliminated the discipline in 10% of cases.

The new Summary Opinion process may have some benefits, including potentially resolving matters more quickly. Of the 56 cases for which the Task Force was able to establish the date of conduct, 24 involved conduct from 2014 or 2015. In those cases, the average time between the conduct and the opinion was 447 days; 7 cases even came in under one year. In contrast, in all 56 cases (including those involving pre-2014 conduct), an average of 1,049 days elapsed between the conduct and the opinion. Thus, with the Summary Opinion process in the past 2 years, cases have been moving toward a final resolution more swiftly.

THE POLICE BOARD'S HISTORIC FINDINGS MAY HAVE IMPEDED DISCIPLINE

The Police Board has historically only terminated officers in a low percentage of cases, either reversing the Superintendent's discharge recommendations or imposing a term of suspension instead. From 1999-2008, the Police Board agreed with the Superintendent's discharge recommendations in only 39% of cases.²⁷⁰ Over the past five years, the Board upheld discharge recommendations in only 41% of cases.²⁷¹ In the remaining cases, the Board either found the officer guilty of misconduct and reduced the penalty to a suspension, or found the officer not guilty.²⁷² This practice not only has negative impacts internal to CPD—e.g., perpetuating officers' feeling of impunity—but also further erodes community trust in the accountability and disciplinary process.

These numbers have changed of late, coinciding with a recent change of leadership on the Police Board. From September 2015 through February 2016, the Board decided cases involving nine officers. For eight of the nine officers, the Board upheld the Superintendent's discharge recommendation. In the single instance where the Board disagreed with the recommendation, the Board ordered a two-year suspension and three Board members authored a dissenting opinion arguing for termination as the more appropriate penalty.²⁷³

The precise reason for the historic discrepancy between the Superintendent's discharge recommendations and the Police Board's decisions is not clear. Beyond the makeup of the Board, the quality of the record may be a factor. Several years can pass between the alleged conduct and the evidentiary hearing. A review of Police Board cases over the past five years indicates that it takes an average of 28 months for a case to reach the Police Board if it originates with BIA, and 48 months if it comes from IPRA.²⁷⁴ When so much time passes before the evidentiary hearing, which resembles a trial and involves live witness testimony, the quality of the City's case, including witnesses' recollections, can be negatively affected.

Prosecuting attorneys also may not be sufficiently supported in putting on their cases before the Police Board. The attorneys, who work for the City's Law Department, are not involved in the underlying investigations. Rather, they work from the written file already compiled by IPRA or BIA, which may be several years old. Once a case makes it before the Board, witnesses may no longer remember what occurred, they may testify differently from the facts in the written file, or the original charges may not match the live testimony.

The Police Board is relatively transparent but the organization of its information presents some obstacles to effective analysis. The Board issues monthly, quarterly and annual reports, posts the full written decision for each case it hears, and its monthly meetings and evidentiary hearings are open to the public. However, some information that could easily be placed in its regular reports is only available in the Board opinions themselves, such as the number of suspension days, where relevant, and the rank of the CPD member. The Board also does not post monthly or quarterly report archives—only the reports for the most recent month and quarter are available online. Finally, reports and data are located in several different places on the website, making it challenging to navigate without prior knowledge about where information is housed.

The Police Board is fairly streamlined and efficient. In 2015, the median number of days from filing of charges to Police Board decision was 209 days.²⁷⁵ Given the Police Board's process of taking live testimony and performing a de novo review of each disciplinary case before it, it would be difficult to cut time from this stage of the process.

THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT OF HOW DISCIPLINE IS IMPOSED

The public is largely deprived of basic information regarding what discipline is imposed in response to complaints of misconduct. State statutes, the Municipal Code, CPD Orders, CBAs and Police Board procedures govern CPD's disciplinary process. It is difficult for the public to obtain a complete picture of the process.

Because only a small fraction of complaints result in discipline, it is deeply troubling that so many systems exist for determining final discipline and no entity tracks them or knows the degree to which the recommended discipline is maintained, reduced or eliminated. Of the methods for imposing final discipline, IPRA mediations and Police Board decisions are made public, while BIA mediations, all arbitrations and instances in which the officer simply accepted the discipline are not. This is particularly significant because in the majority of cases reviewed by the Task Force, including both cases that go through the grievance and arbitration process and those heard by the Police Board, the ultimate discipline imposed was lower than what IPRA or BIA initially recommended.

The fragmented system involving IPRA, the Superintendent, BIA within CPD, numerous arbitrators and the Police Board compromises the strength and significance of the investigative findings and recommendations over time, and discourages systemic accountability and transparency. Each stage of the disciplinary process must be publicly posted, and an entity within the police oversight system must report on the data.

Recommendations

The CPD and IPRA should finalize a discipline matrix and all oversight entities should be required to follow it when recommending or imposing discipline.

The Task Force understands that IPRA already has a draft penalty matrix, and IPRA, the Police Board and BIA are awaiting its formal review and implementation. The matrix should establish clear penalties for failure to cooperate. It should require that officers who lie during misconduct investigations be fired, and officers who retaliate against any complainant be fired and referred for criminal prosecution.

The CPD should develop standards regarding when options may and may not be granted by the Superintendent.

This should also be included in any discipline matrix. Further, the granting and utilizing of options should be publicly disclosed.

Command Channel review should be eliminated entirely, and Superintendent review of BIA cases should also be limited to 90 days, like with IPRA.

The arbitration process should be subject to oversight.

The arbitration process should be scrutinized and monitored by the Inspector General for Public Safety and the Community Safety Oversight Board, and decisions must be made easily accessible to facilitate such accountability measures. Additionally, the Police Board's suspension decision should be binding on Sergeants, Lieutenants and Captains. CPD members should not be allowed to grieve a reduced suspension.

The City should conduct further analysis regarding the role of prosecuting attorneys in Police Board proceedings and whether they are sufficiently supported and best situated to prosecute cases of police misconduct before the Board.

In the meantime, the City Law Department should use training and enhanced trial advocacy protocols to support its prosecutors who try cases before the Board. New York City's model may provide some useful lessons and ideas for future reforms. New York City found when it implemented a program allowing its Civilian Complaint Review Board to prosecute cases using its own prosecutors, there were considerable benefits.²⁷⁶

The Inspector General for Public Safety should audit CPD policies and procedures that may create barriers to imposing discipline for misconduct.

The Inspector General for Public Safety should conduct pattern analysis that includes review of all discipline that is recommended by the new CPIA and BIA in order to assess disciplinary trends, to determine whether discipline is consistently applied and fair and to determine whether final disciplinary decisions are being executed as resolved.

The disciplinary process should be made fully transparent.

Immediately when BIA or IPRA serve a suspension to a CPD member, the process should be publicly posted and tracked. In real time, the public must be able to see if the member accepted the discipline, grieved the discipline or sought Police Board review, where applicable; how much time was spent in each stage; and the final disposition. While the disciplinary system is dispersed through several entities, it must always run through the CPD at some point.

Other Considerations

Some have questioned whether the Police Board should continue to serve as yet another fact-finding entity that adds an extra layer to the police oversight system, given its historically-high rate of overturning Superintendent discharge recommendations. Instead of reviewing the evidence anew (usually years after the fact), some argue that the Board could serve more of a traditional appellate role by reviewing

investigatory findings and discipline recommendations under a more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.

These changes would negate the need for Police Board hearings as they are currently conducted. An officer appealing discipline would have the opportunity to file a written brief outlining why the findings or the discipline imposed were an abuse of discretion, and the City would have the opportunity to file a brief in response, defending its actions. The Board would then render its decision, taking into account the standard of review.

While this approach has some appeal, the Task Force has not adopted it. In the current process, the Police Board represents an officer's only opportunity to be heard in termination cases. Further study would be needed before eliminating this fundamental level of due process. Moreover, the recent trend of officers universally choosing arbitration over the Police Board for suspension cases seems to suggest that officers do not view the Board as a favorable venue.

Why aren't the police held accountable through the courts and other systems?

POLICE MISCONDUCT SETTLEMENTS LACK TRANSPARENCY AND ADEQUATE OVERSIGHT

Currently, the Corporation Counsel must seek approval from the City Council for litigation settlements (including those relating to police misconduct) in excess of \$100,000. For every case for which City Council settlement approval is sought, the Corporation Counsel provides oral presentations or memorandums to the Finance Committee explaining the reasons why the proposed settlement is being recommended. The Corporation Counsel claims attorney/client privilege for these presentations and memoranda, so they are not made public. In addition, the Corporation Counsel provides the Finance Committee a monthly report about all settlements, including those below the \$100,000 City Council threshold.

The Law Department posts on its website a list of judgment and settlement payment requests sent to the Comptroller from 2008 to the present.²⁷⁷ The downloadable spreadsheets include the case number, payee name, amount, fee costs, primary cause, city department involved, disposition and date. The primary cause field is typically limited to a few words such as "fall down/sidewalk," "illegal search/seizure" or "false arrest," although many entries—approximately 25% in 2015—are abbreviations or acronyms that are not explained. While the Law Department should be commended for placing settlement data on the web that can be tracked, more can and should be done to make the system fully transparent.

Information as to the Corporation Counsel's police misconduct docket and the attorneys' evaluation of the cases on that docket is essential for the City Council to know in order to discharge its oversight responsibility. The Corporation Counsel has a duty pursuant to Rule 1.4 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct to inform the members of the City Council with respect to all ongoing litigation relating to the CPD.

Additionally, the City's lawyer has conflicts that may make it more difficult to hold officers accountable for misconduct and to make the system transparent. The Corporation Counsel, the City's top lawyer, is charged with conducting "all the law business of the city."²⁷⁸ That includes representing the Mayor, the City Council, IPRA and the Office of Inspector General, as well as individual police officers in some cases. This can create all kinds of complicated situations, because fundamentally a lawyer has a duty of loyalty

to his “client,” but if the same legal department represents multiple clients whose interests diverge, conflicts may significantly compromise the multiple, simultaneous representations. The Corporation Counsel has some process in place that attempts to address some of these inherent conflicts.

These conflicts—or at least the appearance of conflict—can frequently arise in police misconduct lawsuits. The Corporation Counsel often represents both the police officer and the City, which is often also named as a defendant. The potential for conflict is even greater when the Corporation Counsel wishes to settle a case by making a payment to the victim.

LITIGATION PRACTICES MAY IMPEDE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE COURTS

Inefficiencies and delays arising in litigation of civil rights and other cases against the police, particularly discovery issues, significantly slow down the processing of civil lawsuits by citizens. Civil rights attorneys with extensive experience litigating against the City have raised concerns about the City’s compliance with discovery requests. They maintain that documentation is frequently withheld through a system in which discovery is delegated to paralegals, City attorneys maintain ignorance of available documents within CPD, and discovery obligations are not treated with appropriate seriousness.

The City recently retained Winston & Strawn to conduct an independent review of the Law Department’s Federal Civil Rights Litigation division. In deference to that review, the Task Force is not making substantive findings or recommendations on these issues.

BIAS OR THE PERCEPTION OF BIAS MAY TAINT THE STATE’S ATTORNEY IN POLICE MATTERS

The relationship between police officers and the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office creates actual bias or the perception of bias that undermines trust in the system and may result in criminal behavior by police going unpunished.

CPD and the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office are required to work in close collaboration. CPD investigates cases that the State’s Attorney ultimately prosecutes. Police officers often testify in cases brought by the State’s Attorney and the strength of the State’s Attorney’s case may depend on the strength of the police officer testimony. Because of that close working relationship and interdependence, many wonder whether the State’s Attorney can be fair and impartial when deciding whether to bring charges against police officers accused of misconduct, or when deciding the severity of the charges to bring.

Indeed, many believe that the State’s Attorney’s office has a bias in favor of police officers, especially in cases that may involve more serious misconduct where police officers might face severe penalties. They believe that the long time that elapsed from the Laquan McDonald shooting to the day charges were brought against Officer Jason Van Dyke reflects that bias.

Though it is difficult to prove whether some State’s Attorneys do in fact fail to zealously prosecute cases of police misconduct, it is certainly the case that even the perception of bias undermines trust in the system. However, Illinois law does not currently permit the appointment of a special prosecutor in these situations.

Aside from the specific issue of police prosecutions, in its day-to-day work the State’s Attorney regularly encounters police misconduct. However, the State’s Attorney has no mandatory information-sharing protocol with IPRA and BIA. The Task Force is aware of troubling incidents where the Cook County State’s

Attorney's Office has failed to pursue perjury charges when CPD members have lied or are otherwise found not credible in court. In order for the CPD to take meaningful steps toward breaking the "code of silence," it must be made aware of such conduct and take swift action.

THE PENSION SYSTEM HOLDS FEW POLICE ACCOUNTABLE FOR MISCONDUCT

Police officers found guilty of serious misconduct can sometimes continue to receive publicly funded pensions. None of the entities involved in the disciplinary infrastructure have any ability to impair an officer's pension benefits.

Under Illinois law, pension benefits may not be paid to any person who is "convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his service as a policeman."²⁷⁹ The Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago authorizes payments to fund members. Historically, the Retirement Board has rarely voted to deny officers their pensions, even in the face of serious findings of misconduct. For example, the Retirement Board in 2011 voted 4-4 to allow Jon Burge to keep his pension. Burge argued that his convictions for obstruction of justice and perjury related to conduct *after* he had left the CPD.²⁸⁰ The tie vote meant that Burge would continue to receive pension benefits.

Following the Burge case, a new state law was passed that specifically permits the Attorney General to file a civil action to cease pension payments to public employees convicted of felonies related to employment.²⁸¹ The Attorney General's ability to bring these actions is an important check on the police oversight system because non-parties, such as the City of Chicago, are very limited in their legal ability to challenge Pension Board decisions. But it is still difficult and rare to deny a former police officer a publicly funded pension, even if the officer was found to have engaged in serious misconduct while on the job.

Recommendations

The City should disclose more information on police misconduct settlements to the City Council and the public.

The text of oral presentations and written memoranda from the Corporation Counsel to the City Council describing the reasons for proposed settlements above the \$100,000 threshold should describe the reasons for the proposed settlement in sufficient detail to enable the members of the City Council to make an informed decision as to whether to approve the settlement. Moreover, because taxpayer funds are at stake and because of the public importance of cases with a settlement value above the threshold, the memoranda should also be publicly available after a settlement is finalized.

The Corporation Counsel should provide the Public Safety Committee of the City Council with a quarterly police misconduct docket report listing all cases (regardless of settlement amount) and providing: (a) the case name and court number; (b) the names of the defendants and plaintiffs; (c) a brief description of the allegations (beyond the limited information currently provided by Law online); (d) where appropriate, information as to the disposition of the case, including, with respect to cases that have been settled or have resulted in judgments in favor of the plaintiff, the amounts in question; and (d) any additional information with respect to a specific case that, in the Corporation

Counsel's judgment, should be brought to the Committee's attention. (Note that this is a significant advance beyond annual reports currently created by the office.) Further, because of the public importance of the police misconduct docket, the docket report described above should be publicly available.

The new Inspector General for Public Safety should also provide a "red flag" coversheet for every proposed settlement that goes before the City Council. The coversheet should detail any history of complaints and allegations for the officers involved in the subject case.

To avoid conflicts in police misconduct cases and other matters, the City Council should enact legislation that permits it to hire its own General Counsel to provide legal services and advice on legislative, policy and litigation matters.

The General Counsel office must be adequately staffed and fully empowered to represent the interests of the City Council. This should include the legal authority to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses for purposes of examination and the production of documents and other items for inspection and/or duplication, and the authority to hire outside counsel as appropriate. Similarly, CPIA should have the ability to retain and compensate counsel of the agency's choosing to represent the agency in actions to enforce subpoenas issued by the agency.

The City should advocate for new state legislation that would require the appointment of an independent prosecutor, separate from the State's Attorney, to handle all phases of any prosecution of any case in which a police officer is charged with causing death or great bodily harm without justification.

The State's Attorney should be required to provide oversight bodies with evidence of police misconduct that is not the subject of an ongoing prosecution.

The City should seek to secure a Memorandum of Understanding with the Cook County State's Attorney's Office and the Public Defender's Office that requires these entities to notify CPD, the Corporation Counsel's office and the police oversight bodies—BIA, CPIA and the Public Safety Inspector General—in any case where an officer is found to be lying or otherwise found to be not credible under oath. Such a notification should trigger a complaint log number and an automatic investigation, much like a firearm discharge notification.

Further research into the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund is required to determine if additional changes in law and policy can ensure that police officers are not rewarded for official misconduct.

Understandably, the law makes it difficult to take away a pension benefit from someone who has earned it. But people should not be rewarded for abusing their power and violating the public trust and the law.

Endnotes

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- ²²¹ FOP Contract Appendix L ¶ 7.
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Early Intervention & Personnel Concerns

Why does CPD lack a culture of accountability when it comes to the internal management of its police officers?

There is a sense within the community, which the Task Force has heard time and again, that police officers are not held accountable for their actions and misconduct. The larger discussion on policing that is taking place across Chicago has included the question as to why CPD has fostered a culture in which supervisors turn a blind eye to misconduct and do not provide sufficient oversight to ensure that officers perform their duties with integrity.

Community members are rightfully skeptical that enough is being done internally to adequately supervise officers and to identify officers whose actions are falling short of the community's expectations. CPD lags behind other police departments when it comes to managing risk posed by officer misconduct.

The fact of the matter is that there is a general absence of a culture of accountability within CPD, largely because no one in top leadership has taken ownership of the issue. Although so-called "problem officers" are either well known to their supervisors and CPD's leadership or easily identified, few steps are being taken to proactively manage and redirect those officers' conduct. The effective tools for providing greater oversight and supervision to officers are well known and widely used in other jurisdictions. There appears to be no urgency within CPD around accountability. Something must change, and that change must come from the highest levels of CPD.

CPD's efforts to actively monitor and improve officer behavior appear to be at a standstill, but the problem is not new. CPD's history is replete with examples of wayward officers whose bad behavior or propensity for bad behavior could have been identified much earlier if anyone had viewed managing this risk as a business imperative.

Take former CPD officer Jerome Finnigan as an example. In 2006, Finnigan, an 18-year CPD veteran, was arrested for leading a rogue group of officers in CPD's elite Special Operations Section in carrying out robberies, home invasions, kidnappings and other crimes. Finnigan was later charged with plotting to hire a hit man from a street gang to murder his former partner, who he believed was cooperating with prosecutors. Finnigan pled guilty to the murder-for-hire scheme and income tax-related charges stemming from money he stole and is serving a 12-year sentence in federal prison.

When Finnigan was arrested, many reported that he had been considered a model officer. Indeed, he won numerous commendations for his work in the Special Operations Section. In 1999, he received the Superintendent's Award of Valor for protecting a store owner during a robbery and helping apprehend the offenders, all while he was off duty. Even prosecutors conceded at his sentencing that Finnigan was at one point viewed as an outstanding officer.

But, despite outward appearances, red flags were piling up long before 2006. Between 2000 and the time he was indicted in 2006 and ultimately resigned in 2008, Finnigan racked up 89 CRs. Over the entire course of his career, he had 161 total CRs—a shocking number by any standard. These CRs were for a range of serious complaints, including numerous lawsuits; numerous warrantless, non-consensual searches; theft; and other felony crimes. And yet, according to CPD records provided by the City, no effort was ever taken to enroll Finnigan in the department's formal intervention programs or otherwise intercede in his obvious pattern of misconduct.²⁸² (Finnigan was later identified in CPD's manual efforts to identify and enroll more officers in the department's formal intervention programs—discussed in more detail below—but, by that point, Finnigan had already been indicted.)

In 2005, another CPD officer, Corey Flagg, was arrested for his part in a ring of five Englewood officers who used traffic stops and home invasions to rob drug dealers. Flagg pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana, as well as possession of a firearm in a drug trafficking crime, and was sentenced to nearly 10 years in prison. Flagg's record also raised numerous red flags. As with Finnigan, Flagg incurred large numbers of CRs during his tenure at CPD—88 in total—and received a number of lengthy suspensions. (Unlike Finnigan, Flagg was enrolled in the department's behavioral intervention program in 2003.)


Some might argue that Finnigan's and Flagg's criminal conduct is aberrational. It is not. Police corruption cases in Chicago may not be commonplace, but neither are they rare occurrences. Former CPD Gang Crimes Officer Joseph Miedzianowski (sentenced to life imprisonment for racketeering, drug conspiracy and robbery), former CPD Chief of Detectives William Harnhardt (pled guilty to racketeering and conspiracy) and former CPD Narcotics Officer Glenn Lewellen (guilty of narcotics conspiracy) are but three of the most notorious instances of police corruption in recent memory.²⁸³ But there have been others, and it is clear that some portion of the Chicago police force still is not meeting their professional and legal obligations.



Certainly, a great majority of CPD officers are principled, dedicated and ethical employees who serve our community with respect and care. However, for any number of reasons, unfortunately there are times when officer performance comes up short. For example, a review of CR histories of all CPD officers between 2007 and 2015 showed that approximately 1,572 officers had 10 or more CRs to their name during that time period (many with more than 10).²⁸⁴ Of those officers, 189 were Sergeants, 21 were Lieutenants and 2 were Commanders.

The Task Force also took a close look at litigation and settlement data provided by the City for civil rights cases involving allegations against CPD officers. Given the often-disheveled state of this data, as the City provided it to the Task Force, it is difficult to report on these cases with absolute certainty, but we can provide reasonable estimates.²⁸⁵

From 2010 through 2015, the City has handled approximately 2,000 cases involving civil rights allegations against its police officers. The Task Force has been told that there are about 400 such cases pending against police officers at any one time. The amount of money the City pays to resolve these cases is staggering—over \$600 million since 2004, with close to \$400 million spent in the last five years alone.²⁸⁶ Many of the names of CPD officers who appear frequently on the litigation and settlement lists are familiar with the public—Joe Dortha Parker (24 cases), Richard Fiorito (11 cases), Jerome Finnigan (10 cases) and Keith Herrera (8 cases). Clearly, a portion of CPD's officers are costing the City and its taxpayers many millions of dollars each year in settlements, judgments and lost man-hours and, in the most egregious circumstances, unnecessarily injuring or killing community members. The actions of these officers are significantly contributing to the erosion of trust between CPD and the public—the very people they have sworn to serve and protect.



One part of the solution to this deeply ingrained problem is improving oversight and management of police officers, something that is sorely lacking in today's CPD. When men and women choose to join the police force, it is often for life. CPD—and, in turn, the taxpayers and citizens of Chicago—make a huge investment in every police officer over the course of his or her career.

More can and should be done to support these officers and redirect their behavior before it is too late. Police departments around the country use tools to identify officers with at-risk behavior to receive additional non-disciplinary supports in order to redirect the behavior of wayward cops, including counseling, training and reassignment. It is up to CPD leadership to take responsibility for a pivot toward a culture of accountability and embrace these management tools to improve oversight of their officers and, in turn, improve policing outcomes for the community.

What are the current internal mechanisms for holding CPD's officers accountable for their conduct?

Although it would be unfair to say that CPD is not taking any steps to understand and intervene in officer misconduct, the proactive steps that have been taken are significantly limited and woefully inadequate compared to best practices. Moreover, some steps have been subject to significant resistance from stakeholders, such as the police unions.

CPD relies on two formal early intervention programs to address officers exhibiting potentially problematic conduct. These are known as Behavioral Intervention System (BIS) and Personnel Concerns (PC), and both were implemented in 1980 and remain in place today.²⁸⁷ BIS is a non-disciplinary system that seeks to provide “early identification of members who engage in conduct which is contrary to the goals of the Department.”²⁸⁸ This program puts the onus on command and supervisory officers to monitor the performance of their subordinates. Police officers are placed in BIS upon approval by the command staff member of the Human Resources Division. The command staff member may consider officers for inclusion based on recommendations from certain high-level individuals within the CPD system. The program looks at certain “performance data” as “behavioral intervention indicators.” Once admitted into the BIS, the police officer will be subject to an Individualized Performance Plan (“IPP”), which governs the steps used to resolve the unacceptable performance/behaviors.

PC is another non-disciplinary system that addresses the most serious problematic behavior or performance issues and is often the second line of intervention where BIS has not reformed undesirable conduct. CPD uses the system “to intervene in an employee’s problems, behavior, or performance issues which, without assistance, may lead to severe disciplinary measures or separation from the Department.”²⁸⁹ As with BIS, any number of high-ranking individuals within the CPD system can recommend a police officer for placement into PC and must be approved by the command staff member of the Human Resources Division.

PC allows for a range of “corrective action[s] to address the identified behavior,” including but not limited to, requesting a Psychological Fitness for Duty Evaluation, changing the officer’s partner, weekly performance reviews and retraining. The steps taken are documented in the officer’s IPP, and Personnel Concerns Progress reports are prepared and submitted up the chain of command to the command staff member of the Human Resources Division for review. For both the BIS and PC programs, supervisors are required to prepare reports regarding counseling sessions and other meetings, as well as compliance with the IPP. These reports are sent to CPD’s Human Resources Division. The Human Resources Division only began tracking these reports with an Excel spreadsheet in 2014.²⁹⁰

In the mid-1990s, CPD was on the cutting edge of using technology to identify police officers who were engaging in blatant misconduct or whose behavior was otherwise out of step with department policies. CPD acquired a computer software system called BrainMaker Professional to sift through internal data on all officers and, based on computer code that identified behavioral patterns, picked out the officers who showed potential for problem behavior.²⁹¹ The idea was to divert the identified officers toward counseling before they committed any crimes.²⁹² According to reports, initial runs of the system showed that it was fairly adept at picking out problem officers, based on the fact that many of the officers identified by the system had already been singled out by supervisors for participation in CPD’s formal intervention

programs.²⁹³ But it also picked out others who, based on patterns of behavior hidden in the troves of data kept on them in CPD, were potentially at risk for problems; even though their disciplinary and intervention histories were clean.²⁹⁴

Eventually, CPD scrapped the BrainMaker system.²⁹⁵ According to some, the program was discontinued in response to opposition from the FOP; others suggest that the program was never fully embraced by CPD leadership.²⁹⁶

In 1997, the Commission on Police Integrity promoted an “early warning” system in Chicago, which the Commission explained was embodied in CPD’s existing BIS and PC programs.²⁹⁷ To “enhance the Department’s ability to identify and correct the behavior of officers at risk,” the Commission called for expansion of those programs. Essentially, the Commission applauded steps CPD was already taking to add a requirement that officers who were participating in the BIS and PC programs to complete IPPs. Eventually, this requirement was implemented in both programs. Although it moved the ball forward, this recommendation clearly did not go far enough to promote a culture of accountability. (The Commission also recommended that CPD analyze unit-wide conduct as part of its “early warning” system. It does not appear that CPD ever adopted that recommendation.)

CPD undertook other efforts in the late 1990s and early 2000s to expand accountability measures and early intervention activities. One example was the implementation of the Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (“CLEAR”) system, which gave supervisory personnel a new tool to analyze officer behavior.²⁹⁸ Numerous analyses were conducted using the CLEAR system to better understand police officer behavior and outcomes, including use and misuse of medical leave and factors that contribute to the lodging of citizen complaints against police officers. Another reform that was created was the use of management intervention for certain infractions that were viewed as minor.

But those reforms, in large part, were allowed to wither on the vine or were never executed at all. Money that was slated for the development of a computer-based early intervention system was diverted to other department priorities. Realizing that CPD still needed to address problem officers even without the help of a computer program, in 2006, CPD tried to manually conduct a review of employees and recommend police officers it viewed as requiring intervention for more supervision and monitoring. This assessment was based on the number of CRs filed against them and the number of TRRs they had completed over a certain period of time. Many of the officers who were identified were enrolled in BIS or PC.

In 2006, the FOP filed a grievance in response to this manual review and sought to have officers who were placed in BIS removed from the programs.²⁹⁹ According to the FOP, the members who were placed in BIS did not satisfy the criteria for placement in the program as set forth in the corresponding general order, in violation of the CBA.³⁰⁰ In a subsequent settlement agreement, CPD agreed to remove officers from BIS, as well as any officers who had been upgraded to PC.

A later innovation was the implementation in 2008 of a “dashboard” as part of CPD’s Performance Recognition System, which tracks various data points for individual officers, including CRs, days off and trends in citations. The full list of data points for the Performance Recognition System dashboard is: Complaint Registers, Complaint Register Logs, Tactical Response Reports, Summary Punishment Action Requests, Awards, Arrests, Contacts, Driver Cards, Traffic Stop Statistical Study Cards, Recovered

Firearms, Search Warrants, Medical Events, Injured on Duty Days, Non-Injured on Duty Days, CR Ratio and TRR Ratio.³⁰¹

The purpose of the Performance Recognition System and its complementary dashboard is ostensibly to “assist[] Department supervisors in recognizing exceptional or adverse behavior related to job performance of members under their command” and identify behavior that “may be improved by nondisciplinary options or methods.”³⁰² The dashboard comes equipped with the ability to compare individual officers against others, with adjustments from unit to unit and supervisor to supervisor. Each officer is given a red, yellow or green designation with respect to the officer’s CRs and TFFs. The CR Ratio is a percentage ratio of the number of CRs divided by the number of arrests. The TRR Ratio is a percentage ratio of TRRs divided by the number of arrests. For each percentage ratio, under 3% is a green designation, 3-10% is a yellow designation, and over 10% is a red designation.³⁰³ The Performance Evaluation System policy also includes a range of “interventions” that a supervisor can take if he or she identifies exceptional or adverse behavior among any of their officers.

Why are these current CPD accountability systems ineffective?

INCOMPLETE DATA COLLECTION AND LIMITED ANALYSIS

Our research reveals that CPD engages in a wide range of data collection about officer behavior. But, as with other data collection activities across CPD, this collection is incomplete, and distribution and analysis is decentralized and limited. In addition, systematic follow-up or review does not appear to be required for shared data.

For instance, on a quarterly basis, the Office of Legal Affairs and the BIA distribute, respectively, summaries of lawsuits naming police officers as defendants and officers recommended for BIS/PC. These reports are pushed out to command personnel in CPD, but they are apparently used for information purposes only and no action is sought or required. Thus, distribution and analysis is limited, and follow-up on this crucial information is neither mandatory nor documented in any systematic way. Moreover, the information contained in the OLA reports is skeletal and provides very little useful information to command staff and supervisors about the nature of lawsuits lodged against their officers. Below are sample excerpts of these reports.

Sample Office of Legal Affairs Quarterly Report:

Quarterly Report						
Olname	Ofirstname	Docketnum	Daterecvd	Officer#	Unit Assign	category
██████	██████	13C4152	7/11/2013	██████	001	03d
██████	██████	13M1303255	12/16/2013	██████	001	TC
██████	██████	13C4152	7/11/2013	██████	001	03d

Sample BIA Quarterly Report:

Bureau of Internal Affairs Analytical Section Q3 2014 data for Behavioral Intervention and Personnel Concerns Programs					03-October-2014
Notice of employees with sustained Excessive Force complaints in which separation is not recommended within in the last 5 years (since 01 Oct 2009) as per E. 06-06 IV-C-1 and IV-C-3. RC: Notification of Eligibility for Placement into a Personnel Management Program					
Unit 001					
Employee Number: [REDACTED]					
<u>CR#</u>	<u>Closed</u>	<u>Sworn</u>	<u>Final</u>	<u>Findings</u>	
1043290	11/07/2012	Y	003-Days Suspension	SU	
Employee Number: [REDACTED]					
<u>CR#</u>	<u>Closed</u>	<u>Sworn</u>	<u>Final</u>	<u>Findings</u>	
1035207	06/27/2011	Y	000-Violation Noted	SU	

Other important litigation-related data points receive even less attention from CPD. One recent case highlighted the most dramatic manifestation of this problem, where a judge expressly ruled that an officer's testimony against a defendant was not credible.

In 2015, a Cook County court ruled against the detective in a hearing to suppress two incriminating statements that the detective said he obtained from the defendant.³⁰⁴ The detective claimed that the defendant confessed to the alleged crime when he visited him in the hospital while he was heavily sedated after emergency surgery for multiple gunshot wounds. Nurses who were present for the questioning testified that the defendant was in no condition to be interviewed because of the heavy morphine sedation he was under at the time. In granting the motion to suppress, the judge reportedly described the detective's testimony as "garbage" and concluded that he had "to seriously question whether [the defendant] ever did anything but maybe grunt or even knew who he was talking to."³⁰⁵ Not long after the court excluded the alleged incriminating statements, the State's Attorney's Office dropped the charges against the defendant.³⁰⁶

Although some judges will go on record expressly finding that a police officer's testimony is not credible, explicit findings are the exception. More often, we hear that evidence is lacking against a defendant to sustain the charges, but the message is clear. There is no systematic or regular collection of information regarding adverse findings against individual officers in criminal or civil cases.

In addition, other sources of highly relevant information are currently available to CPD but not acted upon. For instance, we know that there is a problem with CPD officers showing up for court appearances. Data provided by CPD shows that, of the 20,922 Summary Punishment Action Requests ("SPARs") initiated by supervisors from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2015, approximately 9,440 of the SPARs were opened under the "court appearance violation" complaint category. (SPARs are "[a]n alternative disciplinary procedure for conduct defined as a less serious transgression which is observed by or comes to the attention of a Department supervisor or command staff member."³⁰⁷) That means that 45% of all SPARs for that 5-year period relate to an officer's violation of a mandatory court appearance.

When an officer makes an arrest but then fails to show up to account for that arrest in open court, legitimacy is lost and trust diminishes. This high number of no-shows also raises serious questions about the underlying legitimacy of the arrests. Even in the face of a lack of accountability for this crucial element of their officers' job, it is not clear how CPD addresses this issue internally outside of issuing SPARs and, as a result, short suspensions.

Finally, notwithstanding the staggering amount of money that the City spends annually on legal settlements and judgments against officers, there is no action taken within CPD on the basis of that information. Officers who are creating significant liability for the City are among the first category of officers who warrant special attention for possible professional intervention. And yet this important metric is not being monitored closely, nor are any specific disciplinary or non-disciplinary actions taken in the face of the filing or disposition of a lawsuit. Moreover, if the City decides it must settle a case due to credibility questions or other indefensible actions by an individual officer, there currently exists no formal, systematic process for identifying problem officers and taking appropriate action. Clearly, the lines of communication between CPD and the City's Law Department, which is responsible for defending individual officers in legal proceedings, could be significantly improved. Moreover, CPD, particularly the BIA, Office of Legal Affairs and Human Resources, must develop a comprehensive plan for acting and intervening based on litigation information.

DISCRETIONARY SUPERVISOR REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE DATA

Although supervisors have a potentially invaluable tool and data for each of the officers under their charge through the Performance Recognition System and the dashboard program, this monitoring and intervention system is literally not working.

First, there are no mandatory requirements that supervisors use the system to analyze data or intervene in officer misconduct. Review of the data is entirely discretionary—or it is at least treated that way.³⁰⁸

Second, supervisors are not required to input information to explain the data or the reasons for the green-yellow-red designations or take any action in response to the data they receive.³⁰⁹ As a result, there is no way to know if supervisors are even using the dashboard, much less how they are using it. Although the governing departmental policy says that it is a designated supervisor's responsibility to monitor, track and take action in response to "exemplary" or "adverse" behavior,³¹⁰ there do not appear to be any enforcement mechanisms and, according to our interviews, the system is considered far from mandatory. In fact, Task Force interviews with officers and supervisory personnel indicate that the dashboard has not been functional so far in 2016.³¹¹

FORMAL INTERVENTION PROGRAMS ARE UNDER-UTILIZED

Even CPD's more formalized intervention programs—BIS and PC—are only lightly used. They are also not structured in a systematic way that is supported from top leadership and promotes buy-in from supervisors and the rank-and-file.



Participation in the BIS and PC programs has dropped off precipitously in recent years. In 2007, 276 officers were included in either BI or PC. Participation quickly dropped off after the FOP filed a grievance against CPD for certain officers' inclusion. CPD and the FOP settled the grievance by agreeing to remove officers from the programs. By 2013, **zero** officers were being actively managed through either of those programs. In 2014, only 7 officers were enrolled in the program. In 2015, 13 officers were enrolled.

Logic tells us that far more officers should be in these programs. CPD has approximately 12,500 budgeted sworn officers. We know that, each year, thousands of CRs are lodged, and a consistently high number of lawsuits are filed. If supervisors and leadership were truly taking a hard look at the conduct of their officers, we would expect many more officers to be involved in the formal intervention programs.

In addition to being used for only a handful of officers (and for one year, not at all), the programs appear to be used on an ad hoc basis only. That is, officers are admitted to the programs if they are identified for inclusion by a select group within CPD, including their chain of command, BIA or IPRA, but no one is required to evaluate officers for potential inclusion in the programs in any systematic or mandatory way. Under those conditions, we can be sure that officers who warrant additional attention are falling through the cracks. Officers can also only be included in the program for intervention if approved by the department's top Human Resources staff, which makes it more likely that officers are only included in the programs when their conduct is so egregious as to call for action at the highest levels of the department. It also requires the attention of high-level administrators with innumerable demands on their time. The programs also focus mostly on problems that are identified through the department's disciplinary system, and trends of problematic behavior are not based on a more nuanced mosaic of data. On top of that, CPD does not use any metrics to measure or assess the effectiveness of the programs. This further diminishes the ability to hold officers and the entire intervention system accountable.

With that said, CPD did implement a nondisciplinary intervention program in 2004 to try to target one form of misconduct (verbal abuse) that is often the subject of CRs but is difficult to investigate because of the he-said/she-said nature of the allegation. Under the program, supervisors are responsible for implementing interventions when a verbal abuse complaint register is received for his/her direct report. The program provides a schedule of interventions that increase in magnitude as the number of verbal abuse complaint registers rack up against an officer. However, it does not appear that CPD has made any sustained efforts to measure or analyze the effectiveness of this program, even though the Special Order governing the program requires CPD to do so.³¹² Although the Task Force was told that CPD performed one such assessment of the program around 2008,³¹³ CPD has not provided the relevant materials evidencing the results of that assessment in response to the Task Force's requests.³¹⁴

LITTLE FOCUS ON MANAGEMENT ROLE OF SUPERVISORS

Our review of CPD's policies has revealed that there is very little focus on the development of personnel management skills for officers in supervisory positions.

Sergeants are promoted through exam or merit appointment. Neither promotional process, however, formally evaluates Sergeant candidates for competency with personnel management principles or concepts. As CPD acknowledges, this process does not address the development of leadership skills or determine whether candidates for promotion are capable of handling the management roles regarding the health and well-being of supervisees they would assume. Although the panel reviewing candidates for promotion consider leadership potential, they do not consider metrics or requirements that are focused on the ability to manage the well-being or overall conduct of police officers under their supervision. Upon promotion, Sergeants receive very little additional leadership or management training. The sum total of newly promoted Sergeants' training on relevant issues includes seven hours of leadership training.

After officers are promoted to supervisor roles, there is no formal process in place to evaluate their performance. Supervisor evaluations are merely informal in nature, and any evaluation practice is completely dependent on the practices of each district's and district Commander's informal evaluation practices. The performance of a supervisor's officers may be addressed in this informal evaluation that is provided to supervisors, but it is not required and is provided only at the discretion of the leadership of the particular district in which a supervisor works.

Neither the message from the top nor the evaluation and promotion processes emphasize officers' performance and/or personnel concerns. Instead, the focus of top leadership at the department appears to be entirely concerned with crime statistics to the exclusion of any other metrics. For instance, command staff meets monthly for CompStat meetings. The meetings' focus is on discussion and dissemination of crime statistics, but, according to our interviews, there was, until very recently, no attention paid to personnel issues, much less discussion of addressing real or suspected misconduct.

As an indication of the lack of focus on management issues, it appears that training on the BIS and PC intervention programs was only provided to Commanders, Captains and Lieutenants during a CompStat meeting earlier this year.³¹⁵ So far as we can tell, this training has not been provided to Sergeants who are the direct supervisors of beat officers and on a daily basis teach more officers than any other supervisor. While we applaud this step toward elevating the importance of intervention within the department, much more must be done within CPD to ensure that active management of its police officers is a top priority.

What is the right tool for CPD to use to hold police officers and their supervisors accountable on a range of issues, including use of force and respectful interactions with citizens?

A robust management system for police officers is essential. Pre-employment screening, recruit training, and in-service training are clearly not enough. And CPD's current monitoring and intervention system is woefully inadequate, lacking any sense of leadership or urgency and therefore failing to provide adequate oversight. To permit comprehensive management of the City's police officers, it is imperative that CPD has a system in place that allows for a 360-degree view on the conduct of its officers.³¹⁶ This comprehensive system will require the aggregation and analysis of data across a wide range of officer touch points to identify those officers requiring additional management and intervention.

The intention should be to provide a tool that CPD can use to identify problematic behaviors at the earliest possible instance so that it can get officers back on track or manage them out of the department. Implementing such a system will not require CPD to re-invent the wheel. Indeed, as mentioned previously, many other jurisdictions across the country have led the way by implementing EIS as a way of proactively identifying officers who exhibit behaviors that put them at risk of misconduct.

In significant part, this widespread practice is the result of the Department of Justice requiring the implementation of EIS through the consent decrees that result from the type of pattern and practice investigation that it is currently conducting of CPD. Based on this precedent, if the Department of Justice substantiates a pattern and practice violation in Chicago, we fully expect that the Department of Justice will impose EIS on CPD at the end of its investigation. To varying degrees, a number of other jurisdictions have also implemented EIS independently of the Department of Justice. Indeed, as early as 1999,

approximately 27% of the law enforcement offices surveyed by the National Institute of Justice had already implemented some form of EIS.³¹⁷ The New York Police Department, for instance, has long had EIS to monitor officer conduct and intervene with additional supports where needed.³¹⁸ It is currently in the process of updating its EIS to create “a single, integrated database for both officer performance analysis and department-wide risk assessment.”³¹⁹ The Miami-Dade Police Department’s EIS may be the oldest such system, which was first developed around 1981.³²⁰

Studies of these systems show that they can work and are effective at reducing instances of officer misconduct.³²¹ EIS leverages numerous sources of data regarding officer conduct, including arrests, citizen complaints, missed training and much more, to spot officers whose behavior is outside of the acceptable range of other peer officers with similar assignments. Isolating these officers then allows the police department to use the system to apply non-disciplinary interventions to modify problem behavior or, on the flip side, acknowledge and commend exceptional conduct. But no EIS will have the intended impact without complete buy-in from CPD’s top leadership, line supervisors and unions.

Recommendations

CPD leadership must take ownership of accountability issues and order the design and implementation of a mandatory EIS that centrally collects data across a broad range of data points to capture information on the totality of officer activity.

CPD leadership must fully embrace a shift toward a culture of accountability. To that end, the Task Force recommends that CPD implement a mandatory EIS system. Support for this new accountability mechanism must come from the top. Our research shows that CPD has suffered from a crisis of leadership when it comes to taking ownership of accountability for the conduct of its officers and the impact they have in the community.

An accountability system requires buy-in from the whole spectrum of the law enforcement system—from CPD brass and rank-and-file to judges to prosecutors to all external investigatory bodies (currently IPRA and the Chicago Police Board). One challenge to implementing EIS is obtaining support from the relevant stakeholders. This includes police officers, supervisors and the unions. Many studies indicate great apprehension about the motivations for and effectiveness of an EIS from these stakeholders, but those studies also indicate that the problems that were feared are generally not realized.³²²

To get ahead of this challenge, experts in the field stress the importance of “operational change management” to promote buy-in.³²³ That means owning the roll-out of EIS to ensure that those impacted understand the purpose and process of the new system and making sure that any necessary organizational changes are made to absorb the new activity required by the system. Educating officers that EIS is for intervention and not discipline can go a long way toward forging a smooth transition.³²⁴

This education process can also extend to community stakeholders. Informing community members about EIS can improve confidence in accountability practices and foster better community relations.³²⁵ For instance, at the Detroit Police Department, leadership instituted a meeting similar to CompStat to discuss use of force issues and policy changes with respect to its EIS in which community members were invited to participate.³²⁶ This was also meant to show community

members that these performance and policy issues were taken seriously, and, to do so, leadership made a point of discussing these topics in the stand-alone Command Accountability Meetings that they convened.³²⁷

In recommending that CPD adopt an EIS, it is not the Task Force's intention to lay out every specific detail of the EIS that should be adopted. Without careful study of the department's needs, that exercise would be impossible. However, our research has identified many consistent themes and insights that we believe should inform any EIS:

(1) CPD's EIS must be non-disciplinary in nature.

First and foremost, as a best practice, it is important to be clear that an EIS is meant to be exactly what its name implies—intervention and *not* discipline.³²⁸ EIS is meant to be complementary to a police department's disciplinary system as a “component of an agency's personnel management toolbox.”³²⁹ Numerous police departments that the Task Force interviewed regarding their EIS programs stressed the importance of this point.³³⁰

(2) CPD's EIS should track all available data on officer activities.

The next issue that must be confronted is what types of data points or performance indicators will be fed into the system for analysis. Based on our review, current models vary between a dozen to a few dozen data points/indicators. In the Los Angeles Police Department and the San Diego Police Department, for instance, their EIS programs use 14 different data points on each individual officer.³³¹ The Detroit Police Department, on the other hand, tracks 52 different performance indicators.³³² There is a basic universe of data points that are common to the existing systems (e.g., uses of force, complaints), but some data points may also be adopted in response to issues or controversies that are specific to a given police department.³³³

In order to obtain a true 360-degree view on CPD officer conduct, the Task Force recommends that all trackable officer activities should be fed into its EIS. The system should be designed to integrate data from a variety of sources to capture information on the totality of officer activity. Minimum data collected should include: citizen complaints; SPARs; traffic accidents; missed court appearances; medical usage; traffic crashes; traffic chases; shots fired; discretionary “contempt of cop” arrests (e.g., resisting arrest, disorderly conduct); and legal actions naming police officers (tracking through resolution of civil lawsuit or criminal case and any adverse findings at any stage of case). Currently, CPD already collects a great deal of this data, but efforts to analyze that data are sorely lacking. CPD can better leverage the data it has at its fingertips to measure the performance of its officers in a systematic way and intervene with those officers who are sliding off track.

(3) CPD's EIS should use peer-to-peer data comparisons to identify which officers receive interventions.

Once the relevant data points have been identified, the system must determine how to identify officers for intervention. Within the context of an EIS, this is often referred to as setting “thresholds” or “triggers.” There is no consensus on the best set of thresholds or triggers, and a variety of different practices are used, including: (1) setting department-level thresholds; (2) setting them based on a comparison between officers who perform similar functions (known as “peer groups”); and (3) using performance ratios (e.g., uses of force to number of arrests).³³⁴

The Los Angeles Police Department analyzes each officer's data against the officer's designated "peer group," of which there are 33 in all.³³⁵ The peer groups are designated so that officers performing similar activities are compared against other officers performing those same activities (i.e., similar rank, function, duty, and assignment); however, the peer groups do not take into account how those same activities can differ based on a geographic assignment across the city. In contrast, the Seattle Police Department's trigger thresholds are standard across the department for all officers.³³⁶ This means that there are no peer groups to ensure that the thresholds are tailored to the different kind of functions that officers can perform across the police department.

Given the vast differences in policing across Chicago, CPD should use true peer-to-peer comparisons to allow for apples-to-apples comparisons. Therefore, officers who are performing patrol duties are compared against other patrol officers and officers assigned to "fast" districts are not held up against officers in relatively "slow" districts. One challenge with this approach is that the actual "task" that a given officer undertakes—both in terms of its potential productive value for society, and its risk of an adverse outcome—can vary enormously even within job assignments, police beats and shifts. In developing its peer-to-peer comparisons, CPD must ensure that EIS is not confounding the influence of officer risk with the challenge of the job or environment in which they are working to avoid disincentivizing officers from taking on the hardest assignments. With this in mind, the actual triggers that CPD would use in this system must be determined based on a careful study of the data. Appendix 8 explores the technical aspects of identifying the right triggers in more detail.

(4) CPD's EIS should use a structured, tiered program where interventions are appropriate, escalated proportionally and are timely.

Research also stresses the importance of having a varied menu of intervention options available to meet the varied needs of officers.³³⁷ Some successful options suggested by the best practices research include informal counseling by the officer's supervisor, training opportunities, professional counseling on personal issues, officer-to-officer peer support program, crisis intervention teams, and reassignment or relief from duty.³³⁸

Our research of other police departments' programs showed that there can be a wide range of approaches to interventions. In Los Angeles, department policy delineates the types of interventions that may be adopted by an immediate supervisor, but which intervention is used is left to the discretion of the supervisor.³³⁹ The San Diego Police Department utilizes a range of mandatory and discretionary interventions.³⁴⁰ The mandatory interventions are applied in cases of officer-involved shootings and deaths in custody. Discretionary interventions are used in other cases where intervention is triggered and include a range of potential options, including counseling by immediate supervisor, substance abuse treatment, a peer officer program, meeting with the department's Wellness Unit and reassignment. Other departments, like the Seattle Police Department, leave the option of which intervention to use within the discretion of the officer's supervisor, although the choice is reviewed by the supervisor's chain of command and the internal body (the Performance Review Committee), which oversees the EIS program.³⁴¹

The Task Force recommends that CPD create a structured, tiered program where interventions are appropriate, escalate proportionally and are timely. It should adopt a set of mandatory interventions to provide supervisors with a range of options for personnel actions. Intervention options should

include, but not be limited to, meeting with a direct supervisor, meeting with a commander, training, referral to employee assistance resources and/or reassignment or relief from duty.

(5) CPD's EIS should track officer transfers and require supervisors to review and acknowledge data on new officers who are transferred onto their assignment.

Given the reality that officers are often transferred around to different districts, it is imperative that the EIS should include tracking of all transfers and require the officer's new supervisor to log into that officer's activity history within the EIS and acknowledge a review of the history, and, to the extent that the officer is involved in a series of ongoing interventions, the supervisor must confirm participation in the interventions. This is an element of many of the EIS programs the Task Force reviewed, including the system in the Los Angeles Police Department³⁴² and the Detroit Police Department.³⁴³

(6) CPD's EIS should require ongoing monitoring of interventions and develop an assessment tool to routinely examine the program for improvement.

In addition, follow-through and ongoing monitoring of interventions is critical to ensuring that the interventions are fully implemented and to impart upon the officers that the process is being taken seriously.³⁴⁴ CPD should also develop an assessment tool that routinely examines the EIS process and interventions to determine the program's effectiveness and to identify areas for improvement. Although the academic research on this aspect of EIS programs is not as developed, ongoing oversight of a program is a logical strategy for strengthening its efficacy and accountability. Routine monitoring, assessment and modification of EIS programs is required in other jurisdictions. The Seattle Police Department requires the Performance Review Committee, the internal body that oversees the EIS program, to review and make changes to the program as dictated by its outcomes.³⁴⁵ In the Detroit Police Department, the Civil Rights Division manages the program and conducts performance and environmental audits, including examinations of command morale and department operations.³⁴⁶

As a final note, putting an EIS program into place will obviously represent a significant shift in CPD's culture of accountability, and many challenges are likely to accompany that change. As the experiences of other jurisdictions indicate, a major challenge lies in the creation of the technology and data environment that is necessary for building an EIS program.³⁴⁷ Based on other jurisdictions' experiences, EIS programs often take years to design and implement. While much of the needed data might already exist, it is often siloed across different functions of the department, some of it may not be digitized, and there are important data security and privacy concerns to take into account. Then there are the more nuanced questions about how to actually build the data criteria that will trigger interventions. Implementing an EIS program within CPD is likely to carry many of these same challenges.

CPD must make support and training of supervisors a top priority and create policies that hold supervisors accountable for the conduct of their officers.

The literature is clear that one of the most critical elements of a successful EIS program is the prominent role of immediate supervisors.³⁴⁸ Considering that immediate supervisors are the department employees with the most interaction with and responsibility for police officers, this finding makes sense. As representatives of the Los Angeles Police Department made clear, its EIS program's focus on supervisors helps to achieve the program's risk management aims, because it forces supervisors to pay attention to the behavior of their officers and, in turn, reinforces good behavior among their officers, because they know that their supervisors are paying attention.³⁴⁹

A robust EIS program can represent a sea change in the job responsibilities of a supervisor. The best practice research identifies the preparation of supervisors to conduct interventions as the most important issue challenging the implementation of an EIS program.³⁵⁰ As such, it is essential to the success of the program that departments provide comprehensive training to supervisors regarding their new role in the EIS program well before the system is set into place. The San Diego Police Department has gone to great lengths to support its officers through the creation of its Wellness Unit.³⁵¹ The Wellness Unit staff—a total of four who provide 24/7 officer support—are responsible for providing resources to officers on a 24/7 basis. This includes assisting supervisors by checking in with officers if a supervisor cannot do so for any reason, and providing a neutral and trusted resources for discussing problematic officer behavior.

Studies point to some key principles for ensuring that supervisors have the skills and support they need to support a strong EIS program: (1) having supervisors who fully understand the EIS program in place in their department and their responsibilities, which requires training on the system's capabilities and processes; (2) providing supervisors with the tools and resources they need to create change; and (3) adopting mechanisms to ensure that supervisors are accountable for executing their responsibilities under the EIS program.³⁵² Training supervisors on leadership and basic management skills is imperative. EIS programs require supervisors to take a hands-on role in their officers' professional development, and many times interventions lead to the discovery of deep personal or professional issues that require deft management. Supervisors need to be trained to take on this new dynamic when they are promoted from officer to Sergeant.³⁵³

The Task Force makes several recommendations in this regard. First, CPD must provide training to supervisors on their responsibilities and obligations as the first line of defense in accountability generally and in the EIS process specifically. This means, at the very least, providing mandatory training and talking points that help guide supervisory interventions with officers.

CPD should also integrate regular accountability measures for supervisors to incentivize buy-in to the new system. As part of that effort, CPD should integrate supervisor responsibilities for EIS and personnel management into the testing and promotional requirements. Also, CompStat meetings must be expanded immediately to include information about personnel actions, and supervisors should be held accountable for the performance indicators of their officers, just as they currently are with crime statistics and trends.

In a broader sense, CPD must provide greater support to supervisors in their management roles. All Sergeants, Lieutenants, Captains and Commanders should be trained in managing the well-being of officers under their command and be compelled to use the dashboards that track officer activity.

The individual in charge of human resources at CPD must be an expert in the field of human resources and related personnel matters.

The Director of Human Resources for CPD must be an actual human resources professional with bona fide experience handling a diverse and complex work force in a complicated organization, such as CPD. The CPD Director of personnel plays a critically important role in the accountability system. Presently, the Director serves as the gatekeeper for who is admitted into the formal intervention programs, can act as a resource on very sensitive personnel matters, is heavily involved in developing strategies for the recruitment of new members to the department, and also has a hand in developing tests for promotions and managing the overall promotion process. Going forward, the Director must also have responsibility for making sure that the Early Intervention System is socialized through the entire department, that supervisors receive the kind of training and support that they need to intervene where appropriate, be conversant in and embrace the best practices in addressing the health and well-being of the department's most valuable assets, its people, and ensure that accountability becomes a core value of the department at all levels. Given the centrality of the position, the Director must be someone who has a track record of experience and success with implementing accountability systems such as the early intervention systems recommended in this report, expertise in managing relations with unions, and appropriate certifications and experience in managing a complex human relations function in a large organization like the CPD.

Until a fully automated EIS program can be implemented, CPD should create a manual intervention system, which undertakes an immediate assessment of officer fitness for duty.

CPD, working with IPRA and/or the new CPIA, and with reference to the time period January 1, 2010 – January 1, 2016, should immediately identify officers (1) with 10 or more CRs, whether or not an affidavit was completed; (2) who have a pattern of missing court; or (3) who have been named in two/three or more lawsuits during this time period.

During this time, CPD should conduct monthly meetings with the State's Attorney, Public Defender, Presiding Judge of Criminal Division, City Law Department and, separately, Chief Judge of the Northern District of Illinois for the purpose of determining any adverse findings against police officers that bear on credibility, training issues or patterns of behavior. All information gathered should be factored into the manual intervention system.

Any officers identified through these methods should be assessed for placement in BIS, PC or some other form of individualized work plan that involves their chain of command.

The EIS program should include community outreach efforts by providing public access to data generated by the EIS program and inviting community stakeholders to CompStat-type meetings to discuss EIS data and outcomes.

With all of the data that will be generated by the EIS program at its disposal, it is incumbent on CPD to make important information about its officers available to the public. As in many of the areas the Task Force examined, transparency into its non-disciplinary intervention programs and the data it

collects surrounding the performance of its police officers is essentially nonexistent. Although there are important privacy restrictions to keep in mind as it pertains to sensitive personnel matters, much of the information that CPD currently collects, and the information that we recommend it collects in the future, is information that can be made public.

In order to provide the community with this important data, the Task Force recommends that CPD publish, on a monthly basis, aggregate data on the following: new and pending complaints by unit, disciplinary actions, missed court dates, new civil legal proceedings against officers, new criminal legal proceedings against officers, vehicle pursuits, vehicle collisions, uses of force, employee commendations, use of firearms, injuries to persons in custody, judicial proceedings where an officer is the subjective of a protective or restraining order, adverse judicial credibility determinations against an officer, or disciplinary actions.

Moreover, additional steps must be taken to reach out to community stakeholders in a real and meaningful way about police interventions. As many thought leaders on the topic have explored, early intervention is consistent with the goals of community policy and can be another avenue to help improve community-police relations. In Detroit, for example, the police department's consent decree with the Department of Justice included recommendations for increased community outreach.³⁵⁴ In response, the Detroit Police Department instituted quarterly meetings with community members to discuss performance issues, providing scorecards for units that outlined the number of officers trained, the number of officers that missed training and the number of use-of-force incidents, among other indicators.³⁵⁵ The meetings include an opportunity for questions from the community audience.³⁵⁶ The Task Force recommends that CPD establish a similar regular community-inclusive meeting to share data and insights from EIS.³⁵⁷

Endnotes

²⁸² Data provided by the City of Chicago via letter dated Mar. 11, 2016.

²⁸³ See also 1997 Report of the Commission on Police Integrity, *supra* note 47, at 9-10 (providing a history of police corruption in Chicago).

²⁸⁴ Data provided by the City of Chicago via letter dated Mar. 11, 2016.

²⁸⁵ Andrew Schroedter, Chicago Police Misconduct – A Rising Financial Toll, Better Government Association (Jan. 31, 2016), *available at* <http://www.bettergov.org/news/chicago-police-misconduct-%E2%80%93-a-rising-financial-toll>; Mark Iris, Your Tax Dollars at Work! Chicago Police Lawsuit Payments: How Much, and for What?, 2 Va. J. Crim. Law 25 (2014), *available at* <http://virginiajournalofcriminallaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/2.1-Iris-SMW-3.31.14.pdf>.

²⁸⁶ Better Government Association, *supra* note 284.

²⁸⁷ Data provided by the City of Chicago via letter dated Mar. 29, 2016.

²⁸⁸ CPD, Employee Resource E06-05, Behavioral Intervention System (Mar. 22, 2005).

²⁸⁹ CPD, Employee Resource E06-06, Personnel Concerns Program (May 4, 2005).

²⁹⁰ Data provided by the City of Chicago via letter dated Mar. 29, 2016.

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²⁹⁴ *Id.*

²⁹⁵ Mills, *supra* note 291.

²⁹⁶ *Id.*

²⁹⁷ 1997 Report of the Commission on Police Integrity, *supra* note 47, at 3, 20-21.

²⁹⁸ See Wes Skogan et al., "Policing Smarter Through IT: Learning from 'Chicago's Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR) System,'" Washington, D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (Dec. 2003), *available at* http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/html/cd_rom/tech_docs/pubs/policingsmarterthroughitlessonsenterprise.pdf.

²⁹⁹ FOP Grievance No. 129-06-021.

³⁰⁰ *Id.*

³⁰¹ Data provided by the City of Chicago via letter dated Mar. 7, 2016.

³⁰² CPD, Employee Resource E05-02, Performance Recognition System (Feb. 21, 2012).

³⁰³ Data provided by the City of Chicago via letter dated Mar. 7, 2016.

³⁰⁴ Steve Schmadeke, In Chicago Police Shooting, Judge Ripped Cop and Tossed Hospital Bed Testimony, Chicago Tribune (Jan. 29, 2016), *available at* <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-cop-shooting-judge-outraged-met-20160128-story.html>.

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³⁰⁶ See Certified Statement of Conviction/Disposition, 14-cr-187202 (May 12, 2015 entry).

³⁰⁷ CPD, Special Order S08-01-05, Summary Punishment (Apr. 26, 2013).

³⁰⁸ Working Group Interview.

³⁰⁹ Working Group Interview.

³¹⁰ CPD, Employee Resource E05-02, *supra* note 301.

³¹¹ Working Group Interview.

³¹² CPD, Special Order S08-01-08, Nondisciplinary Intervention Program, Sec. VIII (May 1, 2004).

³¹³ Working Group Interview.

³¹⁴ Data provided by the City of Chicago via letters dated Mar. 2, 2016 and Apr. 7, 2016.

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³¹⁶ See, e.g., Samuel Walker & Stacy Osnick Milligan with Anna Berke, Strategies for Intervening with Officers Through Early Intervention Systems, Washington, D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, at 39 (Feb. 2006) (noting that EIS "gives a global picture of behavior"), *available at* <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/publications/e01060004.pdf>.

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³²⁰ Walker, Early Warning Systems, *supra* note 316, at 4.

³²¹ *Id.*, at 3.

³²² Samuel Walker, Early Intervention Systems for Law Enforcement Agencies: A Planning and Management Guide, Washington D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, at 73-81 (2003), *available at* http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/html/cd_rom/inaction1/pubs/EarlyInterventionSystemsLawEnforcement.pdf.

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³²⁴ Walker, Strategies for Intervening, *supra* note 315, at 11-12.

³²⁵ Samuel Walker & Stacy Osnick Milligan with Anna Berke, Supervision and Intervention Within Early Intervention Systems: A Guide for Law Enforcement Executives, Washington, D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, at 40-41 (Dec. 2005), *available at* http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Early_Intervention_Systems/supervision%20and%20intervention%20within%20early%20intervention%20systems%202005.pdf.

³²⁶ Working Group Interview.

³²⁷ Working Group Interview.

³²⁸ Walker, Strategies for Intervening, *supra* note 315, at 27.

³²⁹ Walker, Supervision and Intervention Within Early Intervention Systems, *supra* note 324, at 5.

³³⁰ Multiple Working Group Interviews.

³³¹ Working Group Interview.

³³² Working Group Interview.

³³³ Walker, A Planning and Management Guide, *supra* note 321, at 29-30.

³³⁴ *Id.* at 31-33.

³³⁵ Working Group Interview.

³³⁶ Working Group Interview.

³³⁷ Walker, Supervision and Intervention Within Early Intervention Systems, *supra* note 324, at 21.

³³⁸ *Id.* at 21-27; Walker, Strategies for Intervening, *supra* note 315, at 31-35.

³³⁹ Working Group Interview.

³⁴⁰ Working Group Interview.

³⁴¹ Working Group Interview.

³⁴² Working Group Interview.

³⁴³ Working Group Interview.

³⁴⁴ Walker, Supervision and Intervention Within Early Intervention Systems, *supra* note 324, at 27-28; Walker, Strategies for Intervening, *supra* note 315, at 23-24.

³⁴⁵ Working Group Interview.

³⁴⁶ Working Group Interview.

³⁴⁷ Walker, Supervision and Intervention Within Early Intervention Systems, *supra* note 324, at 31-33.

³⁴⁸ Walker, Strategies for Intervening, *supra* note 315, at 1; Walker, Supervision and Intervention Within Early Intervention Systems, *supra* note 324, at 9-10.

³⁴⁹ Working Group Interview.

³⁵⁰ Walker, A Planning and Management Guide, *supra* note 321, at 37.

³⁵¹ Working Group Interview.

³⁵² Walker, Strategies for Intervening, *supra* note 315, at 9-26

³⁵³ *Id.* at 28-29.

³⁵⁴ Working Group Interview.

³⁵⁵ Working Group Interview.

³⁵⁶ Working Group Interview.

³⁵⁷ The access and/or publishing of aggregated EIS data in any format will be most helpful if designed in a way as to not interfere with or jeopardize the integrity of the system. The primary function of an EIS is to accurately predict police officer behavior, and to provide the framework to then respond to those predictions with appropriate interventions.

De-Escalation

It is critically important that all CPD officers approach each and every citizen encounter with an emphasis on respect and the sanctity of all life. That approach will avoid escalating even the most casual encounter. CPD officers must also seek to de-escalate situations so as to minimize the use of force. Minimizing the use of force not only prevents unnecessary injury and loss of life, it builds police legitimacy and trust. The recommendations throughout this report, if implemented, will contribute to overarching de-escalation efforts, such as developing a stronger, values-based policing philosophy, addressing racism and implicit bias, re-defining community policing, developing an early intervention system to identify problem officers, holding officers accountable for misconduct and continuing the rollout of body cameras. Out of deference to the Department of Justice's ongoing investigation, the Task Force did not conduct a detailed analysis of CPD's use-of-force practices. Rather, we focused our de-escalation analysis on the frequent situations where officers encounter citizens experiencing a mental health crisis.

The Task Force does not need to search very far to find examples of police encounters with persons experiencing mental health crises that went tragically wrong. In these situations, the person in crisis may be agitated, overwhelmed and frightened. Officers approaching in a command and control manner may increase the person's fear and agitation, reducing his or her willingness and ability to peacefully comply with instructions.

At the same time, officers perceive these situations as unpredictable and potentially very dangerous and understandably want to gain control of the scene quickly. Unfortunately, if officers do not have strong de-escalation skills, they may act in a way that inadvertently escalates the situation. In the worst case scenario, officers, the person in crisis or bystanders may get hurt or killed. At best, unnecessary escalation results in a stressful interaction and often an arrest of the person in crisis for behavior that occurred as a result of the police encounter (e.g., battery to a police officer) and entry into the criminal justice system.

These potentially avoidable outcomes are costly in terms of human life, as well as taxpayer dollars. They also further erode the relationship between the police and the community. There is an urgent need for policing approaches that embrace de-escalation and procedural justice over traditional command and control strategies for mental health-related and other types of police encounters with the public.

Changes in police procedures and practices are not the only challenge facing our local mental health system. The mental health care safety net has been eroded in recent years. Our bare bones mental health system fails to provide adequate treatment for early intervention, preventive mental health treatment or crisis mental health care. Neither Medicaid nor private coverage devotes to providers the resources necessary to effectively treat those living with mental illness. This is so despite national policy initiatives—most notably the Affordable Care Act—to improve and expand access to services. There are huge capacity shortages, and people who need and want help are not able to readily access it.

One in five people experience a mental illness in their lifetime.³⁵⁸ Although most of those individuals will never need crisis intervention services, many will. Mental health treatment is extremely effective in restoring the health and well-being of people who are living with mental illness.³⁵⁹ Some individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities experience similar crises, sometimes arising from psychiatric co-

morbidities. These individuals also require appropriate crisis intervention and treatment outside the stigmatizing reach of the criminal justice system.³⁶⁰

The bottom line is that most people living with mental illness still do not receive treatment. Without treatment, mental illness—especially serious mental illness—can result in significant disability and decreased quality of life.

Sadly, those who suffer from mental illness often end up in jail and not in treatment. Even more sadly, there are countless stories of individuals acting in a purposefully criminal way so that they would get arrested in order to get their medications or mental health treatment. We have also heard from many families begging that their child get arrested as they see Cook County Jail as the only accessible treatment provider. On any given day, a significant percentage of intakes at Cook County Jail self-identify as mentally ill.³⁶¹ We are arresting and incarcerating people with mental illness in record numbers throughout the County. This is a national tragedy.

Without community care—services and supports, including insurance coverage to help them recover—people living with mental illness simply do not get treatment, and their illnesses get worse. When that happens, people living with mental illness end up in emergency rooms, in jail or on the streets with no place to live. Too often, all of the above happens. Here's a snapshot of what has happened in Illinois since funding cuts took place in FY2009:

- Emergency room visits for people experiencing psychiatric crises increased by 19% between 2009 and 2012.³⁶²
- The total number of nights spent in a shelter statewide increased from 2,000,000 in FY2011 to 3,041,000 in FY2013.³⁶³ The National Alliance to End Homelessness estimates that approximately 32% of the 14,144 individuals who currently experience homelessness on any given night in Illinois have a serious mental illness.³⁶⁴

These patterns reflect three real and solvable problems. First, studies show that emergency rooms and jails cost much more than community treatment.³⁶⁵

Second, a vicious cycle arises involving jails, homelessness and excessive emergency room use. People leaving jail who are living with mental illness have few, if any, housing options. Without a warm handoff to a service provider, they often become homeless. In 2015, 2,134 individuals experiencing homelessness were detained overnight at Cook County Jail, 34% of which were flagged for mental illness.³⁶⁶ Once homeless, they lack access to health care services or do not seek services. Consequently, their mental health problems get worse. Then one of two things is likely to happen: they get arrested and end up back in jail, or they end up in an emergency room. At the emergency room, because there are so few housing options, hospitals often refer the homeless who are living with serious mental illness into expensive nursing home care. Many people do not need such an intensive, expensive level of care. They need the recovery-promoting combination of community care and supported housing shown to successfully help remove this population from homelessness.

Third, none of these are ideal treatment methods or outcomes for people living with mental illness. Their treatment options and outcomes should not be emergency rooms, jails, living on the street or in nursing homes. Instead, mental health treatment should involve a compassionate, comprehensive system of care that provides the effective treatment that breaks this cycle and renders these options unacceptable.

Police officers are too often the first responders to those living with mental illness and experiencing a crisis. This has been the status quo for far too long. No other chronic health condition is treated in this way. In turn, police officers are arresting individuals experiencing mental illness and are symptomatic in their illness. This occurs because symptoms of mental illness are sometimes demonstrated in behaviors that may look criminal. Furthermore, officers who are not well trained to identify the signs and symptoms of mental illness can further escalate a situation to the point that an arrest is made. Reliance on the police to respond to those living with mental illness or in crisis must stop. This costly and wasteful response often perpetuates trauma and limits recovery.

Even officers who have training to support those in crises have limited options to divert those living with mental illness to health care providers instead of jail. Currently, the only diversion option is the emergency room at various hospitals.³⁶⁷ If someone is experiencing a mental health crisis and reports feeling like harming himself or someone else, he meets the criteria for hospitalization. However, many individuals whom officers encounter do not meet the criteria. Nevertheless, officers have no option but to transport those people to an emergency room that is designated a police drop-off. Officers report increased frustration when they see that same person back in their beat hours or days later untreated, with no change in their behavior. This demonstrates the poor use of manpower and wasted resources.

The police are being held responsible for responding to all the social ills in our communities but are left with few resources to respond proactively. We must shift the responsibility to other community partners and resources to support our community. This cannot be done without a well-thought-out and properly executed plan. A tremendous investment needs to be made by all parties. This includes CPD, hospital systems, social services, the Office of Emergency Management Communications (“OEMC”) and other community stakeholders. As is the case with anything that creates change, this cannot happen in isolation. The task requires buy-in from the City and participating organizations, adequate funding and other resources, meaningful data collection and community engagement.

Why are so few 911 calls to OEMC identified as mental health-related?

In 2015, there were approximately 5 million 911 calls made to OEMC.³⁶⁸ Of those, approximately 2.45 million—slightly less than half—were dispatched to the police.³⁶⁹ While only 25,000 of those calls were pre-identified by the caller as mental health-related, national estimates suggest that anywhere from 3-10% of police contacts are mental health-related.³⁷⁰ This suggests that, last year alone, the OEMC fielded anywhere from 73,500 to 245,000 mental health-related calls, most of which were *not* flagged as mental health-related by the caller.

Emergency call takers and dispatchers are a critical component of mental health crisis response. Our observations indicate that OEMC suffers from recurring problems with its approach to determining whether calls involve a mental health crisis, including inadequate protocols, limited training, lack of data and other support, and gaps in communication with CPD.

OEMC’s procedures emphasize speedy dispatch of emergency resources in response to service calls. Insufficient manpower may contribute to this emphasis on speed, at the expense of accurate identification of mental health calls and the quality of response.

OEMC personnel currently receive only a one-hour annual training about crisis intervention and mental health from a non-subject matter expert. OEMC personnel report that it is challenging to effectively probe callers to determine whether mental health may be at issue. Callers may not like to discuss mental health because of its stigma. Even if they do, callers often do not use clinical terms to describe their situations, and callers from different communities may use different words to explain the same mental health crisis. Additional training could improve call takers' ability and comfort in asking questions and identifying mental health calls.

Additionally, current OEMC data systems do not utilize data on prior calls to provide location or personal history that could assist in identifying likely mental health calls or other relevant background information for responding officers.

Recommendations

OEMC should invest in a Smart911 system.

Some cities have worked to solve the challenge of the lack of information presented to dispatch by callers through implementing Smart911 systems. Smart911 allows citizens to create a "Safety Profile" for their household that includes any information they want 911 and emergency response teams to have in the case of an emergency. This can include health and medical information, including known mental health issues. When a household member makes a call to 911, his or her Safety Profile automatically displays to the 911 dispatcher, which enables the dispatcher to send the right response teams with the right information to the scene.

While Smart911 has been made available to the City in recent years, the City has yet to purchase and implement this effective program. This is so despite the fact that 32 states and more than 400 municipalities, including Washington, D.C., Seattle, Atlanta and Denver, are currently using the program. The effectiveness of Smart911 is tested every day. As an example, in Addison, Illinois, emergency responders received a 911 hang-up call from a resident who had registered a Safety Profile that showed her adult son had a cognitive disability and violent nature. The information provided through Smart911 alerted the responding officers that the son would not respond to verbal commands, but, by using other methods they were still able to de-escalate the situation without any physical injury to him.

Smart911 systems show significant promise and can deliver a substantial return on the investment. They can also help avoid tragic incidents like the shooting deaths of Quintonio LeGrier and Betty Jones. If LeGrier's mental health history had been entered into a Smart911 system and that information was made available to emergency dispatchers and responding officers, the entire incident could have played out very differently. The Task Force recommends that the OEMC invest in and implement a Smart911 system for Chicago immediately.

OEMC should implement a 16-hour mental health awareness training.

The Crisis Intervention Team ("CIT") model includes training emergency communicators as a key element of effective programs. There is currently no "best practice" approach, as some agencies have emergency communicators go through the full 40-hour CIT training with police officers, while others have developed training specifically designed for emergency communicators. The Alameda Police

Department provides 16 hours of training that covers mental health awareness and CIT information and, similar to CIT trainings, includes panels of persons with lived experience and family members. The Task Force believes that the Alameda model strikes a good balance and recommends that the OEMC implement a 16-hour mental health awareness training specifically tailored to call takers.

OEMC should devote attention to supporting personnel in providing compassionate and effective service to the community and implementing stress management training that complies with national standards.

Emergency communicators have a very stressful job dealing with members of the community in life-threatening and emotional situations. The nature of the job puts them at high risk for compassion fatigue, which can significantly impact their sensitivity to and patience with members of the public and lead to poor job performance (e.g., failing to recognize mental health calls or failing to obtain mental health information from callers).

Many studies have also found that the 911 worker populations often suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and other stress-triggered issues. While research has not yet focused on the potential solutions to mitigate these problems, the National Emergency Number Association (“NENA”) has established standards for implementing a Comprehensive Stress Management Program (“CSMP”).³⁷¹

NENA recommends that a CSMP: (1) provide stress management training; (2) offer on-site educational materials and resources about stress-related risks and managing stress; (3) establish internal operating procedures that will ensure employee participation in critical incident stress management activities; (4) establish and encourage employee use of Employee Assistance Programs that provide counseling services for their employees; (5) identify local resources and encourage proactive utilization of those resources; (6) establish peer support programs; (7) include comprehensive information on how to manage suicidal callers and calls that involve individuals with serious mental illness as part of general 911 training; and (8) incentivize personal health programs relating to lifestyle practices and changes.

The Association of Public-Safety Communication Officials International (“APCO”) has also published minimum training standards for 911 call takers, echoing many of NENA’s recommendations. APCO further recommends that an agency be responsible for providing information in both verbal and written form, though the call takers themselves are responsible for the “application of stress management principles.”³⁷²

The Chicago Department of Public Health (“CDPH”) should partner with mental health agencies and advocacy groups to develop a two-step community education campaign on the signs of mental illness and how to best respond to a mental health or related crisis.

CDPH should partner with mental health agencies and advocacy groups to develop and support mental health awareness and education in the community. An ideal time to do that would be when it rolls out a new Smart911 system. As part of the campaign, the City should sponsor the training and education of credible messengers in communities throughout the City on signs and symptoms of mental illness and on how to either enter information in Smart911 or otherwise request a CIT-trained officer when calling 911. Those credible messengers should then engage with the community

and pass on that same training and education. Particular constituencies, such as caregivers for individuals living with severe mental illness and intellectual disabilities, school systems, faith-based groups and agencies supporting those with disabilities, should be engaged in this process.

What is CPD's current approach to mental health crisis response? Don't they have a Crisis Intervention Team Program? Why isn't it working?

In 2005, following a series of highly publicized shootings of persons with mental illnesses, CPD established its CIT program to ensure the "dignified treatment and safety of arrestees and other persons requiring assistance ... to obtain mental health evaluation treatment, or hospitalization."³⁷³ CIT, sometimes called the Memphis Model, includes partnerships between police, mental health agencies, advocates and persons with lived experience; 40 hours of specialized training for officers who volunteer to become CIT officers; designated points of access to emergency psychiatric assessment and care; and changes to policies and procedures to facilitate a more effective response to persons experiencing mental health crisis.³⁷⁴ The CIT Center at the University of Memphis estimates that over 2,700 jurisdictions are implementing CIT programs.³⁷⁵

Consistent with the Memphis Model, CPD collaborated with community stakeholders to develop and implement the 40-hour training and to work through various system issues. The training educates officers on how to respond to mental health crises and collaborate between law enforcement and community mental health agencies.³⁷⁶ The training also provides opportunities for officers to interact with persons with lived experience of mental illness, family members and mental health professionals. Both internal evaluations and externally funded studies indicate that officers find the training extremely useful and that it improves their ability to respond to persons in crisis.

CPD initially began by piloting the program in two districts, providing the 40-hour training to 30-40 officers and supervisors in each district.³⁷⁷ In light of initial successes, CPD rapidly expanded the CIT program and was training roughly 30 officers throughout the City each month by July 2006.³⁷⁸ Since 2006, the number of trainings provided annually has varied based on funding, which has come primarily from external sources. Today, approximately 15% of Chicago's more than 12,000 police officers are certified by the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board as CIT officers.

In response to requests from CIT-trained officers based in Chicago public schools, in 2010, CPD became the first in the nation to offer an "Advanced" 40-hour CIT training program to focus on the unique needs of youth.³⁷⁹ CIT-Youth trains officers to identify and divert juveniles with mental health needs to treatment, rather than incarceration.³⁸⁰ CPD also offers a similar program targeting veterans.³⁸¹

The CIT program has had a number of positive outcomes. A National Institute of Mental Health-funded research study found significant differences in how Chicago's CIT-trained officers respond to persons potentially experiencing a mental health crisis compared to their non-CIT-trained officers. Specifically, CIT-trained officers were less likely to use force with more resistant subjects, and they were more likely to take steps to link individuals to mental health services. CIT-trained officers also reported feeling better prepared to respond without needing to use force and that the skills they learned in CIT training really worked to de-escalate tense and potentially dangerous situations.³⁸²

Why aren't all identified mental health crisis calls getting a CIT response?

Notwithstanding a promising beginning and strong training curriculum, the Critical Response Unit ("CRU") has been significantly constrained in its ability to fully implement the CIT model. With only four staff members assigned full-time to the unit, the CRU simply does not have the resources to fully support CIT officers in Chicago's 22 police districts; work with OEMC to ensure call-taker protocols and training support effective identification of mental health calls; liaise with other City agencies, community providers and stakeholders; respond to special call outs; track CIT call data; and run up to 30-week-long training sessions per year.

Additionally, the number of CIT-trained officers is insufficient to ensure CIT availability 24/7 in all districts. While existing data does not allow for accurate estimates of the needed capacity, it does suggest current capacity is not adequate to meet demand. For example, out of the nearly 60,000 calls in 2010 to 2012 that 911 call-takers initially identified as "mental health-related," only a quarter of them were handled by CIT officers, even though call-takers "make every effort" to dispatch the calls to them.³⁸³ As noted above, OEMC significantly under-identifies mental health-related calls. As a result, the actual number of calls appropriate for CIT response is likely much higher, and the capacity issue may be more dire.

These problems are further exacerbated by a poor communications system between the OEMC and CPD. OEMC personnel are hindered in dispatching CIT officers on duty for each watch and district because they cannot easily and consistently identify them, even though station supervisors are supposed to send OEMC a list of officers that are CIT-trained at the beginning of each watch. Then, OEMC personnel have to manually enter daily watch rosters into their systems. These tasks could easily be automated to save time and improve accuracy of information. There is also no process in place for CPD to share changes in their General Orders or day-to-day operational practices in a consistent and timely manner.

Recommendations

CPD should increase the number of CIT-certified officers to 35% of all patrol officers, and ensure that individual districts with the highest number of mental-health calls are staffed to 35% or higher. All districts and all watches should staff at least two CIT-certified officers. Refresher courses should be developed and provided to CIT-trained officers. CPD should attach a permanent code "z" to officer names that OEMC can always access so dispatch can assign appropriate officers to calls.

Ensuring that there are a sufficient number of CIT-trained officers during any watch to provide full coverage for mental health-related incidents is crucial. Yet, it is not necessary and may not be desirable to train all officers in CIT. The "Memphis Model" recommends having only a portion of a police force CIT-trained, reasoning that not all officers have the ability to be CIT officers and that volunteers may be more interested, invested and effective.³⁸⁴

Initial recommendations from the CIT Center at the University of Memphis suggested that 25% of a department's patrol force be CIT trained to ensure availability of CIT response. More recently, they have acknowledged that this may vary based on the needs of specific cities and that larger, more densely populated cities may need to train 35% or more to ensure coverage. Chicago does not

currently have adequate data to determine the precise capacity needed. However, it is clear that 15% is not sufficient. The Task Force recommends that Chicago increase its CIT capacity to 35% of patrol officers. We also recommend that data systems be improved so that the adequacy of CIT capacity can be empirically assessed.

The City should create a “Mental Health Critical Response Unit” within CPD that is responsible for mental health crisis response functions, training, support, community outreach and engagement, cross-agency coordination and data collection and houses the CRU.

The Task Force recommends that the City create a new unit within CPD known as the Mental Health Critical Response Unit (“MHCRU”). MHCRU would be responsible for overall mental health crisis response functions, training, supporting community outreach and engagement, cross-agency coordination and data collection and would house the CRU. MHCRU should be housed within the Bureau of Support Services, in the Education & Training Division. It should be led by an officer with the rank of Lieutenant or higher, be adequately resourced and staffed and work with an advisory board of local stakeholders. MHCRU would oversee CIT training, support CIT officers in the field and operate a co-responder unit assisting with high-risk subjects or providing follow-up for persons who frequently come in contact with police.

PATF Proposal: Mental Health Critical Response Unit



In order for CPD's mental health crisis response strategies to be effective, the MHCRU unit must have the organizational support and resources to do its work. The CRU must be prioritized such that both the police department and the community give mental health crises the attention they merit, and the CRU can obtain the amount and quality of resources that it needs. The U.S. Department of Justice has recognized this and required the prioritization of these units in its consent decrees and settlement agreements with several cities.³⁸⁵

Given the breadth of functions of the MHCRU unit, it should be staffed by at minimum 8 full-time sworn personnel carefully selected and vetted based on experience and commitment to providing effective mental health response and an absence of excessive force complaints against persons experiencing crisis in the preceding three years. Pending a comprehensive assessment of personnel need, unit staffing may be increased beyond 8.

A full-time data analyst should be assigned to this unit to evaluate the CIT training program and inform personnel need, community feedback, and analysis of OEMC calls, as well as effectiveness of police interventions and evaluations of the training.

Why are so many people with mental illnesses having repeat contacts with CPD and ending up in the criminal justice system?

Studies suggest that over 60% of incarcerated individuals meet diagnostic criteria for some mental illness.³⁸⁶ That means that of the approximately 76,400 people who were admitted to Cook County Jail in 2012, approximately 46,000 were people living with mental illness.³⁸⁷ It is therefore not surprising that following national trends, many jails and prisons in Illinois have become the de facto mental health treatment centers. The Cook County Jail is now considered one of the larger, if not the largest, mental health care providers in the country. In fact, many people do not receive mental health treatment until they enter the criminal justice system.

In the past decade, Illinois has made some of the largest cuts to mental health spending in the nation. During that same time period, the City of Chicago closed six of its twelve mental health clinics and other private agencies closed their doors. While there are community mental health agencies providing good services in Chicago and the Affordable Care Act has infused additional resources, long waiting lists are common. The current State budget crisis further threatens the ability of many facilities to stay open at all. The situation is particularly dire on the South and West sides of the City.

In the context of an overburdened mental health system, police officers frequently encounter persons with mental illnesses who are in crisis or struggling to get their basic needs met. Officers have few options for addressing these situations. They can arrest the person and take him or her to lock-up or jail, transport the person to the designated hospital emergency department for psychiatric evaluation or do nothing at all. Many individuals in crisis do not need or meet the criteria to be hospitalized nor are they engaged in criminal behavior. But an officer may recognize that without some type of intervention, the problem will continue and, in some cases, put the individual with mental illness or others at risk.

Interviews with officers indicate they are often frustrated with the time it takes to transport an individual to the hospital and then see the same individual back in their beat within hours, in the same or worse condition. Under current conditions, arresting the person and taking him or her to jail may be a more

efficient use of officer time, and ironically may also be more effective in obtaining the required mental health treatment. This is not an acceptable system response to the predictable challenges of severe mental illness. Emergency departments and jails are poor venues to provide proper treatment for persons experiencing mental health crises. And both are very expensive. The lack of appropriate resources needlessly criminalizes many men and women who could receive more effective and humane treatment outside the criminal justice system, with a more carefully organized and properly funded mental health system.

Recommendations

The City should create a crisis response system to support multi layer co-responder units where behavioral health providers are working with OEMC and CPD to link individuals with mental health issues to treatment, 24 hours a day.

While providing CIT training to police officers is a key tool for de-escalating responses to mental health crises, many jurisdictions recognize the value of also going beyond traditional police functions to more directly address the problem of mental illness. The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended that law enforcement agencies "engage in multidisciplinary, community team approaches for planning, implementing, and responding to crisis situations with complex causal factors."³⁸⁸

The co-responder model is one such approach. The model's primary component is intensive collaboration with mental health professionals for responding to crises and persons with mental health issues who repeatedly come to the attention of police. Police may respond in tandem with mental health professionals, allowing them to maximize their respective skills and better share information. Instead of simply arresting a person experiencing a mental health crisis, these clinicians help assess whether an alternative intervention (e.g., connecting with a social worker, getting treatment) would be more appropriate. After an incident, a clinician may follow up with the person who experienced a crisis.

The crisis response system includes a crisis line that is staffed by clinicians and is well-connected to other systems (like OEMC) that can respond to mental health emergencies. Intensive training and development of this multi layer co-responder model is necessary and relies heavily on the City and its Department of Public Health. The crisis response system should also include mobile crisis workers that can respond and provide assessments. These clinicians may also respond at the request of police officers, and request police assistance when needed.

The Los Angeles Police Department's crisis response system includes co-response teams and has become nationally recognized as a best practice.³⁸⁹ Its Mental Evaluation Unit ("MEU") consists of 61 officers and detectives and 28 clinicians with the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health.³⁹⁰ The MEU has teams that pair a clinician with a police officer or, for more complex cases, with a police detective. Deploying these teams for crisis calls saved more than 6,600 hours of patrol time and at least \$10 million in 2014.³⁹¹ MEU officers and clinicians also help staff a crisis hotline that patrol officers—before taking action in a situation that appears to involve a mental health crisis—are required to contact for an assessment of the most appropriate intervention. Approximately two-thirds of these calls involved a "one-time crisis" resolved with the first contact.

Moreover, in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, the police department's partnership with the largest community provider of mental health services to respond to crisis calls resulted in further benefits. Besides providing people experiencing mental health crises with the help they needed and generating significant cost savings, the collaboration in Pawtucket enhanced transparency and rebuilt trust between law enforcement and mental health professionals, as well as between law enforcement and community members.³⁹²

The City should expand and invest in Crisis Stabilization Units ("CSU") for individuals suffering from symptoms of mental illness who do not need to be psychiatrically hospitalized.

Holy Cross Hospital has a small CSU for adults. In the 8 months the unit has been open, inpatient hospitalizations have decreased 42% because patients are immediately linked to mental health providers.³⁹³ Holy Cross is not a CPD drop-off site nor does CPD's general order currently allow officers to drop off individuals experiencing symptoms of mental illness at a CSU as opposed to a designated emergency room. However, this is an important option for persons needing stabilization and has shown initial promising results:

- Prior to the CSU, 75% of individuals suffering from symptoms of mental illness in the emergency room were admitted as inpatients; after the CSU that number dropped to 34%.
- The Holy Cross CSU has served 466 people.
- The average length of stay is 14 hours.
- In the emergency room, for an individual with both mental illness symptoms and medical issues, the average wait time is 5 hours. For individuals with mental illness symptoms, the wait time for the CSU is only 1 hour, down from 18 hours in the emergency room.³⁹⁴

Several projects are also under way to better link individuals with mental illnesses who come in contact with the police to mental health services. Funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, CPD is working with Mt. Sinai Hospital and Thresholds to link persons transported to the Mt. Sinai emergency room for psychiatric evaluation. This pilot project also includes a hotline that officers can call for persons not needing transport but in need of linkage. This service is only available during business hours and not widely known within CPD. This is yet another reason why an MHCRU would be such an essential component to the internal and external communication of services and resources available to officers.

The City and the MHCRU should identify frequent, high-use and high-need individuals and help them get mental health treatment.

Some individuals in mental health crises are frequent players in both CPD and hospital emergency departments. The strain on both CPD and the healthcare system could be significantly reduced by identifying these high-use individuals and helping them get the mental health treatment they sorely need. Sharing data between the City's Department of Public Health, insurers, hospitals and other mental health providers, CPD and OEMC is critical to identifying frequent, high-use individuals for intervention.

For example, in response to a recognition that a small group of individuals were very high users of emergency room services, Illinois Masonic Hospital developed a program that identifies high users of

emergency services and links them to community treatment teams. Last year they intervened with a woman who visited the emergency department over 700 times costing the hospital \$2.5 million.³⁹⁵ With engagement and community treatment, employment support, medication management, and continual following up, this patient reduced her visits to only eight times the following year, saving millions of dollars.

Several recent demonstration projects and randomized trials explore strategies to address the medical and psycho social needs of individuals who come into repeated contact with law enforcement, medical and social service systems. Medical facilities across the United States pay increasing attention to “hot-spotters”—specific individuals and settings associated with repeated and costly use of medical and social services.³⁹⁶ Many of these interventions implement cooperative interventions from housing, mental health and social service agencies to provide effective case management, secure housing and other services to address chronic risks.

To help frequent, high-use and high-need individuals receive treatment, the City should fully fund Assertive Community Treatment (“ACT”) teams and Mobile Crisis Prevention to provide relentless engagement. ACT is an evidence-based program that is less expensive than hospitalization or jail and significantly reduces recidivism and re-admittance.

Why are we only treating people after they are in crisis?

The current mental health system focuses on chronic care management for people who are living with severe, disabling mental illnesses. It does not address early intervention that might encourage recovering and support a high functioning individual avoiding long-term disability. It also does not address the needs of other individuals who do not experience severe mental illness, but who satisfy criteria for intellectual and developmental disabilities that may heighten risks of mental health crises. Without these less intensive, recovery-promoting services, persons living with mental illness fail to get timely treatment until their symptoms are so severe as to require costly crisis management. In other words, the current mental health system may treat pneumonia but not the common cold, so you have to wait until your cold turns into pneumonia before you can get treatment.³⁹⁷

Clinical research studies have long established the importance of early intervention following the first episode of psychosis.³⁹⁸ Prolonged duration of untreated psychosis not only reduces the effectiveness of treatment, but also increases the risk of incarceration.³⁹⁹ Persons experiencing the first episode of psychosis while still untreated are at an increased risk of substance abuse, violence and arrest.⁴⁰⁰ Moreover, recent studies have found that changes in the brain caused by child trauma result in heightened sensitivity to stress often found in people diagnosed with psychotic disorders.⁴⁰¹

Interventions found effective for promoting recovery after a first episode of psychosis include low doses of atypical antipsychotic medications, cognitive and behavioral psychotherapy, family education and support and educational and vocational rehabilitation.⁴⁰² Care and services should be offered over at least a two- to three-year period.⁴⁰³ The RA1SE Early Treatment Program reflecting this programming has been implemented in 17 community clinics across the nation thus far.⁴⁰⁴

Early intervention is crucial to countering the progression of the illness and decreasing the risk of criminal justice involvement. This treatment is particularly important for young adults. Studies have

found that younger inmates generally suffer from the highest rate of mental health problems.⁴⁰⁵ For example, 63% of state prisoners age 24 or younger had a mental health problem, while 40% of those age 55 or older had one.⁴⁰⁶

Recommendations

The City should invest in first episode programming so that young adults experiencing their first episode of psychosis or major depression are immediately linked to intensive services to reduce progression of illness and decrease the risk of criminal justice involvement.

How are police escalating trauma, including at crime scenes?

Many communities in Chicago are constantly traumatized due to community violence and other toxic stress. Over 75% of children in a high-violence urban area report contact with community violence, meaning they either have seen violence, been a victim of violence or known a victim of violence.⁴⁰⁷ This level of trauma and violence is devastating—children exposed to gun violence report high levels of anger, withdrawal and post-traumatic stress.⁴⁰⁸

Youth living in violent communities may experience “pathological adaptations” and can find it hard to form trusting relationships, especially with police.⁴⁰⁹ Repeated exposure to violence is traumatic and creates a constant state of fear for children and adults. When children are raised in this environment, they are continuously in a heightened state of arousal, which can lead to perceiving threats when there are none and to either respond by withdrawing or lashing out. This is the environment that officers are walking into when responding to calls. Many parts of our community are in a constant state of fear, mistrust and survival.

The vicious cycle of violence feeds into our criminal justice system when children experience such high levels of trauma that affects their development, leading to the development of mood and anxiety disorders, aggression, deficits in social skills and substance use. The high levels of trauma not only affect youth in their current lives, but affect their behaviors and development later on. Children who experience violence are more likely to perpetrate violence as an adult, including aggression, delinquency and other violent crimes. Community violence, toxic stress and trauma saturate our city, and efforts to break the cycle of violence will be suffocated unless we actively work to address the trauma that people are experiencing every day.

Recommendations

CPD should work to decrease trauma and escalation at crime scenes by reducing the show of heavy weapons and expanding the Chicago Survivors program.

Police officers must be cognizant of the traumatized state of many communities when they respond to crime scenes so as to not exacerbate matters. Officers should seek to reduce a show of force and heavy weapons where appropriate.

In September 2015, the Chicago Department of Public Health’s Crisis Response and Recovery Program partnered with Chicago’s Citizens for Change on its “Chicago Survivors” program.⁴¹⁰ The collaboration sought to provide immediate responses to family members of murder victims in order

to provide services and assist them through the aftermath of loss due to violence.⁴¹¹ Chicago Survivors is a promising program, but its funding cycle is ending and its efforts are constrained by current staffing. The program currently provides one-hour training to lead homicide investigators on “More Effective Engagement and Communication with Families Following Homicide.” It also provides a fresher course on crime victims’ services and a general overview of the symptoms of PTSD and complicated grief.

The City and CPD should expand the capacity of the Chicago Survivors program by using the program to: (1) respond to all homicides City-wide; (2) provide homicide scene de-escalation, which would lower arrests and agitation within the community; (3) conduct PTSD assessments; (4) provide links to six months of family support services; (5) provide officer training to promote more effective and compassionate engagement; (6) provide training to state prosecutors and the medical examiner’s office; and (7) help ensure that working adults have sufficient time and ability to mourn the loss of loved ones.

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Video Release Policy

The Task Force developed a policy for the public release of video and audio recordings of certain critical incidents involving police officers, in particular those involving the use of deadly force or in which death or serious injury results. The Task Force produced this policy on a somewhat expedited basis due to the need to address pending issues and incidents.

The Task Force released the proposed policy on February 16, 2016, and the Mayor immediately adopted it. The adoption of the policy made Chicago the first city in the nation to have a specific, written policy that guarantees the public's timely access to video and audio recordings relating to sensitive police-involved incidents. Nevertheless, and in keeping with the overall timetable for the presentation of its final report, the Task Force has continued to review the policy as it was adopted, and has received and reviewed additional comments and relevant materials. This section of the report will address the process by which the policy was created and some of the concerns behind it, as well as some changes the Task Force proposes in light of information received since its adoption.

The Task Force received and reviewed a considerable quantity of material related to the issue of the public release of recordings of police incidents. While no other city had a written policy, there was a wealth of material to consider, including proposed policies as well as commentary from people and groups on all sides of the issue. The Task Force obtained input directly from a number of concerned entities and individuals, including members of the public, City agencies (including the Law Department and IPRA), prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys, leadership of the FOP, and attorneys who litigate claims against police officers and who pursue FOIA claims directed at obtaining the release of recordings of police incidents. After the policy was released by the Task Force and adopted by the Mayor, the Task Force received a number of comments and additional information, some of which is reflected in proposed changes to the policy that are described below.

Why does the City not immediately release all video, audio and police reports on every police shooting or death in custody?

Before the Mayor's adoption of the policy on February 16, 2016, the practice in Chicago was generally to withhold from public release any video recording of a police incident until investigations, whether criminal or merely disciplinary, were concluded. This practice, like the absence of any written policy, was consistent with many jurisdictions the Task Force surveyed. However, the Task Force found that the absence of a clear, written policy led to inconsistencies, confusion and mistrust on the part of the public, as well as a proliferation of expensive and time-consuming litigation conducted under the Freedom of Information Act. In many cases, it also left the public in the dark about matters of serious public interest.

In deciding what the video release policy should say, the Task Force was keenly interested in how other jurisdictions handled this issue. As noted, the Task Force's survey of policies around the nation found that as of February 16, 2016, no other city had a written policy on the release of audio and video of police-involved incidents. But other jurisdictions have considered the issue, and their experiences were

informative. This report will summarize two of the many jurisdictions that were considered—New Orleans and Seattle.

New Orleans, by coincidence, issued a written policy on February 24, 2016, just eight days after the Mayor adopted the video release policy produced by the Task Force. New Orleans is under a police-related federal consent decree, and the new policy was also approved by the Federal Monitor and the U.S. Department of Justice.

The New Orleans policy provides that, within 48 hours of a critical incident involving a police officer, the Public Integrity Bureau (“PIB”) of the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) must provide any recording recovered from the scene to: (1) the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office; (2) the City Attorney’s Office; (3) the NOPD Compliance Bureau; and (4) the local United States Attorney’s Office. Those agencies then advise the Superintendent of the NOPD on whether the recording should be made public. The PIB considers the nature of the incident, the safety and privacy concerns of individuals involved, and whether the release would interfere with an ongoing investigation. Taking the advice of those agencies into account, the PIB must make a final recommendation to the Superintendent no more than seven days following the incident. The Superintendent then determines, within 48 hours of receiving the PIB’s recommendation, whether any recordings may be released to the public. Any recordings that are released may be redacted to protect the identity of juveniles, victims, witnesses, and suspects, and to ensure the safety and security of anyone involved with the incident. If the Superintendent decides recordings will not be released, the NOPD must inform the federal judge overseeing the consent decree, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Monitor.

The New Orleans policy arises in a somewhat different context than that present in Chicago, principally because of the presence of the consent decree. That said, differences between the New Orleans policy and the policy produced by the Task Force should be noted. The most prominent is the affording of discretion to the NOPD Superintendent, albeit after consultation with other concerned entities, as to whether a recording should be released. By contrast, the Task Force’s policy eschews discretion on the part of any official in favor of mandatory release after a specific and limited interval. The Task Force felt that this model was more likely to serve the interests of transparency and trust that were its paramount goals. In addition, the Task Force found that use of a model in which some official or agency was charged with deciding whether to release a recording on a case-by-case basis would raise difficult issues regarding in what City office or agency such an official would be lodged and what criteria would be applied in deciding whether recordings should be released—issues addressed more fully below.

Many commentators, including some who provided input directly to the Task Force, suggested that it consider how the issue of the release of recordings is handled in Seattle. Aumber in fact claimed that Seattle followed a policy of releasing all such recordings immediately, and touted that approach.

When the Task Force contacted responsible Seattle officials, it turned out that was not the case. First, Seattle does not have, and never has had, a department-wide immediate release rule, and it has no written policy at all. From December 2014 to July 2015, the Seattle Police Department (“SPD”) operated a pilot project in which 12 police officers (out of approximately 1,300 in the department) wore body cameras while on duty. With the assistance of local hackers, software was developed that allowed the video and audio recorded by those 12 body cameras to be redacted to obscure all images and eliminate audio, and then to be uploaded to a YouTube channel, where it was available for public

review within a day of its being recorded. The recordings covered by this policy were not limited to incidents involving the use of force; rather, they included everything that was recorded on the officer's body cameras. The pilot project ended, and currently there are no Seattle officers wearing body cameras or uploading recordings. Nor has the pilot project been expanded to include more officers. The SPD continues to assess its pilot project.

So how, after having the benefit of the pilot program, does Seattle actually handle these issues? Seattle's current policy gives discretion to the Chief of Police to release a video when she deems it appropriate and necessary. If the Chief of Police declines to release a recording, the Washington Public Records Act ("WPRA," equivalent to Illinois' FOIA) allows interested parties to request release of a video and, if necessary, sue to obtain its release. The WPRA includes an exemption from release for pending criminal investigations. The authority to declare an investigation of a police-involved incident a "criminal investigation" exempt from release under WPRA rests solely with the Director of the SPD's Office of Professional Accountability, who reports to the Chief of Police, but is otherwise outside the SPD chain of command. Moreover, under Washington state law the criminal investigation exemption to WPRA ceases to apply once a matter is actually referred to a prosecutor's office. Like the New Orleans model, and unlike the policy produced by the Task Force, the Seattle policy that is actually currently in force affords at least some discretion to the SPD to withhold a recording from release for some period of time, subject to litigation seeking its release.

Recommendations

The Task Force's video release policy provides that recordings and reports related to certain specified types of police incidents be automatically released to the public no later than 60 calendar days from the date of incident, or at an earlier date when possible. Law enforcement agencies, or IPRA (or its successor), may by written request obtain a one-time extension of that deadline, limited in length to 30 days.

This policy makes Chicago the first city in the nation to have a specific, written policy guaranteeing the public's timely access to information relating to sensitive police-involved incidents, including police-involved shootings and deaths in custody. The policy strikes a balance between the public's need for information about police activity and the interests of law enforcement agencies in conducting investigations without risk of compromising important sources of evidence. The policy is attached as Appendix 10.

In formulating the policy, the Task Force attempted to balance the interests of various concerned people and entities. These interests included, but were not limited to, the public's need to be informed about the way its police officers conduct themselves, especially where the use of force is concerned, as well as the need for agencies charged with addressing the consequences of police incidents to be able effectively to investigate them. While the public's interest in being informed is obviously substantial, the Task Force believes that it is also in the public's interest to assure the ability of prosecutors and other agencies to investigate these incidents and to address their consequences, legal or otherwise.

The Task Force believes this policy addresses these and other concerns effectively in a way that will foster greater transparency and trust between the community and its police force. It is important to

note, though, that the Task Force believes that consideration of these issues needs to be an ongoing process. The policy expressly provides that it should be reviewed after one year (or less) to determine whether earlier release (or other changes designed to further increase transparency) might be appropriate in light of experience and implementation.

Specific Provisions of the Policy. After stating its purpose in Section I, the policy sets forth the considerations behind it in Section II. These include the public's interest in timely access to recordings and reports about certain kinds of serious incidents involving the use of force by police officers, the interests of persons depicted in those recordings, and the interests of agencies investigating those incidents in avoiding the compromise of their investigations by, for example, prematurely making such materials available to potential witnesses. As Section II indicates, the goal of the policy was to balance those interests, and in that respect, Section II speaks for itself. The Task Force regards all of those concerns, including not impairing the investigative process, as being in the public interest.

Section III of the policy defines its scope, both with respect to the kinds of incidents it covers and the kinds of recordings and reports it covers. As to the former, the Task Force considered, but did not entirely mirror, the categories of incidents that are within the power of IPRA to investigate under Chicago Municipal Code § 2-57-040(c) and (d). The policy covers incidents in which force is used both "on the street" and when an individual is in police custody. While some suggested that covered incidents involving the discharge of firearms be limited to those in which an individual is actually struck, the Working Group and the Task Force rejected that view, deeming an instance in which an officer fires at a civilian but misses to be well within the zone of interests governed by this policy.

In light of comments received since its adoption, the Task Force does recommend some modifications to Section III A as it was adopted by the Mayor. One concerns the inclusion of incidents involving the use by police officers of stun guns or Tasers. After the policy was produced, the Working Group received, and relayed to the Task Force, concerns related to the administrative burden that would be imposed by including the literally hundreds of such incidents that take place each year within the scope of the policy. While the Task Force does believe that the issues raised by those types of incidents are indeed of public concern, it does not want to see what it views as an otherwise workable policy dragged down by its own administrative weight. Accordingly, the Task Force recommends that at this time incidents involving Tasers and stun guns be included only if they result in death or in great bodily harm, a concept that is already defined in Section III A.

Another proposed change, offered mainly for purposes of clarification, would clarify that covered incidents involving the discharge of firearms do not include accidental discharges.

Finally, the Task Force recommends modifying the policy to make clear that incidents resulting in death or great bodily harm to a person in CPD custody refers to those incidents where the death or great bodily harm results from the use of force by another person.

Section III B addresses what kinds of materials are covered by the policy. The policy applies to both audio and video recordings, as well as certain specified police reports. Notably, the policy is not limited in its application to recordings made on City equipment; rather, it includes any recordings made on private or other equipment that come into the possession of the City later. As a matter of

clarification, the Task Force notes that recordings made during and as part of an investigation of an incident, including recordings of witness statements, are not intended to fall within the scope of this policy.

Section IV of the policy governs the release of materials that it covers. The Working Group and the Task Force considered a number of possible models and intervals with respect to when and whether recordings and reports should be released, including immediate release of all materials, mandatory but delayed release, and release unless delay was approved by some responsible official or agency. Here, as in all of its considerations regarding this policy, the Working Group and the Task Force balanced the interests of those seeking release as soon as possible with those seeking to delay release.

The possibility of charging some official of the City with determining whether and for how long the release of material covered by the policy should be delayed was considered at length, but was ultimately rejected for several reasons. One was the concern that trust and transparency would not be fostered by affording such discretion to an official of the City's executive branch. Another was the difficulty in setting forth the criteria under which such an official would decide whether to delay release, and for how long. A third reason was that no City official could accurately evaluate the concerns of law enforcement agencies as well as they could themselves. The Task Force also considered the possibility of subjecting the question of whether and when to release to a court process, but determined that doing so would require an exercise of jurisdiction not currently afforded to Illinois courts. Ultimately, the Task Force opted for a policy that mandated release rather than leaving it, as other jurisdictions do, to the discretion (however cabined) of an official.

Having decided to mandate release, the Task Force also felt that immediate release in every case would not necessarily serve the public interest. Just as it has an interest in knowing how its police officers are doing their jobs, the public also has an interest in seeing that the agencies charged with investigating incidents involving the use of force by police, including prosecutors and IPRA, are able to conduct their investigations without fear that the release of recordings or reports would compromise their efforts. The Task Force recognized that, under certain circumstances, making recorded evidence or reports available to the public during the early stages of an investigation could result in those materials influencing witness accounts of the incident. Accordingly, the Task Force concluded that while release should be mandatory, some period of delay should be provided to allow for the conducting of witness interviews and other early investigatory functions.

Informed by the experience of a number of members of the Task Force and the Working Group with investigating cases involving the use of force by police officers, as well as the views it received from others, including criminal defense attorneys whose clients' interests could be adversely affected by an earlier release, the Task Force settled on a 60-day delay from the date of the incident (or, if the recording was made on non-City equipment, from the date a City agency comes to possess it) before release. Section III C of the policy makes it clear that material can be released earlier if it can be determined that doing so will not compromise an investigation.

Recognizing also that not all investigations proceed on the same timetable, the Task Force provided for an additional, one-time, 30-day extension upon written request made by a law enforcement agency or IPRA. Written requests need not contain investigative detail, but should invoke concerns

similar to one or more of the exemptions included in FOIA. Written extension requests will themselves be made public, so that the cause of the additional delay can be known to persons interested in the issue. Following this period of up to 90 days, the policy does not allow for any further delay in release of these materials.

Section V of the policy addresses notice to affected parties. It requires IPRA, prior to the release of any material it covers, to provide notice of the pending release to any individual who was the subject of the police action depicted or described in it, or to the person's family or legal representative if they are deceased. The policy permits them to view the recording themselves and requires IPRA to brief them on the status of the investigation in a way and to an extent that does not itself compromise that investigation.

Section VI, as noted above, calls for review of the policy in one year or less to determine whether, after the policy has been in use, the period of delay in releasing material can be shortened. The Task Force recommends that this section be modified to make clear that ongoing review should address any provisions of the policy that might appropriately be modified, including, for example, whether to add all incidents involving Tasers and stun guns back into the policy's coverage.

Finally, Section VII makes it clear that the policy is not intended to supersede any legal obligation with respect to the release of any material, including any court order, any legal obligation to withhold identifying or other sensitive information of any person, or any obligation under FOIA, including those relating to privacy and safety.

The policy is intended to balance the interests of a range of stakeholders with varied, and sometimes opposing, interests in the issue of when the recordings and reports it covers are made public. Like any balancing effort, the result will not make everyone happy, and the Task Force recognizes that implementing it will impose burdens and costs. But those concerns must, in the view of the Task Force, give way in some respect to what the Task Force views as the paramount interest of the public in timely access to the best available information regarding how the police officers that serve them exercise their unique ability to use force in performing their duties. Indeed, nowhere is the public's interest more strongly implicated than in situations in which an officer uses deadly force on a civilian, or when harm comes to one held in police custody. It was for this reason, in large part, that the Task Force chose mandatory release, as opposed to release at the discretion of some official or agency.

The Task Force hopes that the policy will foster transparency and thus encourage trust. The more informed members of the community are about how officers act at their most critical moments, the more grounds they will have to trust their police force, and to trust that officers who violate rules or the law will be dealt with justly. But the Task Force recognized that the public interest is also served by protecting the efficacy of the processes by which police incidents of this kind are investigated. Just as transparency regarding what police officers do will foster trust between the police and the community, so will the sense that relevant agencies can effectively determine what has occurred as a first step to determining what the consequences should be.

Overarching Issues

Does CPD's training need significant overhaul?

The answer is yes. The Task Force found that CPD has consistently failed to devote adequate resources to training officers once they leave the Academy. While CPD provides almost double the state-mandated time for new recruit training, once an officer leaves the Academy, over the remaining decades of an officer's career, there is virtually no annual, mandated training. The only annual mandated training is for firearms certification, nothing more. To be sure, there are occasional mandated Academy trainings, such as the recent trainings for procedural justice and Taser use. However, unlike in other jurisdictions that have a portfolio of annual, mandatory trainings, survey their members and supervisors on training needs and develop a strategic plan for training, no such processes exist for CPD training. Therefore, the Task Force recommends that CPD should address several aspects of its training programs that cut across all subject areas.

CONTINUING EDUCATION

Based on the Task Force's interviews and review of materials, it appears that CPD does not have a robust strategic approach for ensuring that all officers have ongoing training and professional development opportunities to develop and maintain the professional competencies needed to perform well. Other than an annual, under-resourced firearms qualification, there is no regular in-service training or certification requirement. Even though all officers complete pre-service training, training changes over time based on best practices and needs.

Any additional mandatory in-service training appears to be reactive, rather than systematically planned to address identified needs and changes in policing. For example, CPD is currently developing a 16-hour, two-part force mitigation training for patrol officers to begin in spring 2016 and end July 2016. There is no information about the frequency or decision to make this an annual or refresher training, however. CPD has developed and is continuing to develop procedural justice training, but, as discussed earlier in the report, the roll-out of this important training has not been fully implemented.

The International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training ("IADLEST") endorses mandated annual in-service law enforcement training, although it leaves the number of training hours and the selection and/or approval of subjects to the discretion of local law enforcement administrators. There is some variation here, with Utah, Portland, and Massachusetts requiring 40 hours annually; Indiana, Missouri, and Washington requiring 24 hours annually; and California requiring 24 hours every two years.

Additionally, practices in other jurisdictions suggest that it is highly important to regularly assess training needs, conduct in-service training, and engage the community. For New Orleans, the Department of Justice recommended that the police department establish an executive training education task force—including both law enforcement leadership and community members—that would provide the superintendent with information on current training priorities and broad training goals.⁴¹² Moreover, the Education and Training Division Commander conducts an annual training needs assessment to update its

training, and its plan includes having subject matter experts help create, implement, and teach the curriculum. The New Orleans Consent Decree also requires that the department provide eight hours of in-service training annually on community policing and problem solving.⁴¹³

Recommendations

Provide an annual 40-hour in-service training for all sworn personnel, including periodic refresher classes on procedural justice.

Law enforcement is an ever-changing occupation. Laws, court decisions, techniques, technology, and the broader community are in a constant state of flux. As a result, it is imperative that police officers keep abreast of changes and community needs in the areas they serve so that they can more effectively serve the citizens, help the agencies that employ them avoid civil liability, and develop necessary supervisory and management skills.

Implement a systematic approach to identify training needs and revise in-service training curriculum on an annual basis.

This systemic approach will require CPD to conduct a thorough training review and needs assessment to inform the development of annual in-service training. The training review should be conducted annually and take into consideration: (1) analysis of officer safety issues; (2) misconduct complaints; (3) problematic uses of force; (4) input from all levels of CPD; (5) community input; (6) recent court decisions; (7) best practices research; (8) the latest law enforcement trends; (9) individual district needs; and (10) any changes to Illinois or federal law, Chicago law, or CPD policy. Training priorities should reflect CPD's commitment to transforming the department by incorporating problem-solving, community-focused and trauma-informed goals that are represented in all policing strategy.

FIELD TRAINING OFFICER PROGRAM

CPD relies on FTOs to train probationary officers after they leave the Academy. The FTO program has great potential, but it has long needed improvement. When the Commission on Police Integrity reviewed the FTO program in 1997, it found the program "understaffed" and recommended that the number of FTOs should be increased from the then-current level of 67 officers "to at least 200 officers."⁴¹⁴ The Commission also recommended that the salaries for FTOs should be raised to attract more officers.⁴¹⁵

Unfortunately, not much has changed over the past 18 years. There are currently 88 FTOs, and, at times, there are four probationary officers for every FTO. Ideally, the ratio would be closer to 1:1. Otherwise, probationary officers have less time to interact with and learn from their FTOs and must spend significant time without FTO supervision.

Moreover, there still does not appear to be sufficient incentive for experienced officers to become FTOs. Although there is a pay increase (about \$3,000) and opportunity for overtime, the extra pay is not substantial. For a short period, CPD created training districts, which limited FTOs' options for where they could work. They are not eligible to work in specialized units due to their assignments with PPOs. FTOs work without a partner if they are not currently supervising a PPO unless it is third watch. Officers report that working with a random partner with whom they have not developed rapport or trust is

troublesome. FTOs have a tremendous amount of responsibility and none of the authority or incentive to take on the job.

Finally, although there is an initial training program for when an officer first becomes an FTO, the program lacks ongoing or regular refresher courses for its FTOs.

Recommendations

Reinvigorate the Field Training Officer program.

CPD needs to attract, train and employ more FTOs to provide valuable training and mentoring to probationary police officers. Current staffing levels of FTOs are not sufficient. CPD should analyze the current impediments to attracting FTOs and develop additional incentives for officers to become FTOs. For example, CPD could consider giving officers some form of credit for serving as FTOs during the Sergeant promotion process.

Implementation of Policy Changes

Changes in policy directives are reflected in general and special orders, and they are made accessible online and available 24 hours a day. However, there is no documentation of or any record that officers read and understood the orders. Officers may be reminded of an order during roll call to reflect a current instance, but this occurs infrequently. In general, officers are not held accountable for keeping up to date with orders.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police ("IACP") has recommended disseminating information in multiple ways, including (1) roll calls, (2) training bulletins, (3) email messages, and (4) a three-ring binder in squad cars.⁴¹⁶ The orders could also include checklists of the required procedures that the officers have to submit along with their incident reports. However, the IACP recommendations, published in 2004, likely need to be updated based on advances in technology and the availability of additional tools for ensuring that officers are knowledgeable about current policies.

There does not appear to be much data available on the practices of other jurisdictions regarding ensuring that all officers are regularly updated on new policy changes. Washington, D.C.'s Metropolitan Police Department, however, has issued a special order mandating that all sworn and civilian members must sign for the receipt of the General Orders, Special Orders, Standard Operating Procedures, and General Order Changes.⁴¹⁷ At a minimum, there must be (1) a signature roster that each member will sign and date upon receipt of newly published directives and (2) a signature roster file that contains copies of all signature rosters that have been completed and submitted.

Recommendations

Implement procedures to ensure that sworn personnel remain informed on all directives and policies.

Within 30 days of the release of new directives and policies, all sworn officers should be provided copies and be required to sign a statement acknowledging that they received and reviewed the directive or policy and had an opportunity to ask questions. CPD could also use brief online quizzes to ensure officers understand new directives and policies.

Officers should also be held accountable for knowing how and where to access CPD guides and manuals and for knowing the contents. Officers should be required to sign a receipt acknowledging this responsibility and that they have received instructions on how and where to access the guides and manuals. Officers should also have adequate resources, such as working computers in their squad cars and at the stations, so they can review general orders as needed. CPD should also consider investing in technology, such as a Smartphone app, to provide easy access to general orders and other important communications.

Are there enough Sergeants to effectively supervise the large number of patrol officers?

Sergeants are the linchpin to ensuring that patrol officers are accountable to the communities in which they serve. Sergeants work directly with their officers on a regular basis and are in the best position to notice, document and address officer behavior. But, due to budget constraints, the number of available Sergeants per shift does not always provide appropriate coverage to ensure all patrol officers are adequately supervised.

Currently, CPD's average "span of control" is a ratio of 1 Sergeant to every 11 officers. But, when other elements are factored in, such as vacations, sick leave and other events that disrupt officer and Sergeant availability, the ratio is often closer to 1:20. "Span of control" is defined as the number of individuals or resources that one supervisor can manage effectively during emergency response incidents or special events.⁴¹⁸ One commentator has defined "span of control" as simply representing the number of people a manager has responsibility for communicating with.⁴¹⁹ High spans of control mean that there is not enough time for a supervisor to evenly disperse his or her time among subordinates.

How did this state of affairs come to pass at CPD? The problem starts with structural issues. Years of budget cuts and the flattening of supervisory ranks have caused a staffing shortage in supervisory personnel. The career ladder within CPD is broken, and surveys show that 98% of officers believe that promotions are due to connections, not merit.⁴²⁰ This sentiment is compounded by the fact that almost 10 years passed between the two most recent Sergeant promotion exams, which left many out of the promotion process for years.⁴²¹

There are additional, on-the-ground issues that further strain supervisors' ability to do their job. First, as a result of the CBA's bidding process, junior officers, who need the most support, are placed in the most difficult neighborhoods at the most difficult times. Second, personnel information does not follow officers around as they move between assignments and supervisors. Thus, Sergeants are not provided documentation about their officers' prior behavior or disciplinary history, which hampers their ability to monitor the officers' actions in the field. Third, officers often work with several different Sergeants over the course of a week-long shift in order to maximize coverage. Fourth, due to the limited number of Field Training Officers, Sergeants often take time away from supervising their patrol officers to check on officers who are still on their probationary periods. Finally, Sergeants must respond to calls due to a lack of available officers, which additionally reduces their ability to supervise.

Recommendations:

CPD should increase the number of Sergeants on patrol.

CPD should implement monthly meetings of all Sergeants in a district to ensure the sharing of officer performance, to provide mentoring opportunities to newer Sergeants, and to provide a forum for best practice sharing to prevent officer misconduct.

Why aren't all CPD officers already wearing body cameras?

Body cameras are a promising technological tool to protect both the public from police misconduct and police officers from false allegations of misconduct. They promote accountability and transparency. The presence of body cameras can also de-escalate encounters, resulting in improved behavior among both police officers and the public. The commander in charge of CPD's body camera pilot program, Marc Buslik, recently explained this phenomenon: "When they know they are being recorded, both sides, everything becomes less intense"; "[t]he camera brings everything down on both sides. Officers noticed right away."⁴²²

CPD is already embracing the use of body cameras. In January 2015, CPD initiated a body camera pilot program.⁴²³ The program initially involved 30 body cameras on officers working the 2:00 p.m. to midnight shift in the Shakespeare District (14th). Though the sample size is small, initial results were promising. Since the program was launched, complaints filed against officers for that district/watch fell by 26%, and excessive force complaints fell to zero in 2015 compared with seven in 2014.⁴²⁴ In 2016, CPD is expanding the pilot program to all three watches in six additional police districts—Wentworth (2nd), South Chicago (4th), Gresham (6th), Deering (9th), Ogden (10th), and Austin (15th).⁴²⁵

Police departments nationwide are increasingly using body cameras. As of early 2015, about 25% of the nation's 17,000 police agencies were using them in whole or in part, with 80% evaluating the technology.⁴²⁶ In Los Angeles, the LAPD is outfitting every officer with body cameras.⁴²⁷ While empirical data is still trickling in, several studies have documented substantial decreases in citizen complaints, use of force, and assaults on officers after body cameras were distributed.⁴²⁸ There is some debate about whether these declines are attributable to improved officer behavior, improved citizen behavior, or citizens being less likely to file frivolous complaints (or some mix). Regardless, these are all positive developments.

Recommendations

CPD should continue rolling out and evaluating body cameras with the ultimate goal of providing body cameras to every police officer who regularly comes into contact with civilians.

Body cameras show significant promise. Only a small percentage of the many thousands of complaints filed against CPD officers result in sustained findings, often because there is insufficient evidence of what happened aside from a "he said, she said." Body cameras can provide objective evidence to support meritorious complaints, while also discouraging and reducing the filing of unfounded complaints. In either case, the use of body cameras would greatly improve the functioning of Chicago's police oversight system. To the extent body cameras improve officer

behavior, they also could help pay for themselves by reducing the more than \$600 million the City has paid to resolve police misconduct cases since 2004.

CPD should continue its roll-out and evaluation of body cameras with the ultimate goal of providing body cameras to every police officer who regularly comes into contact with civilians. The City should also continue to evaluate policies governing the use of body cameras, which raise a variety of issues (e.g., what to record, how to record and store recordings, and how to ensure that officers comply with the policy and properly use the cameras). Some of these questions are already addressed in a new state law that went into effect on January 1, 2016, the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act.⁴²⁹ The Act creates “standardized protocols and procedures” on such issues as when cameras must be turned on, how citizens are notified, access, retention, and discipline.⁴³⁰

Endnotes

⁴¹² New Orleans Police Department Policy Manual (2014).

⁴¹³ New Orleans Consent Decree (2012), available at <http://www.nola.gov/nopd/nopd-consent-decree/>.

⁴¹⁴ 1997 Report of the Commission on Police Integrity, *supra* note 47, at 19.

⁴¹⁵ *Id.*

⁴¹⁶ W. Dwayne Orrick, Best Practices Guide: Developing a Police Department Policy-Procedure Manual, International Association of Chiefs of Police (2014), available at <http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/BP-PolicyProcedures.pdf>.

⁴¹⁷ Special Order: Dissemination of Written Directives, Metropolitan Police Department D.C. (2006), available at <https://go.mpdonline.com/GO/SO-06-13.pdf>.

⁴¹⁸ Management Span of Control: Introduction to the Incident Command System (ICS100), Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C.

⁴¹⁹ Robert L. Bailey, Span of No Control (Mar. 1, 2015).

⁴²⁰ Wesley G. Skogan, Summary, Chicago Officer Survey 2013 (Oct. 8, 2013).

⁴²¹ Working Group Interview.

⁴²² Paul Biasco, How Chicago Police Hope Body Cameras Will Restore The Public's Trust, dnainfo.com (Jan. 7, 2016), available at <https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20160107/logan-square/how-chicago-police-hope-body-cameras-will-restore-publics-trust>.

⁴²³ CPD, Body Worn Camera Pilot Program – Phase 1, Department Notice D15-01 (Jan. 1, 2016).

⁴²⁴ *Id.*

⁴²⁵ CPD, Office of News Affairs, Mayor Emanuel and Police Superintendent Escalante Announce Districts for Body-Worn Camera Expansion (Dec. 23, 2015), available at <http://4abpn833c0nr1zvwp7447f2b.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/23Dec15-Release-Body-Worn-Camera-Expansion.pdf>.

⁴²⁶ Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, A Win For All, ACLU (Mar. 2015), available at <https://www.aclu.org/police-body-mounted-cameras-right-policies-place-win-all>.

⁴²⁷ Kate Mather, A Fight Over Access to Video from LAPD Body Cameras is Shaping Up, Los Angeles Times (Feb. 5, 2015), available at <http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-lapd-cameras-20150205-story.html>.

⁴²⁸ Michael D. White, Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras, Washington D.C.: Office of Community-Orientated Policing Services (2014), available at <https://www.ojpdagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/spotlight/download/Police%20Officer%20Body-Worn%20Cameras.pdf>.

⁴²⁹ 50 ILCS 706/10-1, 35.

⁴³⁰ 50 ILCS 706/10-5.

Disclaimer

This report is the product of the Police Accountability Task Force and its affiliated Working Groups, with participants of diverse expertise and affiliations addressing many complex and contentious topics. It is inevitable that arriving at a consensus document in these circumstances entailed some compromise. Accordingly, it should not be assumed that every Task Force (or Working Group) member embraces in totality every formulation in this report or even that all participants would agree with any given recommendation if it were taken in isolation. Rather, the Task Force reached consensus on these recommendations as a package.

Moreover, while the Task Force formed Working Groups to address five general subject areas, there was inevitably overlap between the Working Groups and subject areas. The discussion of a particular issue in this report under a particular Working Group should not be construed to mean that only that Working Group contributed to the Task Force's findings and recommendations. In the end, the findings and recommendations in this report represent the work of the entire Task Force.

Appendix 1

Police Accountability Task Force Members

Lori E. Lightfoot, Chair, is President of the Chicago Police Board, a partner at Mayer Brown LLP, and a former federal prosecutor. She served as Chief Administrator for the Office of Professional Standards of the Chicago Police Department, where she managed a 100-person office of civilian investigators charged with investigating police-involved shootings, allegations of excessive force and other misconduct alleged against Chicago police officers.

Deval Patrick, Senior Advisor, was formerly Governor of Massachusetts and is a native of Chicago. Governor Patrick served under President Bill Clinton as the U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, where he worked on issues including racial profiling and police misconduct.

Joe Ferguson, Technical Advisor, is Inspector General of the City of Chicago and a former federal prosecutor with experience representing the United States in cases involving employment discrimination, civil rights, environmental law and government program fraud.

Randolph Stone is a clinical professor at the University of Chicago Law School, director of the Criminal and Juvenile Justice Project Clinic, and a former Cook County Public Defender. He serves on the boards of the Youth Advocate Programs, Inc., the Federal Defender Program, and the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, and writes and teaches on criminal law, juvenile justice, indigent defense, and race and criminal justice.

Sergio Acosta is a partner at Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP and is an experienced criminal litigator, investigator, former federal prosecutor, and member of the National Hispanic Prosecutors Association and the Hispanic National Bar Association.

Victor B. Dickson is the President/CEO of Safer Foundation, which is a national leader in the fields of community corrections, prisoner re-entry, and workforce development. He worked for more than 20 years in the corporate sector with AT&T and Sprint and in 2014 was appointed to the Illinois Human Services Commission. He also serves on the Illinois Commission to Eliminate Poverty and the Illinois Workforce Investment Board.

Maurice Classen is a Program Officer with the MacArthur Foundation, where he focuses his work on public safety, justice, police reform, municipal and neighborhood growth, and policy issues. Prior to joining the MacArthur Foundation, he was a Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in King County (Seattle), Washington.

Alexa James is the Executive Director of NAMI Chicago, which is the largest mental health advocacy agency in Chicago and supports those impacted by mental illness. Prior to joining NAMI Chicago, she worked with children and adults living with mental illness, as well as those impacted by poverty and trauma.

Sybil Madison-Boyd is the Director of the Learning Pathways Program at Digital Youth Network in DePaul University's College of Computing and Digital Media. Her work addresses barriers to equitable educational outcomes for urban youth through systems change and innovative reform and, for the past 20 years, in partnership with Chicago Public School leaders, teachers, social workers, and students.

Appendix 2

Police Accountability Task Force Working Group Members

COMMUNITY-POLICE RELATIONS

Leader: Victor Dickson, Safer Foundation; President and CEO

Leader: Sybil Madison-Boyd, DePaul University; Learning Pathways Director, Digital Youth Network

Leader: Randolph Stone, University of Chicago Law School; Clinical Professor of Law

Keith Ahmad, Law Office of the Public Defender – Cook County; First Assistant Public Defender

Karina Ayala-Bermejo, Legal Aid Society of Metropolitan Family Services; Executive Vice President of Human Resources & General Counsel

Todd Belcore, Social Change (Chicago International Social Change Film Festival); Executive Director

Amy Campanelli, Law Office of the Public Defender – Cook County; Public Defender

Herschella Conyers, University of Chicago Law School; Clinical Professor of Law

Sol Flores, La Casa Norte; Founding Executive Director

Craig Futterman, University of Chicago Law School; Clinical Professor of Law

Steve Gates, Youth Advocate Programs; Director

Benny Lee, National Alliance for the Empowerment of the Formerly Incarcerated (NAEFI); CEO

Xavier McElrath-Bey, Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth; Youth Justice Advocate/ICAN; Co-Founder & Coordinator

Jonathan Peck, Alternatives Inc.; Restorative Justice Coordinator

Howard Saffold, Positive Anticrime Thrust; CEO

Rabbi Michael Siegel, Anshe Emet Synagogue; Senior Rabbi

Wesley Skogan, Northwestern University; Professor

Eliza Solowiej, First Defense Legal Aid; Executive Director

Debra Wesley, Sinai Community Institute; Founder and President

Richard Wooten, Gathering Point Community Council; President and CEO

POLICE OVERSIGHT

Leader: Maurice Classen, MacArthur Foundation; Program Officer

Advisor: Joe Ferguson, City of Chicago Office of the Inspector General; Inspector General

Anthony Beale, 9th Ward, City of Chicago; Alderman

Sheila Bedi, MacArthur Justice Center; Attorney

Locke Bowman, MacArthur Justice Center; Executive Director

Mark Flessner, Holland and Knight LLP; Partner

Adam Gross, Business and Professional People for the Public Interest Chicago; Director of Justice Reform Program

Janine Hoft, The People's Law Office; Attorney

Kwame Raoul, 13th District, State of Illinois; State Senator

Freya Rigterink, City of Chicago Office of the Inspector General; Assistant Inspector General

Ronald Safer, Riley, Safer, Holmes and Cancila LLP; Partner

Gretchen Slusser, Thred Partners; President

EARLY INTERVENTION & PERSONNEL CONCERNS

Leader: Lori Lightfoot, Mayer Brown LLP; Partner

Anthony Berglund, University of Chicago Crime Lab; Research Manager

Craig Chico, Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council; Executive Director

Monica Haslip, Little Black Pearl; Founder and Executive Director

Daniel O'Neil, Smart Chicago Collaborative; Executive Director

Julia Quinn, University of Chicago Crime Lab; Research Manager

Dave Williams, Youth Advocate Programs; Regional Director

DE-ESCALATION

Leader: Alexa James, National Alliance on Mental Illness Chicago; Executive Director

Fred Coffey, Chicago Police Department; Former Deputy

John O'Malley, United States Marshal Service; Retired Chief Deputy

Harold Pollack, University of Chicago School of Social Services Administration; Helen Ross Professor

Carolyn Vessel, I AM ABLE Center for Family Development; President and CEO

Amy Watson, University of Illinois at Chicago; Associate Professor

Ronnie Watson, Chicago State University; Retired Chief of Police

VIDEO RELEASE

Leader: Sergio Acosta, Hinshaw & Culbertson; Partner

Joel Bertocchi, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP; Partner

Lori Lightfoot, Mayer Brown LLP; Partner

Barry Miller, Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission; Former Executive Director

Lisa Plaza, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP; Paralegal

Randy Samborn, Levick; Senior Vice President (Former PIO for the US Attorney)

Jeff Urdangen, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law; Clinical Associate Professor of Law

Adam Vaught, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP; Associate

Appendix 3

Police Accountability Task Force Interviews

Below is a list of the subject matter experts and community members consulted as part of our fact finding. In the course of our work, Task Force and Working Group members consulted with numerous subject matter experts at various points in the process. While we have tried to capture them all here, we have inevitably missed some, and we acknowledge everyone's contributions and apologize for any omissions.

INDIVIDUALS:

Keith Ahmad, Law Office of the Cook County Public Defender; First Deputy Public Defender

Arif Alikhan, Los Angeles Police Department; Director, Office of Constitutional Policing and Policy

Roseanna Ander, University of Chicago Crime Lab; Executive Director

Scott Ando, Independent Police Review Authority; Former Chief Administrator

Dean Angelo, Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge 7; President

Greg Bella, Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge 7; Recording Secretary

Lucius Black, Community Renewal Society, Police Issue Team

Rebecca Boatright, Seattle Police Department; Senior Legal Counsel

Merrick Bobb, Federal Court-Appointed Monitor Overseeing Seattle Police Department and Police Assessment Resource Center; Executive Director

Brian Buchner, National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement; President

Alexander Bustamante, Los Angeles Police Department; Inspector General

Max Caproni, Chicago Police Board; Executive Director

Keith Calloway, Chicago Police Department; Deputy Chief and Director of Education and Training Division

Amy Campanelli, Law Office of the Cook County Public Defender; Public Defender

Jadine Chou, Chicago Public Schools; Chief Safety and Security Officer

Sarah Creighton, San Diego Police Department; Assistant Chief of Police

Joseph De Angelis, University of Idaho; Assistant Professor of Criminology and Sociology

Kathe Dellacecca, Sinai Health System; System Vice President for Behavioral Health

Richard Emery, New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board; Chair

Jason Ervin, City of Chicago – 28th Ward; Alderman

John Escalante, Chicago Police Department; Interim Superintendent

Philip K. Eure, Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD, NYC Department of Investigation; Inspector General

Sharon Fairley, Independent Police Review Authority; Chief Administrator

Joe Ferguson, City of Chicago Office of Inspector General; Inspector General

Pastor Cy Fields, Community Renewal Society | New Landmark Missionary Baptist Church, Senior Pastor

Peggy Flaherty, Thresholds; Senior Vice President, Clinical Operations

Lorie Fridell, Police Executive Research Forum; Former Director of Research

Craig Futterman, University of Chicago Law School; Clinical Professor of Law

Mike Gennaco, OIR Group; Principal

Mike Golden, Office of the State's Attorney, Cook County; Assistant State's Attorney

Maggie Goodrich, Los Angeles Police Department; Chief Information Officer

Cheryl Graves, Community Justice for Youth Institute; Executive Director

Rev. Christopher Griffin, Community Renewal Society | First Baptist Congregational Church

Norris Henderson, Voice of the Ex-Offender (VOTE); Founder and Executive Director

Susan Hutson, New Orleans Office of the Independent Police Monitor; Independent Police Monitor

Mark Ishaug, Thresholds; Chief Executive Officer

Beth Johnson, Cabrini Green Legal Aid; Director, Legal Programs

David Johnson, Franczek Radelet; Partner

Jeff Jordon, San Diego Police Department

Jamie Kalven, Invisible Institute; Executive Director

Walter Katz, Office of the Independent Police Auditor; Independent Police Auditor for the City of San Jose

Annette Kelly, FOUS Youth Development Services; President

David Kennedy, National Network for Safe Communities; Director

Dan Kirk, Office of the State's Attorney, Cook County; First Assistant State's Attorney

Robert Klimas, Chicago Police Department, Bureau of Internal Affairs; Commander

Armand Lemoyne, Los Angeles Police Department; Sergeant

Anne Levinson, Seattle Police Department; Civilian Auditor for the Office of Professional Accountability

David LeValley, Detroit Police Department; Deputy Chief

Lori Lightfoot, Chicago Police Board; Chair

Marc Loveless, Coalition for Justice and Respect; Founding Director

Jon Lucas, Seattle Police Department; Sergeant

Mina Malik, New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board; Executive Director

Garry McCarthy, Chicago Police Department; Former Superintendent of Police

Todd Miller, Rave Mobile Safety; Vice President of Public Safety

Nicholas Mitchell, Denver Police and Sheriff Departments; Independent Monitor

Dr. Julie Morita, Chicago Department of Public Health; Commissioner

Kim Neal, Cincinnati Citizen Complaint Authority; Director

Roger Nunez, Los Angeles Police Department; Sergeant

Donald O'Neill, Chicago Police Department; Director of Human Resources

Emily Owens, University of Pennsylvania; Associate Professor of Criminology, Business Economics, and Public Policy

Stephen R. Patton, City of Chicago; Corporation Counsel

Ursula Price, New Orleans Office of the Independent Police Monitor; Executive Director for Community Relations

Sheri Richardt, Advocate Illinois Masonic Medical Center; Management Team, Behavioral Health Services Department

Dennis Rosenbaum, University of Illinois at Chicago; Professor, Department of Criminology, Law and Justice

Ilana Rosenzweig, Independent Police Review Authority; Former Chief Administrator

Ralph Russo, New Orleans Police Department; Insight Project Director

Dr. Rashad Saafir, Bobby E. Wright Comprehensive Behavioral Health Center; Psychiatrist/President and CEO

Ron Reid

Seretha Reid

Ron Safer, Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP; Partner

Bob Scales, Sanford, Olson & Scales; Partner

Ora Schub, Community Justice for Youth Institute

Michael Schlosser, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Police Training Institute; Associate Director

Karen Sheley, ACLU of Illinois; Director, Police Practices Project

Andre Simenauer, Motorola Solutions; Senior Public Safety Solutions Consultant

Tracy Sitka, Chicago Justice Project; Executive Director

Wes Skogan, Northwestern University; Professor, Department of Political Science, Legal Studies and the Institute for Policy Research

Brandon Smith, Journalist

Sandra Sosa, Alternatives, Inc.; Restorative Justice Manager

Dr. Carrie Steiner, First Responders Wellness Center; Clinical Psychologist

Flint Taylor, People's Law Group; Partner

Michael Tobin, Office of Police Complaints, Washington D.C.; Executive Director

Matthew Topic, Loevy & Loevy; Attorney

John Vassal, Office of the State's Attorney, Cook County

Ciera Walker, Community Renewal Society, Congregational Organizer

Samuel Walker, University of Nebraska – Omaha, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice; Professor Emeritus

Eric Washington, Chicago Police Department; Deputy Chief of Community Policing

Ronnie Watson, Chicago Police Department; Deputy Chief - Retired

Vanessa Wesley, Chicago Police Department; Officer and Coordinator - Bridging the Divide

Chuck Wexler, Police Executive Research Forum; Executive Director

James White, Detroit Police Department; Assistant Chief of Police

Alex Wiesendanger, Community Renewal Society; Director of Organizing

Camille Williamson, Adler University; Director of Community Engagement

Linda Zerwin, Emergency Telephone System Board of DuPage County; Executive Director

THE TASK FORCE CONVENED AND MET MULTIPLE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS:

Chicago Coalition for Police Accountability

Chicago Survivors/Chicago Citizens for Change

Civil Rights and Criminal Defense Attorneys

Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge 7

THE TASK FORCE MET WITH YOUTH FROM THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS:

Mikva Challenge – Emilo Araujo, Shacretta Bernard, Kristine Hernandez, Dwayne Lewis, Daniel Mercado, Amber Snelling

Precious Blood Ministry of Reconciliation

Sullivan High School

**THE TASK FORCE MET WITH SENIOR STAFF FROM THE FOLLOWING
AGENCIES/DEPARTMENTS:**

Chicago Police Department – Commanders, Current and Retired Officers, District Advisory Council
Volunteers

Chicago Police Department Taser Training Team

City of Chicago Law Department

City of Chicago Office of Emergency Management and Communications

Cook County Public Defender

Cook County State's Attorney

Independent Police Review Authority

Seattle Police Department

Appendix 4


Community Relations Working Group Checklist

- The City should engage the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice to implement a “Reconciliation Process” in Chicago. Critical elements of the process involve the Superintendent publicly acknowledging CPD’s history of racial disparity and discrimination in police practices and making a public commitment to cultural change required to eliminate racial bias and disparity.
- The Mayor and the President of the Cook County Board should work together to co-sponsor quarterly summits of key stakeholders and community leaders to develop and implement comprehensive criminal justice reform.
- The Mayor and the President of the Cook County Board should work together to develop and implement programs that address socioeconomic justice and equality, housing segregation, systemic racism, poverty, education, health and safety.
- CPD should clarify in its general order prohibiting racial profiling and other biased-based policing whether race may be used to any degree in developing grounds for a stop, other than where race is part of a specific suspect description.
- Through its Data Portal, CPD should regularly release incident-level information on arrests, traffic stop reports, investigatory stop reports and predecessor contact cards and officer weapon use (firearm and nonlethal). To facilitate trend analysis, the incident-level data should reach back at least to January 1, 2010.
- CPD should resume publishing annual reports.
- After the ACLU agreement terminates, CPD should continue supervisory review and audits of investigatory stop and pat-down practices, with oversight by the new Community Safety Oversight Board and Inspector General for the Public Safety.
- CPD should develop and use recruitment, selection and promotion strategies that increase diversity and the likelihood that officers will be culturally competent, fair and impartial, especially when policing communities of color.
- CPD should hire a Deputy Chief of Diversity and Inclusion.
- CPD should adopt and promote a clear, progressive policing philosophy grounded in core values such as respect, protecting the sanctity of all life and protecting civil and human rights.
- CPD should bring in experts and credible trainers to deliver comprehensive training on cultural competence and implicit bias for all recruits, officers and supervisors.
- CPD should involve the community in officer training that includes being trained by and partnering with community leaders, organizations and youth.
- CPD, including the Deputy Chief of Diversity and Inclusion, should analyze deployment strategies to ensure officers are culturally competent and have a proper understanding of the neighborhoods where they are assigned.

- Where possible, CPD should assign more experienced officers to high-crime districts, beats and shifts. If new officers are given these difficult assignments, they should be partnered with experienced officers with exemplary disciplinary histories and the proven ability to work with diverse populations.
- CPD should adopt community policing as a core philosophy.
- CPD should replace CAPS with localized Community Empowerment and Engagement Districts (CEED) and support them accordingly.
- CPD should expand the methods it uses to communicate and work with neighborhood residents.
- CPD should reinvest in civilian organizing staff.
- CPD should renew its commitment to beat-based policing and work to expand community patrols.
- CPD should include information about how the public is being involved and how effectively neighborhood concerns are being addressed in CompStat.
- CPD should evaluate and improve the training officers receive with respect to youths to ensure that all officers are prepared to engage with youth in ways that are age-appropriate, trauma-informed and based in a restorative justice model.
- CPD and CPS should ensure that officers who are assigned to schools have clear job descriptions and expectations that are shared by CPS and CPD, receive extensive and ongoing training on how to engage with youth and crisis intervention and are swiftly reassigned if they fail to meet expectations.
- Train the community in Know Your Rights and Responsibilities, including by:
 - Creating a CPS policy and City Ordinance requiring that students receive instruction on how to exercise 4th, 5th and 6th Amendment rights; and
 - Create a technology platform to assist with a public service announcement campaign and informational videos in police stations.
- The City should enact an ordinance, and CPD should promulgate general orders:
 - Mandating that arrestees be allowed to make phone calls to an attorney and/or family member(s) within one hour after arrest, allowing only for limited exceptions in exigent circumstances;
 - Mandating that a legal aid or other provider be contacted within 30 minutes of the arrest of any juvenile, and that CPD wait for legal representation to arrive before any questioning of a juvenile occurs; and
- Confirming that CPD will prominently post information concerning rights to counsel, as already required under state law, and include any willing legal aid provider's name and 24-hour contact information.

Appendix 5

Oversight Working Group Flowchart



CURRENT REVIEW, GRIEVANCE & ADJUDICATION STAGES


Chicago Police Department



Arbitration **7**



Chicago Police Board **8**



PATF PROPOSAL CHANGES

The Task Force recommendations will significantly streamline and bring much-needed accountability and transparency to the complaint, investigation and adjudication processes. The descriptions of proposed changes correspond to numbers on the Complaint Flowchart diagram to highlight some major areas of reform.

Current Complaint Triage, Investigation & Discipline Recommendation Stages

IPRA & CPD BIA	1	The affidavit step, which is an obstacle to the reporting of misconduct, requires investigators' time and resources and leads directly to the closure of numerous cases each year, would be eliminated. Anonymous complaints and a community engagement process would also facilitate easier reporting.
CPD BIA	2	Improvements to the investigations conducted by individual police districts, such as requiring a consistent investigative structure and updating data and case tracking systems, would streamline operations and improve accountability.
IPRA & CPD BIA INVESTIGATION PROCESS	3	The "mediation" program, which presently functions like plea bargaining and preempts a full investigation of the complaint, would be reformed. Mediations of allegations that could result in serious discipline would be prohibited. Additionally, the City would be encouraged to establish a mediation program based on national best practices that involves both police and citizens to promote dialogue and better understanding in accordance with restorative justice principles and objectives.
	4	IPRA would be replaced by a more independent Civilian Police Investigative Agency (CPIA). Investigations by CPIA and BIA would be informed by pattern and practice analysis, and would be improved through regular audits by the Inspector General for Public Safety, greater oversight through the Community Safety Oversight Board, enhanced technology and new training. Numerous steps currently mandated by the collective bargaining agreements that hinder the efficiency and effectiveness of investigations would also be eliminated. Examples of current CBA-based practices include allowing officers to amend prior statements after viewing video footage, limitations on when and how interviews of officers may be conducted and limitations on how closed complaint files can be used in disciplinary proceedings.
	5	The investigative oversight entities (currently IPRA and BIA) would be required to make disciplinary recommendations according to a single, formal, publicly available discipline matrix, thereby bringing more predictability and fairness to the disciplinary system. Additionally, there would be greater transparency in their reporting of investigatory findings.

Current Review, Grievance & Adjudication Stages

CPD	6	Command Channel review, a process by which multiple CPD members in the accused's chain of command can recommend changing the finding and discipline recommendation made by IPRA or BIA, would be eliminated. This process adds time to the process and is a redundant layer of due process.
ARBITRATION	7	Increased transparency and scrutiny would bring much needed accountability to the arbitration process, where the majority of suspension decisions (other than those which are mediated) are ultimately resolved. When IPRA and BIA recommend discipline, arbitrators frequently eliminate or reduce the discipline and only maintain the recommended discipline in a minority of cases.
CPB	8	There would be greater oversight of termination cases before the Police Board through regular, publicly reported Public Safety Inspector General assessments of disciplinary trends and impediments to imposing discipline.
	9	The opportunity for sergeants, lieutenants, and captains to challenge a suspension through the grievance process after the Police Board has already issued a decision on the case would be eliminated.

Appendix 6

Oversight Working Group Checklists

OVERSIGHT TOP LINE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The creation of a new Inspector General for Public Safety, which would audit and monitor CPD and the entire police oversight system.
2. The creation of a new Community Safety Oversight Board, which would allow the community to have a powerful platform and role in the police oversight process.
3. The creation of a new Civilian Police Investigative Agency, which would replace the Independent Police Review Authority in investigating serious cases of police misconduct.
4. The implementation of reforms to other components of the police oversight system, including BIA and the Chicago Police Board, to improve investigations and transparency within the system.
5. The implementation of additional reforms to remove roadblocks to accountability, including reforms to improve the mediation program across the oversight entities and elimination of command channel review.
6. Overhaul to the City's collective bargaining agreements with policing employee entities.

Collective Bargaining Agreement Checklist

The contracts for Sergeants, Lieutenants and Captains expire on June 30, 2016. The FOP contract expires a year later, on June 30, 2017. Preparation for the negotiation of all four contracts is currently under way.

The following CBA provisions should be removed or revised:

- The affidavit requirement should be removed so that investigators can identify additional cases of police misconduct.
- Anonymous complaints should be allowed to encourage reporting by those who fear retaliation, including whistleblowers.
- Officers should not be informed of the complainant's name prior to interrogation. There is little need for the officer to know the name of a complainant prior to interrogation if it is later disclosed during the resolution of the case.
- The provisions delaying interviews in shooting cases for at least 24 hours should be revised to ensure that officers are separated and remain separated from other officers until all officers have given statements. The Department of Justice's Consent Decree with the Los Angeles Police Department contains such a requirement. When formal questioning begins, the inquiry will start with a recitation of any and all conversations that the officer has had with law enforcement between the shooting and the commencement of the interview.
- Officers should no longer have a right to amend statements if they have not been provided with the audio or video evidence, and reviews of the footage should not be pre-conditions to charging a Rule 14 violation.
- Investigations of complaints known to CPD for five years or more should not require Superintendent permission. This is an unnecessary rule, as the statute of limitation will apply for criminal matters, and, for administrative matters, the nature and severity of the conduct should determine whether the complaint should be investigated. Should an individual continue to make such decisions, the authority should be vested in someone outside of CPD, such as the Chief Administrator of IPRA (or its successor, CPIA).
- The provision requiring destruction of records should be eliminated. The rule is in tension, if not outright conflict, with general principles of public record-keeping, deprives the public of important information that is rightfully theirs, and may include the destruction of information that serves numerous operational and public policy objectives.
- The provision that forbids CPD from rewarding officers who act as whistleblowers should be removed.
- The CBAs should be amended to require police officers to disclose secondary employment, as other City workers are required to do.
- The CBA dictates the manner in which interrogators can ask questions, which presents an unnecessary burden on interrogators and potentially sets them up to violate the CBA for a technicality. The policy does not appear to comport with any best practices and should be eliminated.

- The CBA requires that officers must be informed of the nature of the allegation prior to interrogation. This provision is presently interpreted very specifically to mean a detailed recitation of the facts that support all possible charges. Moreover, if the officer lies to investigators during the investigation, new allegations must be presented to the officer. This provision should be amended to allow for more general recitation of allegations.

Civilian Police Investigative Agency Checklist

IPRA should be replaced with a new Civilian Police Investigative Agency (CPIA). The City Council should enact legislation that ensures the new civilian oversight entity is established in accordance with the principles described below.

- **Design an open and public selection process for a Chief Administrator.**

The new Community Safety Oversight Board should select the Chief Administrator. It is important that CPIA be perceived as legitimate; the selection of this position should be insulated from politics, transparent and widely inclusive. The selection process should also include multiple opportunities for significant community input that will be seriously considered by the selection committee.
- **Establish selection requirements for the Chief Administrator and investigators to avoid bias.**

In order to prevent bias (and the perception of bias), previously sworn employees of CPD (and non-sworn employees who have worked for CPD within the past five years) and the Cook County State's Attorney Office should be prohibited from serving as investigators and/or the Chief Administrator. Individuals who hold these positions must reflect the City's diversity.
- **Provide a grant of jurisdiction that ensures that CPIA is informed by community complaints.**

CPIA must be empowered to investigate the issues that are of most pressing concern to the community. CPIA's jurisdiction should be expanded beyond IPRA's current jurisdiction to include unlawful search and seizures and denial of access to counsel. At the end of CPIA's first year of operation, an outside, independent entity should evaluate whether the expanded jurisdiction of CPIA is appropriate and achievable.
- **Establish a clear, easy-to-understand mission statement.**

This is essential to provide civilians and officers with a fair and impartial complaint system and to employ the preponderance of the evidence standard when deliberating on complaints.
- **Remove barriers to accountability.**

No credible allegation should be ignored because of technical complaint submission requirements (like an affidavit requirement) or because the civilian involved is hesitant or unable to provide a complaint form. The Chief Administrator should be empowered to investigate any incidents that fall under her jurisdiction, even in the absence of sworn complaints. Complaints must be accepted from anyone with personal knowledge of the incident. The Chief Administrator may launch investigations based on any credible source, including media accounts, a review of use of force reports or referrals from other oversight entities.
- **Gather and leverage data generated by civil litigation and criminal motions to suppress to learn more about trends in citizen complaints.**

The civil rights and criminal defense bars in Chicago have, through decades of litigation, developed rich data regarding CPD policy and practice. This information has largely been untouched by the various oversight entities. This represents a significant missed opportunity to ensure accountability. CPIA should be charged with investigating the facts of all civil lawsuits, which, if submitted as a complaint, would fall under its jurisdiction. Further, CPIA should develop a process to gather the facts contained in all criminal motions to suppress that allege facts, which if submitted as a complaint, would fall under its jurisdiction to determine if a full investigation is warranted.

- **Establish clear lines of jurisdiction.**

Misconduct investigations often reveal multiple layers of wrongdoing. For example, in a use of force investigation, it may become clear that an officer filed a false police report. CPIA does not have original jurisdiction to investigate false reporting, but, if the false reporting is related to a force investigation, the monitor should be empowered to investigate it and issue appropriate findings.

- **Empower CPIA with the authority needed to investigate.**

CPIA must have the ability to collect evidence, conduct prompt interviews, subpoena witnesses and enforce its subpoena power by retaining outside, independent counsel. This is an existing power within IPRA and should be continued in a new body unabated.

- **Civilian oversight should run currently with criminal investigations.**

In the past, IPRA investigations have consistently stalled while the Cook County State's Attorney determined whether or not it would move forward with criminal charges under the same set of facts as IPRA was investigating. The practice led to long delays in investigating and resolving IPRA's cases after the State's Attorney's Office closed its investigation. This need not be the case. While it may sometimes make sense for an IPRA investigator to pause her or his investigation to preserve the integrity of the criminal matter, this rule is not universal. Rather, it is better practice to presume that the matters should be run concurrently, and both entities should meet regularly to determine if one or the other investigation should be paused during the process or, in the ideal, if both cases can be investigated at the same time.

- **Ensure an accessible, safe and comfortable complaint process.**

Civilians must be able to file complaints via the internet, over the phone and in their communities. The new body should use national models, such as New York City's Civilian Complaint Review Board, which has developed a model of hosting meetings within city neighborhoods on a posted rotating basis to take and verify complaints.

- **Conduct community education regarding rights and the oversight process.**

CPIA must be responsible for launching a public education/community engagement campaign that educates the public about their rights and the complaint/investigative process.

- **Establish community oversight over CPIA.**

CPIA must be legitimately accountable to members of the community. The community must have the power to require that CPIA hold public hearings through the new Community Safety Oversight Board, CPIA must develop (and be responsive to) a civilian feedback process, and CPIA must be audited by an independent third-party entity selected by those on the selection committee if an auditing function is not otherwise available in the City. Additionally, CPIA must hold regular community meetings to inform the public of its actions.

- **Proactively prevent abuse and misconduct through policy and practice recommendations and use-of-force analyses.**

CPIA must conduct pattern and practice analyses both proactively and reactively where it has subject matter jurisdiction. This should include proactive analyses of potential patterns of police misconduct that are within its subject matter jurisdiction, including information found in court filings, judicial findings, internal CPD documents and incidents where individuals were charged with offenses commonly believed to cover up police misconduct (such as assault on a police officer, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest and misconduct investigations), and other potential pattern evidence, and the

establishment of a transparent process (that is informed by community concerns) for CPIA to make training, policy, and procedure recommendations to CPD. In turn, CPD must publically respond to these recommendations.

- **Operate with complete transparency.**

CPIA must prioritize keeping the public informed by posting summary reports of each completed investigation; publishing comprehensive annual reports on its work; and establishing a transparent process to make training, policy and procedure recommendations to CPD and a transparent process to make public CPD's response. CPIA should also promptly respond to all requests from the new Community Safety Oversight Board.

- **Provide resources to be rigorous and independent.**

In order to provide sufficient oversight and meet the demands of an expanded jurisdiction that includes explicit obligations regarding community engagement and policy and practice recommendations, CPIA must have sufficient resources, and those resources should, to the extent possible, be insulated from the political process. CPIA's funding should be a percentage of CPD's budget so that the office cannot be defunded. This funding should provide CPIA with sufficient resources and powers to conduct prompt, unbiased and independent investigations into police misconduct that are of the highest quality. Best practices within the field indicate that the budget should be tied to 1% of CPD's budget and/or a ratio of 1 CPIA investigator for every 250 sworn CPD officers.

- **Provide complainant support.**

CPIA should provide supportive services to complainants, including regular updates regarding the investigation, information about the process and outcomes and referrals to outside service providers when needed. All of the investigators who work for CPIA and BIA should be trained to work with victims of trauma and taught to conduct victim/trauma-sensitive interviews.

- **Develop and adopt standardized penalties.**

As with other oversight entities, CPIA should adopt a discipline matrix, a national best practice that determines a fixed set of penalties for behavior and history. A matrix has been used informally at IPRA for over a year and should be formally reviewed and adopted.

- **Establish penalties for CPD's failure to cooperate.**

Require CPD to fire officers who lie during misconduct investigations. Require CPD to fire and refer for criminal prosecution any officer who retaliates against any person who reports police abuse.

- **Ensure the appropriate use of the mediation program.**

CPIA should establish clear and bright line rules regarding the cases and procedures for its mediation program. To the extent possible, CPIA should create a program that is in line with national best practices for mediation for citizen oversight organizations.

- **Address limits imposed by the CBAs.**

Require that the collective bargaining agreements conform with rigorous, transparent and accountable civilian oversight.

IPRA Recommendation Checklist

We recommend that IPRA should continue to conduct police misconduct investigations until CPIA is able to assume responsibility for those investigations. During this interim period, the following actions should be taken:

- **IPRA should contract with an independent, third-party entity**, such as the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) or the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE), to conduct an ongoing audit of IPRA's operations and to audit each completed investigation prior to finalization. IPRA staff should defer to the outside entity's findings regarding deficiencies in investigative practices and findings.
- **IPRA should immediately begin implementing, where possible, the transparency** requirements recommended for CPIA.
- IPRA, with oversight and guidance from the City of Chicago Inspector General and the incoming Chief Administrator of CPIA, **should begin the process of drafting a series of transition memos** that will attempt to memorialize institutional knowledge regarding technology infrastructure, complaint intake processes, investigative protocols, interactions with the police department, and all other topics identified as critical to a successful transition to CPIA.
- **IPRA should engage in the community outreach activities** described for CPIA.
- **IPRA should review and clarify its process and criteria for the affidavit override process and keep data related to it.** IPRA should also be more proactive in seeking affidavits. Investigators used to actively seek out the affidavits, sometimes even knocking on doors. Investigators now play a much more passive role and have placed the burden on the complainant.
- **IPRA should develop and adopt a clear discipline matrix** that provides a range of potential penalties for different types of misconduct, along with aggravating and mitigating factors that can be considered.

Independent Inspector General for Public Safety Checklist

Based on our review of the national experience with police oversight generally and police auditing specifically, we have concluded that Chicago would benefit tremendously from the creation of an independent monitoring entity. The creation of this position would greatly enhance the transparency, accountability and quality of the oversight structure. The Task Force recommends that the new entity be housed within the City of Chicago Office of the Inspector General because it already has relevant expertise, the general authority to conduct this work and has begun to audit some police department functions and build up institutional knowledge. We also recommend the following related to the new Inspector General's powers and obligations:

- **Give the inspector general a broad scope of authority to review and make recommendations.** Enabling legislation should follow the models set out in Los Angeles, Denver and New York, where the inspector general or monitor's powers are defined in broad terms, rather than providing a list of narrow functions, which could be interpreted as significantly restricting the auditor's authority. The enabling legislation should leave no doubt that the inspector general may perform the functions laid out below. While the inspector general would have the power to make findings and issue recommendations, the inspector general could not override the decision of another investigative body.
- **Auditing/Monitoring/Reviewing individual cases.** While CPD and IPRA or its successor have primary responsibility for investigating civilian complaints and incidents involving death, serious injury or serious use of force, the inspector general would work to ensure the quality and integrity of individual investigations.
 - The inspector general should be authorized not just to raise concerns about the quality and integrity of an investigation generally, but also about the quality and integrity of specific findings from the investigation.
 - The inspector general should be empowered to request that individual investigations be expanded or reopened. If CPD or IPRA (or its successor) does not expand or reopen the investigation, or complete it to the satisfaction of the inspector general, the inspector general's office should be authorized to conduct additional investigation.
 - When investigations into serious uses of force do not result in sustained findings, the inspector general should be required to work with IPRA (or its successor) and CPD to conduct Force Analysis Panels to determine if the incident revealed any systemic deficiencies in training, policy, supervision, or equipment.
- **Auditing and Monitoring patterns of police activity and complaints.** When reviewing complaints and data about police behavior, the inspector general should be empowered to examine not just individual incidents as described above, but also information in the aggregate. The inspector general should identify patterns, determine whether the patterns reflect systemic problems, and, if so, make recommendations about how to address them.
 - Pattern analysis should include, but not be limited to: officer use of force; police shootings; use of Tasers or any weapon used to inflict pain and/or gain compliance; citizen complaint log numbers; and potential bias, including, but not limited, to bias in policing related to race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and geography.
 - Pattern analysis could also include reviewing all sustained findings and discipline recommended by IPRA or its successor, the Police Board and BIA in order to assess disciplinary trends, to determine

whether discipline is consistently applied and fair, and to determine whether final disciplinary decisions are being executed as resolved.

- Pattern analysis could also include analyses of citizen complaints, use of force, lawsuits, and other relevant data to identify individual and groups of officers who may be engaged in a pattern of misconduct.
- **Auditing operations, policies and procedures.** The inspector general should have broad authority to review police operations, policies, supervision, training and procedures. The goal is to review and analyze all relevant information (including litigation and settlement data) in order to identify systemic patterns and problems, including, but not limited to, those that may correlate to race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and geography, and propose changes in policies and procedures, training and supervision.
- **Provide broad power to initiate audits.** The inspector general should not be required to seek approval to conduct any specific audit or investigation. Enabling legislation should incorporate language like Los Angeles' "The Inspector General is empowered to initiate and conduct investigations of the Department, without limitation as to the type of the activity of the Department, including on-going and in-progress matters."
- **Oversight authority should not be limited to CPD.** The inspector general should be authorized to make recommendations for all departments whose work directly affects CPD operations, including, but not limited to, IPRA (or its successor), the Police Board, OEMC, the Fire Department and the City's Department of Law.
- **The inspector general should serve for a fixed term and should only be removed for cause.** City ordinance should establish a fixed term of office for the inspector general, though, at the conclusion of a term, an inspector general could be considered for reappointment. The removal process should also require a City Council hearing. These provisions will make it much more difficult to remove the inspector general for political reasons and will make it easier to issue critical reports without fear of reprisal.
- **Job qualifications should be established.** There should be clearly articulated educational and employment history requirements for leadership positions. Job qualifications could include relevant certification. In addition, in order to prevent bias and the perception of bias, former police officers should be prohibited from serving as inspectors general.
- **There should be public engagement in the selection process.** The selection of an inspector general must incorporate meaningful community input. The City of Chicago Inspector General should have the ultimate authority to hire the Inspector General for Public Safety, but the process should include extensive public engagement. At minimum, CPIA should have an opportunity to review applications and interview finalists, and finalists should be required to participate in several public forums where they would answer questions from the general public. The position should require City Council confirmation. It is essential that the selection process be perceived as fair, open and uninfluenced by politics, and that it include genuine opportunities for community engagement.
- **There should be public engagement with the office of the Inspector General for Public Safety.** Either the civilian oversight entity should have regular meetings with the Inspector General for Public Safety to facilitate communication with the broader community, or a Citizen Advisory Board should be

created for the Inspector General for Public safety for this purpose. The civilian oversight entity should have the authority to request that the inspector general perform an audit into a particular area. In addition, the inspector general should have a community outreach staff and budget. The outreach should include public events to solicit feedback and input on the auditing entity and its work and public education initiatives to inform the public about the office and the scope of its work. The outreach should include both youth and adult populations. Engagement and outreach will help to ensure that people have enough information to take full advantage of the office's skills and capacity, especially in communities where trust in CPD is lowest. A civilian oversight entity or Civilian Advisory Board and a committed, engaged, sensitive and thoughtful community outreach staff can help to ensure that the office reaches its full potential.

- **The office of inspector general must be authorized to legally represent itself, including as necessary, retaining outside, private legal counsel** in any legal matter, enforcement action or court proceeding when the inspector general determines that the City of Chicago's Corporation Counsel would have a conflict in representing the interests of the inspector general.
- **The inspector general must have sufficient resources to meet the substantial demands of the office.** Additional research should be conducted to determine an appropriate funding and staffing level, but our assessment based on the interviews we have conducted so far suggests that the office should maintain a ratio of approximately 1 staff person for every 250 sworn officers, with sufficient discretion vested in the Inspector General to determine the appropriate balance of staffing levels and qualifications.
- **The budget should be insulated from politics.** City ordinance should mandate a specific staffing ratio and require funding to provide for that staffing level. The ordinance should establish a minimum annual budget for the office.
- **City ordinance must specify that the inspector general have unfettered access to data from CPD, IPRA (or its successor) and other agencies such as the law department, except where the law prohibits it, and that access must be clearly spelled out in legislation.** Access to data must include direct access to CPD databases and, to protect the integrity of investigations, the ability to use information from the databases in a way that is invisible to CPD. The access to data must include litigation and settlement data, data from body and car cameras and early warning system data. The inspector general should have direct access to information wherever possible, and the rest should be provided in a timely fashion unless a written explanation is provided. There should be a presumption of disclosure. The City should consider including a provision that permits sanctions in the event that any entity fails to cooperate in any request for data. The inspector general should be provided documents without charge.
- **The ordinance should include affirmative obligations for some law enforcement-related officials to share specified information with the inspector general.** For example, IPRA or its successor and BIA should be required to report monthly to the inspector general any problems and deficiencies relating to CPD's operations, policies, programs and practices that would reasonably be expected to adversely affect the effectiveness of the department, public safety, the exercise of civil liberties and civil rights, or the public's confidence in the police force.

- **The ordinance should specify protections afforded to sources in order to prevent retaliation and encourage people to come forward with information.** City ordinance should require the inspector general to keep confidential the identity of a complainant, as well as all information and documents, except when necessary for the inspector general to carry out its duties and when the law so requires. Among other things, the City should not be able to subpoena the inspector general's notes of interviews with complainants. City ordinance should also prohibit retaliation against any employee who has contact with the inspector general. If retaliation is suspected, the inspector general should be authorized to open an investigation into the matter and issue a complaint to the appropriate entity.
- **The inspector general should be required to produce an annual report.** The report should summarize the audits and investigations conducted in the past year, reporting the analysis of information including patterns and trends, the outcomes of individual investigations/complaints and all recommendations. Annual reports should also provide status updates on the adoption of previous policy recommendations. All reports should be available to the public on the inspector general's web site.
- **The inspector general should be required to prepare a written report for every investigation, review, study or audit it conducts, including any recommendations that come out of the investigation, review, study or audit.**
- Though the inspector general should have broad discretion to initiate investigations about anything within the scope of its jurisdiction, **the inspector general should also be required to perform regularly scheduled audits on certain subjects**, including but not limited to:
 - sustained findings and discipline recommended and implemented by IPRA or its successor, the Police Board, and BIA in order to assess trends, consistency, fairness, and whether final disciplinary decisions are being executed as resolved;
 - citizen complaints and investigations, use of force, lawsuits and settlements to identify individuals and groups of officers who may be engaged in a pattern of misconduct and to identify areas for reform; and
 - video footage from officer body and officer car dashboard cameras to evaluate whether they are fully operational and being used according to policy and to ensure that all possible officer violations of CPD policy and/or law captured on video footage are properly investigated.
- **The inspector general should be required to provide reports to the City Council prior to any vote regarding a payout providing information on litigation and settlement trends, as well as any information or trends regarding the officer or supervisor involved.**
- **The CPD Superintendent or head of any entity that is the subject of recommendations should be required to publicly respond to reports in writing within 60 days of the issuance of the report.**
- **The inspector general should provide the City Council with an analysis of the complaint history of those officers who are the subject of potential civil lawsuit settlements before the Council considers said settlement proposals.**

Community Safety Oversight Board Checklist

We propose the creation of an entity comprised of community representatives that will have the power to oversee CPD, its BIA, the new CPIA and all other police oversight mechanisms. The particular powers of this Community Safety Oversight Board and the process for selecting its members should not be decided until the Mayor and City Council hold full and robust public hearings on the topic and fully vet the design and implementation of this critical body. Though we do not provide a specific design and implementation process for the Board, the Task Force makes the following general recommendations about powers and responsibilities:

- Selecting the Chief Administrator of the new CPIA and conducting public hearings to make the selection.
- Requesting that the Inspector General for Public Safety perform specific audits and analyses of the policies, procedures and practices of CPD, CPIA and the Police Board that the community does not believe are being adequately addressed, and issuing recommendations based on the findings, to which CPD or the relevant agency must respond.
- Requesting that the Inspector General for Public Safety perform specific audits of CPIA and BIA investigations of serious cases of alleged police misconduct or the use of force to promote the quality and integrity of the investigations.
- Directing CPD, CPIA and the Police Board, through requests to the Inspector General for Public Safety, to collect and share data to facilitate community oversight.
- Analyzing all sustained findings and discipline recommended by CPIA, BIA or the Police Board to assess disciplinary trends, determine whether discipline is consistently applied and fair, and determine whether final disciplinary decisions are being executed.
- Conducting public hearings on any and all matters related to the CPD and its oversight entities.
- As representatives of the broader community, holding frequent public meetings.

Selection Methodology for Community Safety Oversight Board

In selecting Community Board members, it will be critical to establish a process that maximizes the Board's independence, ensures transparency and provides accountability to the public. The Task Force considered five methods for selecting Board members. In sum, the Task Force considered elections, City Council or Mayoral appointments, a third-party application process and hybrid versions of these options:

- **City Council Appointment.** This model would follow an extensive process of public application among a number of citizen constituent groups (noted below), hearing and selection, with the determination of eventual selection made by the Council, which could manage it through one or more of its standing committees (e.g., the Police and Fire Committee and the Human Relations Committee) or working through or in conjunction with a non-partisan external body with expertise in community relations and/or police accountability. One advantage of this model is that it would leave to the most locally elected political actors the determination of balance and inclusivity of representation across the broad array of constituent groups and interests directly impacted by policing and police accountability.
- **Inspector General (IG)/third-party body Appointment** (the "good governance" actor model). This model would follow the same selection process as highlighted above but would leave the application process and ultimate selection to an entity somewhat removed from City government. This model could include a selection committee run by the inspector general's office or the Better Government Association, with eventual ratification by the City Council. The model is attractive as it is removed from government, but that same attribute may also lead to a delegitimization of current bodies.
- **Election.** A process by which each member of the Board is elected by district or neighborhood, arriving at a fully representative body. This model does not exist, has not been successfully implemented anywhere else in the country, and is disfavored because it brings with it a host of challenges, which include being susceptible to cooptation by pre-existing power structures, use by individuals looking for a political springboard and a potential lack of diversity. Additionally, the cost and political nature of this process lead us to be concerned about this approach.
- **Mayoral Appointment.** This model would involve a public application process and eventual appointment by the Mayor. This method would accord with recent practices in such cities as Seattle and Cleveland, which have recently undergone Department of Justice investigations. However, in our current political climate, it is likely this process would be perceived as highly influenced by politics. Thus it is not recommended.
- **Hybrid Model.** Some hybrid of the foregoing options.
- As part of the selection process in the Mayoral, City Council or third-party selection processes, candidates will submit their applications to a specified office to ensure proper qualification. These applications will then be posted to the internet and nominated by a proscribed process (e.g., for every vacancy on the Board of the civilian oversight entity, the screening committee will interview candidates and recommend three people, who would participate in a series of public hearings to present their credentials and answer questions from the selection committee and the public). The Mayor/City Council/third-party would then select/vote for one of three nominated candidates for each position, or the selection committee would approve them.

Selection for Community Safety Oversight Board Checklist

Whether selected by the Mayor, the City Council, a third party or otherwise, the membership of the Board would include the following:

- **9 to 11 members** (an odd number) selected from across the City, representing various communities and a cross-cut of interests.
- 2-year (or 4-year) terms that are **staggered to ensure regular review of the membership**. Individuals will have to apply to be reappointed and max out after two or three terms.
- **Diversity requirements stated expressly to require inclusion** of representatives of each of the following communities: faith, LGBTQ, immigrant, previous complainants about police abuse, youth, civil rights advocates and neighborhood leaders. There will also be requirements for geographic diversity, as well as one representative each from the Mayor's office and CPD (retired or active).
- **No payment for participation.**
- The members must be residents of Chicago, **cannot be employees, officials or appointees of the City** or its delegate agencies or affiliated non-for-profits, and cannot have run previously for public office.
- Meetings and **votes for the body will be public.**

A coalition of community groups has proposed the creation of a Civilian Police Accountability Council (CPAC) to establish direct community oversight over CPD. The proposal here strives to honor the principles established by CPAC. We recommend that, as soon as possible, the City Council hold public hearings with the goal of developing the specific details of the Board—based on direction of the community—and selection of the Board members within 90 days of the start of the hearings. Among the issues, these hearings should address:

- The role and responsibilities of the Board.
- The selection of those involved in the Board, including, but not limited to, the feasibility of electing representatives to fill certain roles.
- The staff and resources that will be made available to the Board.

Remaining Recommendations

- CPD should create a hotline for department members, whether civilian or sworn, to lodge complaints, and develop a third-party system for the processing and follow-up of all comments and complaints reported to the hotline.
- BIA should be given the resources and staff it needs to conduct effective investigations, exercise more oversight over district investigations and increase the transparency of investigations.
- CPD and IPRA/CPIA should finalize a discipline matrix and all oversight entities should be required to follow it when recommending or imposing discipline.
- CPD should develop standards regarding when options may and may not be granted by the Superintendent.

- Command Channel review should be eliminated entirely, and Superintendent review of BIA cases should also be limited to 90 days, like with IPRA.
- The City and CPD should ensure that the arbitration process should be subject to oversight.
- The City should conduct further analysis regarding the role of prosecuting attorneys in Police Board proceedings and whether they are sufficiently supported and best situated to prosecute cases of police misconduct before the Board.
- The City must ensure that the disciplinary process be made fully transparent.
- The City should disclose more information on police misconduct settlements to the City Council and the public.
- To avoid conflicts in police misconduct cases and other matters, the City Council should enact legislation that permits it to hire its own General Counsel to provide legal services and advice on legislative, policy and litigation matters.
- The City should advocate for new state legislation that would require the appointment of an independent prosecutor, separate from the State's Attorney, to handle all phases of any prosecution of any case in which a police officer is charged with causing death or great bodily harm without justification.
- The State's Attorney should be required to provide oversight bodies with evidence of police misconduct that is not the subject of an ongoing prosecution.
- Further research into the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund is required to determine if additional changes in law and policy can ensure that police officers are not rewarded for official misconduct.

Appendix 7

Early Intervention & Personnel Concerns Working Group Checklist

- CPD leadership must take ownership of accountability issues and order the design and implementation of a mandatory EIS that centrally collects data across a broad range of data points to capture information on the totality of officer activity.
 - CPD's EIS must be non-disciplinary in nature.
 - CPD's EIS should track all available data on officer activities.
 - CPD's EIS should use peer-to-peer data comparisons to identify which officers receive interventions.
 - Create a structured, tiered program where interventions are appropriate, escalate proportionally and are timely.
 - CPD's EIS should track officer transfers and require supervisors to review and acknowledge data on new officers who are transferred onto their assignment.
 - CPD's EIS should require ongoing monitoring of interventions and develop an assessment tool to continually examine the program for improvement.
- CPD must make support and training of supervisors a top priority and create policies that hold supervisors accountable for the conduct of their officers.
 - Provide training to supervisors on their responsibilities and obligations as the first-line of defense in accountability generally and in the EIS process specifically. This means, at the very least, providing mandatory training and talking points that help guide supervisory interventions with officers.
 - Integrate regular accountability measures for supervisors to incentivize buy-in to the new system. As part of that effort, CPD should integrate supervisor responsibilities for EIS and personnel management into the testing and promotional requirements. Also, CompStat meetings must be expanded immediately to include information about personnel actions, and supervisors should be held accountable for the performance indicators of their officers, just as they currently are with crime statistics and trends.
 - Provide greater support to supervisors in their management roles. All sergeants, lieutenants, captains and Commanders should be trained in managing the well-being of officers under their command and be compelled to use the dashboards that track officer activity.
- The individual in charge of human resources at CPD must be an expert in the field of human resources and related personnel matters.
- Until a fully automated EIS program can be implemented, CPD should create a manual intervention system, which undertakes an immediate assessment of officer fitness for duty.
 - CPD, working with IPRA and/or the new CPIA, and with reference to the time period January 1, 2010 – January 1, 2016, should immediately identify officers (1) with 10 or more CRs, whether or not an affidavit was completed; (2) who have a pattern of missing court; or (3) have been named in two/three or more lawsuits during this time period.
 - During this time, CPD should conduct monthly meetings with the State's Attorney, Public Defender, Presiding Judge of Criminal Division, City Law Department and, separately, Chief Judge of the Northern District of Illinois for the purpose of determining any adverse findings against police

officers that bear on credibility, training issues or patterns of behavior. All information gathered should be factored into the manual intervention system.

- Any officers identified through these methods should be assessed for placement in BIS, PC or some other form of individualized work plan that involves their chain of command.
- The EIS program should include community outreach efforts by providing public access to data generated by the EIS program and inviting community stakeholders to CompStat-type meetings to discuss EIS data and outcomes.
 - Publish, on a monthly basis, aggregate data on the following: new and pending complaints by unit, disciplinary actions, missed court dates, new civil legal proceedings against officers, new criminal legal proceedings against officers, vehicle pursuits, vehicle collisions, uses of force, employee commendations, uses of firearms, injuries to persons in custody, judicial proceedings where an officer is the subjective of a protective or restraining order, adverse judicial credibility determinations against an officer, or disciplinary actions.
 - Establish a regular community-inclusive meeting to share data and insights from EIS.

Appendix 8

Early Intervention System – Identifying Triggers

I. OVERVIEW

The hope for an EIS system is to improve relations between police and the community, reduce officer misbehavior, and save both taxpayer dollars and the career prospects of individual police officers. Many police departments around the country now employ these tools, including several departments that are working with the Department of Justice. However, one limitation of most EIS systems is that they are not validated—the way they select officers to receive additional non-disciplinary supports is not based on any real data or empirical evidence about what indicators actually predict which officers will engage in unproductive practices or future misconduct. The University of Chicago Crime Lab intends to work closely with CPD in the coming months to develop such a data-driven system.

II. CHALLENGES TO BUILDING PRODUCTIVE EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS

EIS tools are only as useful as they are accurate. Every police department has limits on resources that can be used to provide non-disciplinary supports to officers. EIS systems that recommend services to officers who are actually at low risk of engaging in misconduct waste valuable resources that could have benefited another officer to a greater degree. And EIS systems that fail to recommend officers who are truly high risk miss an opportunity to help that officer as well as the rest of the department and community at large. Many reports have noted that these are challenges with many EIS systems that are in operation around the country.

Perhaps the main reason so many EIS tools have low predictive accuracy is that they are not validated, which means that the “triggers”—or thresholds of behavior that automatically initiate an intervention targeted toward an officer—were not developed by using data to determine statistically which early indicators are truly predictive of future misconduct or unproductive performance. Instead many EIS triggers are simply set at certain levels because departments, unions, and the Department of Justice decided on them based on educated assumptions—that is, based on guesses.

A different challenge for every EIS system is that typically we do not have access to “ground truth” measures of officer misbehavior or any other aspect of officer productivity. Many measures that are used in EIS systems capture whether a given police action resulted in a bad outcome. But given the inherent challenges of policing, particularly in big-city, high-crime environments, even correct police actions will sometimes result in bad outcomes. What an EIS system would ideally wish to predict is inappropriate police actions, rather than bad outcomes.

A third challenge for EIS systems is difficulty in isolating the contribution of the individual officer from the potentially confounding effects of the specific job assignment or context in which the individual is working. The challenge is analogous to one that is frequently encountered in the education field, where focusing on measures of teacher performance (like the test scores of students in a teacher’s classroom) runs the risk of conflating the contribution of the teacher-to-student learning from the contribution of community social factors that affect student outcomes and are beyond the control of the teacher. If a performance system does not adequately control for differences among teachers in the socio economic

and related challenges faced by the students in the teacher's classroom, the result will be to effectively penalize those teachers that choose to take on the most challenging assignments.

A similar problem arises in the case of policing, where a good EIS system should not disincentivize officers from choosing to work in the most challenging jobs and communities where arguably the importance of and need for high-quality policing is the greatest. Some EIS systems try to address this problem by making "peer-to-peer" comparisons. One challenge with this approach is that the actual "task" that a given officer undertakes—both in terms of its potential productive value for society, and its risk of an adverse outcome—can vary enormously even within job assignments, police beats, and shifts (for example, due to differences in the amount of self-initiated activities that officers undertake). We refer to this as the "task confounding" problem. Attempts to address this task confounding problem by accounting for officer activity often rely on fairly crude measures, such as arrests made, which inevitably miss many other aspects of variation across officers as to what they actually do on the streets. Ultimately, a good performance measure has to take the features of task and context into account.

III. BUILDING A NEW EIS TOOL IN CHICAGO

A top priority for any new EIS tool for CPD would be to make better use of the rich set of data that the department collects to build a tool that is as accurate as possible in predicting future officer behavior. The key outcome that existing EIS tools within CPD are currently oriented around is to predict which officers will be fired by the department in the future. A different type of outcome that many EIS systems predict, including many of the EIS systems developed by departments working under a consent decree with the Department of Justice, is some indicator of an officer's use of excessive force. There is a long list of officer behaviors that could, in principle, be predictive of those outcomes. Which behaviors are actually most predictive in practice is a statistical question.

The University of Chicago Crime Lab will work closely with the CPD to try to build the most accurate possible validated EIS, using the best possible analytic techniques, including new methods from the computer science field of machine learning or statistical learning.

One challenge in forming accurate predictions of which officers might benefit from early intervention is the sheer quantity of candidate indicators that could potentially be considered. The City of Chicago collects vast amounts of information about individual officers and policing outcomes that are distributed across multiple different data systems. These include various measures of misconduct originating from BIA, IPRA, and the department's automated complaint system (AutoCR), which includes allegations that have been founded as well as those that have not. The City also collects measures of officer activity while out on the street (arrests, guns confiscated, field interrogations conducted, use of force), in court (including disposition of court cases, or even attendance rates at court), and other aspects of job performance, such as commendations received or use of medical leave. Most EIS systems focus on just a subset of these candidate predictors, chosen through some combination of professional judgment (that is, a best guess) and other practical or political considerations. There is no guarantee that the subset of candidate predictors that are selected in this way is the most predictive possible set of predictors—which, in turn, means that the EIS system that results is not nearly as effective as it could or should be.

Machine learning provides a powerful technique to search over very large numbers of candidate predictors to find the optimal combination that is the most predictive, given the data that are available.

These tools are built by assembling information about the experiences of previous officers while on the force at CPD, and allowing the data to determine which patterns of behavior or outcomes are predictive of outcomes such as being terminated by the department in the future or being found to have used excessive force. The tool can then help flag similar patterns that arise to individual officers in the future who could then be diverted to non-disciplinary supports to reduce the chances that they wind up either harming the public, themselves, or their own prospects at a successful career at CPD.

Machine learning also has distinct advantages over traditional statistical methods given its ability to detect subtle patterns among variables that would never occur to a human data analyst. As an example, previous job records predict how well individuals perform as officers, but only for officers below a certain age. Traditional statistics would require the analyst to know and specify this interactive effect, whereas statistical learning algorithms could discover that age and previous job, together, hold predictive power.

In building an EIS tool with machine learning algorithms, we address the task confounding problem through two steps. First, whenever possible, we will incorporate fine-grained features of the task (such as beats in which the officers are working, the shift, the time of year, and indicators of individual officer activity levels) into the model. Controlling for these differences will help facilitate comparisons of officers facing similar circumstances. Second, whenever possible, we plan to predict a measure of officer performance as reflected in CPD's own disciplinary and personnel decisions. For example, we can predict which officers will be fired by CPD, which is the focus of the department's current EIS. Analogously, we can predict which officers will face sustained complaints of misconduct. The presumption behind this approach is that CPD, IPRA and other related actors have already invested resources in investigating these situations, and the resulting decisions take into account the specific context (task) in which an officer was working in deciding if his or her behavior warrants disciplinary action or some other form of intervention. If the disciplinary system is functioning properly then by focusing on this type of outcome, part of the task confounding problem has already been taken into consideration.

For the sake of being as helpful as possible to individual officers and to the members of the public who might be affected by adverse officer behavior, there would be great value in being able to tell as soon as possible when an officer starts down a path that might result in founded misconduct. The usual tradeoff for prediction systems is that the closer in time to the outcome being predicted, the greater the predictive power of the system—but the more harm that has already resulted. Any new EIS system could explore the possibility of enhancing the ability to predict future misconduct as early in an officer's career as possible by potentially drawing on non-standard sources of data, such as even including what the department collects from officers at the hiring stage and how they perform in the Academy.

Finally, other departments around the country have found that the ability of such tools to be helpful for early intervention can be enhanced if the tool is part of a larger performance measurement system for officers. The methods we develop for predicting misconduct can easily be extended to positive performance. As an example, these techniques can be used to predict which officers receive commendations for their exceptional service at CPD. In addition, a more general performance measurement system could, in principle, be used to help inform other department human resource decisions, for example by predicting which patrol officers will be successful in specialized roles like detective, FTO, or even supervisory positions. Overall, these tools can be used to help the department identify highly productive officers within their ranks.

Ultimately, frontline officers and supervisors must view the EIS tool as helpful to their day-to-day jobs in order for it to be deemed worthwhile by CPD. The Crime Lab intends to work closely with CPD, as well as with key stakeholders, to ensure a full range of perspectives is considered. Whether these prediction tools translate into any changes in CPD personnel choices is a policy decision that will be made by CPD and the City, and is beyond the purview of our analytical work. Our goal would be to build a set of predictions that can highlight for the City the potential gains that could come from incorporating these predictive analytics into different aspects of CPD's day-to-day operations. Which of these predictive analytic tools should ultimately be incorporated into those operations, and how, is ultimately a policy question, not a social science question.

Appendix 9

De-Escalation Working Group Checklist

- OEMC should invest in a Smart911 system.
- OEMC should implement a 16-hour mental health awareness training.
- OEMC should devote attention to supporting personnel in providing compassionate and effective service to the community and implementing stress management training that complies with national standards.
- The Chicago Department of Public Health (“CDPH”) should partner with mental health agencies and advocacy groups to develop a two-step community education campaign on the signs of mental illness and how to best respond to a mental health or related crisis.
- CPD should increase the number of CIT-certified officers to 35% of all patrol officers, and ensure that individual districts with the highest number of mental-health calls are staffed to 35% or higher. All districts and all watches should staff at least two CIT-certified officers. Refresher courses should be developed and provided to CIT-trained officers. CPD should attach a permanent code “z” to officer names that OEMC can always access so dispatch can assign appropriate officers to calls.
- The City should create a “Mental Health Critical Response Unit” within CPD that is responsible for mental health crisis response functions, training, support, community outreach and engagement, cross-agency coordination and data collection and houses the CRU.
- The City should create a crisis response system to support multi layer co-responder units where behavioral health providers are working with OEMC and CPD to link individuals with mental health issues to treatment, 24 hours a day.
- The City should expand and invest in Crisis Stabilization Units (“CSU”) for individuals suffering from symptoms of mental illness who do not need to be psychiatrically hospitalized.
- The City and the MHCRU should identify frequent, high-use and high-need individuals and help them get mental health treatment.
- The City should invest in first episode programming so that young adults experiencing their first episode of psychosis or major depression are immediately linked to intensive services to reduce progression of illness and decrease the risk of criminal justice involvement.
- CPD should work to decrease trauma and escalation at crime scenes by reducing the show of heavy weapons and expanding the Chicago Survivors program.

Appendix 10

Proposed Video Release Policy

I. PURPOSE.

This policy will provide direction to officials and agencies of the City of Chicago ("City") with respect to the public release by the City of videotape and audiotape recordings and certain specified police reports that relate to certain types of incidents involving Chicago Police Department ("CPD") officers, and shall prescribe procedures under which requests can be made to delay temporarily the release of those items to the public.

II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.

This policy is intended to strike a balance between competing and sometimes conflicting interests of (a) the public in timely access to video and audio recordings and particular related initial police reports pertaining to certain incidents involving the use of force by police officers; (b) individuals who are the subject of the police action; and (c) units of local, state and federal government (including agencies of the City) involved in investigating or otherwise addressing the consequences of those incidents. Government institutions and officials with appropriate jurisdiction may have an interest in temporarily delaying the release of such information to the public in circumstances where it might compromise their efforts to address these incidents, including (but not limited to) criminal, disciplinary or other types of investigations; those interests may include a desire to avoid instances where early release of information could cause fact witnesses, whether civilian or otherwise, intentionally or inadvertently to conform their recollections of events to fit what they see in a video, hear in an audio recording, or read in a report. In addition, certain individuals, such as persons injured in these incidents or their families, may also have interests concerning the release of these items. Despite those interests, however, the people of the City have an undeniable, and in some cases paramount, interest in being informed, in a timely fashion and based on the most accurate information possible, about how their police force conducts its business, especially where the use of force by the police results in the death of, or great bodily harm to, a civilian.

This policy attempts to balance those competing interests by permitting specifically interested entities to request a temporary delay in the public release of recordings or reports in order to protect the integrity and effectiveness of their investigations, while assuring that these materials will become available to the public within a limited and certain period of time. The goal of this policy is to increase transparency with respect to the operations of CPD, and in doing so to foster increased trust and communication between the community and the police officers who serve it.

III. SCOPE.

A. Incidents. Consistent with (though not identical to) Municipal Ordinance Code Section 2-57-040(c) and (d), this policy encompasses the following types of incidents: (1) those in which a CPD officer discharges his or her firearm in a manner that strikes, or that potentially could strike, another individual, even if no allegation of misconduct is made; (2) those in which a CPD officer discharges his or her taser or stun gun in a manner that strikes another individual and results in death or great bodily harm; and (3) those in which, as a result of the use of force by a police officer, the death of, or great bodily harm to, a person

occurs while that person is in police custody. (Referred to hereinafter as the "Incident.") "Great bodily harm" means any injury that is serious enough to require treatment in a hospital or similar facility located in a correctional institution.

B. Recordings and Reports. This policy applies to the following items that relate to any Incident: all video and audio recordings relating to the Incident, including tapes of 911 calls, OEMC dispatch recordings, CPD radio calls, video and audio from CPD dash or body cameras, videos from CPD or OEMC POD cameras, as well as any video or audio recordings made using cameras or equipment not owned or controlled by the City that come into the possession or control of CPD or IPRA; and any arrest reports, original case incident reports, tactical response reports (TRR's), and officer's battery reports (OBRs) (Referred to hereinafter as the "Information.")

IV. RELEASE OF INFORMATION

A. Timing of Release of Information. Any Information covered by this policy shall be released to the public no more than 60 calendar days from the date of the Incident unless a request is made to delay the release of any or all of the Information pursuant to this policy. Where any video or audio recording covered by this policy made using cameras or equipment not owned or controlled by the City comes into the possession of the City after the date of that incident, it shall be released to the public no more than 60 days after it comes into the possession of the City, but the City shall make every effort to provide for the release of such recordings simultaneously with the release of other Information related to the Incident.

B. Requests to Delay Release. Upon written request from a government entity specified herein, the City will delay release of Information for a period not to exceed 30 calendar days. Any such request shall be made in writing and shall be directed to the City Corporation Counsel. Such a request may be made by the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, the Cook County State's Attorney, the Attorney General of Illinois, IPRA, or any other federal, state, county or local law enforcement agency. Any request must set forth with specificity the length of the delay requested (not to exceed an additional 30 calendar days) and shall set forth as reasons supporting the requested delay one or more of the factors listed at 5 ILCS 140/7(d)(i) through (vii). In addition, any such request must identify the specific item(s) sought to be temporarily withheld from release. The written request to delay release will itself be released to the public immediately upon receipt using a portal or website used for the distribution of Information subject to this policy. The City will not honor any further requests to delay release beyond the initial request, and will not honor a request for a delay of release that exceeds 30 calendar days.

C. Early Release of Information. Where doing so will not compromise an ongoing investigation, any Information covered by this policy may be released before the expiration of 60 calendar days, and may occur as soon as possible after the Incident.

D. Manner of Release of Information. The City shall create and maintain a publicly accessible website, dropbox or similar portal dedicated to the posting of the Information covered by this policy.

V. NOTICE TO AFFECTED PARTIES.

Prior to the release of the Information, IPRA will attempt to notify any person who was the subject of the police action and is depicted in any video recording, or if that person is deceased or otherwise unavailable, that person's legal representative and/or next of kin, that the video recording and any related Information will be released and the date of release. IPRA will also offer to promptly show such

individuals (and/or, if applicable, their legal representative and/or next of kin) the video recording(s) in which that person was depicted, and to play any related audio, in advance of its public release, and to answer questions and provide other information concerning the Incident and the status of any investigation of the Incident, to the extent that information can be provided without compromising any investigation.

VI. ONGOING REVIEW.

The provisions of this policy should be reviewed by the City after it has been in effect for one year (or sooner if appropriate) in order to determine whether experience with its implementation and application supports revision of the policy with respect to any issue, including (but not limited to) whether the 60-day period and the 30-day extension it provides for may be shortened or whether its scope may be expanded to cover additional types of incidents.

VII. LEGAL PROCESS.

This policy is intended solely to govern the conduct of the City and its agencies and officials with respect to the matters it covers. It is not intended to displace or supersede any legal right or remedy available to any person or entity. It is also not intended to prevent or hinder compliance by the City with respect to any legal obligations, including (but not limited to): (a) any order of court; (b) any obligation to redact identifying or other information from any item covered by this policy before its release to the public; or (c) any obligations imposed by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 ILCS 140/1 *et seq.*

Appendix 11

Overarching Recommendations Checklist

- Provide an annual 40-hour in-service training for all sworn personnel, including periodic refresher classes on procedural justice.
- Implement a systematic approach to identify training needs and revise in-service training curriculum on an annual basis.
- Reinvigorate the Field Training Officer program.
- Implement procedures to ensure that sworn personnel remain informed on all directives and policies.
- CPD should increase the number of sergeants on patrol.
- CPD should implement monthly meetings of all sergeants in a District to ensure the sharing of officer performance, to provide mentoring opportunities to newer sergeants, and provide a forum for best-practice sharing to prevent officer misconduct.
- CPD should continue rolling out and evaluating body cameras with the ultimate goal of providing body cameras to every police officer who regularly comes into contact with civilians.

POLICE **ACCOUNTABILITY** **TASK FORCE**



EXHIBIT 101




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Rahm Emanuel

Chicago City Council Address

delivered 9 December 2015, Chicago, Illinois



AUTHENTICITY CERTIFIED: Text version below transcribed directly from audio

Members of the City Council, police officials, community leaders, and religious leaders:

We are here today because Chicago is facing a defining moment on the issues of crime and policing -- and even the larger issues of truth, justice, and race. We can either be defined by what we have failed to do or what we choose to do.

To meet this moment, we need to come to a common understanding of how we got here and why. We need a painful but honest reckoning of what went wrong, not just in this one instance but over decades. We need to talk about what to do differently to ensure that incidents like this do not happen again; about the police culture that allows it and enables it; and the even larger cultural issues that devalue life in our communities.

Like every other challenge we have ever faced, this one is not bigger than us or beyond us. The only thing that stands between us and a better place is whether we have the collective will to admit to ourselves where we have fallen short; and have the courage to do the hard but necessary things that will take for us to move forward.



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Chicago needs your heart, your strength, and your spirit -- because that is what it will take from all of us in this room and outside of this room.

What happened on October 20th, 2014 should never have happened. Supervision and leadership in the police department and the oversight agencies that were in place failed.

And that has to change.

I am the mayor. As I said the other day: I own it. I take responsibility for what happened because it happened on my watch. If we're going to fix it, I want you to understand it's my responsibility with you. But if we're also going to begin the healing process, the first step in that journey is my step -- and I'm sorry. Nothing less than complete and total reform of the system and the culture that it breeds will meet the standard we have set for ourselves as a city.

I have reflected deeply on what happened that night: A young man with a knife, agitated, surrounded by police officers. But until that point where Police -- until that point where Police Officer Jason Van Dyke got onto the scene and got out of his car, this was a routine situation. It could have and it should have been contained and managed. Situations like this are defused and resolved all the time without the loss of life, which is why we never hear about them.

The majority of our officers do their job professionally every day. But thirty seconds after Officer Jason Van Dyke arrived, it was anything but routine or by the book: Sixteen shots were fired. A young man from Chicago died in the streets of Chicago.

Nothing, nothing can excuse what happened to Laquan McDonald.

Our city has been down this road before. We have seen fatal police shootings and other forms of abuse and corruption. We took corrective measures but those measures never measured up to the challenge.

So today I want to describe the challenges that we must address. Every police officer is sworn to protect life, and, under the most extreme circumstances, to take life. It is a staggering responsibility that requires officers to make split second decisions. In millions of encounters each year between the police and the public, it may be too much to expect that every officer will always get it right. But it is not too much to expect that we can put the right safeguards in place to hold officers accountable when they get it wrong.

What makes an officer's job all the more difficult, dangerous, and demanding is that it rests on upholding that sacred trust with citizens that he or she serves. Nevertheless, I ask every officer in Chicago: reflect on your work, your training, your experience and -- to be honest -- about the fears and frustrations you bring to that job. They are real. They matter. And we as a city cannot be afraid to talk openly and honestly about them.



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We can define the rules of police-citizen engagement, but everyday decisions will always be made by men and women in uniform, on the street, in the community, under extreme pressure, in a dangerous world where guns easily fall into the wrong hands. We are right to ask the best and the most from every officer. But the rest of us -- who do not put our lives on the line every day -- must be honest about our own responsibilities as well.

As a nation, we have done too little to reverse the gun epidemic that makes every encounter between the public and the police potentially lethal. Shoot first and ask questions later too easily become the default practice and posture in a fearful world where mass killings are now a regular event and there's an increasing likelihood of a gun in every home, car or backpack. The Chicago Police Department takes more illegal guns off the street than either New York or L.A. While we must hold accountable the fraction of officers who betray our solemn and sacred trust, we must also acknowledge the real dangers the police face and the honorable work that the vast majority of them do every day.

My uncle was a police sergeant here in Chicago. I respect the work he did and other officers do today. But let me be really clear: We cannot ignore nor can we excuse wrongful behavior especially when it costs the life of another citizen. Police are not protecting the city of Chicago when they see something and then say nothing.

Our reforms will rely on the work of police, elected officials, community and religious leaders across our city who bring their experience, relationships, and close knowledge of the communities they serve. We need your leadership, your involvement, because a big part of this effort is to empower your constituents to help police make our communities safer. We have to provide opportunities to the community to air their grievances with the police, and we need community leaders to foster those conversations and to keep those conversations productive, honest, and respectful.

I want to speak directly to every resident of Chicago: I work for you. My first responsibility and your government's first responsibility is to keep you and your family safe and to make sure that you feel safe in your neighborhoods. And we have clearly fallen short on this issue -- and that needs to change. It starts by hearing your fears and your frustrations -- as well as your hopes and your expectations.

We also need to see what we can do in our communities to restore trust where it has been lost. I know some of you are afraid to work with police. You do not trust them.

And want to be honest: When an African American mother or father or grandparent feel it is necessary to train their sons and daughters to behave with extreme caution -- when they are pulled over by police and have both hands visible on the wheel and visible, what does that say? We have a trust problem.



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It is not something I would ever tell my children. That's unacceptable. When parents tell their children not to congregate on corners, especially in groups, out of fear for them encountering the police, what does that say? We have a trust problem.

So we, elected leaders, police officers, and community and religious leaders, have a responsibility to earn back the trust and to change that narrative. This is not just about what the police need to do.

When a nine-year-old son is executed in retaliation against his father by someone who knew his mother, what does that say? We have normalized gun violence.

When an adult victim of gun violence himself gives his 14-year-old niece a gun to settle a score from social media which then leads to the homicide of another child, what does that say? We have normalized gun violence.

All of us must set a higher standard of behavior for our children and help them understand that people can work out their problems responsibly and fairly with mutual respect. We need to reset our norms. We need to reset our expectations. We need to reset our values. This is not just a community or police problem. I know that, personally -- have a lot of work to do to win back the public's trust and that words are not enough. I will not rest until we take the concrete steps that are necessary to confront all of these issues, comprehensively, effectively.

There will be many who doubt our efforts. I get that. I begin this effort with a request of every person in this city to...bring out the best in themselves and to look for the best in others as we focus on the hard work ahead. It falls [in]to three over-arching areas: justice, culture, and community. The pursuit of justice on the issue of police misconduct is our most immediate and pressing goal. And several efforts are already underway.

First, Officer Van Dyke has been charged with murder and the state's attorney is proceeding with that case. The public trust is the most important resource we have. But I recognize that a prolonged investigation served to undermine public trust. And every day that we held on to the video contributed to the public's distrust. And that needs to change.

Second, there's a federal civil rights investigation into this shooting and the conduct of the officers who responded to the scene. That investigation began over -- a little over a year ago. And again, that is being handled by the U.S. Attorney.

Third, the Justice Department is now looking more broadly at the issue of police misconduct, police oversight, and civil rights here in Chicago. We welcome it. We will be a better city for it. It is in our self-interest because we need their help and assistance to make the fundamental and necessary changes.



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Fourth, on August 6, the ACLU and the Chicago Police Department came to an agreement to have an independent evaluation of CPD's investigatory stop practices and procedures, additional data collection on stops, better training for officers, and better transparency for the public. As part of this historic agreement, the Chicago Police Department will create enhanced training to reinforce the law and policy and to ensure respect for civil rights -- because civil rights and public safety go hand-in hand.

Fifth, we announced a task force last week of respected and knowledgeable leaders in criminal justice and police oversight who will conduct a very public and thorough review of our existing system of training, oversight, discipline, accountability, and transparency. In a letter made public this week, the task force outlined a timeline and plans to hold public hearings with the community and with experts from across the country.

The task force is led by Lori Lightfoot, a distinguished former prosecutor with a deep history of investigating police misconduct. She currently chairs the Chicago Police Board, with rules on police disciplinary -- which rules on police disciplinary cases. It also includes Inspector General Joe Ferguson -- Inspector Joe Ferguson, retired Chicago Police Superintendent Hiram Grau, former federal prosecutor Sergio Acosta, and University of Chicago law professor and former public defender Randolph Stone. In addition, Chicago native Deval Patrick, the former chief of the civil rights division at the Department of Justice and former Governor of Massachusetts, is serving as a senior advisor to the Task Force.

Collectively, the members of the task force bring decades of experience, knowledge, and different perspectives to these complex issues. They have committed to delivering a report to the public by the end of March [2016] that clearly identifies the problems and offers real solutions to each and every one of them.

They will look at the Bureau of Internal Affairs at the Police Department, which investigates corruption. They will look at the Independent Police Review Authority, which investigates police shootings and citizen complaints. They will look at IPRA's record since it was created in 2007 and ask a simple question: Why, out of hundreds of police shootings in the last eight years, only a handful of them have led to any charges? They will ask why some police officers with repeated and multiple citizen complaints of excessive force have yet to face any meaningful disciplinary action.

These facts defy credibility, which is why on Monday I appointed Sharon Fairley to head IPRA. She brings a wealth of experience from both the public and private sectors to help reinvigorate IPRA and reestablish the integrity and independence it was originally designed to have.

The first recommendation of the task force is that we appoint a senior officer for civil rights at the Chicago Police Department who will have clear authority to implement the recommendations of the task force and ultimately the recommendations of the Department of Justice.



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They will also look at the report from former prosecutor Ron Safer offering recommendations to strengthen police disciplinary procedures -- although we [have to] cast a wider net than that effort. They have to examine decades of past practices that have allowed abusive police officers with records of complaints to escape accountability. They should revisit every policy and every protocol -- including the timing and release of videos that are part of an ongoing investigation.

As you know, two new videos were released this week -- raising even more questions about police actions. Although the state's attorney is declining to prosecute in one of them, IPRA will be doing another review of both cases. The task force will also look at what other cities are doing and the steps they took. Cities across America are dealing with similar challenges. There are lessons to be studied, lessons to be learned, and lessons to be implemented.

We have all seen the videos from Cleveland, New York, North Charleston, and -- and as recently as Miami. We have read the studies and articles about racial profiling, the lack of diversity in our police ranks across the country, and the disproportionate levels of enforcement towards people of color. It is my deepest hope that we continue to address these issues in a peaceful, passionate, and productive way. But I fully understand that the public's patience -- patience is limited. You want answers. You want corrective action. You deserve both -- and you will get both. To be clear, this task force will not be guided or directed by my office. Their job is to get out all the facts about the police department and the reforms and the changes that must be adopted.

As we move forward, I am looking for a new leader of the Chicago Police Department to address the problems at the very heart of the policing profession. The problem is sometimes referred to as the "Thin Blue Line." The problem is other times referred to as the "Code of Silence." It is this tendency to ignore; it is the tendency to deny; it is the tendency in some cases to cover-up the bad actions of a colleague or colleagues. No officer should be allowed to behave as if they are above the law just because they are responsible for upholding the law. Permitting and protecting even the smallest acts of abuse by a tiny fraction of our officers leads to a culture where extreme acts of abuse are more likely, just like what happened to Laquan McDonald.

We all have grieved over young lives lost again and again to senseless violence in our city. Now more than ever we need good and effective policing. We cannot have effective policing if we turn a blind eye to extreme misconduct -- as we saw its worst in the tragic case of Laquan McDonald. We cannot ask citizens in crime-ravaged neighborhoods to break the code of silence if we continue to allow a code of silence to exist within our own police department. We cannot ask young men to respect officers if officers do not respect them in kind. Respect must be earned. Respect is a two-way street.



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The search has begun for a new superintendent to lead the work in changing this culture and to lead the department. In the meantime, acting Superintendent John Escalante has already taken some initial steps. Last weekend, he announced that there will be zero tolerance for patrol officers who fail to properly engage dash-cams. He has taken the step to expand the use of body cameras to a third of our districts. He will also retrain police for deescalating tense situations and minimizing the use of force. And he will recommit to reinvigorating our community policing strategies. Chicago is where the whole idea of community policing began. It remains the -- the best and the most comprehensive approach we have in changing the everyday conditions that breed crime and violence -- and then breed mistrust.

We have more work to do. We need better training to live up to the values and the principles of community policing. It is one thing to train officers on fighting crime. It is a whole nother thing to train them to build friendships and relationships, which are integral to fighting crime. This takes time, effort, and patience on the part of police officers. They have to sit with parents; they have too sit with their kids and community leaders. They have to listen, collaborate, and in many cases, be a mentor.

Over the past few years, we have trained 10,000 officers on the concept of community policing, but frankly training is not enough. The leadership of the police department needs to reinforce that training and set the examples necessary for the principles to also be translated into action. We also train police to understand the circumstances when they can use excessive force. As one sergeant in the 15th District said to me recently, there is a difference between whether someone can use a gun and whether somebody should use a gun. Just because extreme force is justified does not always mean it is required. This is where the right training and the right leadership is essential. But for this effort to succeed, we must rebuild the partnership with our communities -- and that gets to the third principal: community.

In our city today, we have people of every background, race, culture, and ethnicity; and that is Chicago's greatest strength. We have a vast well of talent, ideas, and energy. We have the skills and knowledge to lead the world in every field, and in many areas we do. We have the love and strength of our mothers and fathers, and the hopes and dreams of our children. We need to direct our collective energy towards those -- towards a common vision of a better tomorrow for the city.

And every one of us needs to reflect on what we can do in our lives to make our communities safer. Includes me. How do we raise our kids? What values do we teach them? How do we help them negotiate those challenging years between childhood and adulthood so youthful mistakes do not lead to negative consequences? How do we give more young people more opportunities instead of a path to nowhere? For many of these young men, gang life is the only life they know.



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When I was sworn into office in May, I said then: "When young men and women join gangs in search of self-worth, we as a city must and can do better." I said, "When young men and women turn to lives of crime for hope, we as a city must and can do better." I said, "When prison is [the] place we send young boys to become men, we as a city must and can do better." When I talk to these young men who have had negative experiences with police they tell me they just want one, simple human thing: Respect.

I was with a group of young men this weekend having lunch -- all who had had a history with the criminal justice system. All had made a choice to doing something different, and to try to get on the right path, to do the right thing; acknowledge what they did in the past was wrong. They made a choice. So I asked them, "Tell me the one thing I need to know." And rather than tell me something, one young man asked me a simple question that gets to the core of what we're talking about. He said, "Do you think the police would ever treat you the way they treat me?"

And the answer is *no*. And *that* is wrong!

And *that* has to change in this city. That has to come to an end -- and end now.

No citizen is a second class citizen in the city of Chicago. If my children are treated one way, every child is treated the same way. There is one standard for our young men. And we can do everything that we're talking about, but it comes down to one simple thing! It's what we are taught when we're children and what we hope to teach our children as parents! And that - is the value of respect.

We can have the training. We can have the leadership. We can have the manual.

But it is what is in here that we need to call out onto the streets of Chicago. Because *respect* is earned! *Respect* is a two-way street. And that is what we'll be beginning to demand from this day forward.

Now, while we have communities overrun by gangs and guns -- I want to be clear to everybody -- we also have grandmothers who sit on a porch watching kids go to school, people who mentor young men, and kids who are graduating and going on to college. We as a city cannot just show up when there is either a basketball shot or a gunshot. We must be there every day helping to nurture that sense of community.

Beyond the issues of policing and fighting crime, we must also address the underlying challenges of family, of poverty, of joblessness, of hopelessness which demand greater action, not just in this city but across the country. We cannot wait another day to address the current crisis that we face.



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We have to have better oversight of our police officers to ensure that they are living up to the high standards we expect of them. And we also have to create a place for the community to vent their understandable feelings and fears about the police without it devolving into acrimony and finger-pointing.

We have to have these difficult conversations if we are going to build trust; and not just have conversations but also have the ability to hear each other. We have to enable people to speak freely and we have to listen intently.

We have to listen to the parents whose children were killed and see their extraordinary grace, their strength, and their courage -- that is required of them to endure the infinite pain of burying a child.

We have to listen to the men who have been in and out of the criminal justice system and listen to the limited choices they have faced and understand them rather than simply condemn them.

And finally, the community has to listen to our police officer talk about their work and the challenges of working in communities over-run by gangs, drugs, guns, and the loss of hope and opportunity.

And at the same time, the -- the police have to listen to the community to understand the challenges they face and hear their hopes and expectations for their own future and their own children's future. Both sides have to look beyond the surface to see the common humanity they share instead of the differences that divide them: a young man can look at the uniform or see a father; the officer can see dreadlocks and tattoos or a student and an artist. Our efforts are to have them see past their roles to their souls. That is our work.

We have to be honest with ourselves about this issue. Each time when we confronted it in the past as a city, Chicago only went as far as our conscience so we could move on. This time must be different. It will be a bumpy road -- make no mistake about it. It is a painful process. It is a long journey because of the issues we need to confront.

But we as a city will not hesitate in the pursuit of what is right. We cannot shrink from the challenge any more than we can ignore the wrenching video of a troubled young man, a ward of the state of Illinois, failed by the system, surrounded by the police, and gunned down on the streets of Chicago.

This is not the Chicago we love, and this is not the Chicago we know. This is not the police department we believe in and trust to protect our families and our neighborhoods. This is not who we are. And this will not stand.



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Laquan McDonald's death was totally avoidable. Our only choice as a city is to do everything in our power to right that wrong.

It starts today. It starts now. And it starts with us.

Thank you.

EXHIBIT 102



KENTUCKIANA
— COURT REPORTERS —

MASTER DOCKET CASE NO. 19-CV-01717

**IN RE: WATTS COORDINATED
PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS**

**DEPONENT:
EDDIE JOHNSON**

**DATE:
August 31, 2022**



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1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
3 ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
4 JUDGE FRANKLIN U. VALDERRAMA
5 MAGISTRATE JUDGE SHEILA M. FINNEGAN
6 MASTER DOCKET CASE NO. 19-CV-01717,
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12 IN RE: WATTS COORDINATED
13 PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
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23 DEPONENT: EDDIE JOHNSON
24 DATE: AUGUST 31, 2022
25 REPORTER: KORTNEY CHASE

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STIPULATION

The VIDEO deposition of EDDIE JOHNSON was taken at LOEVY & LOEVY, 311 NORTH ABERDEEN STREET, THIRD FLOOR, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60607 on WEDNESDAY the 31ST day of AUGUST 2022 at 1:08 p.m.; said deposition was taken pursuant to the FEDERAL Rules of Civil Procedure.

It is agreed that KORTNEY CHASE, being a Notary Public and Court Reporter for the State of ILLINOIS, may swear the witness and that the reading and signing of the completed transcript by the witness is not waived.

PROCEEDINGS

VIDEOGRAPHER:: This is the video deposition of Eddie Johnson taken by Loevy & Loevy in the matter of Watts Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, Civil Action No. 19-CV-01717, held at Loevy & Loevy, 311 North Aberdeen Street, Chicago, Illinois 60607. Today is August 31, 2022. The time is 1:09. Court Reporter is Kortney Chase of Churchill Reporting. The videographer is Rick Casper. The Counsel can now introduce themselves and the Court Reporter's free to administer the oath.

MR. RAUSCHER: Scott Rauscher on behalf of the Plaintiffs represented by Loevy & Loevy and the Watts Coordinated Proceedings.

MR. FLAXMAN: Joel Flaxman for the Flaxman Plaintiffs. Collin Gill from my office is also present.

MR. BATTLE: Kenneth Battle on behalf of the witness, Eddie Johnson.

MR. BURNS: Terrence Burns on behalf of the City of Chicago Defendants.

MR. KOSOKO: Ahmed Kosoko on behalf of Ronald Watts.

MR. PALLES: Eric Palles on behalf of Kallat

1 Mohammad. And I got to tell you, I can't hear
2 anything. Or actually, it's very low.

3 MR. LEINENWEBER: Tom Leinenweber on behalf of
4 Matthew Cadman and Michael Spaargaren.

5 MS. WEST: Allyson West on behalf of the
6 remaining individual Defendant Officers.

7 COURT REPORTER: Mr. Johnson, would you please
8 raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear or
9 affirm that the testimony that you're about to give
10 will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
11 the truth?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.

13 COURT REPORTER: Thank you.

14 DIRECT EXAMINATION

15 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

16 Q Can you say and spell your name please?

17 A Eddie Johnson, E-D-D-I-E J-O-H-N-S-O-N.

18 Q And you're probably already aware of this.

19 We agreed with your Counsel on a three-hour time limit
20 today, and then we'll be asking you questions on certain
21 specific topics. I'm not going to spend time
22 memorializing that, but I trust that your Counsel will
23 jump in if he thinks that I'm going astray from that.

24 A Thank you.

25 MR. PALLES: Please, Scott. You must talk

1 louder.

2 MR. RAUSCHER: I'm going to try my best, but I
3 mean, we're in Chicago. If you need to call in, we
4 can set up a dial-in or something. But I think
5 everyone here can hear me. I'll do my best.

6 MR. PALLES: All right. I mean, all right.
7 Fine. I'll -- maybe I'll do that the next part.
8 Okay, thanks.

9 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

10 Q Were you the Superintendent of the Chicago
11 Police Department?

12 A Yes.

13 Q What years did you serve as superintendent?

14 A April of 2016 through December of 2019.

15 Q Were you with CPD before April 2016?

16 A Yes.

17 Q How many years did you serve in the police
18 department?

19 A I served a total of 31 years with the Chicago
20 Police Department.

21 Q Did you know Ronald Watts?

22 A Personally?

23 Q Personally.

24 A No.

25 Q What about Kallat Mohammad?

1 A No.

2 Q Did you know -- do you know any members of
3 the Watts team personally?

4 A No.

5 Q Do you know who Al Jones is?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Do you know him personally?

8 A I know who he is, but I don't have a -- I
9 never had a personal relationship with him. No.

10 Q When you say you know who he is, you mean like
11 you recognize him or you knew of him, or something else?

12 A I may recognize him if I were to bump into him
13 on the street. I'm not sure. But I don't recall ever
14 working with him. I just know who he is because his son
15 played baseball with Jackie Robinson West and so did I
16 at one time.

17 Q How do you know that fact?

18 A That his son played baseball? I saw him.

19 Q Okay. You saw his son playing?

20 A Yes.

21 Q How did you know who it was?

22 A By his name. His mom, I believe her first
23 name is Nedra Jones, used to work -- we -- she and I
24 used to work together in the Fifth District at one
25 point. So, I'm more familiar with her than I am him.

1 **Q How long ago did you work with, is it Nedra?**

2 A Nedra, yes.

3 **Q How long ago did you work with Nedra?**

4 A So I was a sergeant in the Fifth District from
5 2000 -- I'm sorry, 1998 to, I believe, 2001.

6 **Q She was in the Fifth District during that**
7 **time?**

8 A Correct.

9 **Q What was her job in the Fifth District?**

10 A She was on patrol to the best of my
11 recollection.

12 **Q Did you ever talk to her about her husband?**

13 A No.

14 **Q To your knowledge, have you ever talked to**
15 **Al Jones?**

16 A I may have bumped into him maybe, but I -- I'd
17 be guessing, but I don't recall talking to him.

18 **Q Did you ever work in the Second District?**

19 A No.

20 **Q Had you heard of -- when was the first time**
21 **you heard of Ronald Watts?**

22 A I would be guessing. I don't recall the
23 year, but I -- when things happened and it was reported
24 on the news, that's my first recollection of hearing
25 about Ronald Watts.

1 **Q** And was that around the time when he was
2 arrested or around the time when exoneration started
3 happening?

4 A It would've been the time he was arrested.

5 **Q** What was your job with CPD around 2012?

6 A 2012? 2012, I believe I was the Deputy Chief
7 of Area Central, which -- so 2012, I believe I was
8 Deputy Chief of Area Four at some time. And I believe
9 that's the year we consolidated. And then I would've
10 been a Deputy Chief of Area Central.

11 **Q** Were you ever briefed by anyone on Watts' or
12 Mohammad's arrest?

13 A No.

14 **Q** Were you ever involved in any discussions
15 whether formal or informal at CPD about those arrests?

16 A No.

17 **Q** Did you ever talk to anybody about those
18 arrests around that time, around 2012?

19 A Not that I recall.

20 **Q** Was there a time when you were Superintendent
21 of the Chicago Police Department when you learned more
22 about Watts and Mohammad in mid-2013?

23 A While I was superintendent?

24 **Q** Yes.

25 A Not so much Watts and Mohammad, but about the

1 other officers involved.

2 **Q So maybe let's back up one step. Was there**
3 **any time when you learned any of the circumstances of**
4 **Watts' or Mohammad's arrests or the reason for those**
5 **arrests?**

6 A No. I don't recall ever being briefed about
7 the specific details of their arrests. I knew they had
8 been arrested and went to prison, but I don't recall
9 ever being briefed about the specifics of their arrests.

10 **Q And does that include while you were**
11 **superintendent you don't think you were briefed on the**
12 **specifics of their arrests?**

13 A No, by the time I became superintendent,
14 they had already been arrested, in prison, may have been
15 out of prison. I really can't say.

16 **Q All right, but you learned about members of**
17 **their team while you were superintendent; is that right?**

18 A Correct.

19 **Q What did you learn about members of the Watts**
20 **team while you were the superintendent?**

21 A So while I was superintendent, I can recall
22 being informed that the State's Attorney's Office was no
23 longer going to call some members that were affiliated
24 with Watts and Mohammad. They would no longer call them
25 to testify at court proceedings.

1 **Q Is there anything else you learned about the**
2 **team while you were superintendent?**

3 A To the best of my recollection,
4 that was -- that was about it.

5 **Q Who told you that the CCSAO wasn't going to**
6 **call some members of the Watts and Mohammad team to**
7 **testify?**

8 A To the best of my recollection, I believe it
9 was the General Counsel, Charise Valente.

10 **Q What did she tell you?**

11 A She told me that she had received notification
12 from the state's attorney's office that they would no
13 longer call these particular officers to testify in
14 criminal proceedings.

15 **Q Did she say why?**

16 A She said that they had concerns about their
17 credibility concerning the Watts and Mohammad
18 investigation.

19 **Q Did she explain what those concerns about**
20 **credibility were in any detail?**

21 A No. To the best of my recollection, she asked
22 them for further information, but as far as I know,
23 we never received anything in furtherance.

24 **Q Did you ask for more information?**

25 A From whom?

1 **Q From anyone?**

2 A To the best of my recollection when Charise
3 and I discussed it, I said to her, "When you get that
4 information, let me know."

5 **Q Did she say to you, "I'm asking for more**
6 **information," and you said, "let me know what you find**
7 **out?"**

8 A Something to that effect.

9 **Q And when you said you don't think you got**
10 **that -- that CPD didn't get that information, are you**
11 **basing it on the fact that you never heard more about it**
12 **or is there something more specific?**

13 A I'm basing it on the fact that I never heard
14 anything additional.

15 **Q And you would've expected her or someone else**
16 **to come follow up with you if they would've learned**
17 **more; is that right?**

18 A Correct.

19 **Q Was that a -- do you remember any other**
20 **instances while you were superintendent where you had**
21 **learned that the Cook County State's Attorney's office**
22 **was not going to be calling CPD officers to testify at**
23 **trial because of credibility concerns?**

24 A I don't recall. I'd be guessing right now,
25 but there may have been instances, but I don't recall

1 any specific other times where that occurred.

2 **Q Was it uncommon then in your experience for**
3 **the CCSAO to make this type of request?**

4 A I had heard, and it might not have been as my
5 time as superintendent, but I could have been deputy
6 chief or chief, and I had heard about certain officers
7 not being allowed to come testify at Cook County Court.
8 Yes.

9 **Q What was your -- you know, we've talked about**
10 **in general terms at least your discussion with**
11 **Ms. Valentine's -- Ms. Valentine?**

12 A Valente.

13 **Q Valente. Sorry. With Ms. Valente. What was**
14 **your reaction -- what was your reaction, gut reaction**
15 **when you heard that a bunch of officers weren't going to**
16 **be called to testify?**

17 A I wanted to know what was the circumstances
18 that they came to that decision. What was it based on?

19 **Q Did you have concerns when you heard that?**

20 A Well, of course. You know, being the
21 superintendent, if I -- if I hear that a group of
22 officers aren't going to be called anymore, then yeah,
23 I want to know why.

24 **Q Did you do anything internally other than ask**
25 **for more -- ask someone to go get more information? Did**

1 you do anything internally to look into why the CCSA0
2 made -- might have made the decision it made?

3 A Well, internally, we wouldn't be able to
4 figure that out. They would have to tell us. They made
5 that decision. So, it -- internally there would be
6 nothing for us to do except to ask them why they came to
7 that decision.

8 Q Did you or anyone else, to your knowledge,
9 talk to any of the officers at the CCSA0? I'm going
10 to -- let me rephrase that. Did you ever talk to any of
11 the affected officers about the CCSA0's decision?

12 A Me, personally?

13 Q Yeah.

14 A No.

15 Q Did you direct anybody at CPD to talk to any
16 of the officers about the state's attorney's decision
17 not to call them to testify?

18 A No.

19 Q Do you know if anyone at CPD did talk to the
20 officers about the state's attorney's decision to not
21 call them to testify?

22 A I don't know.

23 Q Does the department have any sort of tracking
24 system for when the state's attorney says we're not
25 calling someone because of credibility reasons?

1 MR. BATTLE: Scott, when you get through the
2 questions like that, I just want to make sure you're
3 asking him about his personal knowledge, right?

4 MR. RAUSCHER: To his knowledge they
5 haven't --

6 MR. BATTLE: Yeah. Sure, I understand.
7 I just want to make sure we're all on the same page.
8 Go ahead. I'm sorry. That's no problem. That's
9 okay.

10 A So, my personal knowledge, the only tracking
11 mechanism that we may have had, and again, I would be
12 guessing, but I would imagine if we did have a tracking
13 mechanism, Internal Affairs would be aware of it as well
14 as the General Counsel's office.

15 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

16 Q Do you know whether Internal Affairs or the
17 General Counsel's office tracked that type of
18 information while you were superintendent?

19 A I couldn't emphatically say yes, I did.

20 Q Do you have any -- what's your best guess?
21 You did or you didn't?

22 A I -- I --

23 MR. BURNS: Objection to the form of the
24 question.

25 A My best guess would be that, yes, they did

1 keep track of officers that would no longer be able to
2 testify.

3 Q And who do you think -- who do you think is
4 more likely to have tracked it? Internal Affairs, the
5 General Counsel or both?

6 A I would think both would have knowledge of it.

7 Q And why do you think that they would've -- why
8 do you think they track -- let me rephrase. What's the
9 basis for your belief that they may have tracked this
10 information?

11 A Because if officers were no longer be called
12 as witnesses at criminal proceedings, we wouldn't want
13 them to be involved in any litigation or court cases or
14 criminal cases, because the credibility of the case
15 would be in jeopardy and those officers could taint that
16 particular case. So, it would be incumbent on us to
17 keep track of who those individuals were.

18 Q Would -- were there any repercussions for the
19 officers internally based on the county state's
20 attorney's decision not to call them to testify?

21 A Yes.

22 Q All right. What were the repercussions for
23 the officers?

24 A So because the Cook County State Attorney's
25 Office would no longer use them as witnesses in court

1 proceedings, we removed them from field duties so that
2 they wouldn't be able to taint potential cases.

3 **Q What does it mean to remove an officer from**
4 **field duty?**

5 A So basically if the officers were working in
6 the street and coming in contact with the public, then
7 we chose to put them on like an administrative position
8 so that they wouldn't be in contact with the public.

9 **Q So is the idea basically, it's not for cases**
10 **that were already pending, but you don't want them going**
11 **out making arrests because then there's no way to go**
12 **testify about what happened?**

13 A Correct. Pending cases that -- that,
14 you know -- that horse is out of the barn, so to speak.
15 But we didn't want -- moving forward, you don't want the
16 potential of any other cases to be tainted.

17 **Q Is that the right general concept the way I'm**
18 **describing it? You don't want an officer going out**
19 **arresting someone and then there's no one to testify**
20 **about it. Is that the idea?**

21 A Correct. I think that's -- that's reasonable,
22 yes.

23 **Q Is there another way, a better way to describe**
24 **it?**

25 A No, that's -- that's reasonable.

1 Q Were there any other reasons that you put
2 those officers on field duty?

3 A Took them off -- going back to the --

4 Q I'm sorry, took them off. Yeah.
5 Are there -- were there any other reasons that you
6 removed the Watts officers from field duty beyond the
7 concern that if they remained on field duty, they would
8 taint cases?

9 A To the best of my recollection, I think around
10 that same time some cases had been vacated that they
11 were a part of along with the fact that the State's
12 Attorney's Office would no longer use them. So in my
13 judgment while I was superintendent, that was reasonable
14 action.

15 Q Why did the fact that cases had been vacated
16 play into the decision to remove officers from field
17 duty?

18 A Because apparently there was some reason to
19 the -- to -- for the Court system or the Cook County
20 State's Attorney's Office to be concerned with them
21 being able to have credibility issues.

22 Q Did the fact that the Court system and the
23 state's attorney have concerns with credibility cause
24 you to have concerns with their credibility?

25 A Yes.

1 Q Would -- would what you did removing them from
2 field duty, would that commonly be called just putting
3 them on desk duty?

4 A You could refer to it as that, but I made it a
5 point to try to ensure they wouldn't have contact with
6 the public in general.

7 Q Would not?

8 A Would not have. Right.

9 Q So it's even more than that because desk duty
10 could involve contact with the public, is that --

11 MR. PALLES: Excuse me, can you repeat that
12 last thing, Scott?

13 Q Yeah. So, is what you're saying is there
14 could be a desk duty job that involved contact with the
15 police, but you made sure that whatever they were doing
16 internally didn't involve those instances?

17 A Correct, because --

18 MR. RAUSCHER: Okay. Joel pointed out that I
19 misphrased that question.

20 MR. BATTLE: Okay, well, we'll start over.

21 Q We're going to start over again. Is what
22 you're saying that there are certain desk duty jobs
23 where police officers would have contact with the
24 public; is that right?

25 A Correct.

1 **Q And you wanted to make sure that the Watts**
2 **team didn't have any contact with the public?**

3 A Correct.

4 **Q Why were you concerned that the Watts team**
5 **have any contact with the public?**

6 A Well, just out of an abundance of caution of
7 what had occurred. If they had contact with the public,
8 that could potentially rise to something criminal,
9 and I didn't want them to be in that position.

10 **Q Was any part of that a public relations issue?**

11 MR. BURNS: Objection to form.

12 A No, it was just -- in my estimation, it was
13 just the right thing to do.

14 **Q Was it a community relations driven decision**
15 **at all?**

16 A Again, no. If this -- if this were not a
17 newsworthy thing and this occurred, I would still have
18 made the same decision.

19 **Q Did you consider the decision to put the**
20 **officers on, what would you call it? So, they're not on**
21 **field duty. What do you refer to it as?**

22 A Just taking them off of field duty. It's just
23 putting them in an administration -- administrative
24 position.

25 **Q Would you refer to the decision to put the**

1 officers in an administrative role as a disciplinary
2 action?

3 A No, I had to be -- I had to ensure that we
4 didn't take a job action against those particular
5 officers because there had been nothing that I was aware
6 of that would justify relieving them of their police
7 powers or anything. So, taking them off the street
8 didn't damage them or harm them in any way. They were
9 still receiving the same pay. If they wanted to work
10 what we referred to as special employment, they were
11 still able to do those things. So, no it wasn't
12 disciplinary.

13 Q What does it mean to work special employment?

14 A So with the Chicago Police Department, we have
15 voluntary employment opportunities such as working with
16 the Chicago Transit Authority, CTA, part-time. So those
17 officers could request that. Any officer in good status
18 could request to work those job opportunities.
19 So, because I wasn't taking a job action against them,
20 I didn't want to prohibit them from still being able to
21 do those types of things.

22 Q Did they still have the power to arrest people
23 when they were on administrative duty?

24 A Yes, I -- again, I didn't relieve them of
25 their police powers. I simply took them off the field

1 duties.

2 Q Why did you not remove them of their --
3 relieve them of their police powers?

4 A Because there was no evidence that I was aware
5 of that would substantiate relieving them of their
6 police powers. Everything that I was aware of there
7 were allegations made, but no -- nothing was sustained.

8 Q Even if not technically a disciplinary action,
9 would you think of it colloquially as a disciplinary to
10 take someone from the field and put them on
11 administrative duty?

12 MR. BATTLE: Objection to form.

13 MR. BURNS: Objection. Form.

14 MS. WEST: Objection to form.

15 A No, it was it wasn't a disciplinary action at
16 all. There's a collective bargaining agreement as
17 superintendent I have to abide by that. So, I was
18 careful not to take a disciplinary action against them.

19 Q So let me try to take it out of that
20 collective bargaining context. Think of it -- let's
21 maybe just think of it as a hypothetical. There is no
22 collective bargaining agreement. There was no
23 collective bargaining agreement when you were the
24 superintendent and you took someone from working on the
25 street, making arrests, and said you're going to work an

1 administrative job and you're not going to talk to
2 anyone from the public. Would you consider that
3 disciplinary action?

4 MR. BATTLE: Objection.

5 MR. BURNS: Objection.

6 MS. WEST: Object. Vague. Incomplete
7 hypothetical.

8 MR. BATTLE: Yeah. Join.

9 MR. BURNS: Form. Join.

10 A Again, no. There are thousands of officers
11 that would like to work administrative positions.

12 Q I did leave out a fact from the hypothetical.
13 It's a fair point. Or maybe two. Let's -- we can kind
14 of track the facts here. There are officers who are not
15 asking to be removed from the field. Someone comes to
16 you and says the state's attorney has concerns about
17 their credibility, will not call them to testify at
18 criminal cases. A bunch of cases they were involved in
19 have led to vacated convictions. There's no collective
20 bargaining agreement. You say, I've got concerns about
21 this. I'm not going to have them working in the street
22 anymore or talking to the public. They're going to be
23 inside doing administrative duties. Is there anything
24 about that that you think is disciplinary?

25 MR. BURNS: Objection.

1 MS. WEST: Objection to form.

2 MR. KOSOKO: Objection. Foundation. Incomplete
3 hypothetical.

4 MR. BURNS: Joining.

5 MS. WEST: Join.

6 A Again. No, you know, officers know what
7 discipline is and what discipline is not. And again,
8 you know, we have thousands of officers that would love
9 to work administration -- administrative positions.
10 So those particular officers that were affected, I have
11 no way of knowing what they would've considered that to
12 be. But me personally, because I know the differences,
13 I -- no, it wouldn't have been disciplinary.

14 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

15 Q Take a look at Exhibit 3. So Eric, and for
16 those on the phone, I'm going to show him Exhibit 3.

17 (EXHIBIT 3 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION)

18 MR. BATTLE: What's your Bates number, Scott?

19 MR. RAUSCHER: It's City of Chicago's Answers
20 to December 1, 2017, Interrogatories from Lionel
21 White.

22 MR. BATTLE: I got it.

23 MR. RAUSCHER: And for those who didn't see the
24 e-mail, I just pre-stamp things. So, I'm not going
25 to be going in order and may not use all the

1 exhibits, so I'm just going to refer to them by the
2 numbers from that list I sent around. Yours has it,
3 doesn't it, Terry?

4 MR. BURNS: Yeah, just wanted a copy of it so I
5 have number 3, so we're good with that.

6 MR. KOSOKO: You said December 1, 2007
7 interrogatories by --

8 MR. RAUSCHER: 2017.

9 MR. KOSOKO: -- by Lionel White?

10 MR. RAUSCHER: I'm going to actually start
11 with -- if you can look at Interrogatory 2 starts on
12 Page 2 and then the response to that.

13 MR. BATTLE: Scott, do you want him to read it
14 or are you going to ask him a question?

15 MR. RAUSCHER: Maybe just read it. It's only a
16 paragraph.

17 MR. BATTLE: Okay.

18 THE WITNESS: Do you want me to read the
19 answers, too?

20 MR. RAUSCHER: Yeah. If you could read the
21 answer. There's a sentence that refers to you in
22 the middle of that. That's why I want to ask you
23 about it. Is the answer -- to your knowledge, is
24 that answer correct?

25 MR. BURNS: Before he does answer, I will

1 interpose an objection. This is directed to the
2 city. So you're just asking him to verify the answer
3 that we gave?

4 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

5 Q I just want to know if you think -- so,
6 let me -- I understand. You may not be able to answer
7 part of it because it's about 2012. And if you can't
8 answer it, that's fine. But part of it talks about what
9 you did. I want to know if you think it's correct.

10 A So the decision to place Sergeant Alvin Jones
11 along with the other officers on desk duty, that part is
12 factually correct. That was a decision I made based on
13 the state's attorney's office not wanting to use them in
14 court proceedings.

15 Q Okay. And are there any other reasons that
16 you know of or can think of as to why they were put on
17 desk duty?

18 MR. BURNS: Objection. Asked and answered.

19 A No, that's basically it.

20 Q Is there anybody at the Chicago Police
21 Department -- let me rephrase. In 2017, was there
22 anybody else at the Chicago Police Department who could
23 make the decision to put an officer on desk duty or
24 administrative duty?

25 MR. BURNS: I object, before he answers.

1 Incomplete foundation.

2 A How can I describe this? This is a
3 hypothetical. So, for instance, if a district commander
4 were aware of some allegations against a particular
5 officer in his or her particular unit, then I suppose,
6 yes, they could say, you know what, Officer Johnson, I'm
7 going to sit you down for a moment, take you off the
8 street and -- and put you inside just until these things
9 are investigated. So the answer is yes, I wouldn't
10 be -- I wouldn't have to be the only one that could make
11 that decision.

12 Q What was the process -- what was the process
13 generally in 2017 for an officer to be assigned to an
14 administrative job?

15 MR. BURNS: Objection. Foundation.

16 A Again, I -- when you say process, it makes me
17 think is there something written down that would govern
18 how you did that. And I think it's more so because
19 that's not an everyday occurrence. So, I think it's
20 more so information provided would determine whether or
21 not we think an officer should be taken off the field
22 and put on administrative duty. For instance, an
23 officer, a female officer could be pregnant and their
24 commanding officer could decide to put them on
25 administrative duty. So, there's just different

1 reasons, you know? So, it's -- it's hard to, you know,
2 put a bubble over your whole thing because there are
3 different reasons and circumstances that might dictate
4 someone doing that.

5 **Q Why did the decision to put the Watts officers**
6 **on administrative duty get to you instead of someone**
7 **lower in the organization?**

8 A Because the documentation came from the Cook
9 County State's Attorney's Office to the General Counsel
10 who's in the superintendent's office. So, she wouldn't
11 go to someone underneath and ask. She would come to the
12 superintendent to ask.

13 **Q Did she report directly to you at the time?**

14 A Yes. She was a direct reporter.

15 **Q All right. Can you also look at, while you**
16 **have it in front of you, the first interrogatory, and**
17 **the response to that? You could read the whole thing if**
18 **you want. My question really is going to be about the**
19 **quote attributed to you.**

20 A Okay.

21 **Q Do you recall saying -- there's a quote in**
22 **this first paragraph. Do you recall making that**
23 **statement?**

24 MR. BURNS: In the answers, is that what you're
25 asking?

1 Q Yeah. Yeah. So, I'm in the -- I'm in the
2 first paragraph of the answer and there's a quote that
3 says, "Superintendent Johnson stated, 'It did happen
4 years ago, but unfortunately CPD was not in charge of
5 that investigation. So, a lot of that information we
6 just don't have. There were outside entities involved
7 in that investigation. It was taken away from the
8 Chicago Police Department. So that information we just
9 don't have in court.'" Do you see that?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Do you have -- do you have any memory of
12 saying that?

13 A No, not really.

14 Q Do you dispute that you said -- that you said
15 that?

16 A What I can say is that I -- I'm pretty sure I
17 said something along these lines. If it's -- if it's
18 verbatim, I can't say, but I -- I do -- I would have
19 said something to this effect.

20 Q And what was the basis for you making that
21 statement?

22 A I had probably been briefed on it, you know,
23 so however I was briefed and whatever I was told, that
24 would've been the basis for me making that statement.
25 Because I had no personal knowledge of it or any

1 involvement in it.

2 **Q** So when you say you had no personal knowledge
3 of it, do you mean you have no -- you had no personal
4 knowledge in November of 2017 as to whether the
5 investigation into Watts and Mohammad was taken away
6 from the Chicago Police Department?

7 MR. BURNS: Objection. Form of the question.

8 **A** No. When I say I didn't have any personal
9 knowledge, I mean the investigation itself, from 2004,
10 2005, up to whenever it was concluded. I had no
11 personal knowledge of that. So, before I would've made
12 a statement like this, someone would have had to have
13 briefed me on it prior to me making this statement.

14 **Q** And I understand that part of the answer.
15 I just want to make sure that we're clear. So, you
16 didn't -- I know you didn't have personal knowledge of
17 the investigation when it was going on, right? Does
18 that also mean that you didn't have personal knowledge
19 of whether that investigation was taken away from the
20 Chicago Police Department?

21 MR. BATTLE: At -- time and scope are we
22 talking about?

23 MR. RAUSCHER: At any time.

24 MR. BATTLE: At any point? At any time?

25 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

Q Including November 2017.

A So if I said taken away, that might not have been the right verbiage to use. I do recall knowing that the federal government was in charge of the investigation. And I do recall knowing that they were the lead. Anything that came of it, they had all those privileges, and not CPD.

Q I'm sorry, go ahead.

A So if I did say taken away, because I did have knowledge that it was a joint investigation. So, if I said taken away, I might have misspoke.

Q When you say you had knowledge, is what you mean you had knowledge based on the briefing that you had gotten before you made the statements?

A Correct.

Q And did you see documents as part of that briefing, or was someone would've told you, "Here's what you should be prepared to say?" Something like that?

A Yes, I was just briefed on it. I don't recall seeing any documents or anything regarding that investigation.

Q And when you say the federal government was the lead, is that just based solely on the briefing that you got?

A Yes, because this was conducted prior to me

1 being superintendent.

2 **Q And then what do you mean when you say they**
3 **have, like, the privileges that come from being the**
4 **lead?**

5 A So the evidence and everything that comes with
6 it, they're in charge of those things and not CPD.

7 **Q And are you making an assumption that that's**
8 **the case, or do you know that for a fact?**

9 A No. I know that.

10 **Q How do you know that?**

11 A Just based on my police experience. If the
12 federal government is involved in cases, especially
13 involving police corruption, they generally have the
14 lead on those things. And internally with CPD, we don't
15 do anything with it until the conclusion of their
16 investigation.

17 **Q So was that a policy at the CPD that if the**
18 **Feds are investigating jointly with CPD, the CPD doesn't**
19 **do anything until the Feds are done?**

20 A So if there's a criminal aspect of it, then
21 yes, CPD wouldn't do anything until the investigation is
22 done. Because remember, everything are allegations
23 until they're proven. So, we have to wait until the
24 evidence suggests, or is proven. And then CPD would do
25 something administratively.

1 **Q** When you say there's a criminal aspect, do you
2 mean if there are charges, or do you mean if the
3 investigation is into potential criminal activity?

4 **A** It could be both. So, if there -- if there's
5 an investigation involving alleged criminal activity,
6 then of course, CPD wouldn't do anything
7 administratively until the criminal portion was done.

8 **Q** And is there any time period that you're aware
9 of? Is there any -- are there any other limits on how
10 long CPD would let an investigation into one of its
11 officers go before taking any action?

12 **A** I don't have any knowledge of a specific time
13 frame. I just know that if CPD did something,
14 we could -- we could tank the investigation by doing
15 something on our own before the criminal part is
16 concluded.

17 **Q** And then if a criminal investigation into a
18 CPD officer is concluded without charges, does that mean
19 CPD automatically doesn't act?

20 **A** Repeat that?

21 **Q** So an investigation doesn't necessarily lead
22 to criminal charges, right? Is that -- you agree with
23 that?

24 **A** Uh-huh.

25 **Q** If a invest -- a joint investigation between

1 CPD and the federal government into a CP officer doesn't
2 lead to charges, does CPD ever still do anything?
3 Do they still ever act?

4 MR. BATTLE: Going to object to the fact that
5 incomplete hypothetical. Go ahead and answer,
6 if you can.

7 A So if it didn't lead to criminal charges, then
8 sometimes CPD would do internal investigation. Because
9 it might not lead to any criminal charges, but it could
10 be something that was a violation of policy, or things
11 of that nature. So we would still look at the
12 investigation at the conclusion of the criminal portion.

13 Q Were you ever given any specifics about any of
14 the evidence that the federal government with CPD
15 developed against Watts and other members of this team?

16 A No.

17 Q Did you ever ask for that information?

18 A So with Watts and Mohammad, they were -- prior
19 to me becoming superintendent, as far as I knew, they
20 had been indicted, went to prison. I don't know if they
21 were out of prison at the time that I became
22 superintendent. So, there would've been no need for me
23 to inquire about them. As far as the other members of
24 the team goes, when we got notification from the state's
25 attorney's office concerning their credibility issues,

1 I knew that I personally reached out to the
2 US Attorney's office and the FBI to ask them, did they
3 have anything at that point that would suggest that I
4 should take further action against those officers?
5 If they could share it with me, fine.
6 If not, I understood. But if I were to take a job
7 action against them, was -- did they have any reason to
8 think that they had evidence that would suggest that?
9 And they said, no.

10 **Q Who did you talk to at the US Attorney's**
11 **office?**

12 A It would've been -- I can't remember if Zach
13 Fardon was the US Attorney at the time or John Lausch,
14 but whichever one of them was in charge, I would've
15 reached out to that person.

16 **Q Did you talk directly to the US Attorney at**
17 **the time?**

18 A Yes.

19 **Q When did you make that -- was it a call or a**
20 **letter or --**

21 A No, it was a phone call.

22 **Q And about what time period did you make that**
23 **call?**

24 A It would've been around the time we received
25 those documents.

1 **Q November 2017?**

2 A Yes.

3 **Q Is it a call that had been set up by, like, a**
4 **staff member or did you just pick up the phone and call?**

5 A No, we had personal relationships, so I
6 would've just picked up the phone and called.

7 **Q About how long was the conversation or**
8 **conversations?**

9 A My best recollection, maybe 10 minutes or so.

10 **Q Was it just one phone call?**

11 A Phone call for me asking if there was anything
12 I should be concerned with, and then the phone -- the
13 return call saying no.

14 **Q So it wasn't like you called, they said**
15 **immediately no. They looked into it.**

16 A No, they looked -- they -- I'm going to
17 assume they looked into it because they -- it was a few
18 days before both of them got back to me.

19 **Q Who did you talk to at the FBI?**

20 A It would've been the SAC. Jeff Sallette.

21 **Q I'm sorry. Could you spell that last name?**

22 A S-A-L-L-E-T-T-E, I believe. He might get me
23 if I misspell his name.

24 **Q Jeff Sallette, though?**

25 A Yes.

1 **Q Okay.**

2 **A To the best of my knowledge.**

3 **Q He's the special agent in charge of the**
4 **Chicago office at the time?**

5 **A Correct.**

6 **Q Was it the same process? You just picked up**
7 **the phone, called and he called you back later?**

8 **A Correct.**

9 **Q And what specifically did you ask either**
10 **Fardon or Lausch, and then Sallette?**

11 **A I don't remember specifically how the**
12 **conversation went, but I would have said, "Listen,**
13 **I have these officers that can no longer testify at**
14 **court that were involved in the Watts case. If there's**
15 **any reason I should have a concern about any criminal**
16 **activity or any evidence that might come forward later,**
17 **that would suggest they shouldn't be on the street.**
18 **You don't have to share it with me if you can't, but at**
19 **the very least, I need to know so that I can relieve**
20 **them of their police powers if that's appropriate."**

21 **Q Did you just ask them about criminal activity?**

22 **A Any activity that would suggest relieving them**
23 **of their police powers.**

24 **Q Did you give them any guidelines about what**
25 **activity would warrant relieving them of police powers?**

1 A No.

2 Q In your mind, what types of activity would you
3 have been looking for that would've justified relieving
4 those officers of their police powers?

5 MR. BURNS: Objection to form of question.

6 MS. WEST: Join.

7 A It wouldn't have been anything specifically,
8 but if there's a criminal investigation, it would be
9 criminal allegations, I would imagine. So, I -- there
10 was nothing that specifically, because I didn't want to
11 taint that response from them. I just wanted to know if
12 there was something that I should be concerned about.

13 Q Did you go back and ask anyone in Internal
14 Affairs the same question?

15 A So when you say same question, was there
16 anything that CPD should be concerned with?

17 Q Yeah. So, did you go back to -- it was a
18 joint investigation, right? So, I -- let me back up a
19 sec. I was making an assumption but tell me if I'm
20 right about this. You called the FBI and the US
21 Attorney's office because you knew they did a joint
22 investigation into, at least Watts and Mohammad, right?

23 A Correct.

24 Q And you are aware that, and would've, at a
25 minimum included looking at other officers' activities?

1 A Correct.

2 Q That's the reason you called them to ask if
3 there was anything they knew about the other officers
4 that would warrant relieving them of police powers,
5 right?

6 A Correct.

7 Q And the joint investigation included the
8 Chicago Police Department?

9 A Correct.

10 Q So did you go back and talk to the division or
11 divisions at CPD that were involved in the joint
12 investigation?

13 A Yeah. I spoke to them prior to reaching out
14 to the US Attorney and the FBI.

15 Q Okay. Who did you speak to at the CPD before
16 you reached out to the FBI and the US Attorney?

17 A I would have asked the General Counsel if she
18 had any information. And I don't recall if Eddie Welch
19 or Keith Callaway were the chiefs, both of them at
20 different times were Chiefs of Internal Affairs, but
21 whoever the Chief was at the time, I would have inquired
22 to that person if there was something there that we had
23 internally that would suggest relieving them of their
24 police powers.

25 Q And were those -- did you get no answer for

1 those two?

2 A Correct. There was nothing that we had that I
3 was aware of.

4 Q What was the process for talking to the Chief
5 of Internal Affairs and the General Counsel?

6 A I would just pick up the phone and call them
7 to my office and ask them.

8 Q And then did they go back -- and did you
9 expect them to go back and look at files and talk to
10 people, do some sort of investigation?

11 A Yes. To the best of my recollection, none of
12 them answered immediately. They went back to their
13 respective offices, and I'm going to assume they looked
14 into it and came back and told me that we didn't have
15 anything.

16 Q Would there be any written record of any of
17 these meetings?

18 A No.

19 Q No To-From memos or anything like that?

20 A No.

21 Q You didn't ask them to memorialize the fact
22 that they went and looked, and didn't find anything to
23 justify relieving the officers of their police powers?

24 A No.

25 Q Why did you not have it written down?

1 MR. BURNS: Objection to form of the question.

2 A Again, this was an investigation spearheaded
3 by the federal government. So, to the best of my
4 knowledge, they would have had the bulk of anything, and
5 they would've shared it with us. Because they didn't
6 in -- in my opinion, there wouldn't have been much for
7 us to memorialize. And we have to remember, this was
8 2016, 2017. That investigation started in 2004, 2005.
9 So, I wouldn't have thought it would've taken 15 years
10 to figure that out. So, if we would have had something,
11 I would've -- a reasonable person -- reasonable person
12 would assume we should have it already.

13 Q Or they missed it, right?

14 MR. BURNS: Objection. Argumentative. .

15 MR. BATTLE: Argumentative.

16 MR. RAUSCHER: It's not that argumentative.

17 MR. BATTLE: Jinx.

18 THE WITNESS: But it's always a possibility.

19 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

20 Q Have you been following along any of the
21 recent press coverage about the Watts cases or the
22 exonerations?

23 A No. Since I left CPD, I try to concentrate on
24 other things.

25 Q If the Chief of Internal Affairs would've come

1 back to you and said, "You know what? This person
2 wasn't -- this officer wasn't charged, but there's an
3 officer who said that he was in two places at the same
4 time then and he had been lying about it." Would you
5 have said, "We should relieve that officer of police
6 powers?"

7 MR. BURNS: Objection.

8 MS. WEST: Objection, incomplete hypothetical.

9 MR. BATTLE: Joined.

10 MR. BURNS: I guess we're all joining in.

11 MR. BATTLE: Sorry, Madam Court Reporter.

12 THE WITNESS: I would've said we have to
13 investigate it. You know, you -- I never took
14 relieving police officers of their police powers
15 lightly, nor did I take taking them off the street
16 lightly, You know? So, if allegations were made, you
17 know, I think in America, our judicial system is set
18 up where you're innocent until proven guilty. We
19 have a collective bargaining agreement that we have
20 to abide by. So, officers deserve due process, just
21 like anyone else. So, if an allegation is made, we
22 have a duty to investigate it. And at the end of
23 that investigation, if the results are proven, then
24 that officer should be disciplined in whichever way
25 is appropriate.

1 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

2 Q So even if the officer would've said, "You
3 know what, I lied about this arrest, I couldn't have
4 been -- said I was in two places at once, but obviously
5 I couldn't have been." You still would've said "Let's
6 investigate, see how it plays out."

7 MR. BATTLE: Same objection.

8 MS. WEST: Join.

9 MR. BURNS: Form. Incomplete hypothetical.

10 THE WITNESS: So, if an officer came and
11 said, "I lied about something," then that's what we
12 call a Rule 14. So, you still have to do the
13 investigation, but that officer would've been --
14 would have been removed from the street.

15 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

16 Q Would you have had to do an investigation
17 before you strip that officer of their police powers?

18 A Again --

19 MR. BURNS: Objection. Again, incomplete
20 hypothetical.

21 A -- you're asking me a hypothetical. So again,
22 hypothetically, if an officer came and said, "I lied
23 about this arrest, blah, blah, blah," then we would do
24 the investigation. But because he's admitting upfront
25 that he lied about an arrest or whatever the details of

1 that arrest were, then we could immediately remove that
2 person, because they told us that. It's not an
3 allegation. That particular officer is saying he did
4 this or that.

5 **Q If you would've known that CPD had video**
6 **evidence of Kallat Mohammad taking bribes back in 2008,**
7 **would that have changed your view that the investigation**
8 **was taken away from CPD?**

9 MR. BURNS: Objection. Form of the question.

10 A You mean if CPD had video of that? Like I
11 said, if I said taken away, I might have misspoken,
12 but if I saw -- not just as superintendent, as a
13 supervisor, if I saw a video of one of our officers
14 taking money, then I would -- I would see if --
15 certainly, a superintendent, I would remove that officer
16 from the street immediately and relieve them of their
17 police powers.

18 **Q Even if there was a joint investigation going**
19 **on at the time?**

20 A Okay. So, we're talking about different
21 things.

22 **Q Okay.**

23 A If there is a joint investigation with another
24 agency, especially a federal government, then no, I
25 wouldn't have. I would consult with them to see which

1 way they want us to go with that. Because sometimes you
2 may leave. I mean, if it's not imminent life or death
3 situations, the agency might want you to leave them out
4 there to gather further information, you know? So, it
5 just depends on the situation.

6 **Q I don't know if you can answer this, but do**
7 **you know how many years you would've been willing to**
8 **wait as superintendent for that investigation to**
9 **conclude after there's video evidence of an officer**
10 **taking bribes?**

11 MR. BATTLE: Objection, speculation. Answer if
12 you can.

13 A Yeah, I -- I'd be guessing, you know, because
14 some federal investigations take six months, some take
15 two years, you know. So, it depended on what the
16 investigation entailed. So, you know, all those
17 investigations are different. So, it's -- it is hard to
18 answer that question.

19 **Q Does four years seem too long as a former**
20 **superintendent to let someone stay on the street after**
21 **taking bribes?**

22 MR. BATTLE: Same objection.

23 MR. BURNS: Joined.

24 A So as a former superintendent, I would want
25 that investigation. If I had that knowledge at the

1 time, I would want that investigation concluded as
2 quickly as we could.

3 Q Do you have any recollection of hitting
4 questions and talking to the -- actually, you know what,
5 I'm sorry. Before I move on, we talked about how you
6 would've been briefed to give the information that we
7 just talked about, about the joint investigation.
8 Who would've been responsible for those briefings at the
9 time?

10 A So if I was briefed about an investigation
11 like that, I'm sure General Counsel would've been
12 involved, Chief of Internal Affairs, and the director of
13 media relations would've been involved.

14 Q Do you have any recollection of getting asked
15 about Al Jones's promotion?

16 A Not specifically, but I may have been asked
17 about his promotion, but I'd be guessing. I can't
18 recall.

19 Q Or about -- well, let me -- maybe you can take
20 a look at Exhibit 8. It's PL -- starts PL Joint 048190.

21 (EXHIBIT 8 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION)

22 MR. BATTLE: Give me one second.

23 MR. RAUSCHER: That's okay.

24 MR. KOSOKO: Scott, which one is this?

25 MR. RAUSCHER: Exhibit 8.

1 MR. KOSOKO: 8? Thank you.

2 THE WITNESS: Okay. You want me to read
3 this?

4 MR. RAUSCHER: No, you can. Or I've
5 highlighted a couple parts that are a little bit
6 closer to what they asked you about. So, if you
7 want to just look at those. That's fine with me
8 also.

9 THE WITNESS: Okay.

10 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

11 Q Did you get a chance to look at that?

12 A Yes.

13 Q So, one of the things you said here is "that
14 CPD has an obligation to be accountable for everything.
15 So, things that we should go back and take a look at, we
16 will." And that was in the context of an article about
17 Al Jones being promoted.

18 MR. BATTLE: Are you asking him if he said it
19 or are you asking him what the article said?

20 MR. RAUSCHER: I'm -- I'm asking both,
21 I guess.

22 MR. BATTLE: Okay.

23 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

24 Q You see it in the article, and did you say it?

25 A I see it in the article. Yes. Did I say

1 this? I don't recall. I may have.

2 Q Do you have any reason to doubt that you said
3 it?

4 A No.

5 Q Do you know Chip Mitchell?

6 A Yeah. I remember him.

7 Q Through his job. Do you know Patrick Smith
8 through Easy?

9 A I don't recall him. I do recall Chip
10 Mitchell, but I don't recall.

11 Q In your experience, did Chip Mitchell
12 accurately quote you when he reported stories?

13 A In my experience, I think he was fair. So

14 Q To your knowledge, he wasn't misquoting you?

15 A Not to my knowledge.

16 Q Did you go back and look at Al Jones'
17 promotion?

18 MR. BATTLE: Because you're talking about at
19 some point after this article?

20 Q So right. This article is dated January 6,
21 2017.

22 A Okay.

23 Q See that on the front?

24 A Yes.

25 Q At any time after January 6, 2017, did you go

1 back and look at Al Jones's promotion?

2 A When you say look at it, what do you mean?

3 Q Well, you said, "Any -- things that we should
4 go back and take a look at, we will." And I'm wondering
5 if you did that.

6 A So I think first we have to figure out what I
7 meant when I said "things." So, promotion wouldn't be
8 one of them, because once an officer is promoted, that's
9 done. That's a done deal. Whether it's through testing
10 procedure or merit promotion, there -- there's nothing
11 we can do to go back and take that back, to my
12 knowledge.

13 Q Okay. So, what did you mean when you said,
14 "So things that we should go back and take a look at,
15 we will?"

16 A So what I meant by that, to the best of my
17 recollection, would have been misconduct issues.

18 Q By Jones, by --

19 A Anyone.

20 Q okay. Were there any specific misconduct
21 issues that you went and looked at after January 6,
22 2017, or that you directed others to look at?

23 A I don't remember specifics. However, I do
24 recall the Chief of Internal Affairs. If investigations
25 have been over five years or more, I, as the

1 superintendent have to -- had to give permission for the
2 Internal Affairs division to go back, or COPA for that
3 matter, to go back and reopen those investigations. So
4 anytime they brought things to my attention involving
5 those things, I generally gave approval to go back and
6 look at it.

7 **Q Do you recall ever saying no to that type of**
8 **request?**

9 A No, I don't.

10 **Q And by that type of request, I mean, to open**
11 **an investigation for something dating back more than**
12 **five years.**

13 A Yes. No, I don't recall.

14 **Q So I was going to ask what the process is for**
15 **deciding whether to approve it, but is the process you**
16 **just approved them, basically?**

17 A No. So what would happen is they
18 would -- they would come to me with an old
19 investigation, and they would brief me on reasons that
20 we may want to go back and take another look at it.
21 And once they did that, then I would give approval.

22 **Q Do you recall ever being asked to -- or do you**
23 **recall which specific investigations relating to the**
24 **Watts team you were asked to let COPA or Internal**
25 **Affairs reopen?**

1 A No.

2 Q Did you ever -- do you recall ever hearing
3 whatever happened with any of the investigations into
4 the Watts team that you have been asked to reopen?

5 A To the best of my recollection, I was never
6 given any information in furtherance that would
7 substantiate relieving any of those officers of their
8 police powers.

9 Q Do you recall getting any types of updates on
10 the investigations -- of COPA or Internal Affairs
11 investigations?

12 A No. I just recall that I never received
13 anything. I may have gotten briefed, but I don't recall
14 ever getting anything that justified relieving them of
15 their police powers.

16 MR. BURNS: Scott, are you saying there was an
17 IAB investigation?

18 MR. RAUSCHER: No. He said it. He said that.
19 I think he said he went to Internal Affairs and
20 talked to them.

21 MR. BURNS: He asked for information, but
22 you're saying there was an investigation.

23 MR. RAUSCHER: I'm asking. I'm not trying to
24 make a representation.

25 MR. BURNS: Okay. I just want to be clear on

1 that.

2 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

3 Q Do you know whether there was any Internal
4 Affairs investigation into the Watts crew while you were
5 superintendent?

6 A I don't. I'm not sure. I'd be guessing.

7 Q Could you take a look at Exhibit 9, please.
8 That starts COPA Watts 015996.

9 (EXHIBIT 9 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION)

10 A Okay.

11 Q You have a chance to look over this exhibit?

12 A The front page or the entire thing?

13 Q Well, tell me first what the front page is.

14 A The front page is the Chief of Internal
15 Affairs asking me for permission to reopen the
16 investigation that was more than five years old.

17 Q And then you -- there's a stamped
18 approved -- or not stamped, but there's a signature
19 under approved that's looks like your signature.

20 A Correct.

21 Q Do you hand sign that?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Personally?

24 A Yes.

25 Q Okay. Would you have had a conversation with

1 **Eddie Welch as the Chief of Internal Affairs at the**
2 **time?**

3 A Correct.

4 **Q Would you have had a conversation with Eddie**
5 **Welch before you signed approving this?**

6 A Yes.

7 **Q Do you remember having that conversation with**
8 **him?**

9 A No.

10 **Q What would that conversation typically look**
11 **like?**

12 A It would typically look like the Chief of
13 Internal Affairs, whomever that person would be, giving
14 me -- briefing me on why we should reopen that
15 investigation.

16 **Q Then can you look at the next few pages of**
17 **this exhibit?**

18 A Okay.

19 **Q What's the -- so that second page and beyond,**
20 **is an April 2, 2017 letter from Sharon Fairly to you; is**
21 **that right?**

22 MR. BATTLE: It's in August. You said April,
23 Scott.

24 MR. RAUSCHER: August.

25 MR. BURNS: (Inaudible).

BY MR. RAUSCHER:

Q Yeah, yeah. That's it. All right. Let's try again. Second page and beyond of that Exhibit Number 9 is an August 2, 2017, letter from Sharon Fairly to you; is that correct?

A Correct.

Q And she at the time was the head of IPRA?

A Correct.

Q What's your understanding of what she's asking in this letter?

A Basically, she's stating concerns about the officers that work with Sergeant Watts and Kallat Mohammad. And having concerns about their involvement in past activities. And she's asking me, because the case is over five years old, I would have to give permission for IPRA to investigate it.

Q And is your response to the November 16, 2017 letter giving approval to her in her letter? She -- are you giving approval in that, or is there some other process to approve IPRA's request?

MR. BURNS: Objection to form.

A I'm trying to understand what you're asking me. So are you asking me --

Q Well, let me ask you this. How did you respond to this? To the August 2, 2017, letter?

1 A So if I'm not mistaken, this 16 November
2 letter is giving authorization to both to proceed with
3 the investigation.

4 **Q Is that normally how this process would work?**

5 A To the best of my recollection.

6 **Q IPRA would write a letter to you and then**
7 **Internal Affairs would write a cover letter to you about**
8 **the IPRA letter?**

9 A That's because we have to remember, or maybe
10 you don't know that IPRA and Internal Affairs typically
11 work together in these types of investigations. So, I
12 can't say factually, but I can assume that the Chief of
13 Internal Affairs and Sharon Fairly, that whoever the
14 chief of IPRA was, had discussed it before it came to
15 me. And so yes. Typically, that's how it would go.

16 **Q And the -- if you look at the first page of**
17 **this exhibit, second sentence, which is also the last**
18 **sentence in the first paragraph, says, "A verbal**
19 **acknowledgement was given to COPA to proceed with the**
20 **related attached investigations."**

21 A Yes.

22 **Q Who gave that verbal acknowledgement?**

23 A So I don't remember specifically, but in
24 general, the Chief of Internal Affairs. Or, I may have
25 told her to go ahead with it. So, it could have went

1 either way.

2 **Q** Did the Chief of Internal Affairs have the
3 authority to approve IPRA doing investigations that
4 related to incidents more than five years old?

5 A No, he would've had to come to me to ask -- to
6 get permission to give it to him.

7 **Q** Okay. So regardless of who gave -- who
8 relayed the acknowledgment to IPRA, you're the one who
9 had to sign off on it?

10 A Correct.

11 **Q** And would there have been a written
12 memorialization of your verbal approval at any time
13 before this November 16, 2017 letter?

14 A Probably not of the verbal approval.
15 No, I doubt it.

16 **Q** Do you know why there was a delay from August
17 2nd to November 16th, to give approval for this
18 investigation?

19 MR. BURNS: Objection.

20 MR. BATTLE: Object to the form regarding
21 delay. Go ahead, Eddie.

22 A No. I don't.

23 **Q** Is that an unusually long period of time to
24 wait for approval?

25 MR. BURNS: Objection. Form.

1 A No, not particularly.

2 Q Do you know whether Internal Affairs worked
3 with IPRA or Copra on any -- COPA on any Watts related
4 investigations while you were superintendent?

5 A No, I don't. I don't.

6 Q Do you recall ever talking to Eddie Welch
7 about any Watts team related investigations?

8 A Well, I'm sure I spoke to him. You know, that
9 bears out by the fact that he wrote this letter to me.
10 So, I'm sure we had some conversation about it.

11 Q And you don't remember anything specifically?

12 A No. The only thing I can tell you that I know
13 factually, is that nothing was ever given to me to
14 substantiate relieving them of their police powers.

15 Q Do you know who Ben Baker, Arisa Glen, or
16 Lionel White are?

17 A No.

18 Q Do any of those names sound familiar to you?

19 A No.

20 Q You remember there was a time when COPA came
21 to you and asked you to relieve certain officers of
22 their police powers?

23 MR. BATTLE: And of course you're talking about
24 relating to this particular case?

25 MR. RAUSCHER: Yes.

MR. BATTLE: Okay.

THE WITNESS: Because I was going to say, they were routinely asked.

MR. BATTLE: He's speaking particularly about this particular case.

THE WITNESS: So, this case?

MR. BATTLE: Yes. Go ahead, Scott.

BY MR. RAUSCHER:

Q Do you recall -- no, that's fine.

Do you recall a time when COPA came to you and asked you to relieve the police powers of certain Watts team members?

A I recall them requesting that, yes.

Q What do you recall about that request from COPA?

A That I believe they sent some documentation asking for those officers to be relieved of their police powers.

Q Do you remember any of the details or the substance of the allegations against those officers?

A No.

Q When you say it -- I don't want to get into details about other officers, but you said COPA would routinely ask you to relieve police powers. How frequently did you mean?

1 A They might ask once a month. You know, once
2 every month or every couple months for a particular
3 officer to be relieved of their police powers.

4 **Q And was there a certain procedure in place in**
5 **your office to respond to those requests from COPA?**

6 MR. BURNS: Objection to the form.

7 MR. BATTLE: I think you're going a little bit
8 outside the scope of what we're --.

9 MR. RAUSCHER: I'm not asking --

10 MR. BATTLE: And if you're asking about these
11 guys --

12 MR. RAUSCHER: Well, as it relates. I mean,
13 these guys -- I'm just asking generally. Because
14 he got it for these guys, so I guess I could ask
15 it --

16 MR. BATTLE: For these guys. Yeah. If they
17 could --

18 MR. RAUSCHER: If you want me to say, "Did you
19 follow your procedure for these guys?" That's-- I
20 can get that at the same place.

21 MR. BATTLE: I would rather do it that way to
22 make it the same question.

23 MR. RAUSCHER: That's fine.

24 MR. BATTLE: Thank you.

25 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

1 **Q** Can you take a look at Exhibit 2, which is,
2 your Counsel, I think can hand it to you, it starts City
3 **DG033667.**

4 (EXHIBIT 2 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION)

5 THE WITNESS: Hold on a sec.

6 MR. BATTLE: This one.

7 THE WITNESS: Is that Exhibit 2?

8 MR. BATTLE: Yeah, yeah..

9 MR. RAUSCHER: It's hard copy.

10 MR. BATTLE: I think we got something. Do you
11 see it?

12 THE WITNESS: Yeah, yeah, I do. The one
13 from Sidney Roberts?

14 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

15 **Q** Yup.

16 A Okay.

17 **Q** Or to Sidney Roberts, I guess.

18 MR. BATTLE: Right, to Sidney Roberts, okay.

19 A Okay.

20 **Q** Did you see -- maybe take a look, in addition
21 to the first page of the request from Sidney Roberts
22 that I think led to this response by you. So, it's a
23 few pages of very similar letters.

24 A Was that dated 16 January 2019?

25 **Q** So there's a February 1 -- January -- February

1, 2019. January 16 and then January 17.

A Double-sided then?

Q Yeah, sorry. They're double-sided.

MR. BURNS: Where do you see the one, you're saying, Scott?

MR. RAUSCHER: First one is February 1st. They just go in order.

MR. BURNS: Yeah. February 1st.

MR. RAUSCHER: January 16 and January 17. All 2019.

MR. BATTLE: So, he wants you to take a look at this one. And then the next couple.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

MR. BATTLE: The next three.

MR. RAUSCHER: Four.

MR. BATTLE: Four. Okay, so they're all basically saying the same?

MR. BURNS: Are they the same? Is that what you're --

THE WITNESS: Basically, they're all saying basically the same thing.

BY MR. RAUSCHER:

Q So do you recall getting those letters and then sending the response that is the first page of this exhibit?

1 A I don't recall specifically getting the
2 letters. I'm sure I did. Along with the response.
3 But yeah, I have a broad recollection of that.

4 **Q And in the response, you asked for information**
5 **about the progress of COPA's investigation so that you**
6 **could make a determination about whether to relieve the**
7 **officers of their police powers; is that right?**

8 A Yes.

9 **Q Was that your normal procedure to respond to**
10 **COPA requests to relieve officers of their police power?**

11 A Yes. If -- again, relieving officers of
12 their police powers is a job action and not to be taken
13 lightly. So I had no problems doing that if there was
14 documentation. Some -- something that would
15 substantiate a job action against them. So, I was
16 simply asking, without telling me the details of the
17 entire investigation, but I need something concrete in
18 order to justify relieving them of their police powers.

19 **Q And was one of the things you were asking for**
20 **here, at least implicitly, a record of what the officer**
21 **had testified to?**

22 A I was asking for any --

23 **Q I mean -- I'm sorry.**

24 A I was asking for anything that would
25 substantiate relieving them of their police power.

1 So for example, if they had something that was proven to
2 be false testimony, then they could have submitted that,
3 you know? Because that would've been a rule 14
4 violation in police policy. So, I was just asking for
5 anything to substantiate me relieving them of their
6 police powers.

7 **Q Did you write this? Did you type up this**
8 **letter yourself**

9 A Typically, no.

10 **Q Who would've been responsible for typing up a**
11 **letter like this one?**

12 A I would guess General Counsel would've typed
13 this up.

14 **Q And would you have reviewed it before it went**
15 **out the door?**

16 A Yes. Because that's not a stamp signature.
17 That's my actual, handwritten signature. So, I would've
18 read it before it went out. Yes.

19 **Q Did you ever get a response from COPA to this**
20 **letter?**

21 A Not that I can recall. No, I didn't.

22 **Q Were you surprised by that?**

23 A Yes. Typically, if they wanted me to relieve
24 an officer of their police powers, they would've told me
25 some sustainable reason to do it. And in this

1 instance, I didn't get it.

2 Q The report from log 1087742 was recently
3 released to the public. Have you seen that?

4 A Wait, say that again?

5 Q So the -- there's a log number 10877442.
6 That's one of the things that Sidney Roberts is asking
7 about.

8 A Uh-huh.

9 Q That report was recently released and got some
10 media coverage. Have you seen any of that coverage or
11 read the report?

12 A No.

13 Q Would you have -- were you authorized to see
14 COPA documents when you were the superintendent?

15 A No.

16 Q So they -- they had to -- they could share
17 things with you, but you didn't have the right to say,
18 "Give me X, Y, and Z reports from this investigation?"

19 A No, they were an independent agency.
20 So -- and typically if they wanted me to relieve someone
21 of their police powers, for example, they would give me
22 something regarding that investigation that will
23 substantiate that. But I had no authority to just go in
24 there and look at their investigations.

25 Q When you say they're an independent agency,

1 independent of who?

2 A The police department.

3 Q Meaning, they don't report to you, as
4 superintendent?

5 A Correct.

6 Q Did you have a good working relationship with
7 Sidney Roberts?

8 A In my estimation, yes.

9 Q And did you pick up the phone or consider
10 picking up the phone and calling and saying, "Are you
11 going to get me more information about this?"

12 A To the best of my recollection, I didn't call
13 her to ask her that information. I -- listen -- listen.
14 My job was to be transparent about what CPD did in terms
15 of investigations. Because that was at the crux of a
16 lot of the reason I became superintendent. So, I would
17 be careful not to do anything that I thought might taint
18 that. So going through it in this manner was typically
19 the way I did it. I don't recall ever calling her
20 saying, "Give me more than --". I just don't recall it.

21 Q When you say be transparent, you mean -- what
22 do you mean by that?

23 A So what I mean by that is not to give the
24 appearance that we're trying to steer COPA's
25 investigation in one way or another. They were

1 independent for a reason. Because in a lot of
2 instances, especially when you start talking about
3 misconduct, you do need an independent agency to look at
4 those things.

5 **Q Do you recall talking to -- do you know who**
6 **Keith Callaway is?**

7 A Yes.

8 **Q And who was -- do you know what Keith**
9 **Callaway's job was in the winter of 2019?**

10 A I believe he was the Chief of Internal Affairs
11 at the time.

12 **Q Do you recall talking to Keith Callaway about**
13 **COPA's request to relieve the officers of police power?**

14 A Not specifically, no.

15 **Q Is he someone who you would have typically**
16 **talked about it with? Talked about that type of request**
17 **with, around that time?**

18 A Yes. If it was an investigation involving
19 COPA and the relief of police powers him -- if he -- him
20 being the Chief of Internal Affairs, yeah, that's
21 absolutely who I would have spoken to.

22 **Q And why would you have spoken to the Chief of**
23 **Internal Affairs about a request by COPA to relieve an**
24 **officer of police powers?**

25 A Because typically, COPA and Internal Affairs

1 communicated -- communicated a lot. So, he might have
2 information in -- in those communications.

3 Q So is it safe to assume that if he didn't
4 relieve the officers of police power at that time, he
5 didn't have any additional information that you -- that
6 you didn't have?

7 MR. BATTLE: Objection. Form of the question.

8 MR. RAUSCHER: That was not a good question.

9 Agree with that.

10 MR. BATTLE: No worries.

11 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

12 Q I heard it like halfway through. Is it safe
13 to assume that Keith Callaway didn't give you any
14 information, any substantive information about the
15 investigation in February or January of 2019?

16 A Yes. It's safe to assume that he didn't give
17 me anything that would justify relieving him of police
18 powers. Yes.

19 Q If he would have, you would've done it,
20 presumably?

21 A Yes.

22 Q And would -- if you would've gotten that type
23 of information from him, it would've been memorialized
24 more, right?

25 A Correct.

1 Q And would you have shared that information
2 with COPA?

3 A COPA was conducting the investigation,
4 so they would've shared that with us.

5 Q You would've -- if you would've gotten
6 something from Keith Callaway, COPA would've already
7 known it?

8 A Correct.

9 Q Do you think that in your time at CPD,
10 there -- there was a code of silence?

11 A When you say code of silence, what do you mean
12 by that?

13 Q Is that a -- have you ever used the phrase
14 code of silence?

15 A Not me personally.

16 Q You've heard other people talk about it?

17 A Yes.

18 Q And you've heard Mayor Emanuel, obviously talk
19 about it, right?

20 A Yes.

21 Q You understand, generally, what people mean
22 when they say code of silence?

23 A I think different people have different
24 definitions when they say code of silence. I've never
25 seen anything written down that generally people would

1 say, "This is the code of silence." That's why I asked
2 the question, when we talk about code of silence, what
3 are we exactly talking about?

4 **Q What are some of the different definitions**
5 **that you've heard used for code of silence?**

6 A So I've heard people say code of silence means
7 when police officers ignore misconduct, or lie about
8 misconduct, or, you know, those types of things, so

9 **Q So all of the definitions are generally about**
10 **-- they generally mean that, right? Lying, ignore**
11 **things, cover things up.**

12 A I wouldn't agree with that.

13 **Q The Department of Justice issued a pretty big**
14 **report while you were superintendent, right?**

15 A Yes.

16 **Q And you read that report?**

17 A Yes.

18 **Q And there were sections in that report that**
19 **talk about the code of silence?**

20 A Yes.

21 **Q Do you agree with any of the conclusions the**
22 **Department of Justice reached about the code of silence?**

23 A I don't remember the specifics now. This is
24 five years later. However, I will say that I don't know
25 what they're basing their conclusion on, so it would be

1 hard for me to agree or disagree with it.

2 **Q What do you mean you don't know what they're**
3 **basing their conclusion on?**

4 A I don't know where they got the information
5 to determine there was a code of silence within CPD.
6 What I can tell you is in my 31 years, I never observed
7 officers getting together saying we're going to do a
8 code of silence, or we're going to ignore what just
9 happened, or lie for an officer who conducted an
10 egregious act. So, I don't know what they based their
11 conclusion on. I don't have that -- I never had that
12 information.

13 **Q Did you ever observe things or hear things**
14 **that may have not been as expressed as officers getting**
15 **together and verbally saying, "We're going to cover this**
16 **up." But it was more complicit of officers maybe doing**
17 **things or turning a blind eye to a wrongdoing?**

18 A Have I ever seen that? Or heard officers
19 talking about that? No.

20 **Q How do you explain incidents over the years,**
21 **where that has happened? Where officers have lied,**
22 **have covered things up for other officers?**

23 MR. BATTLE: Objection, speculation.

24 MR. BURNS: Foundation. Join.

25 A It'd be difficult me to -- for me to explain

1 why an officer would do something like that. I'd be
2 guessing. I really couldn't tell you. I -- you know,
3 me personally, there's no gun worth me taking the chance
4 of going to prison. You don't get extra money for
5 recovering one gun as opposed to 10 guns, so it'd be
6 difficult for me to explain why a particular officer
7 would do something like that.

8 **Q You don't think there's a culture at Chicago**
9 **Police Department in your 31 years, or any period during**
10 **that 31 years that allowed coverups to happen?**

11 MR. BATTLE: Objection.

12 **Q Encouraged coverups?**

13 MR. BATTLE: Sorry, object to foundation.

14 MR. BURNS: Join. Form.

15 A Is there a -- no. No, I don't think there's a
16 culture that allows that. I think if people do that,
17 like in any organization, I think you have people that
18 violate policies, conduct egregious behavior. I don't
19 think that you can say the way the general order is
20 written allows that to happen. I just think it's an
21 individual choice when people do commit acts like that.
22 I think those are just individual choices.

23 **Q Have you ever heard of officers being demoted**
24 **or given less desirable jobs or being threatened, or**
25 **having any repercussions for trying to expose**

1 **wrongdoing?**

2 A Trying to --

3 MR. BATTLE: Trying to expose wrongdoing?

4 MR. RAUSCHER: Yeah. By other officers.

5 MR. BATTLE: Do you understand the question?

6 THE WITNESS: Yes. I think you -- correct
7 me if I'm wrong, I think you're asking me, did the
8 department, as a whole, retaliate against officers
9 if they tried to expose wrongdoing?

10 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

11 Q Not necessarily the -- well, yes. But also,
12 even individuals. Did you ever hear of whistleblowers
13 getting some form of retaliation?

14 A Not -- not personally. No.

15 Q I mean, I don't mean have you ever personally
16 observed it happen? Have you ever heard of that
17 happening at CPD?

18 A I know there have been media reports or
19 lawsuits regarding stuff like that. So that answer
20 would be yes.

21 Q And did you know that while you were
22 superintendent?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Did you do anything to investigate whether any
25 of those types of allegations by whistleblowers were

1 true? That people had been retaliated against for
2 trying to expose internal wrongdoing?

3 A When I heard about it, there was already an
4 investigation. I would hear about it in the news.
5 So whatever entity was investigating it, was the entity
6 that was investigating it.

7 Q And did -- you never thought as
8 superintendent, "Maybe this is a problem that I just
9 wasn't aware of?"

10 MR. BURNS: Objection. Form.

11 MR. BATTLE: Join.

12 A So when you said -- you mean retaliation
13 against whistleblowers?

14 Q Yeah.

15 A No.

16 Q And when you -- when you read the --
17 did -- you read the DOJ report while you were
18 superintendent?

19 A Yes.

20 Q And when you read that report, did you think,
21 "I'd better look into this code of silence issue?"

22 A When I read the report, I thought
23 in general we should look at some of the things which
24 would -- which gave rise to the consent decree.
25 So, with the provisions of the consent decree,

1 I was comfortable that if things of that nature were
2 occurring, we had set up provisions to allow officers to
3 be able to report misconduct. For example, we started
4 an 800 number to allow officers to anonymously report
5 misconduct.

6 **Q And then what would be the process,**
7 **internally, for the investigation of anonymous**
8 **complaints brought to that 800 number?**

9 A So if my recollection serves me correctly,
10 I believe once we set that anonymous hotline up for
11 officers to be able to report it, we didn't want
12 officers to think that it would be not investigated.
13 So, I believe we routed it to the Inspector General's
14 office. It may not have been COPA, but it was a -- it
15 was an outside agency.

16 **Q Could you hand him the DOJ report, Ken.**
17 **And we can call this Exhibit 17.**

18 (EXHIBIT 17 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION)

19 MR. BATTLE: Okay. Yeah. Yeah. That was the
20 last one, right?

21 MR. RAUSCHER: Yeah. That big one?

22 MR. BATTLE: Yeah.

23 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

24 **Q I'm not going to ask you to read the whole**
25 **thing.**

1 A Thank you.

2 Q I will direct you, just to -- there are a
3 couple -- there are two -- there are a couple parts that
4 talk about a code of silence.

5 A Okay.

6 Q So one is on -- starting at PL Joint 005144.

7 A 5144?

8 Q Yeah, so it's -- it's also Page --

9 A I got it.

10 Q -- 480, if you look at the bottom.

11 A Yeah. I have it.

12 Q And then at 5211, there's another longer
13 discussion. Take a look at -- starting there.

14 MR. BATTLE: 5144, you want to ask him about
15 that? Or you want him to read them both first?

16 MR. RAUSCHER: I need to read them both first.

17 MR. BATTLE: 5144, where are we starting at?
18 Let us know where you want to start?

19 MR. RAUSCHER: It starts at the third and
20 fourth paragraphs.

21 MR. BATTLE: Those cases?

22 MR. RAUSCHER: Those cases. You can start at
23 those cases. It's probably more the next one,
24 but I think they run into each other.

25 THE WITNESS: Okay.

1 MR. BATTLE: How far you want him to go?

2 MR. RAUSCHER: That one's really only a couple
3 of paragraphs. It's more later on.

4 THE WITNESS: Okay. So, 5211, the entire
5 page?

6 MR. RAUSCHER: Yeah. Why don't you read
7 those couple on the first, at 5211, start at the
8 bottom and then go to the next page.

9 MR. BATTLE: Which one you want him to read
10 first?

11 MR. RAUSCHER: That's shorter, so we can start
12 there.

13 THE WITNESS: That 5144?

14 MR. RAUSCHER: Yeah. Sorry, I meant 5144 is
15 only a couple paragraphs.

16 MR. BATTLE: Okay. So we're going those first
17 two paragraphs, that bleeds onto the next page?

18 MR. RAUSCHER: Yeah.

19 MR. BATTLE: All right.

20 THE WITNESS: So, after I read all 5144,
21 you want me to go 5211?

22 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

23 Q Why don't you just -- let's stop after you
24 read that full paragraph that starts on 5145.

25 A Okay. Wait. 5145?

1 Q So 5144, and then it goes over. The --
2 there's a paragraph that starts there and continues.

3 A Okay.

4 Q If it's easier, I've circled mine so you can
5 read my circled version if you want.

6 MR. BATTLE: I think he's with you.

7 MR. RAUSCHER: Okay.

8 MR. BATTLE: Yeah.

9 THE WITNESS: Okay, I'm done with that
10 paragraph.

11 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

12 Q So the -- if you look at that last paragraph,
13 starting on 5144?

14 A Uh-huh.

15 Q You see the second sentence says, "The city,
16 police officers and leadership within CPD and its police
17 officer union acknowledge that a code of silence among
18 Chicago police officers exists, extending to lying and
19 affirmative efforts to conceal evidence."

20 A Yes.

21 Q You see that?

22 A Yes.

23 Q Do you recall reading that when this report
24 was issued?

25 A I don't actually recall reading it. I'm sure

1 I did, because I read the entire thing.

2 **Q Does that strike you as an important finding?**

3 MR. BURNS: Objection. Form.

4 MR. BATTLE: Objection. Form.

5 A Yes. I mean, you know, being a
6 superintendent, that would give me cause for concern.
7 But again, I would ask where did they get that
8 information from? Because I was never personally
9 interviewed to comment on that. So my question to them
10 would be, where did you -- how did you -- where did you
11 base that information?

12 **Q Did you ask that question when you were**
13 **superintendent?**

14 A To the Department of Justice?

15 **Q Yeah.**

16 A No.

17 **Q Why not?**

18 A Because they were done with the report by that
19 time. So it was done and over.

20 **Q If you wanted to know where the -- if you**
21 **wanted to know what's the basis for you finding this,**
22 **could you have picked up the phone and called someone**
23 **over there?**

24 A I don't know if they would've -- just based on
25 my experience with the investigation, I don't know that

1 they would've shared that information.

2 **Q But you didn't -- just to be clear, you didn't**
3 **try to find it?**

4 A Not that I recall. I may have asked that
5 question. I don't recall doing it. I may have.

6 **Q Did you ask anyone in your leadership, whether**
7 **they believed there was a code of silence?**

8 A I'm sure we talked about it after this came
9 out. So yes.

10 **Q And who do you -- who did you talk to**
11 **about -- who did you talk to within your leadership,**
12 **after this report came out, about whether they believe**
13 **there was a code of silence at CPD?**

14 A So after the report came out, I remember
15 having conversations with the executive staff. So that
16 would've been all the chiefs, and the first deputy.
17 And I also recall having conversations with the command
18 staff as a whole to talk about these allegations.
19 Because these are serious allegations if they are
20 founded in fact. You know, so if -- in fact, let's
21 take away the city but if police officers and
22 leadership, as well as the union, thought that that was
23 going on, then we have a problem.

24 **Q And so you explored that with the entire --**
25 **all the chiefs of all the --**

1 A I don't remember specifically, but I'm sure I
2 asked them about it.

3 Q And you remember any of them saying either
4 yes or no, I do believe, or I don't believe this?

5 A No, I don't recall.

6 Q What about the command staff? You talked to
7 the whole command staff about it?

8 A I'm sure I did. In some form or fashion.
9 I don't recall anybody saying specifically they know
10 there's a code of silence. People would often refer to
11 this and say, if it -- that you know, had the same
12 opinion I did, if it did exist, and there was some
13 collusion going on, then we had a responsibility to root
14 it out.

15 Q What did -- so one -- tell me about -- what
16 you -- what is the command staff?

17 A So the command staff is from the rank of
18 commander on up to superintendent. So, it would be --
19 so, you know, those? Commander, deputy chief, chief,
20 first deputy.

21 Q How many people were in the command staff in
22 January 2017?

23 A I'd be guessing but I would say roughly, maybe
24 75.

25 Q When you say you talked to command staff as a

1 whole about this, you mean you had a meeting with all of
2 the command staff at that meeting and you brought it up?

3 A Correct.

4 Q And when I say you brought it up, I mean, you
5 brought up the statement by DOJ that leadership within
6 CPD and its police officer union acknowledge that
7 there's a code of silence?

8 A I may not have said it in that exact way,
9 but I'm sure that we talked about code of silence.

10 Q And what are you -- why are you sure you
11 talked about code of silence.

12 A Because that would've been something that was
13 concerning to me, because if my -- when I took over as
14 superintendent, I was determined to change the
15 perception of CPD with the community and build those
16 relationships. So, with them coming out with this
17 report, and just, in full disclosure, I was behind us
18 having a consent decree, because I thought at the end of
19 it, it would make the police department better.
20 So certain aspects of the document was concerning to me.
21 And so that's why I say I'm sure that I spoke to
22 everybody about it. And we had an obligation and a
23 responsibility that if that was going on, it was our job
24 to make sure it stopped.

25 Q Is it fair to say that you think you would've

1 spoken to the command staff because it would've been an
2 important issue discussed, but that you don't have any
3 specific knowledge of actually having that conversation?

4 MR. BATTLE: Object to form.

5 A Yeah, that was some years ago. So, I can't
6 tell you specifically when or where, but I'm fairly
7 certain I spoke to command staff about it.

8 Q When you talked to the chiefs, can you just be
9 more specific about who you're talking about?

10 A So the chiefs of the bureau, so that would've
11 been chief of patrol. Let me back up, first deputy
12 would've been there, chief of patrol, chief of
13 detectives, chief of internal affairs, chief of bureau
14 support services, chief of information services, that
15 might have been all of them. That might have been all
16 of them. And then, of course, my chief of staff
17 would've been there.

18 Q Who was your chief of staff at the time?

19 A At that time, it would've been Robert Boik.

20 Q Boik?.

21 A Boik, B-O-I-K.

22 Q Do you remember -- so was this one meeting
23 with all of the chiefs or were they individual
24 conversations?

25 A It would've been one meeting.

1 Q Did you keep notes or minutes of your meetings
2 with the chiefs?

3 A No.

4 Q And did anybody take notes during those
5 meetings?

6 A No.

7 Q What about with the command staff? Were there
8 notes or minutes of those meetings?

9 A No.

10 Q Would there be any written documentation of
11 the fact that you had meetings with them?

12 A Sometimes there would be and sometimes there
13 wouldn't be.

14 Q How would people get notified of this type of
15 meeting?

16 A Sometimes the bureau chiefs would make phone
17 calls to the deputy chiefs and then the deputy chiefs
18 would reach out. They might do it in conjunction. There
19 may have been sometimes when my secretaries would send
20 out a mass e-mail, but for these, I'm not sure.

21 Q Do you remember anything that was discussed
22 that -- well, let me ask, do you have any specific
23 memory of actually having a meeting with the chiefs
24 where you talked about code of silence after the January
25 2017 DOJ report was released?

1 A I don't have any specific memories. No.

2 Q Do you have any specific memory of asking any
3 of the chiefs whether they believe that there was a code
4 of silence at any point?

5 A No.

6 Q To this day, do you know which people the DOJ
7 report is referring to when it says leadership within
8 CPD acknowledge there's a code of silence?

9 A No.

10 Q Okay. Do you remember anything you did to try
11 to find the answer to that?

12 A As I said before, if -- I may have asked that
13 question, and wasn't provided that information. And I
14 can understand why.

15 Q And why can you understand why someone might
16 not have wanted to tell you that information?

17 A Because I'm sure when they asked certain
18 individuals these questions, because those officers
19 might have been afraid for just anybody to know that
20 they gave those kind of responses, that I'm sure, fairly
21 certain, when DOJ, whomever they talked to, they gave
22 them their word that they would be anonymous.

23 Q Why do you think an officer would be afraid to
24 be identified as someone who believed that there's a
25 code of silence?

1 MR. BATTLE: Objection, speculation. Go ahead.

2 MR. BURNS: Join.

3 A If I had to guess, just because some of the
4 things you asked me about earlier, fear of retaliation.

5 **Q You think that's a reasonable fear for an**
6 **officer to have in 2017?**

7 MR. BATTLE: Same objection.

8 MR. BURNS: Join.

9 A No, I don't.

10 **Q Why do you think it wasn't reasonable for an**
11 **officer in 2017 to fear retaliation for saying that**
12 **there was a code of silence.**

13 A Because in 2017, so by that time I had been
14 superintendent for a while, and I did several focus
15 group meetings around the department. And I just, you
16 know, because I came up through the department from a
17 probationary officer to superintendent, I knew the
18 concerns that officers have, and I made a point to go
19 around saying to them, if you engage in egregious
20 behavior, you will be dealt with accordingly.
21 From separation from the job all the way to facing
22 prison time. And I made that perfectly clear.
23 I also made it perfectly clear in these meetings that if
24 you or anybody you know feel like they need to report
25 misconduct, you don't have to be afraid. That's why we

1 started a hotline number. And I also told them, and I
2 gave my phone number out several times, I said if you
3 feel any certain type of way, you can call me and report
4 misconduct. Because misconduct makes the entire
5 department look bad, not just that individual officer,
6 and our job is to change perception of how the community
7 view the Chicago Police Department. So I made it a
8 point to go around as much as I could to ensure them, if
9 there was misconduct going on, they had an obligation
10 and a duty to report it.

11 **Q Did you do anything to try to change the**
12 **perception that there was a code of silence?**

13 MR. BATTLE: Other than what he's already
14 testified to?

15 **Q Yeah. Other than -- well, did you do anything**
16 **to try to change the perception of the community that**
17 **there was a code silence?**

18 MR. BURNS: Objection. Form.

19 A I don't ever recall using the phrase "code of
20 silence" when I would go talk to community groups, but I
21 made it a point also to let them know if they had
22 knowledge of it, if they knew officers -- because let's
23 face it, officers are friends, family, relatives of the
24 community, they live in the community, so they're part
25 of that community. And I would make a point to let them

1 know if you-all know an officer that's struggling with
2 something like that and wants to report it, I would give
3 them -- now, everybody in Chicago almost had my phone
4 number. But I just wanted to make it clear to everybody
5 that misconduct in the police department can't be
6 tolerated. And so, I would talk to community groups,
7 religious entities, everybody about how transparent I
8 wanted the Chicago Police Department to be, as well as
9 the fact that misconduct just wouldn't be tolerated.

10 **Q Did the department meet your goals for**
11 **transparency while you were superintendent?**

12 A I would say we made a lot of progress,
13 but there was still -- there was always room for
14 improvement, but I was happy with the progress that we
15 were making.

16 **Q What were some of the areas for improvement**
17 **with transparency while you were superintendent?**

18 A I think, well, transparency, some of the
19 improvements that we made was giving community members
20 an avenue to address their concerns, which actually my
21 staff would be angry with me, because I would give them
22 my office number to call if they needed to. Again, that
23 hotline number made it a lot easier for officers to
24 anonymously, you know, report misconduct. So I think
25 that along with me going out, speaking about it, as well

1 as other command staff members, the executive package, I
2 think the rank and file understood that my
3 administration wasn't going to tolerate that.

4 So, I think that those improvements helped.

5 You know, we did online things that made it easier for
6 people to report misconduct and things of that nature.

7 So I just think overall we did a good job in getting
8 that going, but there's always room to get better.

9 **Q Did any officers take you up on your offer to**
10 **call you directly to report misconduct by other**
11 **officers?**

12 A Yeah. A few officers called.

13 **Q What types of misconduct did they call to**
14 **report?**

15 A Racial slurs. I received text messages from
16 officers, or maybe even video a few times of officers
17 using racial slurs or just not doing things that would
18 paint the department in a good light. So yeah, I had
19 officers let me know about things of that nature.

20 **Q When you got those types of reports directly**
21 **to you, what did you do with them?**

22 A I gave them to Internal Affairs. So whoever
23 the Chief of Internal Affairs was at the time, I would
24 call them down and share that information with them and
25 we would conduct an investigation.

1 Q Similarly, if you -- well, could Internal
2 Affairs or IPRA or COPA while you were superintendent
3 investigate anonymous complaints?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Were there any impediments to investigating
6 anonymous complaints that didn't have an affidavit of
7 any wrongdoing?

8 A Not that I recall. Not that I recall.

9 Q All right. If you could then I guess let's
10 take a look at 5211, there's a section called "code of
11 silence".

12 A Yes.

13 Q It goes from 5211 and ends at 5213.

14 A Read the whole page?

15 Q Yeah, well, I guess the first question is do
16 you remember reading this section of the report?

17 A I don't recall this specifically, but again,
18 I'm sure I've read it.

19 Q I think it's probably worth reading over.
20 I don't know if people want a break, we can have him do
21 it during, or we can just keep going.

22 A Keep going.

23 Q Okay.

24 A Okay. So just that page?

25 Q There's three pages. Basically, I would read

1 **until Section 2, which starts at 5213.**

2 A Okay.

3 MR. BATTLE: Scott, we're finished at
4 "tampering with video and audio?" That's the end of
5 it?

6 MR. RAUSCHER: Right before that.

7 THE WITNESS: Which page is that on?

8 MR. BATTLE: 77. If you're on 76, you've got
9 to go to the next page.

10 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

11 **Q Is there anything in this section of the DOJ**
12 **report that you disagree with?**

13 MR. BURNS: Objection to the form of question.

14 MR. BATTLE: I'll join.

15 A I think it's difficult to say that I agree or
16 disagree, again, because I don't know the credibility of
17 where they got their information. I will say this,
18 however, that in terms of officers lying and committing
19 obvious Rule 14 violations, I do agree that that's not
20 acceptable. Those things just aren't acceptable.
21 I do believe, in reading this, if an officer lies in
22 court proceedings, that should be part of a Rule 14, and
23 I can tell you that now it is. While I was
24 superintendent, we took Rule 14s very seriously, and
25 officers knew that. So I will agree that if in fact

1 what, how can I word this, if what is contained in these
2 documents are correct, then yeah, it is of great
3 concern.

4 **Q Did you ever make any effort to determine**
5 **whether what was contained in this section is correct?**

6 A No. Again, I do remember speaking to the DOJ.
7 However, I don't recall the specifics of what we talked
8 about. But I did, I believe her name was Benetta Gupta,
9 if I'm not mistaken, she and I spoke frequently about
10 DOJ reports. So, I did have conversations with them
11 offline regarding the report.

12 **Q What were those conversations like?**

13 A Just based on what was contained and what I
14 thought, or I would often ask them their opinions in
15 terms of what they thought CPD could do in furtherance
16 to help not be a part of misconduct, and what they
17 thought I could do as superintendent to dissuade
18 officers from being not truthful.

19 **Q And what sorts of things did they tell you**
20 **that you could do to help dissuade officers from being**
21 **not truthful?**

22 A I don't recall the specifics of that.
23 That was quite a while ago.

24 **Q How could you be sure that you were trying to**
25 **reform the right things without trying to determine if**

1 the things in the report were accurate?

2 MR. BATTLE: Objection as to someone who is
3 trying to reform the report.

4 MR. RAUSCHER: That's not what I asked.

5 MR. BATTLE: Okay. Say that again.

6 BY MR. RAUSCHER:

7 Q So the report makes a bunch of findings,
8 right?

9 A Correct.

10 Q And you were trying to reform the department?

11 A Correct.

12 Q How could you be sure that you were going to
13 reform the right things in the department if you didn't
14 know whether the findings were accurate?

15 A Well, the things that were contained not only
16 in the DOJ report, but also in the police accountability
17 task force, we took those things seriously. A lot of
18 the information contained in both documents, we had a
19 firm belief that a lot of that information did come from
20 rank-and-file police officers. So they had concerns
21 about it too, which told me, excuse me, that they wanted
22 a better department. So, we had an office within the
23 superintendent's office that specifically focused on
24 these things, the reform efforts that they suggested we
25 partake in, as well as the police accountability report.

1 We started doing those things, because that was an
2 independent agency saying CPD needs to get better at
3 this. And so, I took those things seriously. So I
4 wasn't so much concerned in finding out where they got
5 the information from. I was more concerned in the fact
6 that they said those things and those things that they
7 thought we needed to be better at. And that's what I
8 tried to do.

9 **Q So is it fair to say that you took it**
10 **seriously when DOJ reported that officers were saying**
11 **there was a code of silence, even if you personally**
12 **didn't think there was one.**

13 **A Correct. It's fair to say that I took it**
14 **seriously. Yes.**

15 **Q And you wanted to make reforms that would**
16 **address the officer's concerns about a code of silence.**

17 **A Wanted to address everybody's concerns about**
18 **that. So it wasn't just the officers, because again,**
19 **I wanted the officers to feel comfortable and have a**
20 **department they could be proud of, but I also, being a**
21 **Black man from the city of Chicago, you know, having**
22 **grown up in Cabrini-Green, I knew the distrust between**
23 **the Black community especially, and the police**
24 **department. So, I wanted to try to do something in my**
25 **time as superintendent to correct those things.**

1 **Q Lori Lightfoot was on the police**
2 **accountability task force, right?**

3 A Correct.

4 **Q Did you ever talk to her about her work on the**
5 **task force?**

6 A I don't remember specifics, but I'm sure we
7 had lots of conversations about police accountability,
8 even after the police task force.

9 **Q Have you ever talked to her about the code of**
10 **silence?**

11 A I'm sure we probably did. I don't remember
12 specifics, but I'm pretty sure -- we talked about
13 everything regarding police reform, so I don't remember
14 specifics, but I'm sure it probably came up.

15 **Q And do you know what she said over the years**
16 **about a code of silence?**

17 A No, I don't recall.

18 **Q Do you know whether she believes there is a**
19 **code of silence?**

20 A I believe I saw something where she said
21 something about that, but I couldn't tell you
22 specifically, I'd be guessing.

23 **Q Have you ever talked to her about any of the**
24 **members of the Watts team?**

25 A Not that I recall.

1 **Q Have you ever talked to Rahm Emanuel about the**
2 **code of silence?**

3 A No.

4 **Q Have you ever talked to any public officials**
5 **about whether there's a code of silence or about any**
6 **statements they've made about a code of silence?**

7 MR. BATTLE: Scott, you mean political or
8 police?

9 MR. RAUSCHER: Political.

10 A Not that I recall.

11 **Q Do you know who Shannon Spaulding is?**

12 A I don't know her personally. I remember she
13 had a lawsuit.

14 **Q Do you remember anything about the lawsuit?**

15 A In general, I think she filed a lawsuit for
16 retaliation being a whistleblower, something of that
17 nature, but I don't recall the details.

18 **Q Do you know what she was blowing a whistle**
19 **about?**

20 A I don't recall.

21 **Q Do you know Daniel Atabaria?**

22 A No.

23 MR. RAUSCHER: Can we take just a short break.
24 Obviously, I don't have a lot of time left and I
25 think I'm wrapping up anyway.

MR. BATTLE: All right.

VIDEOGRAPHER: All right, off the record
at 3:17.

(OFF THE RECORD)

VIDEOGRAPHER: And we're on the record at 3:28.

BY MR. RAUSCHER:

**Q Did you ever witness officer misconduct as an
employee of the Chicago Police Department?**

A Personally?

Q Yes.

A No.

**Q Did you ever report officer misconduct as an
employee of the CPD?**

A From witnessing it? No.

**Q Only times you reported it were when you got
complaints from others?**

A To the best of my recollection, yes.

**Q And is that -- did that happen only when you
were the superintendent?**

A No.

**Q When else during your career, not each
specific time, but what other roles were you --**

A As sergeant, I reported misconduct based on
information from citizens, as well as when I was a
lieutenant.

1 Q Did you ever, as sergeant or lieutenant,
2 did you ever get complaints from other officers about
3 officer misconduct?

4 A Not that I recall.

5 Q And then as sergeant and lieutenant, when you
6 got citizen complaints who did you pass them on to?

7 A They would've went to Internal Affairs.

8 Q Did you always pass on the citizen complaints
9 that you received?

10 A Yes. If it was involving misconduct of
11 somebody, yes.

12 Q How were those complaints relayed to you by
13 the citizens?

14 A Verbally? They would tell me.

15 Q They would say officer XYZ did something to
16 me?

17 A Correct.

18 Q Did you ever get any complaints about false
19 arrests of citizens?

20 A I may have, as sergeant and lieutenant,
21 I may have.

22 Q But no specific memory?

23 A I don't specifically --

24 Q If you would've been involved in an arrest and
25 someone would've -- you would've heard someone say,

1 "Hey, I didn't do anything wrong. What are you
2 arresting me for?" would you have reported that?

3 A That's not necessarily a false arrest.
4 So there has to be something more. And people are not
5 happy about getting arrested. So, it would have to be
6 something specific about it.

7 Q What I mean is not necessarily would you have
8 tried to determine whether it was a false arrest, but
9 would you have considered that to be a complaint that
10 you should report? Maybe you already answered that
11 question.

12 A Yeah. If a person just said, "I didn't do
13 anything wrong"? No.

14 Q What type of information would you need to
15 ever rise to the level of a complaint that you would
16 pass onto Internal Affairs?

17 A For example, if a citizen said, "I was already
18 handcuffed and this officer slapped me", you know,
19 something like that, then I would write up the complaint
20 and refer it to Internal Affairs.

21 Q What about someone who got arrested for drugs
22 saying, "I didn't have any drugs on me."

23 A So you're asking me if that would have made
24 me --

25 Q Would you have treated that as a complaint to

1 **pass on to Internal Affairs?**

2 MR. BATTLE: Objection, incomplete
3 hypothetical.

4 A Yeah, that is very hypothetical. It would
5 have to be more specifics involved with that, but just
6 simply saying, "I didn't have any drugs", no. Because
7 typically, in my experience as a sergeant, for example,
8 if my officers made a drug arrest, they would have drugs
9 to inventory.

10 **Q And did you ever get citizens, did you ever**
11 **hear citizens saying, "I didn't have any drugs on me"?**

12 A I don't remember specifically, but I'm sure in
13 my career, in my experience, I did.

14 MR. RAUSCHER: All right, I don't have any
15 questions. Anyone else?

16 MR. BATTLE: (Inaudible).

17 MR. RAUSCHER: I have no questions.

18 MS. WEST: Wait, I'm sorry, I have questions.

19 MR. BATTLE: Hold on. Hold on. Hold on.

20 I heard someone on the phone, or computer.

21 MS. WEST: Sorry, I'm sorry. I didn't hear
22 everybody, is everyone else finished?

23 MR. BATTLE: Yes, everybody here is finished.

24 MS. WEST: Okay. I have probably 10-minutes'
25 worth of questions.

1 MR. BATTLE: Okay.

2 MR. RAUSCHER: Is that Allyson?

3 MS. WEST: I'm sorry?

4 MR. RAUSCHER: Allyson?

5 MS. WEST: Yes.

6 MR. RAUSCHER: Oh, we just want to make sure
7 who it was. Because I'm not in front of the screen.

8 MS. WEST: Oh, you're fine. Although I am, I
9 think, the only woman in the proceedings.

10 MR. RAUSCHER: I didn't hear the attendants.

11 MR. BATTLE: Allyson, who do you represent
12 again?

13 MS. WEST: I represent the individual defendant
14 officers. Okay.

15 MR. BATTLE: Okay. Oh, this is Allyson West?

16 MS. WEST: Yes, sir.

17 MR. BATTLE: Okay. Sorry, Allyson, I didn't
18 see. Now, I can see you better. Go ahead.

19 CROSS EXAMINATION

20 BY MS. WEST:

21 Q No worries. Mr. Johnson. I just want to make
22 sure I'm understanding your testimony correctly. You
23 previously testified that you personally had concerns
24 about the officers that were listed in the Joe Magatz
25 letter; is that correct?

1 A In the Joe -- yes.

2 Q Okay. You had personal concerns about their
3 credibility, sir?

4 A Not so much I had personal concerns about
5 their credibility, but I was concerned that they had
6 concerns about their credibility.

7 Q Okay. Just so I make sure I'm understanding
8 your testimony correctly, you were concerned about the
9 state's attorney's office expressing concerns about
10 those officers that were listed in the do not call
11 letter; is that correct?

12 A Correct. I had no personal knowledge of those
13 officers' credibility. So, it was based on the letter.

14 Q Okay. And the Chicago Police Department
15 didn't make a determination of those officers'
16 credibility before placing them on administrative duty;
17 is that correct?

18 A That's correct.

19 Q Okay. And Mr. Johnson, did you personally
20 ever speak with Joe Magatz or anyone from the state's
21 attorney's office about placing these officers on a do
22 not call list?

23 A Not that I recall, no.

24 Q Okay. Do you know or are you aware of the
25 state's attorney's office communicating with the police

1 department prior to issuing the letter on November 16,
2 2017?

3 A No.

4 MS. WEST: Okay. Mr. Johnson, that's all that
5 I have. Thank you for your time.

6 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

7 MR. BATTLE: Thank you. All right. Reserve.
8 Thank you everybody.

9 VIDEOGRAPHER: This concludes the video
10 deposition of Eddie Johnson.

11 (DEPOSITION CONCLUDED AT 3:35 P.M.)
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1 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

2 STATE OF ILLINOIS

3
4 I do hereby certify that the witness in the foregoing
5 transcript was taken on the date, and at the time and
6 place set out on the Title page hereof by me after first
7 being duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth,
8 and nothing but the truth; and that the said matter was
9 recorded digitally by me and then reduced to typewritten
10 form under my direction, and constitutes a true record
11 of the transcript as taken, all to the best of my skill
12 and ability. I certify that I am not a relative or
13 employee of either counsel, and that I am in no way
14 interested financially, directly or indirectly, in this
15 action.

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KORTNEY CHASE,

COURT REPORTER/NOTARY

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES ON: 09/24/2025

SUBMITTED ON: 09/13/2022

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EXHIBIT 103

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JUDGE FRANKLIN U. VALDERRAMA
MAGISTRATE JUDGE SHEILA M. FINNEGAN
MASTER DOCKET CASE NO. 19-CV-01717

ORIGINAL

IN RE: WATTS COORDINATED
PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS

DEPONENT: TIMOTHY MOORE ON BEHALF OF THE CITY OF
CHICAGO
DATE: MARCH 19, 2024
REPORTER: TALIA JACKSON

30(b)(6)

2..5

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1 EXHIBITS (CONTINUED) Page 7 2 Exhibit Page 3 9 - January 13, 2017, DOJ Investigation of 195 4 The Chicago Police Department 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	1 PROCEEDINGS Page 9 2 3 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're on record. My name is 4 Sydney Little. I'm the video technician, and Talia 5 Jackson is the court reporter today representing 6 Kentuckiana Court Reporters. We are located at the 7 offices of Loevy & Loevy, 311 North Aberdeen Street, 8 Chicago, Illinois 60607. Today is the 19th day of 9 March, and the time is 10:02 a.m. Central. We are 10 convened in person and by videoconference to take 11 the deposition of Timothy Moore in the matter of 12 Watts Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, pending in 13 the United States District Court for the Northern 14 District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Master 15 Docket Case number 19-CV-01717. Will everyone, but 16 the witness, please state you're appearance, how 17 you're attending, and the location you are attending 18 from, starting with Plaintiff's Counsel? 19 MR. HILKE: Wally Hilke for the plaintiffs, 20 represented by Loevy & Loevy. 21 MR. MICHALIK: Paul Michalik on behalf of 22 Defendant City of Chicago and the witness, Timothy 23 Moore. I'm attending in person. 24 MR. FLAXMAN: Kenneth Flaxman for the Flaxman 25 plaintiffs, attending remotely.

Page 10 1 MR. RAVITZ: Gary Ravitz for Kallatt Mohammed. 2 I'm attending remotely. 3 MS. OLIVIER: Kelly Olivier on behalf of the 4 individual defendants represented by Hale & Monico, 5 attending remotely. 6 MS. MIAN: Alezea -- 7 MR. STORTZ: Jake Stortz -- 8 MS. MIAN: Sorry. Go ahead. 9 MR. STORTZ: Jake Stortz -- go ahead. 10 MS. MIAN: Alezea Mian for Ronald Watts, 11 attending remotely. 12 MR. STORTZ: Jake Stortz on behalf of the 13 Leinenweber defendants, attending remotely. 14 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Okay. Thank you. 15 Mr. Moore, will you please state your name for the 16 record? 17 THE WITNESS: Timothy Moore. 18 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Thank you. And do all 19 parties stipulate that the witness is, in fact, 20 Timothy Moore? 21 MR. HILKE: Yes. 22 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Counsel via Zoom, do we 23 stipulate to the witness' identity? 24 MR. MICHALIK: Well, hearing no objection. 25 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Okay. I'm hearing no	Page 12 1 time. I really can't. 2 Q. That's all right. So you've heard this 3 before, but just a few things. We should speak one at a 4 time so the reporter can take everything down, fair 5 enough? 6 A. Fair enough. 7 Q. I'll ask that you let me finish my question 8 and that you can -- I'll let you finish your answers; 9 does that sound good? 10 A. Sounds good. 11 Q. I want to ask you my -- the best questions I 12 can. If you don't understand me at any time, will you 13 please ask me to clarify? 14 A. I will. 15 Q. And if you answer my question, I'll assume 16 you've understood it, fair enough? 17 A. Fair enough. 18 Q. We can take breaks whenever you need, but I'll 19 just ask that you answer any pending question before we 20 go on break, fair enough? 21 A. Fair enough. 22 Q. Is there any reason you couldn't give true and 23 honest testimony today? 24 A. No. 25 MR. HILKE: I want to show you Exhibit 1, our
Page 11 1 objection. Mr. Moore, will you please raise your 2 right hand for the court reporter to swear you in? 3 THE REPORTER: Sir, do you solemnly swear or 4 affirm that the testimony you're about to give will 5 be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 6 truth? 7 THE WITNESS: I do. 8 THE REPORTER: Thank you. Counsel, you may 9 begin. 10 DIRECT EXAMINATION 11 BY MR. HILKE: 12 Q. Good morning, Mr. Moore. 13 A. Good morning. 14 Q. I know you've been deposed at least a couple 15 of times before. You've given testimony as the City of 16 Chicago's 30(b)(6) witness before, correct? 17 A. That is correct. 18 Q. How many times? 19 A. A -- a couple. I don't -- no more than four 20 or five, I think. 21 Q. Can you tell me what cases those were? 22 A. I don't recall. I -- it's been a while. 23 Q. What was the most recent time, if you 24 remember? 25 A. I honestly can't recall how -- the most recent	Page 13 1 30(b)(6) Notice. Do you mind marking this? 2 (EXHIBIT 1 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION) 3 THE REPORTER: Sure. 4 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 5 BY MR. HILKE: 6 Q. Did -- sir, did you review this list of topics 7 in preparation for the deposition today? 8 A. I don't think I reviewed this document prior 9 to today. 10 Q. Let me draw your attention, do you see Topic 11 11 on Page 2, the disciplinary systems within the 12 Chicago Police Department available to address CRs 13 initiated between 1999 and 2001? I mean, sorry, 2011? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. And are you prepared to give testimony on that 16 topic today? 17 A. Yes. 18 MR. MICHALIK: Okay. And, Wally, just for the 19 record, that topic has been limited by subsequent 20 conversations between Mr. Rauscher and Mr. Nolan, 21 what -- to specify certain areas within the broad 22 Topic 11. 23 MR. HILKE: Sure. I'll -- let me put on the 24 record what I understand. The subtopics that have 25 been specified to be, and we can have a further

Page 14 1 conversation about that if we need to. 2 BY MR. HILKE: 3 Q. One of the subtopics the party discussed was 4 which departments and divisions processed CRs, and how 5 CRs were processed within the Chicago Police Department. 6 Are you prepared to discuss that topic? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Another subtopic discussed was what changed 9 and didn't change when the Office of Professional 10 Standards became the Independent Police Review 11 Authority. Is that a topic you're prepared to discuss? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Another subtopic was various disciplinary 14 options, including SPARS and reassignment to desk duty. 15 Are you prepared to discuss that subtopic? 16 A. Yes, I am. 17 Q. Another subtopic was policies and practices 18 for accepting and investigating CRs. Are you prepared 19 to discuss that subtopic? 20 A. Yes, I am. 21 Q. And another subtopic was purposes and goals of 22 the disciplinary system. Are you prepared to discuss 23 that subtopic? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. And are you prepared to discuss all those	Page 16 1 procedures form. There was one of our department 2 orders. I think it was 93-03 That I reviewed. And 3 there were -- there might have been an interrogatory and 4 some, several other documents that -- that I reviewed. 5 Q. And I'm sorry, I didn't hear what you said 6 before several other documents. 7 A. I think it was -- well, there -- there were 8 several other documents, but there was an interrogatory. 9 Q. Interrogatory response. 10 A. Interrogatory, yes. That's -- yes. 11 Q. Okay. I'm going to -- I'm going to take those 12 things one thing at a time, please. 13 A. Okay. 14 Q. Whose depositions did you review? 15 A. I reviewed retired Chief Debra Kirby, retired 16 Chief Tina Skahill, retired Chief Juan Rivera, and 17 Barbara West. I think she retired as an assistant 18 deputy superintendent. 19 Q. And to your knowledge, were those all 20 depositions taken in proceedings by the Watts 21 plaintiffs? 22 A. I -- I believe, yes. 23 Q. Okay. And you described some policy documents 24 you reviewed, including 93 -- general Order 93-03? 25 A. Yes. Correct.
Page 15 1 subtopics for the time period of 1999 to 2011? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. And then the Topic 12 on the next page is the 4 Chicago Police Department's practices and policies for 5 conducting confidential CR investigations and CR 6 investigations associated with allegations of criminal 7 conduct between 1999 and 2011. Are you prepared to 8 discuss that topic? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Okay. And I'm not aware of anything that 11 limits Topic 12 in any way. Are you prepared to discuss 12 that topic in its entirety? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. And that's the entirety -- that's -- as you 15 understand it, those are the only two topics that, you 16 know, as discussed just now that you're going to be 17 presenting testimony on today, correct? 18 A. As I understand it, yes. 19 Q. Okay. Okay. Sir, without telling me what you 20 said to your attorney, or what your attorney said to 21 you, could you please tell me how you prepared for the 22 deposition today? 23 A. I reviewed, with my attorney, several 24 depositions related to this case. I reviewed other 25 police documents. There was an standard operating	Page 17 1 Q. Other than General Order 93-03, did you review 2 any other general orders? 3 A. No, no. Well, there was a -- I think general 4 -- one packet contained, like, General Order, it might 5 have been 08-01, or something like that. I think there 6 was some other general orders mixed in, but I -- I 7 mainly review 93-03. 8 Q. Okay. And you mentioned an interrogatory 9 response. Do you remember what -- whose interrogatory 10 response you reviewed? 11 A. I don't remember. 12 Q. What was the content of the interrogatory 13 response? 14 A. It -- it kind of spelled out, I believe, the 15 -- the process of conducting internal affairs 16 investigations, I believe it was. 17 Q. Okay. And you mentioned several -- you -- 18 what other documents beyond these four depositions, the 19 policies you named, and the IA investigations, did you 20 review to prepare? 21 A. There was a standard operating procedures, a 22 document that I reviewed and I think it was dated 19 -- 23 might have been 1999 or so, and it was for the Bureau of 24 Internal Affairs. 25 Q. Okay. And how long was the standard operating

Page 18 1 procedures document? 2 A. I'd say maybe 40 pages. 3 Q. Was that something you gathered on your own, 4 or was it provided to you by counsel? 5 A. It was provided to me by counsel. 6 Q. Is that a document you had seen before? 7 A. It is. 8 Q. And any other documents you reviewed to 9 prepare? 10 A. Not that I recall. 11 Q. Okay. Would you -- are you currently employed 12 by the Chicago Police Department? 13 A. I am. 14 Q. Could you talk me through the positions you've 15 held and the time period you've held them since you've 16 been in the department? 17 A. I'll do my best. I entered the police academy 18 in December of 1992. After completing my time in the 19 academy, I was assigned to the 24th Police District. 20 And that would've been in May of 1993. From there, I -- 21 I made sergeant in 1999 and I was assigned to the Third 22 Police District. I remained -- in '99, in the third 23 Police District until 2003, where I was detailed to the 24 FBI's Joint Terrorist Task Force. I remained there for 25 two years, and after I left in December of 2005, I was	Page 20 1 Affairs, where I currently work. 2 Q. When you were on the joint FBI Terrorist Task 3 Force from 2003 to 2005, did you participate in any 4 public corruption investigations? 5 A. I did not. 6 Q. Okay. And then in 2006, for the five months 7 you did confidential investigations, would that have 8 included investigations of police officers? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And would've included public corruption 11 investigations? 12 A. You talking about at -- well, mainly, when I 13 was in confidential, during that time, I -- yeah, I -- I 14 investigated police officers and it was misconduct, but 15 they weren't criminal cases for the most part at the 16 time, because that was new to the unit. 17 Q. And then in 2013, when you could return to -- 18 well, strike that actually. In -- other than 19 conversations with your attorney, did you speak with 20 anyone else to get ready for the deposition today? 21 A. I did not. 22 Q. Anything else you did to prepare for the 23 deposition that I haven't asked you about yet? 24 A. No. 25 Q. Okay.
Page 19 1 assigned to the Area 1 Detective Division, robbery, 2 burglary, theft team. Stayed there for about five 3 months. 4 And then in, I think it was sometime in 2006, 5 I was assigned to the Bureau of Internal Affairs, and I 6 was assigned to the Confidential Investigations Section 7 of Internal Affairs. With -- five months later, I was 8 reassigned to the Special Investigation Section of 9 Internal Affairs, where I remained there for 10 approximately seven years. After that, that would -- 11 that would take me to about 2013, where I was reassigned 12 back to the Confidential Investigation Section of 13 Internal Affairs, and that was done just so I can be 14 detailed to the FBI's Law Enforcement Anti- Corruption 15 Task Force, which I ended up working inside the FBI 16 office space. I think that was, like, April of 17 2014. 18 And I remained there as a sergeant until I got 19 promoted to lieutenant in 2017. When I made lieutenant, 20 I remained at the FBI Task Force until 2020, when I made 21 commander of Internal Affairs. And, at that point, I 22 left the task force. About a year and a half later, in 23 December of 2021, is when I retired from the police 24 department. February of 2023, I was hired back as a 25 civilian deputy director of the Bureau of Internal	Page 21 1 A. Oh, I'm sorry. I -- I did -- I -- I reviewed 2 some of our databases just so I could formulate a 3 timeline of -- of my employment. And I used our police 4 -- BIA, Bureau of Internal Affairs, database to 5 determine the years that I was assigned to Special as 6 opposed to Confidential. And that was based on the 7 cases that I handled, and they were marked Special 8 Investigations, as opposed to Confidential 9 Investigations. So I was able to pull that up to see my 10 movement within Bureau of Internal Affairs. 11 Q. Thank you. So that was just in regard to your 12 own employment timeline, correct? 13 A. That is correct. 14 Q. Okay. And in -- are you aware of any policies 15 governing the conduct of Internal Affairs investigations 16 during the time period you're talking about, other than 17 the ones you mentioned reviewing to get ready for today? 18 A. Yes. I'm familiar with the policies. 19 Q. Yeah. I'm sorry. What I meant is, you 20 described a few specific policies you looked at, right? 21 93-03, 08-01 -- 22 A. Yeah. 23 Q. As well as the BIA standard operating 24 procedures -- 25 A. Yep.

Page 22 1 Q. -- correct? 2 A. That's correct. 3 Q. What I'm wondering is, other than those three 4 sources of policies for those investigations, if there 5 are any other sources you're aware of that govern how an 6 Internal Affairs investigation should be conducted? 7 A. Oh, yeah. We -- we have numerous department 8 general orders and special orders that -- that govern 9 that. 10 Q. Okay. What are the other policies you're 11 aware of that govern the conduct of Internal Affairs 12 investigations? 13 A. So I would have to -- I would have to access 14 it in our Internal Affairs database, because there's -- 15 they all -- I mean, there's -- I think it's 08-01, 16 08-02, 08-03. There's -- there's so many different 17 department, general orders, and special orders that we 18 have, and they're all numbered. But I just, I have not 19 really committed those to memory. 20 Q. And some of those I'm definitely aware of, 21 like 93-03 has subcategories like 93-03-01, 93-03-02, 22 correct? 23 A. That's -- that is correct. 24 Q. And the 08, whatever policy you're talking 25 about has 08-01-01, 08-01-02, et cetera, correct?	Page 24 1 Q. Could you tell me what your involvement was at 2 the tail end? 3 A. At the very end, and this is after both 4 Mohammed and Watts had -- had been found guilty, we had 5 to resolve the administrative portion. So I completed 6 the summary, the closing summary report, and uploaded 7 all their attachments to their case into our automated 8 CR system. And I'm the one that recommended that they 9 be separated from the police department 10 administratively. 11 Q. And what was your -- were you a sergeant at 12 the time? 13 A. I was a sergeant. 14 Q. Okay. Okay. And so, your involvement, was 15 that after there were actually the pleas or conviction 16 in the criminal case and, subsequently, an 17 administrative action? 18 A. That is correct. 19 Q. And then, other than recommending their 20 separation following the guilty pleas or findings in the 21 criminal case, was there any other step that Internal 22 Affairs took then in relation to the Watts cases? 23 A. No. I mean, aside from recommending that they 24 be separated, that was -- that was basically it, because 25 it is my understanding that they -- they both resigned
Page 23 1 A. That is -- that's correct. 2 Q. But other than those subcategories of 93 and 3 08, can you help me understand what other policies are 4 out there about Internal Affairs investigations, if 5 there are any? 6 A. Aside from our general orders and special 7 orders, when we're talking about policy, that's -- 8 that's all that we -- we -- we go by, when we're 9 conducting investigations. 10 Q. Got it. So to understand the rules CPD has 11 for conducting Internal Affairs investigations, it's the 12 general orders and special orders where those will be 13 memorialized, correct? 14 A. That is correct. 15 MR. HILKE: Okay. And just confirming to track 16 it down, Paul, the standard operating procedures, 17 that's a document produced in discovery by the City 18 in this case? 19 MR. MICHALIK: I believe it has been, yes. 20 BY MR. HILKE: 21 Q. Okay. So from your time working in Internal 22 Affairs, did you have any personal involvement in the 23 investigations into Ronald Watts and Kallatt Mohammed? 24 A. Yes. At the tail end of the investigation, I 25 -- I did.	Page 25 1 from the police department, or retired at that moment, 2 so... 3 Q. Got it. 4 A. There was nothing else to be done. 5 Q. There wasn't at that time, for example, a 6 follow-up into other officers under Watts who were 7 supervised by Watts, was there? 8 MR. MICHALIK: I'm just going to object to the 9 question. It's beyond the scope of this particular 10 deposition, but you can go ahead and answer. 11 THE WITNESS: No, that -- that concluded the 12 investigation into this Watts and Mohammed case. 13 There was no further investigative work to be done. 14 BY MR. HILKE: 15 Q. Okay. And then I have just a couple questions 16 about your personal knowledge and connection, and then 17 I'm going to move on to another topic. But before your 18 involvement at the tail end, following the criminal 19 conviction, did you have any knowledge of the 20 investigation into Watts, Mohammed, or any officers on 21 Watts's squad prior to that time? 22 A. I did not. 23 Q. Okay. All right. So one of the topics is 24 about the conduct of criminal investigations -- or 25 strike that. One of the topics is about confidential

Page 26 1 investigations conducted within Internal Affairs from 2 1999 to 2011. 3 A. Okay. 4 Q. And I think you already testified that any 5 policies for conducting those investigations would be in 6 the general orders or the special orders; is that 7 correct? 8 A. That is correct. 9 Q. And so, in those orders, is there any way in 10 which a confidential investigation differs in the 11 investigative steps from any other Internal Affairs 12 investigation to be conducted? 13 A. Yes. Just by the -- the nature of the cases 14 that were handled by the Confidential Investigation 15 Section. Those cases, they were usually long-term 16 investigations that required coordination with either 17 the U.S. Attorney's office or the State's Attorney's, 18 surveillance work, and sometimes working with outside 19 agencies to fulfill the requirements of the 20 investigation. So and the -- and so that's kind of the 21 main thing that differed, was the fact that Confidential 22 had covert vehicles, we used resources from other 23 agencies, and we conducted a lot of surveillance at 24 Confidential. 25 Q. That makes sense. In terms of -- now the	Page 28 1 and there may be more surveillance involved. But in 2 terms of just how the policies list out the steps, it's 3 the same set of steps that are listed in the policies 4 for any kind of Internal Affairs investigation, correct? 5 A. Yes. For the most part, yes. 6 Q. Are there any -- is there anywhere you saw in 7 the policies that sets out, here's how the steps that 8 you take in an investigation are different when you're 9 doing a confidential investigation? 10 A. Well, like I said, the -- the different steps 11 will be the -- the fact that these are long-term, covert 12 operations in confidential, which differs from cases in 13 special and general, where you just contact everyone, 14 gather information, bring everybody in, and interview 15 everyone, you know, in real time, as opposed to doing 16 surveillance and gathering information and -- and 17 working with the State's Attorney's office and the U.S. 18 Attorney's office to pursue criminal charges for most of 19 the cases that -- that happen outside of the -- inside 20 of the Confidential Section. 21 Q. And are those differences written out in the 22 general order and special order that govern the 23 investigations? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Okay.
Page 27 1 general orders and special orders, they provide, for 2 example, a list of steps that should be taken in an 3 Internal Affairs investigation, correct? 4 A. That's correct. 5 Q. And in terms of the overall investigative 6 steps, are those the same between general Internal 7 Affairs investigations and confidential investigations? 8 A. Yes. On the onset, yes, they -- they are the 9 same to the point where you -- you make contact with the 10 complainant to find out the nature of the -- of the 11 investigation and find out what we're dealing with here. 12 At that point is where the case is assigned to either 13 the Confidential Section, Special Investigation Section, 14 or General Section. And after that's determined, the 15 case is assigned to an investigator in that particular 16 section and then the -- the investigation is worked up 17 and handled. And if -- if you're asking about the 18 processes of it, so we -- we have to gather, like, if we 19 have witnesses to what happened, we -- we gather the 20 information of the witnesses. If there's any kind of 21 external, like, media, like, video camera footage or -- 22 we gather all of that just to build our case. 23 Q. That makes sense and I understand that 24 operationally, there are going to be different 25 considerations, because, for example, it's longer term	Page 29 1 A. Yes, I believe, yeah, that was in 93-03. 2 Q. And so -- and was that the -- was the reason 3 for listing the differences in investigative steps 4 between confidential investigations and regular 5 investigations, was the purpose of listing those 6 differences in the general orders and special orders so 7 that Internal Affairs investigators would know what 8 other and additional things they need to do during any 9 confidential investigations? 10 A. Well, it -- it would -- it would provide -- 11 yeah, it would -- it would provide an understanding of 12 what to be -- what's to be expected when you work in 13 Confidential and the different types of cases you would 14 work and the manner in which you would work those cases. 15 I mean, I just -- wait, are you still asking about the 16 differences, or... 17 Q. I -- I'm more asking about the purpose of 18 writing down the differences in the general orders and 19 special orders. The purpose is so that confidential 20 investigators can be informed as to what they might need 21 to do differently in a confidential investigation, 22 correct? 23 A. No. Well -- well, I -- I think it's to a 24 larger degree that we -- each order kind of spells out 25 everything that needs to be done within Bureau of

Page 30 1 Internal Affairs. So there are sections within our 2 department, with our department policy that just 3 explains, like, every nuance to the different 4 investigative sections, just so we -- everyone can kind 5 know what to do, what to expect, and how to do it, and 6 follow a certain guideline. 7 Q. Right. And so, if, for example, if an -- 8 well, strike that. And did that -- in addition to 9 confidential investigations, there was also a unit 10 within Internal Affairs that did criminal 11 investigations, correct? 12 A. Right. So -- yes. 13 Q. And so, did -- is the same thing, true for the 14 criminal investigation section? The differences in how 15 they proceed are going to be in the general orders and 16 the special orders? 17 A. Okay. So there -- there was not a criminal 18 investigation section. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. There was there was the Confidential 21 Investigation Section that handled criminal matters. 22 Q. I understand. Let me back up, then. What 23 were the sections of Internal Affairs investigators 24 during this time? 25 A. So you -- you had Confidential, you had	Page 32 1 investigations, and -- and then there was like, within 2 Confidential, there was a general team. There was a 3 General team that just handled kind of everything that 4 belongs to Confidential that is not one of those 5 subcategories that I mentioned. 6 Q. So do I understand correctly that there are 7 four separate teams, medical, residential, criminal, and 8 general? 9 A. Within Confidential. 10 Q. Within Confidential? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Okay. And what about in the special 13 investigations unit? What subunits, if any, are there 14 within that group? 15 A. So within special, you -- you had a team that 16 worked the EEOC complaints. There was a team that 17 worked a rank investigation, which were -- that's the 18 team I was on, and that was lieutenants and above. We 19 investigated those cases. We also investigated the, 20 what I considered to be the high-profile media cases. 21 These cases where you'll -- you'll see an -- an officer, 22 you know, conducting misconduct that's newsworthy that 23 needs to be worked up quickly because the people want 24 answers. So that also fell under the Special 25 Investigation Section.
Page 31 1 Special, you had General. Then you have the 2 administrative section, the advocate section, and the 3 record section. 4 Q. And then the three investigative subunits are 5 going to be confidential, special, and general, correct? 6 A. That is correct. 7 Q. Okay. So a better question would've been the 8 differences between Confidential Investigations, Special 9 Investigations, and General Investigations, those are 10 going to be delineated in the general orders and special 11 orders, correct? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Okay. And you mentioned different unit -- 14 could you tell me what are the different subunits within 15 the Confidential Investigation Section during this time 16 period? 17 A. Within Confidential, you have the -- the 18 medical team that -- that oversaw medical abuse. If 19 somebody is on the medical and they're outside lifting 20 weights when they had an arm injury. So we have those 21 cases. We have residency cases. If you work for the 22 police department or the City, you have to live within 23 the City. So we -- we had a section that investigated 24 officers for residency violations. We had the -- the 25 criminal team that worked up the criminal	Page 33 1 Q. Okay. So I'm hearing those as three separate 2 units, EEOC, rank, and high profile? 3 A. High-profile, correct. 4 Q. Okay. And what about in the -- among the 5 general investigations? Is that divided into different 6 subunits? 7 A. So no, general investigations are handled by 8 -- usually, it's like some of the newer investigators, 9 and they handle everything that's not handled by Special 10 or Confidential, but they do handle officer intoxication 11 cases, on or -- on or off duty, officers involved in a 12 -- traffic crashes. Just your -- your run-of-the-mill 13 complaints that come in against officers that are not 14 handled by Special, Confidential, or IPRA, OPS, or now 15 COPA. So the bulk of our cases in BIA are handled by 16 general. 17 Q. Okay. One second. So from 1999 to 2011, you 18 -- I'll use the abbreviation CR to mean complaint 19 registered, fair enough? 20 A. Fair enough. 21 Q. During that time period, the City could 22 receive complaints of misconduct from residents, 23 correct? 24 A. That is correct. 25 Q. And other officers could also make complaints

Page 34 1 against each other, correct? 2 A. That is correct. 3 Q. And supervisors could request that an 4 investigation of misconduct be initiated against their 5 subordinates, correct? 6 A. That is correct. 7 Q. Likewise, an officer could request an 8 investigation against one of their superiors, correct? 9 A. Correct. 10 Q. Other than coming from an officer or coming 11 from a resident, were there any other sources from which 12 complaints were generated? 13 A. Yeah. During that time frame, a citizen can 14 -- could go to OPS to file a complaint. They can go to 15 IPRA to file a complaint. They can file a complaint 16 over the phone. They can -- they can file a complaint 17 with any supervisor, with any district, or with any 18 unit. Yeah, that's the -- the main reason -- the main 19 ways to do it, yes. 20 Q. So other than, like, a civilian initiating a 21 complaint or an officer making a complaint, there wasn't 22 like a third way, like a computer system that would 23 generate a complaint automatically, was there? 24 A. At that time, no. 25 Q. Okay. It would have to -- it would have to be	Page 36 1 subject report. And then that, at the time, would be 2 faxed over to IPRA or COPA. 3 At that point, they will determined if they're 4 going to keep that case and handle it, if it fell under 5 their jurisdiction, or if they'll send it back to the 6 BIA after they've assigned a log number to it. Then if 7 it comes back to us, we'll handle the investigation. If 8 they decide to keep it, if it's -- if it falls within 9 their purview, they'll keep the case, and they will -- 10 they will investigate it themselves. 11 Q. Okay. And when you say Internal Affairs, is 12 that the same as the Bureau of Internal Affairs, or 13 BIA? 14 A. Yes. Yes, it is. 15 Q. And the log number that's generated, is that 16 the same as the CR number that's used to track the 17 complaint? 18 A. So what happens is, all cases, all 19 investigations are assigned initially a log number. 20 Q. Okay. 21 A. That's the -- that's how it's -- especially 22 back then, they were at log numbers. So when you 23 mention CR number, these log numbers are converted to CR 24 numbers when the sworn affidavit has been executed. 25 Then once it's been executed and signed off by the
Page 35 1 either a civilian deciding to initiate one or a -- an 2 officer deciding to initiate one, correct? 3 A. That is correct. 4 Q. Can you walk me through, and I know that IPRA 5 came onto the scene during this time frame we're talking 6 about, right? 1999 to 2011. So if this process 7 differs, you know, changed during the time, please just 8 advise me of that and I'll ask you about, you know, any 9 distinct time period where the process might have been 10 different; is that fair enough? 11 A. That's fair. 12 Q. Can you tell me -- can you describe to me as 13 sort of the initial stage of a complaint? What -- after 14 a complaint is received, whether from an officer or from 15 a civilian, what the initial stage is in processing that 16 complaint. 17 A. Okay. So -- so when the when the complaint is 18 received to either Internal Affairs or directly to IPRA 19 or COPA, the -- the cases -- all cases are like, 20 basically, triaged through either OPS or IPRA, at the 21 time. So if -- if I was a sergeant and I received a 22 complaint from a citizen, I would do an initiation 23 report that would spell out, you know, everything: who 24 the complainant is, who the accused officer is, list of 25 witnesses. And I would put that in a memo, a to-from	Page 37 1 complainant, then within the auto CR system, there is a 2 -- a toggle button and you would -- you would switch it 3 over to a CR number. So that's -- so all the numbers 4 come, in back then, as infos. Not all, but most of them 5 come in as infos, and then we convert them -- I'm sorry, 6 as log numbers. Then we convert them to CR numbers, 7 unless the person making the complaint is a officer. If 8 it's an officer complaining against an officer, that 9 case is automatically a CR number. 10 Q. I understand. And when it changes from a log 11 number to a CR number, does that change the number? 12 A. It does not. 13 Q. Okay. One second. Okay. And IPRA is the 14 agency that replaced OPS, correct? 15 A. That is correct. 16 Q. And when OPS was in -- was in effect all of 17 its investigators were civilians, correct? 18 A. I -- I believe, because this is going back 19 sometime, but I believe there were sworn Chicago police 20 officers assigned to work at OPS at the time. 21 Q. And so, that would -- including up until the 22 time it became IPA, correct? 23 A. I'm not sure of the time frame, but I do 24 recall there being Chicago Police officers at OPS. 25 Q. Okay. And then when IPRA was created, did any

Page 38 1 sworn CPD officers work there? 2 A. No. 3 Q. And do you know -- and did OPS also employ 4 civilian investigators? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Were most of the investigators at OPS 7 civilians? 8 A. Yes. Yes. 9 Q. What was the extent of sworn officers 10 participation as in -- as working within OPS? 11 A. From what I recall, the sworn officers and the 12 civilian investigators, they did the same work. It's 13 just that they had sworn officers doing investigations 14 for them as well. 15 Q. Okay. What is the -- what is the Auto CR 16 system? 17 A. The Auto CR system is the -- is the -- it's an 18 electronic system that we use to investigate our cases. 19 So we were able to upload all of our attachments to the 20 cases. We were able to memorialize who the accused 21 were, the witnesses were, and that's the case we use to 22 -- just really to work up the whole investigation and 23 then to submit it for approval once we close the case. 24 So that -- that was a standalone system. It had nothing 25 to do with OPS or IPRA. It was our internal database	Page 40 1 THE WITNESS: I'm -- I'm not aware. 2 BY MR. HILKE: 3 Q. Got it. 4 A. I'm not aware of that. 5 Q. So you wouldn't have an answer one way or 6 another as to whether CPD participated in -- like, for 7 example, the superintendent participated in selecting 8 the leadership of IPRA? 9 A. I would have no knowledge of that. 10 Q. Okay. You're not aware of any role that 11 prevent the superintendent from weighing in on these 12 leadership of IPRA, are you? 13 MR. MICHALIK: Object to form. 14 THE WITNESS: I'm not aware. 15 BY MR. HILKE: 16 Q. You understand, just because I got a form 17 objection, that by weighing in, I mean the 18 superintendent participating in, you know, giving 19 feedback on or otherwise having involvement in the 20 selection of IPRA's leaders? 21 A. Yes. I understood, yeah. 22 Q. Then -- so when IPRA and OPS investigated CRs, 23 did the Bureau of Internal Affairs have any involvement 24 in that investigation by OPS or IPRA? 25 A. No.
Page 39 1 that was used to work up our complaints. 2 Q. Did the Bureau of Internal Affairs also use -- 3 wait, sorry. Let me take a step back. Did OPS and IPRA 4 also use Auto CR, or was it just -- well, actually, 5 strike that. Did both the Bureau of Internal Affairs 6 and OPS and IPRA use the Auto CR system? 7 A. No, that was just our system. Now, if they 8 had a different version of our system, I wasn't aware of 9 that because I never worked there. But I -- as I -- as 10 a supervisor, even up to a commander, I -- I just -- I 11 never saw their cases within our system. It was only 12 our investigators that were working within that system. 13 Q. During -- no. Was the -- was the leadership 14 -- well, it was leadership of OPS Civilian Law 15 Enforcement, or could it be either? 16 A. I -- I'm not aware -- I wasn't aware of their 17 leadership structure. I'm not sure. 18 Q. And what about IPRA? 19 A. IPRA, their -- their leadership was civilian. 20 I do recall that. 21 Q. And, the City -- what was -- what was CPD's 22 role, if any, in giving input to the leadership of 23 IPRA? 24 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form of the 25 question.	Page 41 1 Q. And when OPS investigated CRs, did the Bureau 2 -- and -- so let me -- there's kind of two separate 3 sides to it, right? One is the Bureau of Internal 4 Affairs, and the other is OPS, later IPRA, correct? 5 A. That is correct. 6 Q. Did either agency have involvement in the 7 other's investigations? 8 A. I can say with certainty for IPRA, no. OPS, 9 it goes back -- it goes back quite a while and, as I 10 said, they had sworn CPD officers working at OPS. So I 11 just don't know if they had any involvement in Internal 12 Affairs cases back then. 13 Q. Sure. 14 A. I can't say for certain. 15 Q. During our time period, 1999 to 2011, do you 16 have any reason to believe they would have had 17 involvement in those investigations? 18 A. I -- I have no reason to believe that they 19 would have. 20 Q. Okay. Other than OPS or IPRA, you know, 21 taking the -- being the first reviewer of complaints to 22 decide if they were going to keep them or refer them to 23 Bureau of Internal Affairs, are you aware of -- 24 actually, Let me take a step back. At one point during 25 this time period, I believe it's the 2003 to 2007

Page 42 1 Fraternal Order of Police contract, there is introduced 2 an affidavit requirement for investigating complaints, 3 and also an affidavit override procedure. Are you 4 familiar with those? 5 A. I am. 6 MR. MICHALIK: I'm just going to object to that 7 form of that question, the preliminary aspect of 8 that, but the answer can stand. 9 BY MR. HILKE: 10 Q. Sure. And as far as the affidavit override 11 procedure, that meant the head of OPS or IPRA could 12 override the lack of a civilian affidavit if requested 13 to by the Bureau of Internal Affairs, correct? 14 A. That is correct. 15 Q. And, likewise, the other way, that the head of 16 the other agency could override from the first, correct? 17 A. That is correct. 18 Q. Other than sort of processing the complaint 19 initially for assignment and that override procedure, 20 are you aware of any other interaction between Bureau of 21 Internal Affairs and OPS-IPRA during this time period? 22 A. No. No. 23 Q. And would it be -- would it be all right if we 24 agree when we say OPS or IPRA, we're referring to both 25 during this time period, unless we further specify?	Page 44 1 A. If it's assigned to OPS or IPRA? 2 Q. Yeah. 3 A. I don't know their process. You know what I 4 mean? So if they -- if they keep the case, I don't know 5 how -- how they would assign their cases because that's 6 not -- I don't -- I -- I was never able to see what they 7 did. 8 Q. Okay. So you don't -- do you have any reason 9 to believe that OPS and IPRA had a procedure for what 10 they did when they assigned an investigation, in terms 11 of putting the materials together for the investigator? 12 A. Well, I'm -- I'm sure they had a procedure 13 because what I -- what I do know is at the tail end of 14 your investigations, their cases would come to the 15 Internal Affairs Division and it would be housed in our 16 records section, and their file folders and attachments 17 looked similar to ours. So I'm -- I'm almost certain 18 that their processes were pretty similar. 19 Q. Okay. And is that -- and so, based on how the 20 folders -- well, strike that. Okay. And in describing 21 what's similar, you're specifically describing the 22 process of gathering materials to assign a case to an 23 investigator, correct? 24 A. Right. So what I'm -- what I'm saying is you 25 have a manila folder, right? Inside the folder --
Page 43 1 A. If that helps you. 2 Q. It will help me. I'm going to get tired of 3 saying OPS-IPRA, if you don't correct me. 4 A. Sure. Not a problem. 5 Q. Thank you. So getting back to the stages. 6 After OPS decides whether it will retain the complaint 7 or refer it back to the Bureau of Internal Affairs, 8 what's the next stage in the investigation? 9 A. Well, if it's -- if it's returned back to the 10 Internal Affairs Division, then that case would -- well, 11 first of all, it would be a determination made of what 12 section within Bureau of Internal Affairs it would go 13 to. So if it stays in Special, then the administrative 14 sergeant in the Special Investigations section would 15 create a folder, put whatever attachments he or she has 16 available into the folder, and then assign that case to 17 an investigator. And that's the same for General and 18 Special as well, they all have administrative sergeants 19 assigned to those sections, and they'll create the file 20 folder and add any attachments that were obtained from 21 COPA. Well, not -- I'm sorry. IPRA or OPS and have it 22 -- it will be in a file already. 23 Q. Is that the same process for OPS-IPRA? You 24 put everything in a folder, you put in the attachments, 25 and you assign it to an investigator?	Page 45 1 inside every folder is going to be a face sheet, and 2 that's going to spell out the allegations and who the -- 3 the complaint itself, and who the complainant is, and 4 who the accused officers or witnesses are. If we have 5 them, it's going to be on the face sheet. And that's -- 6 unless there's some other photos or anything, that is 7 what the investigators are going to get NBIA and now, I 8 can assume, as well as OPS or IPRA. 9 Q. Okay. So then, what's the next step in the 10 investigations? 11 A. The next step is to -- you're going to review 12 the face sheet. I'm going to see what the allegations 13 are. I'm going to see who the accused officer is. 14 You're going to determine whether or not that accused 15 officer is still employed with the City because why 16 conduct this investigation when he's no longer working, 17 you know, to a certain extent. And then, from there, 18 you'll determine who the -- if there were any witnesses 19 and at -- so, at that point, once you have everything, 20 then you reach out to the complainant and you set up an 21 interview with the complainant to see if everything 22 that's contained in that initial quick view sheet, face 23 sheet, is the extent of their complaint, or if they have 24 anything else to add, or additional information. 25 Q. Okay. If -- when -- if the investigator

Page 46 1 contacts the complainant and the complainant gives a 2 statement that indicates additional allegations, maybe 3 warranted, are you able to expand the allegations in the 4 investigation? 5 A. Oh, definitely. 6 Q. And, you mentioned to an extent why 7 investigate an officer if they've left the department. 8 What was the practice during this time as to what would 9 be done, if the officer had left the department? 10 A. Well, depending on the nature of the 11 allegation and depending on the date that the incident 12 happened and the date that the officer retired because, 13 if the date of the incident, like, occurred -- April 1st 14 is the date of the incident, but the officer retired in 15 March, that officer is no longer a department member, so 16 we would not investigate that case. 17 Q. But, what if -- what if the incident is from 18 before the date the officer left the department? What 19 is the -- 20 A. Right. So we would -- we would -- so we would 21 in -- we would investigate the case. We would take all 22 the witness statements and we'll interview the 23 complainant and, at that point, when it's -- so, we 24 won't -- we would reach out to the -- to the officer, if 25 we're going to serve allegations. But, most times, if	Page 48 1 was the process by which an accused officer's supervisor 2 would be assigned a CR to investigate during this time 3 period? 4 A. Okay. During that time period, there were 5 certain districts, if they had the manpower, they would 6 assign -- they would have a CR sergeant that handled all 7 CRs, if they had the manpower to do that. If -- but, 8 that's -- that's -- that didn't happen a lot. So where 9 you had units that didn't have a CR sergeant, those 10 cases would be assigned to the district and it would be 11 handled by the officer's immediate supervisor. 12 Q. And would that be -- would OPS decide that the 13 complaint should go to the district as part of its 14 process of reviewing the CR? 15 A. Well, the -- no. So what happens is OPS, 16 they're like the repository, they all go to OPS. Those 17 cases are assigned to Internal Affairs, and then 18 Internal Affairs supervisors, or administrative 19 sergeants, will determine if those cases are to be 20 handled in the unit with the -- where the incident 21 occurred, or if it will be kept at BIA. 22 Q. Got it. So the only CRs that would be 23 investigated by the unit would be those CRs that had 24 first been referred to Bureau of Internal Affairs by 25 OPS or IPRA, correct?
Page 47 1 the officer is no longer employed, they refuse to come 2 in because they're not going to be paid to come in, so 3 they're not going to want to come in. So then, we would 4 finalize the investigation and oftentimes put it in a -- 5 what's considered a closed hold status. 6 Q. Okay. So the practice during this time was to 7 continue investigations against an officer, even if that 8 officer had retired, as long as the allegation occurred 9 before the retirement, correct? 10 A. And as you -- and -- and as long as the 11 complainant signs the affidavit. 12 Q. Okay. Let me take a step back. During this 13 time period, CRs could also be assigned to supervisors 14 within the accused officer's chain of command for 15 investigation, correct? 16 A. That is correct. 17 Q. And I've heard that referred to as, like, an 18 accountability sergeant. Is that familiar to you? 19 A. That's -- that's the newer term. We do have 20 accountability sergeants currently in all districts in 21 all units. 22 Q. Okay. So if that's newer, what was -- I want 23 to focus on this 1999 to 2011 period -- 24 A. Okay. 25 Q. -- and not what's newer. How did it -- what	Page 49 1 A. That is correct. So -- because here's the 2 thing. So if a -- if a sergeant in, say, the 18th 3 District types up an initiation report and takes a 4 complaint from a citizen, that complaint would be -- 5 would be generated, and then it would be faxed over to 6 IPRA or OPS. OPS would take a look at it. The -- 7 whatever they -- they'll do whatever they do with it, 8 and then if -- it's not going -- if they're not going to 9 handle it themselves, they will send it back to Internal 10 Affairs. Internal Affairs will then look at it and say, 11 okay, this could be handled at the district level, and 12 they would -- Internal Affairs would send it back to the 13 district for it to be handled by a sergeant in the 14 district. 15 Q. Got it. And how did OPS and IPRA decide which 16 complaints they would investigate and which ones they 17 would refer to Internal Affairs? 18 A. Well, the -- the -- OPS and IPRA only handled 19 certain types of cases. Police-involved shootings, 20 domestics, excessive force complaints. So they -- they 21 just really didn't handle a lot of investigations. Only 22 those types of investigations. And they've expanded it 23 to, you know, search and seizure, and some other 24 categories. But back then, it was really only a handful 25 of complaint types they handled.

Page 50 1 Q. Okay. And the expansion to search and 2 seizure, that was after the time frame we're talking 3 about of 1999 -- 4 A. That is correct. 5 Q. Okay. 6 A. That is correct. 7 Q. And then, for those complaints that were 8 referred to Internal Affairs during that time period, 9 how did Internal Affairs decide which complaints should 10 be investigated by BIA investigators as opposed to 11 assigned to the unit? 12 A. So typically, when cases go back to the unit, 13 the administrative sergeant would review that face sheet 14 or the -- the quick view and determine that, okay, this 15 case is -- everything about this case happened within 16 that district. So he can go back to the district and it 17 be handled by a sergeant within that district because it 18 didn't cross over to another district. So I mean, if 19 it's -- if it's one of those situations where it's not 20 criminal, it doesn't -- it doesn't take a lot of 21 investigatory work -- investigative work, and that 22 sergeant can handle it with, really, just minimal 23 investigative avenues, then it would handle -- be 24 handled in the district because we can't -- we can't 25 afford to have our district sergeants taking on lengthy	Page 52 1 don't -- we don't need them to spend so much time 2 working an investigation if these -- if -- you know, 3 hey, this officer threw my keys down a manhole cover. 4 All right, do we have witnesses? Are there cameras? 5 Did you do it? Did you not do it? And it's done. We 6 just don't -- we just do not assign cases to the 7 districts or units that were complex and took a lot of 8 investigative steps. 9 Q. I think I understand, but just to make sure I 10 did, that was a question of the exercise of judgment 11 within Internal Affairs and not a written policy with 12 criteria for assigning -- 13 A. That is -- 14 Q. -- one to the other, correct? 15 A. Yeah. That is correct. 16 Q. Okay. And could -- and like -- and you talked 17 about allegations of, you know, where the conduct would 18 be criminal, right? Did Internal Affairs receive some 19 CRs, some complaints alleging conduct that would be 20 criminal, if proven? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. And did -- and actually, who within Internal 23 Affairs actually makes that decision of whether the 24 complaint is going to be kept by IA investigators or 25 assigned to the unit?
Page 51 1 investigations because it would take away from them 2 monitoring and overseeing these -- the officers on the 3 watch. So if they're, like, very straightforward cases, 4 they will go back to the district. 5 Q. And as part of the practice for assigning to 6 the unit versus an Internal Affairs investigators, was 7 the seriousness of the allegation also a factor? Was it 8 believed that more serious allegations should be 9 investigated by the Internal Affairs investigators? 10 A. Well, there's -- there's two ways of looking 11 at it because when you talk about seriousness, a lot of 12 cases are serious. I mean, are -- if we're -- we're 13 talking criminal, or we just talking in serious? Because 14 these cases, when citizens make complaints, it's serious 15 to them, so in that respect, all cases are -- are 16 serious unless you're talking about the criminal cases, 17 you know? 18 Q. So one -- am I correct that -- well, actually, 19 let me ask you this. Was -- were there written 20 standards that -- were there written standards for which 21 cases should be assigned to IA investigators versus 22 assigned to the units? 23 A. No. As I -- as I explained, it -- it all 24 depends on how much effort it would take an investigator 25 to complete that at -- at the district level because we	Page 53 1 A. Well, they would be -- once the case comes in, 2 it -- it's kind of triaged by a lieutenant in the -- a 3 lieutenant in the General Investigation Section, at the 4 time, during that time frame. And then, that case would 5 either be sent to Confidential, Special, or kept in 6 General, depending on the type of the case it was. 7 Q. Okay. Or, it could be sent out to the unit to 8 investigate, correct? 9 A. That is correct. 10 Q. And, did the -- was there any policy, any 11 written policy, that prevented that lieutenant from 12 assigning allegations that alleged criminal conduct to 13 the unit to be investigated? 14 A. A written policy? 15 Q. Yes, sir. 16 A. Well, I -- I don't -- I don't really -- I 17 don't really believe there was a written policy. I 18 don't think that's spelled out in the Special Order or 19 General Order. 20 Q. Who did that lieutenant report to? 21 A. The -- well, during that time, there was a 22 commander, and then there were -- there was also the 23 chief. But there was no deputy chief. There was a 24 commander or a chief. 25 Q. And could you walk me through the chain of

Page 54 1 command between the lieutenant and the superintendent, 2 please? 3 A. And the superintendent? 4 Q. Yes, sir. 5 A. Okay. Sure. You -- you have the lieutenant, 6 then you have captains -- or are you talking about 7 within BIA? 8 Q. Yeah. Specifically, for that -- you know, 9 that lieutenant in BIA who is making these decisions, 10 who is his chain or her chain of command up to the 11 superintendent? 12 A. Okay. So you have the lieutenant, then you 13 have the commander of the unit, then you have the chief 14 of Internal Affairs, and then you have the 15 superintendent. 16 Q. So let me go back -- let me go back to the 17 stages of the investigation again. We had gotten so far 18 as trying to interview the complaining. And again, if 19 you have reason to believe the steps would be different 20 for a BIA investigation versus an OPS investigation, 21 please tell me and we'll lay them out separately. But 22 my question is: After interviewing the complainant, 23 what's the next step? 24 A. Well, it all depends on what information you 25 gather from the complainant. If the complainant, let's	Page 56 1 Q. In terms of these general steps for proceeding 2 in an investigation, do those differ between units 3 within Bureau of Internal Affairs? 4 A. They -- they could. So those -- those steps 5 that I laid out are pretty consistent with General and 6 Special investigations. But then, when it comes -- 7 yeah. There -- there's some differences where we work 8 up cases that are confidential. 9 Q. Got it. So tell you what, let's put 10 confidential to the side and we'll walk through it next 11 and if it changes in any other unit or subunit, we'll 12 figure -- we'll specify as we go. 13 A. Okay. 14 Q. Okay. So after the allegations are served on 15 the accused officer -- well, actually, one question. 16 You mentioned trying to contact witnesses in -- as one 17 of the investigative steps. Does that include 18 non-accused officers? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. And so, any -- okay. And so, after all that 21 has been completed, all of those investigative steps are 22 completed and the allegations are served on the accused 23 officer, what happens next? 24 A. Okay. At that -- at that point, the -- the 25 officer is given 72 hours to -- to submit to a -- a form
Page 55 1 see, for instance, tells us that it -- it happened in 2 front of a 7-11 and I saw cameras, then the investigator 3 would have to go out to that 7-11 and try to get video 4 evidence of the incident if there is some available. If 5 the complainant lists several witnesses to the incident, 6 we would -- the investigator would try to make contact 7 with the witnesses to -- to interview the witnesses. 8 And if the complainant was able to identify the officer, 9 then, at that point, either the officer would have 10 already been named as the accused in the investigation 11 or, at that point, the investigator will name the 12 officer as the accused. 13 Q. Okay. And what happens next after those 14 steps? 15 A. So after -- after that, once all the 16 investigative steps have been taken for the case, then 17 there's the -- the accused member is served with their 18 allegations. 19 MR. MICHALIK: And I don't mean to interrupt, 20 but just so that we're clear, we're talking about 21 the BIA general investigations, as opposed to 22 confidential investigations, compared to? 23 MR. HILKE: Well, I'm sorry. Let me ask that 24 as a question then. 25 BY MR. HILKE:	Page 57 1 -- a statement. So that can be done two ways. They can 2 be brought down to the Bureau of Internal Affairs and -- 3 and they can sit for a formal Q and A statement that's 4 typed out or the investigator can request that the -- 5 the member submit a to/from report answering specific 6 questions that the investigator poses to him or her in 7 writing. 8 Q. And by the way, all these steps we've gotten 9 through as far -- thus far, are those the same when the 10 supervisor -- when the complaint is assigned to a unit 11 and the supervisor investigates, just as if another 12 investigator would be conducting the investigation? 13 A. Yes. The only difference is in the -- in 14 units, the investigator would typically just take a 15 to/from report from the accused officer and not sit with 16 the officer and type out a formal Q and A statement. 17 Q. And did -- why is that? 18 A. For the sake of time. For the sake of time. 19 They just -- because if you go way back, we -- you know, 20 we -- we had typewriters and it was time consuming 21 typing out, yeah, statements. So it was easy -- made it 22 a lot easier for the -- for the member to just respond 23 to a series of questions in a written report and they 24 could just hand write the responses out. 25 Q. Got it. And was that a -- was that a fairly

Page 58 1 universal practice during this time period that if a 2 supervisor is investigating, the accused's statement is 3 going to be a to/from and not a typed up interview? 4 A. Yeah, during that time frame, and if it's in 5 the unit, yes. In the District Corp unit, yes. 6 Q. And to your knowledge, were supervisors ever 7 told that they should be taking, you know, typed up 8 statements as opposed to a to/from Reports? 9 A. No. They were not told that. 10 Q. Okay. So then, after the officer is -- either 11 gives a statement or submits a to/from, what's the next 12 stage? 13 A. The investigator will make a determination of 14 the finding of the investigation to -- to -- to see if 15 there was enough information to -- to suggest that what 16 was alleged had happened to sustain the complaint, or 17 there were other findings that -- that could have been, 18 you know, levied on that particular investigation and -- 19 and then the investigator will just close the case out, 20 based on one of those findings. 21 Q. Is there any written guidance you're aware of 22 -- and so strike that actually. To -- were there 23 different accounts of what happened, for example a 24 complainant says misconduct happened and the officer 25 denies it, the investigator has to weigh credibility to	Page 60 1 exonerated, right? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Wherein -- and is that the category where the 4 investigator says, actually, I can go a step further. 5 This did not happen. That's what the evidence shows me. 6 A. Oh, exoneration? 7 Q. Is that what exonerated means? 8 A. No, that means it actually happened, but the 9 officer's actions are lawful and proper. 10 Q. I see. What was -- what's -- 11 A. Unfounded. 12 Q. Thank you. Unfounded is what I was just 13 talking about, right? That's when the evidence shows to 14 the investigator that what was alleged did not occur, 15 correct? 16 A. Right. It's false, not factual, meaning that 17 if a citizen alleges any officer did X, Y, and Z, the 18 evidence shows that that officer was in Florida that 19 day, so he did not do it. 20 Q. Okay. And then, to make a sustained finding, 21 there needs to be evidence in the opposite direction, 22 right? Something that is sufficient for the 23 investigator to believe that the allegation actually did 24 occur as alleged, correct? 25 A. Preponderance, more -- more likely than not,
Page 59 1 determine whether to sustain complaint or not, correct? 2 A. Correct. 3 Q. And is there any written guidance that you're 4 aware of that tells investigators how they should weigh 5 credibility? 6 A. Well, the -- the -- the way the findings are 7 spelled out, you know, like when -- if you have a 8 one-on-one, if it's the investigator and the -- the 9 citizen, then you have the accused officer, and all 10 parties have been interviewed and the investigator 11 cannot make a determination of whether or not what was 12 alleged did occur, then typically that investigation 13 will be not sustained because we -- you can't prove or 14 disprove one way or the other that it happened based on 15 the limited information you received or the witness 16 statements that were available. 17 Q. I understand. What kind of additional 18 evidence would typically be necessary to -- well, 19 actually, strike that. Because -- so that category of 20 not sustained, when it's not possible to make a 21 determination, that's not saying that happened, it's not 22 saying it didn't happen, it's just saying you can't 23 tell, it's not sustained, correct? 24 A. That is correct. 25 Q. There's another category, I think it's	Page 61 1 that happened. 51 percent. 2 Q. Okay. So when an investigator is faced with 3 -- one second. When an investigator is dealing with 4 conflicting accounts, for example, the complainant says 5 misconduct happened of a certain kind, the off -- the 6 accused officer factually denies it, what kind of 7 additional evidence is necessary for the investigator to 8 make a determination that, this isn't just unfounded, 9 this is either sustained or -- I'm sorry. This isn't 10 just not sustained. This is either unfounded or 11 sustained? 12 A. So -- okay, well, as far as even -- additional 13 evidence, videos, photos, witness accounts, impartial 14 witnesses, that are -- you know, so if you have an 15 officer, you have a citizen, typically an investigator 16 would not, you know -- if you interview the officer's 17 partner or the civilian complainant's brother, you know, 18 it's -- it's -- you still kind of weigh it out as being 19 one-on-one because, of course, they're going to side 20 with their -- their parents or significant others or 21 what have you. So it's like, you just, you need some 22 impartial evidence to -- to really weigh in on the 23 investigation to show that it actually did happen, or it 24 didn't happen. 25 Q. Okay. And so, you're essentially looking for

Page 62 1 either video or photo, something objective or a witness 2 who, you know, isn't a relative of the complainant, 3 isn't a partner of the accused officer? 4 A. That is correct. 5 Q. Getting back to my question about weighing 6 credibility, are you aware of any written material given 7 to investigators that guided them as to how they should 8 try to weigh the credibility of the witnesses in an 9 investigation? 10 MR. MICHALIK: Objection. Asked and answered, 11 go ahead. 12 THE WITNESS: Well, so basically, that just 13 boils down to the four -- the four findings. So you 14 have to make your determination based on whether or 15 not the case is sustained, not sustained, unfounded, 16 or exonerated. So I mean -- and -- and reaching 17 that conclusion, it's all based on the attachments 18 and the evidence you -- you gather during the course 19 of your investigation. 20 BY MR. HILKE: 21 Q. I asked you a bad question. What I should 22 have asked is the guidance that the department provided 23 to investigators, to your knowledge, was limited to its 24 description of the four allegation categories; is that 25 correct?	Page 64 1 Q. Yeah, so let me separate two things. I'm 2 going to ask you about the findings now, and I'll ask 3 you about the penalty next. 4 A. Okay. 5 Q. But as to the findings, whether it's a police 6 agent or a sergeant, there's further review after the 7 recommendation of the investigator, correct? 8 A. That is correct. 9 Q. The investigator never has a final say on, 10 like, the investigator, whether a police agent, or a 11 sergeant, or whoever's investigating, never has power to 12 finalize a disciplinary recommendation, that's always 13 made it a higher level in the chain of command, correct? 14 A. That is correct. 15 Q. Okay. And then when a sergeant -- actually, 16 which investigators had power to also recommend 17 punishment when they made a recommendation as to 18 disposition? 19 A. The sergeants. 20 Q. Okay. So within OPS-IPRA -- well, within 21 OPS-IPRA, few of the investigators, and at the time of 22 IPRA, none of the investigators are sergeants, correct? 23 A. That is correct. 24 Q. They're all civilian -- at IPRA, they're -- 25 it's all civilian employees, correct?
Page 63 1 A. That is correct. 2 Q. Okay. And was it the role of the investigator 3 if the investigator may -- and -- strike that. Do you 4 understand by investigator I mean, anyone investigating 5 a complaint, whether it's someone in the chain of 6 command for unit assigned CR, as well as an OPS or BIA 7 investigator? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Okay. For an investigator, if they recommend 10 that a -- well, actually, I should ask you a question. 11 Does the investigator have the power to sustain a CR, or 12 are they just making a recommendation that will be 13 reviewed by others? 14 A. So -- so -- so that's -- that's -- to me, it's 15 a weird question because back then, we had -- were 16 called police agents that were not -- were not 17 sergeants, but they were investigators. So when the 18 police agent finished their investigations, they would 19 -- they would recommend a finding for the case that's 20 reviewed by a sergeant. But the majority of 21 investigators at BIA were and are sergeants now. And -- 22 so we make our -- we would make our own recommendations 23 for penalty. 24 Q. Okay. So -- 25 A. And findings.	Page 65 1 A. That's correct. 2 Q. Does that mean that the IPRA investigators 3 would not make disciplinary recommendations? 4 A. That's a good question. I'm not -- I'm not 5 certain if they -- I'm not certain if they did make the 6 penalty recommendation because that -- those cases went 7 directly to the advocate section. So I, you know, as an 8 investigator, I would not have seen that process, but 9 I'm not certain if they made their penalty 10 recommendation or they made the finding recommendation 11 of their investigation. 12 Q. Yeah. Is it fair to say that the process for 13 who makes penalty recommendations and how is going to be 14 in the general orders and special orders you talked 15 about before? 16 A. It should, yes. 17 Q. Okay. And you just mentioned the advocate 18 section. Can you explain to me what the advocate 19 section is? 20 A. The -- the advocate section is -- is a -- a 21 section that is supervised by the department advocate, 22 who -- who's typically an -- an attorney, an attorney 23 within the department, and they -- they have a team of 24 anywhere from ten to 15 officers, and maybe another -- a 25 sergeant or two, that review the cases and prepare the

Page 66 1 cases to be reviewed by the superintendent and cases for 2 the police board. 3 And -- yeah, so after the -- after the 4 investigation is completed, and our cases are turned in, 5 they go to the advocate section for review and they make 6 sure that the -- the case is sound, complete, the 7 attachments are in order. That the -- the findings are 8 appropriate and all the -- all the complaints that were 9 made by the -- the -- the citizens or the officer 10 complainants have been addressed within the -- the 11 investigation. And then they -- they prepare it for 12 either at -- now command channel review. Because at 13 this point, they -- these cases go out to the command 14 channel for the accused officers. If you -- if you 15 understand what I'm saying. 16 Q. I do. 17 A. So -- and then they also prepare it -- these 18 cases, for review by the -- by legal affairs and the 19 superintendent's office. 20 Q. Does the advocate section review all 21 investigations, or just those recommended sustained? 22 A. No, they review all, not sustained -- yeah. 23 All cases. 24 Q. And so, at is it the case -- 25 A. I -- I'm sorry. Except for cases that are	Page 68 1 Channel back then. I think we had a complaint review 2 panel, is what it was called. 3 Q. Okay. 4 A. So sustaining cases -- see, I don't -- I'm not 5 -- I'm not -- I remember the complaint review panel, and 6 I just don't know if they only worked up or reviewed 7 cases that were sustained, or if they did cases with the 8 other findings as well, but it was comprised of the -- a 9 lieutenant, a -- a sergeant, and another PO, or an 10 officer that's the same rank as the accused member. And 11 they would sit, and they would go over the investigation 12 and they would make the determination of -- of, like, 13 penalty, you know, as -- as -- and it would serve as the 14 -- the Command Channel at the time. 15 Q. Okay. And -- one second. So -- sorry. 16 During this time frame from 1999 to 2011, after the 17 investigator completes the investigation and makes a 18 recommendation, and after the advocacy section, then 19 package -- you know, reviews the investigation, is the 20 immediate next step the complaint review panel? 21 A. Back then -- see, I'm -- I'm not certain if 22 the complaint review panel occurred. Well, no. The 23 case would have to go to the advocate section first, and 24 then the complaint review panel. Yes. 25 Q. And then what happens after the -- and the
Page 67 1 administratively closed. 2 Q. Is it the case that all investigations from 3 1999 to 2011 then should be reviewed by the advocate 4 section before they go to Command Channel Review? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. And do all complaints whether, you know, 7 sustained, not sustained, or any disposition get command 8 channel review? 9 A. No, just -- just the complaints that are not 10 administratively closed, but the cases with findings, 11 unfounded, not -- not sustained, sustained, they go 12 through command channel. 13 Q. Okay. And is the Command Channel Review 14 process different for sustained complaints versus 15 unfounded, exonerated, or not sustained complaints? 16 A. I think the only -- the only difference is for 17 the sustained complaints, if these cases are, I believe, 18 30 days are over and a penalty that's recommended, those 19 cases, I believe go to a third level of review, as 20 opposed to the -- the first and second level that 21 typically gets reviewed. 22 Q. And can you describe to me how the Command 23 Channel Review process worked during this time period? 24 A. During this time? So -- well, so during that 25 time period, there was -- I don't think we had Command	Page 69 1 complaint review panel, is that all allegations or -- 2 strike that. Is that all CRs, or just those where the 3 accused officer requests it? 4 A. I think it was all -- it was -- I believe it 5 was all CRs. I recall it being all CRs that had a 6 sustained final -- sustained finding, and there was a -- 7 a certain penalty. And I don't know -- I really don't 8 recall if it was a penalty of five days or more, or six 9 days or more, but there was some -- there was a trigger. 10 There was a trigger in order for it to go to the 11 complaint review panel and I just don't really recall 12 what that was. 13 Q. Okay. So it was -- in any case, it was some, 14 but not all, sustained CRs were eligible for complaint 15 review panel review, correct? 16 A. Yes, I can say that. 17 Q. And so, then, for those where the complaint 18 review panel -- where it wasn't eligible, did the 19 complaint just go straight from the investigator -- 20 well, strike that, actually. What happened next in the 21 complaint review process, after the complaint review 22 panel? 23 A. After the complaint review panel, then if the 24 -- if the member was going to be suspended X number of 25 days, the advocate section would prepare paperwork and

Page 70 1 -- and basically serve the department member with their 2 suspension paperwork and it would show that you are 3 being suspended for X number of days. 4 Q. I mean, did the, like, superintendent's office 5 or someone else have to approve the investigator's 6 recommendation before it got to that stage of this one? 7 A. No. For -- for the majority of cases, not the 8 superintendent's office, unless we're talking about 9 cases that were separation cases, or cases where the 10 penalty was 30 days or more, and that's at the time -- 11 during that time period. 12 Q. So if it wasn't 30 days or more, or 13 recommending separation from the department, the 14 complaints would go straight from being investigated to 15 the -- by the investigator, the, like, quality control 16 of the -- 17 A. Advocate. 18 Q. -- complaint review of the advocate, the 19 complaint review panel, if eligible, and then actually 20 administering the discipline onto the accused officer? 21 A. That's correct. 22 Q. Okay. And then what -- after the discipline 23 is decided, and the officer -- accused officer is 24 notified, what were the appeal or further steps that the 25 accused officer could then take?	Page 72 1 would the process play out where that's a disciplinary 2 recommendation? 3 A. So that -- after -- see, what I'm not sure of 4 is if they still had the complaint -- I -- I believe 5 they still had the complaint review panel, but then once 6 the case made its way back to the advocate section is 7 when the -- the case would be prepared for review by the 8 superintendent's office. 9 Q. Okay. And if the superintendent -- and do you 10 know, during this time period, do you know who within 11 the superintendent's office was reviewing and making 12 these decisions? 13 A. I do not. 14 Q. Okay. Could it have been either the 15 superintendent or any person delegated by the -- 16 A. Or designee, correct. 17 Q. Okay. Am I correct that it's the 18 superintendent who has the authority to do it, even 19 though they can designate who they want to exercise 20 their authority? 21 A. That is correct. 22 Q. Okay. So then if the designee -- if the 23 superintendent, or their designee, decides to proceed 24 with the suspension of 30 days or more, or a separation, 25 what are the next steps?
Page 71 1 A. He can enter into the grievance process, if he 2 wanted to grieve the matter. So that would require him 3 to do a to/from report, or a memo, requesting that -- a 4 grievance process. And then the grievance process will 5 play out. 6 Q. And how does the grievance process play out? 7 A. At the time, I -- I -- I believe the -- it 8 might have been the member's commander was the -- 9 facilitated the grievance for the -- yeah, for the 10 member, at the time. 11 Q. How does that work? 12 A. So the -- the commander would set a date to 13 say, okay, we're going -- we're going to have this 14 grievance on this particular date. And the -- the 15 member would go into the commander's office and -- and 16 -- and plead his case. And -- and just say that he -- I 17 guess, he would like his penalty reduced or -- and then 18 the commander would make the determination. That's at 19 the time. 20 Q. If the officer doesn't get the relief that the 21 officer wants from the commander, are there further 22 opportunities to appeal? 23 A. No. 24 Q. And then, what about where the suspension was 25 30 days or more, or separation from the department, how	Page 73 1 A. So -- so I -- I know there's paperwork 2 involved and I -- I know that the -- the member -- if 3 it's -- let's -- let's go with the suspension. So 30 4 days pending separation or more, so the superintendent 5 can say, okay, we're not going to fire you. We're going 6 to recommend a 90-day suspension. So at that point 7 paperwork is drawn up. A lot of that paperwork is for 8 finance because back then there was an option to either 9 be suspended from work, or just be at home for 90 days, 10 or you can -- you can give up 45 days of compensatory 11 time and the rest of the time you'll remain home. So 12 there is, like, a lot of paperwork involved in 13 determining -- determining how that member was going to 14 satisfy that suspension time, depending on what options 15 were given to the member by the superintendent's office. 16 Q. So in those cases, the superintendent's office 17 would decide whether and how much to offer in terms of 18 options, meaning substituting paid time off for days 19 actually is suspended and not working? 20 A. That is correct. 21 Q. And so, if the officer chooses to exercise the 22 option and give up paid off -- days paid off, they can 23 return to work sooner and they can start earning money 24 sooner than if they had taken the suspension as a full 25 suspension; is that correct?

Page 74 1 A. That is correct. 2 Q. Okay. And then what if -- what if the officer 3 disagrees with the superintendent's recommendation, what 4 appeal options do they have? 5 A. So at -- at the time during the time frame, I 6 just don't -- I don't recall whether or not there was an 7 option for the case to be brought before the -- I don't 8 think we had a -- maybe -- maybe we had a police board 9 back then. I'm just not -- I'm not sure if we did. 10 Q. Sure. So you -- 11 A. I'm sorry. There -- during some of that time, 12 yeah, think that we did have a police board because I 13 recall going to some of the police board meetings. 14 Yeah. With the -- well, with the -- with Chief Konow. 15 So -- but that was after 2013, so... 16 Q. Yeah. 17 A. Yeah. 18 Q. Okay. And so, then the police board makes an 19 independent evaluation of whether to -- well, strike 20 that. I'll ask -- let me ask this as a question, can 21 the police board either choose to uphold the 22 recommendation or impose different discipline based on 23 its assessment of the evidence? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. And the police board can also decide that no	Page 76 1 probability that this case is going to be sustained, so 2 this would be a good case for -- for mediation. And 3 then, if they agree, the department advocate would be 4 brought in because the -- at the time, the department 5 advocate was the person that was mediating the cases. 6 Q. And then what is the department advocate's 7 role during this time period in mediating the cases? 8 A. So they would draft up paperwork and the 9 paperwork would spell out the allegations and there -- I 10 think it was some statutes that were explained out within 11 the mediation paperwork. And then the -- the -- I won't 12 call it a negotiation, but the -- the department 13 advocate would -- would basically spell out what the -- 14 what the potential penalty -- penalties are that the 15 member's going to be signing off on. So back then 16 typically, if the officer and the attorney for the 17 officer agreed to mediate the case -- say if the officer 18 was facing a ten-day suspension, through mediation, the 19 penalty will be -- will be reduced because we would 20 really weigh in the fact that the officer is admitting 21 guilt -- is admitting guilt and for -- for that, there 22 was a reduction in their recommended penalty. 23 Q. And so, in terms of the stage where mediation 24 occurs, it's after all the investigative steps have been 25 taken up to the point that the officer would give a
Page 75 1 discipline is warranted, correct? 2 A. That is correct. 3 Q. And then if the officer doesn't -- disagrees 4 with the police board, are they able to appeal it 5 further? 6 A. To the best of my knowledge, no. 7 Q. Okay. Yes. Could you tell -- please tell me 8 about how the department -- well, are you familiar with 9 mediation as a potential means of resolution for CRs? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Can you tell me how the department -- what the 12 process was for -- actually, I'll back up. During this 13 time period, in what circumstances was mediation an 14 option during the CR investigation? 15 A. So during the course of the investigation, if 16 the investigator determined earlier on based on the 17 evidence that was gathered during his investigation, 18 that there was a high probability that the case would be 19 sustained. There were -- there was a conversation after 20 serving the member with the allegations, there was a 21 conversation that took place between the member, the 22 member's counsel, and the investigator to say, hey, you 23 know, this is a strong case for mediation because the 24 evidence that I have, and based on my interviews, 25 there's a -- there's a probability -- this is a high	Page 77 1 to/from or a statement, correct? 2 A. Right. So -- back -- here, so back during 3 that time frame, this mediation process was fairly new. 4 So we were conducting full investigations, interviewing 5 everyone prior to mediation, but -- but then the 6 mediation process really evolved to where the FOP and 7 the member's attorneys -- after the member was sometimes 8 served the -- served the allegation, or after witnesses 9 were interviewed regarding the case, the attorneys would 10 -- would get ahead of the case and say, Hey, my -- my 11 client wants -- would like to mediate the case. And 12 once the case is mediated, a lot of the other 13 investigative steps would not be taken because -- and 14 this is after the member is served the -- the 15 allegations, of course. We wouldn't have the member sit 16 for a statement. We would just go ahead and mediate the 17 case, based on the member reviewing the allegations with 18 the attorney. 19 Q. Got it. And so, as part of the mediation 20 process, the accused officer, essentially, agrees that 21 the finding will be sustained, and agrees that there'll 22 be a such and such penalty, but they do not give a 23 to/from, or a statement as part of the investigation; is 24 that correct? 25 A. That is correct. But then there are -- there

Page 78 1 are times where a member has sat for a statement, but 2 then the case has been mediated after that. 3 Q. Okay. And is that usual -- is that usual or 4 unusual in terms of the mediation process? 5 A. That -- 6 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form. Go ahead if 7 you understand. 8 THE WITNESS: That is -- it doesn't happen that 9 often. 10 BY MR. HILKE: 11 Q. Okay. And the example you're talking about, 12 is that from the 1999 to 2011 time frame, or is it after 13 that time period? 14 A. Well, like -- well, back between the -- the -- 15 the time period, mediation was fairly new. I could say 16 I mediated the first case, but mediation was fairly new 17 and the -- a lot of the mediations took place after the 18 interview -- after the interview, but then it -- it 19 evolved to where the mediations were taking place after 20 the member was served with the allegations. 21 Q. Okay. So -- just so I -- just so I understand 22 it right -- okay. When did you -- when did you conduct 23 the first mediation? 24 A. Oh, wow. I would -- I would have to say -- 25 five, six -- if I had to guess, maybe somewhere around	Page 80 1 correct. 2 Q. Okay. 3 A. The victim or complaint do not. 4 Q. Your Counsel just mentioned that when I -- 5 sometimes, the double negatives are confusing for the 6 record, but it's correct that the victim and complainant 7 play no role in mediation, right? 8 A. That is correct. 9 Q. Okay. Now, so some -- one way that complaints 10 could come in to the department during this time frame 11 is if a complainant was arrested and they made an outcry 12 of, for example, being mistreated during their arrest, 13 that could be taken in as a complaint by the department, 14 correct? 15 A. Correct. 16 Q. And department members were obligated to 17 report any outcries of mistreatment, so that such an 18 investigation could take place, correct? 19 A. That is correct. 20 Q. Was there any -- so was there any policy that 21 prevented investigators from investigating a complaint 22 where the complainant had subsequently pleaded guilty or 23 been found guilty of a crime? 24 A. I'm sorry, can you repeat that one more -- 25 Q. Yeah. Like, I'll give an example. Say a
Page 79 1 2008 or '9, maybe. I'm not -- I was -- I'm just really 2 -- I'm not certain of the date, but I -- I recall it. I 3 really -- I recall the mediation, but -- yeah. 4 Q. What was the reason for the department 5 introducing mediation as a way to resolve CRs? 6 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form, foundation. 7 THE WITNESS: I -- I -- I think -- I believe it 8 is -- it was to -- to resolve -- I -- I won't say 9 resolve cases quickly, but if we can have officers 10 come in and admit their wrongdoing, then we can move 11 forward with the investigation and -- and close out 12 these cases, instead of spending a lot of time in -- 13 in doing investigative work and interviewing a lot 14 of people, when the member can just come in and 15 admit their wrongdoing and be -- you know, penalized 16 for it. And then we -- so we can just move on. 17 BY MR. HILKE: 18 Q. I apologize if I asked this, but the victim or 19 complainant, they do not participate in the mediation 20 process, correct? 21 A. No. 22 MR. MICHALIK: That is correct? 23 BY MR. HILKE: 24 Q. You mean is that correct? 25 A. Oh, that is -- I'm sorry. That -- that is	Page 81 1 complainant says, you know, I was falsely arrested for 2 jaywalking. I didn't jaywalk, and then they plead 3 guilty to jaywalking. Would the department be prevented 4 from investigating their outcry of false arrest? 5 A. Prevented from it? No. No. So I mean, if -- 6 if he's making the allegation that he's false -- he's 7 been falsely arrested, the department will generate a 8 log number for that complaint. 9 Q. Okay. And then, you know, say it's -- say 10 it's something more serious, right? Like, say it's a -- 11 say it's a domestic battery and the complainant says I 12 was falsely arrested. I've got a complaint against the 13 officers who arrested me and then they plead guilty to 14 the crime. Is there any policy or practice that if the 15 investigator learns the guilty plea, they should stop 16 investigating the allegation? 17 A. If -- if the member learns of the guilty plea? 18 No. 19 MR. MICHALIK: If the investigator learns of 20 the guilty plea? 21 MR. HILKE: Yes, correct. 22 MR. MICHALIK: I'm not sure -- 23 BY MR. HILKE: 24 Q. Correct. Like, the investigator is 25 investigating this complaint of false arrest.

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1 A. Okay.

2 Q. One of the pieces of evidence the investigator
3 gathers is oh, I learned in the criminal case, my
4 complainant -- the complainant has pleaded guilty to
5 this offense. My question is: At that point, is there
6 any policy or practice for that investigator to stop
7 investigating at that point?

8 A. No. So the -- the investigation's going to
9 move forward. So you -- when, like, you gave the
10 example of domestic, so when dealing with domestic
11 cases, we -- we -- there -- there isn't an
12 administrative allegation associated with the -- the
13 domestic case, and it can be as simple as a case -- the
14 case report number that will lead the investigator to
15 review the actual -- case report, or there can be more
16 information within the -- the face sheet and the
17 administrative case that would -- would lead the
18 investigator to take a deeper dive and investigate the
19 -- the different elements that are contained within the
20 -- the original administrative complaint into the
21 domestic.

22 Q. Yeah. I --

23 A. You know what I mean? So there's -- there's
24 -- because you're -- we're talking about a criminal,
25 domestic case and then we're talking about an

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1 administrative log number that has to be satisfied
2 during the criminal case for the investigator.

3 Q. Yeah. And actually, I -- let me -- let me put
4 a different example in front of you so I'm not -- so I
5 can keep straight what I'm trying to talk about. So you
6 know, call it just, like -- call it just, like, a
7 battery, right? Not a -- not a domestic, just one
8 person battering another, right? And so, Person A is
9 arrested for battery. Their complaint is I didn't hit
10 anyone, the officers made it up. I was falsely
11 arrested. I want that investigated. Investigators
12 working on the case. They later learn in their
13 investigation, that Person A has pleaded guilty to
14 battery. Would that stop the investigation, according
15 to any policy or practice the department had?

16 A. No. So -- no, because during the course of
17 the investigation, we -- we have to continue it because
18 we're going to interview the complainant that's saying
19 that he was falsely arrested for battery and -- and ask
20 him a series of questions regarding what transpired
21 during this battery case.

22 Q. Sure.

23 A. And if we -- during that course of that
24 interview, if we -- if we determine, okay, the member
25 pleads guilty, that -- no, that -- we can also bring him

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1 back in and say, okay, you're -- you're saying that you
2 were wrongfully arrested, but yet you plead guilty for
3 battery and why would you do that? So he might -- he
4 might say, well, I -- I wasn't, you know, you don't know
5 how it's going to play out. So during the course of the
6 administrative investigation, you have to ask a series
7 of questions and if we re-interview the complainant, he
8 might say, well, I was just making it up and I wasn't
9 falsely arrested. So and that would play out during
10 the, you know, also the administrative Q and A.

11 Q. That makes sense. So just so I understand
12 from the investigator, the guilty plea wouldn't be
13 dispositive, it would be important to follow up with the
14 complainant and ask why they pleaded guilty?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. The department would want to know if they
17 pleaded guilty, just because they got a favorable deal,
18 as opposed to really admitting that they had committed
19 the crime, correct?

20 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form, incomplete
21 hypothetical.

22 THE WITNESS: Okay. Can you -- can you repeat
23 that?

24 BY MR. HILKE:

25 Q. I kind of -- saying that the department would

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1 want to know if there was some reason other than -- the
2 department would want to know whether the person pleaded
3 guilty, because they really -- they really admitted they
4 had done it, as opposed to other reasons they might have
5 pleading guilty, like to avoid a harsher sentence,
6 correct?

7 MR. MICHALIK: Object to form. Go ahead.

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's -- that's -- that's
9 exactly -- we just -- we want to know, really, why
10 you would plead guilty in court when you're making
11 this allegation that you are wrong -- wrongfully
12 arrested for battery.

13 BY MR. HILKE:

14 Q. One second. And why would the department want
15 to have that follow up conversation instead of just, you
16 know, looking at a transcript of a -- of a plea under
17 oath and saying, well, that's good enough. That is
18 dispositive of what actually happened here?

19 MR. MICHALIK: Object to form.

20 THE WITNESS: Well, because you -- yeah. Well,
21 in order to do a -- a thorough investigation, you
22 just want to close out all avenues and you -- if the
23 person is pleading guilty in court, we just -- we
24 need to just hear from that person, why that person
25 would do that so we can complete this investigation

Page 86 1 and make sure it's thorough and that every avenue's 2 been -- it's been closed. 3 BY MR. HILKE: 4 Q. Got It. And by being thorough and every 5 avenue being closed, you mean getting a full explanation 6 from the complainant of what additional information they 7 may have to provide, correct? 8 MR. MICHALIK: Object to form. 9 THE WITNESS: Yes. 10 MR. HILKE: Okay. Let's take break. We'll go 11 ten minutes. 12 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: All right. We're off the 13 record. The time is 11:49. 14 (OFF THE RECORD) 15 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: All right. We are back on 16 the record in the deposition of Timothy Moore. 17 Today is March 19, 2024 and the time is 12:04 p.m. 18 MR. HILKE: Let's mark Exhibit number 2, 19 CR 29405. This is General Order in 93-0303. 20 (EXHIBIT 2 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION) 21 MR. MICHALIK: Counsel -- 22 MR. HILKE: Yeah. 23 MR. MICHALIK: -- before we start, this 24 particular exhibit is marked confidential. 25 MR. HILKE: Oh, fine. Yeah. I see that.	Page 88 1 designate this as confidential for purposes now, 2 but, you know, we can talk about it afterwards. 3 MR. HILKE: All right. I -- let's do this. 4 I've marked the exhibit. I'm going to invite the 5 witness to read it, and then I think we're going to 6 be able to go off the -- off the confidential record 7 to ask questions about this policy that's in 8 discovery. 9 MR. MICHALIK: That's fine. 10 MR. HILKE: All right. 11 (CONFIDENTIAL PORTION I REDACTED) 12 BY MR. HILKE: 13 Q. Sir, you've just reviewed Section C, Items 1 14 through 15 of General Order 93-0303, correct? 15 A. That's correct. 16 Q. That's one of the policies you reviewed to get 17 ready for this deposition? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. And that showed the steps that the general 20 orders say need to be taken in an Internal Affairs 21 investigation? 22 A. That is correct. 23 Q. And did -- other than some -- and it includes 24 some language about what should be done if the 25 investigator suspects a criminal prosecution may also be
Page 87 1 MR. MICHALIK: So I think we produced it in a 2 non-confidential way, but to the extent that this 3 exhibit is going to be used, I think we have to 4 designate this part of the deposition as 5 confidential. 6 MR. HILKE: You know, the problem I had was the 7 version you produced had -- was cut off in sections 8 I wanted to use. This is the one in discovery that 9 wasn't cut off. Do you want to take a second and 10 just skim through? It's literally just the policy. 11 MR. MICHALIK: I -- yeah, I don't disagree. I 12 -- you know, it's just that to the extent that this 13 is -- this exhibit is going to be used -- 14 MR. HILKE: Okay. 15 MR. MICHALIK: -- I -- you know, I'm concerned 16 that, you know, that this exhibit has been marked as 17 confidential. That's the issue. Because I think 18 this has been produced in a non-confidential way, 19 so... 20 MR. HILKE: But it's in a -- it's in a form I 21 can't use though because it cut off parts of the 22 policy I need. 23 MR. MICHALIK: All right. Well, let's proceed. 24 MR. HILKE: Yeah. 25 MR. MICHALIK: You know, we'll -- we can	Page 89 1 involved, correct? 2 A. Correct. 3 Q. Other than that, does it differentiate 4 between, you know, General Investigation, Confidential 5 Investigation, or any other kind of investigation? 6 A. No. The -- the initial steps are pretty much 7 the -- the same -- 8 Q. Okay. 9 A. -- with respect to all different sections 10 within the bureau -- Bureau of Internal Affairs. 11 Q. And this is -- this is going back to an 12 earlier topic. I said I would ask you about how does 13 investigative steps proceed for a confidential 14 investigation. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Could you please tell me what's different in 17 terms of the investigative steps during a confidential 18 investigation during this time period? 19 A. Well, the -- it really depends on the nature 20 of the investigation itself than the -- than the -- the 21 case. Typically, when cases make their way to the 22 Confidential Section, those cases are going to require 23 some level of surveillance. Those cases are typically a 24 lot longer to investigate to -- to gather evidence and 25 information regarding the -- whatever particular

Page 90 1 allegation it is. And those cases -- a lot of those 2 cases are criminal in nature. The -- some of those 3 cases involve our policies with respect to people living 4 within the city boundaries, so those are our residency 5 cases. And there are also cases that we handle 6 regarding our medical policy that we investigate, and 7 those -- those cases also require surveillances. 8 Q. So am I correct then that the main difference 9 is that there may be a more complex operational 10 component involving surveillance specifically for these 11 kinds of investigations? 12 A. Yes, you can say that. 13 Q. Okay. Other than the more complex 14 surveillance operations that may be involved, are there 15 any other differences in the steps to be taken in 16 Confidential Investigations? 17 A. Well, yes, because a -- a lot of the -- a lot 18 of the cases that are handled in Confidential, they 19 require a coordination with other agencies, be it the 20 State's Attorney's Office or the U.S. Attorney's Office 21 or our federal partners also get involved in some of our 22 criminal cases over in Confidential. And that does not 23 typically occur with cases that are assigned to Special 24 or General investigations. 25 Q. Got it. And the steps to take to coordinate	Page 92 1 about, the general orders, the special orders, and the 2 standard operating procedures? 3 A. No. No. 4 Q. And so, are you familiar -- this is from the 5 2003 to the 2007 Fraternal Order of Police contract with 6 the requirement that no new complaint register file be 7 opened or -- and no CRB reinvestigated or reopened more 8 than five years after the date the complaint was made 9 known to the police department? 10 A. Yes, I -- I -- I do recall that. 11 Q. And in those instances, the superintendent's 12 requirement -- strike that. The superintendent's 13 approval is required to proceed if so much time has 14 passed, correct? 15 A. That is correct. 16 Q. During 1999 to 2011, what was the process for 17 seeking the superintendent's approval to investigate 18 outside of that time frame? 19 A. So I -- I think -- I -- I don't think there 20 was a -- a written report that was needed. I just think 21 that request was communicated up the chain, and then the 22 chief of Internal Affairs would have, I guess, a 23 conversation with the superintendent. But I don't -- 24 there was not, that -- that I recall, a written request 25 to have that open.
Page 91 1 with other offices, are those also laid out in the 2 general orders and special orders you referred to at the 3 beginning of your deposition? 4 A. I -- I think it -- I think, if I'm not 5 mistaken, it does make -- mention to contact the State 6 Attorney's Office and maybe the U.S. Attorney's Office 7 for assistance with some of our criminal investigations. 8 And it -- it -- it may mention the working with our 9 federal partners as well. 10 Q. Okay. 11 A. Not in that language, but -- 12 Q. Are there any other sources, other than the 13 general orders and special orders, where it's written 14 down the steps to be taken in an investigation when 15 coordinating with other offices? 16 A. I -- I think there is some language in the -- 17 there's a -- there's an SOP that was out back -- back 18 then, standard operating procedures for the whole unit 19 that was out there. And under the Confidential 20 Investigation Section within the SOP, I think it -- it 21 mentioned some of our investigative steps that were to 22 be taken -- 23 Q. Okay. 24 A. -- during that time frame. 25 Q. Got it. Any other sources I'm not asking	Page 93 1 Q. So could have -- is -- so -- and when you say 2 not a written request -- so forgive me if this is 3 obvious, but it would have been a verbal request to seek 4 the permission from the superintendent? 5 A. Yes, because I -- I mean, I just don't -- 6 because a lot of things that we do is done by a to/from 7 or a memo to -- to -- to memorialize it in writing, but 8 I just don't know if that request required that to, from 9 report. And I don't know if it was -- if not, it would 10 have been as simple as, you know, me communicating it to 11 the lieutenant, who would talk to the -- to the chief, 12 who in turn would have a conversation with the 13 superintendent. 14 Q. I understand. Do you have -- do you have any 15 reason to think that a record was kept of how many times 16 the superintendent approved or did not approve such 17 requests during the time frame? 18 A. I don't think there's a -- a record of that. 19 Q. So there -- do you know how many times the 20 superintendent approved or denied requests to 21 investigate outside of the time frame? 22 A. I do not. 23 Q. So it would be if the superintendent had -- 24 strike that. So if -- do you have any sense of, you 25 know, how often the superintendent made such decisions?

Page 94 1 MR. MICHALIK: Object to form, foundation. 2 THE WITNESS: I do not. 3 BY MR. HILKE: 4 Q. Okay. So it'd be consistent with your 5 understanding if the superintendent never approved such 6 an investigation during this time frame, correct? 7 MR. MICHALIK: Object to form. Argumentative, 8 foundation, asked and answered. 9 BY MR. HILKE: 10 Q. I'm just trying to make sure I understand your 11 answer. If the superintendent never approved a request 12 to investigate outside of the time frame, that would be 13 consistent with your knowledge of the process for giving 14 approval outside of five years from 1999 to 2011, 15 correct? 16 MR. MICHALIK: Object to form. 17 THE WITNESS: Well, during that time period, I 18 -- I -- I never -- I personally never had an 19 occasion to request that a case be reopened, me, 20 personally. So -- and as a sergeant investigator 21 back then, that I just -- I -- that -- that never 22 really crossed my desk -- desk or my path, so I just 23 -- I would have no knowledge of that. 24 BY MR. HILKE: 25 Q. Let me go back to the confidential	Page 96 1 that section that after they review the case, they would 2 sign it -- sign off on it. 3 Q. So if a complaint is assigned to the unit and 4 the sergeant is investigating, their lieutenant would 5 approve it when they finish their investigation, 6 correct? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. And if a lieutenant was investigating a 9 sergeant, their commander or whoever's above them in the 10 chain of command would approve it, correct? 11 A. That is -- that's correct. 12 Q. Is it not the commander? 13 A. No, no, no. It's -- it's the commander, 14 because remember, as I said that I was an investigator 15 as a lieutenant -- 16 Q. Yeah. 17 A. -- over at the FBI, so I did handle cases as a 18 lieutenant and my cases were signed off by the commander 19 of Internal Affairs. 20 Q. Okay. And the same is true even if it's 21 assigned to the unit, right? If a unit -- if a unit 22 lieutenant is investigating a unit sergeant, that unit 23 lieutenant's supervisor is going to approve their 24 recommendation? 25 A. That is correct.
Page 95 1 investigation steps for a little bit. After the 2 investigation was finished in a confidential 3 investigation, and now the investigator is making their 4 recommendation for the disposition, does the process 5 from that point on differ in any way from the process 6 you described for other types of investigations? 7 A. No. For -- for -- for your investigation that 8 was conducted in Confidential, within the Bureau of 9 Internal Affairs, that process is the same. Just I want 10 to add one thing, one level of review. So after me, as 11 a sergeant, investigate my case and finish it, my case 12 is reviewed by a lieutenant within that section of 13 Confidential, or when I was working in Special -- 14 Special, the lieutenant would review my case. 15 Q. Okay. 16 A. Then it would move on to either Command 17 Channel or the police review -- review -- review panel. 18 Q. So that -- is that an additional step that 19 applies to all the kinds of investigation we've 20 discussed, that the investigator's supervisor will 21 approve it before it goes to the advocacy section to 22 review? 23 A. That is a -- that's correct. So on our 24 closing summary report for our investigation, there's 25 always a signature line for the -- the lieutenant within	Page 97 1 Q. All right. Okay. Any other differences, just 2 in terms of the stages applying to confidential 3 investigations that we haven't talked about yet? 4 A. Well, we -- when we spoke about the -- the 5 stages within Confidential, yeah, the investigative 6 steps are -- are same as -- as far as processing the 7 case through, the administrative case. The only 8 difference is the -- the criminal cases and the -- the 9 cases that were worked with the -- the task force that 10 was assigned from the Confidential section of Internal 11 Affairs. 12 Q. Which task force are you referring to? 13 A. I'm referring to the Law Enforcement 14 Anti-Corruption Task Force. 15 Q. And what was the -- what was the nature of 16 that task force, the Law Enforcement Anti-Corruption? 17 A. The nature of it? 18 Q. Yeah. 19 A. Like, what do they investigate? Or what -- 20 Q. Yeah, what do they investigate? 21 A. They just -- just allegations of corruption, 22 like coercion, thefts, you know, child trafficking 23 cases, adult trafficking cases, civil rights violation 24 cases. It was just a lot of -- any case that could be 25 -- that would be handled at the federal level that

Page 98 1 involved law enforcement officers. And not just CPD, 2 any law enforcement officer in the Northern District of 3 Illinois. 4 Q. And was this task force in effect for the 5 entirety of the 1999 to 2011 period? 6 A. I'm -- I'm not sure if it was in effect back 7 in 1999, because that kind of predates my involvement on 8 the task force, but I -- I know it was in effect as far 9 back, as I can recall, 2006. 10 Q. 2006. So you're aware that the first -- are 11 you aware that the first -- are you aware that the FBI 12 was engaged in the investigation of Ronald Watts as 13 early as 2004? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Was this task force in effect then? 16 MR. MICHALIK: I'm just going to object. This 17 is beyond the scope of this particular 30(b)(6) 18 deposition. You can answer if you know. 19 THE WITNESS: Well, I -- I can say that there 20 were CPD officers assigned to the FBI to work that 21 case at the time. Whether or not it was considered 22 a task force that was under an MOU, I'm not certain 23 of that, but I know that there were officers that 24 were embedded in the FBI to -- that were working on 25 this case. But to -- if -- I don't want to call it	Page 100 1 a fact not in evidence. 2 BY MR. HILKE: 3 Q. The let me ask it as a question. The -- what 4 you described as a task force, in effect, in -- 5 actually, let me take two steps back. Aside from CPD, 6 were there other agencies who participated in the task 7 force that you were talking about? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Did the FBI participate in the task force? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Did the U.S. Attorney's Office participate in 12 the task force? 13 A. They weren't -- they weren't on the task 14 force. They didn't have a physical presence in the FBI 15 space, but our investigations involved coordination with 16 the U.S. Attorney's Office, but they were not actually 17 on the task force and part of the memorandum of 18 understanding that governed the -- the task force that I 19 was on. 20 Q. Okay. And was that the same -- was that same 21 task force in existence at the -- at the end of 2011, at 22 the end of the time period we're talking about today? 23 A. Well, so when -- here's the thing. So when I 24 started working in the FBI space, that was 2014, and -- 25 and at that point is when they brought on board the
Page 99 1 a task force back then when I wasn't aware -- if I'm 2 not aware that there was a -- an MOU in place. 3 BY MR. HILKE: 4 Q. Okay. And this is -- the reason that you 5 brought up the task force is because there are different 6 practices for investigating CRs as to this task force, 7 correct? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Okay. And do you know if this task force -- 10 do you know if this task force was ever connected with 11 the investigation into Ronald Watts? 12 A. Well, see, like -- like I said, I mean, I 13 don't -- at the time back then, I don't -- it's hard for 14 me to call it a task force. I know that there were 15 officers assigned to the -- the FBI at that time, or 16 working with the FBI, working out of the FBI space, but 17 I don't -- I just know when I was there, I was on a task 18 force. 19 Q. What -- at the end of the Watts investigation, 20 you personally did the final steps of the administrative 21 proceedings against Watts and Mohammed, correct? 22 A. That is correct. 23 Q. Was the -- and at that point, it was a task 24 force, right? That's after 2006, correct? 25 MR. MICHALIK: I'm going to object. It assumes	Page 101 1 state police, the county sheriff's police, and there was 2 an MOU, and that formulated the actual task force. 3 Prior to me being there, there were officers assigned to 4 the FBI to work certain cases. Now, those officers -- 5 sergeants did not work in Internal Affairs, right? They 6 worked out of what's called VTeck Services (phonetic), 7 which is over -- overseen by the first deputy's office. 8 So it wasn't until I got there that I had a physical 9 presence at the FBI, but was assigned to the Bureau of 10 Internal Affairs, if you understand what I'm saying. So 11 there -- 12 Q. I do -- 13 A. -- was changes that -- that took place when I 14 arrived. 15 Q. Yeah. And I don't really care what we call 16 it. What I'm really trying to get at is you're talking 17 about policies and practices being different for some 18 kinds of investigations within CPD. And I guess when 19 you're talking about -- one second. I guess for -- can 20 you define for me, like, the kinds of investigations, 21 involving collaborations with other agencies, where 22 there was a distinct set of practices and policies in 23 this time period? 24 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form, vague. 25 THE WITNESS: '99 to 2011?

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1 BY MR. HILKE:

2 Q. Yeah. And what I'm trying to ask is, I've
3 gotten mixed up in whether it's a task force or a
4 collaboration with the FBI that predated the task force.
5 And I don't care what it's called, all I want to know is
6 about the kinds of investigations where the policies and
7 practices were different from what we're talking about.
8 So if you could define for me what you're referring to
9 when you're talking about a set of investigations where
10 the policies and practices were different, that would be
11 very helpful, and we can go from there.

12 A. Okay. Different from -- from the two
13 different time periods, or different from -- in what
14 respect?

15 Q. Different from the stages you've talked about
16 that apply to general investigations, confidential
17 investigations, any category of investigations we've
18 already talked about.

19 A. Okay. Got you. So even been dating back from
20 1999 to 2011, cases that were assigned to the
21 confidential investigations sections that were worked up
22 at the -- in FBI space, when it -- when it came to
23 investigating those cases, those cases were heavily
24 coordinated by the FBI, because those were what was
25 considered to be the FBI's cases. That CPD had a role

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1 in assisting the FBI in investigating these cases and --
2 and working those cases up to potential charging of --
3 of -- of officers. So when -- when those cases are
4 near, like, completion, right? We still -- those cases
5 also had a complaint register number, or a log number,
6 associated with those cases that was housed at the
7 Bureau of Internal Affairs. And those cases were
8 assigned to the sergeants that were on the FBI task
9 force. So depending on what happened with the
10 investigation against the officer, that was handled at
11 the FBI building. The sergeants assigned to the FBI
12 will -- will finalize the case and go through those
13 steps of typing up summaries, conducting their
14 interviews, and making a finding based on the result of
15 the -- the case and the allegations that were made at
16 the time the case was initiated, if that helps you.

17 Q. It does. Okay. So what you were just talking
18 about refers to investigations in the Confidential
19 Investigation Section where the FBI was working together
20 with CPD, and it would also include the task force that
21 you described earlier, correct?

22 MR. MICHALIK: Objection, misstates the
23 testimony.

24 THE WITNESS: Well, between 19 -- 1999 and
25 2011, I cannot say for certain that that was

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1 considered a task force that these sergeants from
2 Internal Affairs were working on.

3 BY MR. HILKE:

4 Q. And I'm sorry, I didn't mean, was it a task
5 force? I just meant what -- you know, whether it was a
6 task force or not. You're aware that CPD confidential
7 investigations worked with the FBI in an investigation?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And that's what you were just talking about
10 now, correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So --

13 MR. MICHALIK: I don't mean to -- but we could
14 call it a joint investigation. I think that would
15 clear it up.

16 BY MR. HILKE:

17 Q. Yeah. Can we call it a joint investigation?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Between CPD and the FBI.

21 Q. And the FBI. Good. Were there any -- now, is
22 the Bureau of Internal Affairs SOP where I would look
23 for documentation about joint investigations?

24 A. I -- I -- I think there is a -- a paragraph in
25 the SOP under the Confidential Section that -- that

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1 mentions working with outside agencies on
2 investigations.

3 Q. Is there any other written source you're aware
4 of that addresses joint investigations?

5 A. That would be in the MOU.

6 Q. When did CPD first enter -- during this time
7 period, when did CPD first enter into an MOU with the
8 FBI?

9 A. I -- I don't -- I'm not aware of the -- the
10 date of that.

11 Q. We've received, I believe, just one. So I
12 believe the only MOU we've received in this case in
13 discovery is dated 2011. Are you aware of any other
14 specific documented agreement between the FBI and CPD
15 prior to 2011?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Do you have any -- would you have any basis to
18 disagree that the first MOU between CPD and the FBI was
19 entered in 2011?

20 A. I can't disagree with that.

21 Q. Now, in terms of the MOU between the -- in
22 terms of -- and MOU means memorandum of understanding,
23 right?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Were the -- is a memo of understanding between

Page 106 1 the FBI and CPD specific to an individual case, or 2 governing all investigations between the -- all joint 3 investigations? 4 A. All joint investigations. 5 Q. Okay. And did the memorandum of understanding 6 prohibit the Chicago Police Department from moving 7 administratively to discipline an officer who was being 8 investigated in the joint investigation? 9 A. I would -- I would have to review the document 10 to see what the actual language is in the MOU. 11 Q. Okay. And do you have any -- your basis to 12 testify about the memorandum of understanding, is it 13 based on knowledge of any specific conversations that 14 occurred, or would it just be based on the written text 15 of the document? 16 A. As to the written test of -- text of the -- of 17 the document. 18 Q. Okay. And do you have any reason to believe 19 that the Chicago Police Department, during this time 20 period, ever consulted with the FBI about moving for -- 21 administratively for discipline against a police 22 officer? 23 A. I have no knowledge. 24 Q. Do you have any reason to believe that the CPD 25 ever consulted with the FBI about changing the	Page 108 1 A. No, I am not. 2 Q. Okay. All right. Exhibit 4, PL Joint 83511. 3 It's an excerpt of Evaluation of the Use of The 4 Affidavit Override. Sir, have you seen this document 5 before? 6 (EXHIBIT 4 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION) 7 THE WITNESS: I have not. 8 BY MR. HILKE: 9 Q. All right. This is an inspector general 10 report, the Chicago's inspector general, about the 11 affidavit override procedure at CPD. 12 A. Okay. 13 Q. Let me -- one second, please. Let me refer 14 you to Page 8 of the document. 15 A. Okay. 16 Q. And the situation -- and situations in which 17 the affidavit is required. The first sentence there 18 says, in situations in which an affidavit is required, 19 at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, the 20 investigator should either -- should have either secured 21 an affidavit, or determined whether it is appropriate to 22 request an affidavit override; do you see that sentence? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Now, the affidavit requirement, did that come 25 into effect -- and strike that. That's a requirement
Page 107 1 assignment around -- yeah, changing the assignment of an 2 officer who was under investigation? 3 A. Can you repeat that one more time? 4 Q. Yeah. So for example, like, moving to desk 5 duty or reassigning to another district or role, do you 6 have reason to believe the CPD ever consulted with the 7 FBI about moving an officer who is a subject of a joint 8 investigation to another assignment? 9 A. You know, is that during that time frame? 10 Q. During that time frame? 11 A. No, I have no knowledge. 12 Q. Okay. So I'll mark Exhibit 3. We'll mark 13 this part of the deposition confidential, since this 14 does have a confidential stamp on it. 15 (EXHIBIT 3 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION) 16 THE WITNESS: Yep. 17 (CONFIDENTIAL PORTION II REDACTED) 18 BY MR. HILKE: 19 Q. And other than the document we've just looked 20 at, which is City BG62266 and is marked confidential, 21 you're not aware of any other written document 22 reflecting the memorandum of understanding between the 23 FBI and Chicago Police Department, are you? 24 A. Are you talking about from that time frame -- 25 Q. During this time frame?	Page 109 1 that a civilian complainant -- strike that. That's a 2 requirement that a sworn affidavit be submitted in 3 support of a civilian complaint, in most circumstances, 4 before that complaint can be fully investigated, 5 correct? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Okay. And did that requirement take effect 8 with the 2003 to 2007 FOP contract? Do you know when 9 that requirement started at CPD? 10 A. No, I don't know the exact time frame of when 11 that requirement was in place. 12 Q. What were -- what were the circumstances that 13 caused that requirement to be implemented in CPD 14 investigations? 15 A. I -- I don't know. 16 Q. Would you have any reason to disagree that 17 it's because it was bargained between the police union 18 and the department in their 2003 to 2007 contract? 19 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form of the 20 question. It assumes facts not in evidence. 21 THE WITNESS: I have no reason to disagree with 22 that. 23 BY MR. HILKE: 24 Q. Okay. So then the -- was that sentence we 25 just read, that once a preliminary investigation is

Page 110 1 done, the investigator needs to have an affidavit if one 2 is required or determine whether to request an affidavit 3 override, was that true during this time period at the 4 point in which the affidavit requirement was introduced? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. And the sentence at the bottom -- there's a 7 sentence at the bottom. Interviewing the accused CPD 8 member is the only investigative action prohibited 9 before an affidavit or override is obtained. Was that 10 true as to investigations once the affidavit requirement 11 was introduced during this time period? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Who -- in an investigation, it's the -- kind 14 of, like, the sister agency that can actually approve an 15 affidavit override. It's BIA for OPS-IPRA and vice 16 versa? 17 A. That is correct. 18 Q. Whose decision is it to request an over write 19 from -- ride from the sister agency? 20 A. Well, the request initially is going to be 21 made by the investigator to the investigator's immediate 22 supervisor. And yeah, it's going to come from the 23 investigator. 24 Q. And then does it go all the way up the chain 25 of command, so the head of one agency asks for it from	Page 112 1 A. Those cases that -- at the district level that 2 would -- would -- would -- would require an affidavit 3 override, that's -- it was -- those cases are getting 4 into the area where those cases will probably be 5 reassigned back to Internal Affairs because now we're -- 6 it's becoming a time-consuming investigation. You know 7 what I mean? So there will be a judgment call made of 8 whether or not that case will remain at the district 9 unit level or if that case will be brought back to the 10 Bureau of Internal Affairs if there are extra 11 investigative -- investigative steps that will be 12 -- 13 Q. Sure. 14 A. -- taken to complete that case. 15 Q. You -- so if I understand, do you mean that if 16 a unit supervisor requested an affidavit override, 17 there's a decent chance that that might prompt the case 18 to be reassigned to BIA? 19 A. That's correct. 20 Q. Do you know whether any unit supervisor ever 21 requested an affidavit override during this time period? 22 A. I do not. 23 Q. And you don't have knowledge of any location 24 where that information would be tracked, do you? Or 25 documented?
Page 111 1 the head of the other agency? 2 A. That is correct. 3 Q. Did -- are you aware of any guidance that was 4 provided to unit investigators, like supervisors of 5 units, where complaints were referred to as to when and 6 how to request affidavit overrides? 7 A. So I'm not familiar with that process of what 8 occurred at the district level or unit level. 9 Q. Sure. But I guess from the Chicago Police 10 Department, are you aware of any information that the 11 department provided to supervisors in the unit about 12 affidavit overrides? 13 A. No. The only thing that they would have at 14 their disposal to review is our department policy -- 15 policies. Other than that, there's nothing that BIA 16 just handed to the investigators that spoke about the 17 overrides. 18 Q. Okay. So it would just be among all the 19 policies provided to the supervisors, correct? 20 A. That's correct. 21 Q. Then on Page -- if you'll look at Page 12 of 22 the report -- 23 A. Can I -- can I add something to that? So 24 those -- 25 Q. Sure.	Page 113 1 A. No. 2 Q. Turning back to Page 12, if you'll look at the 3 third paragraph, the -- Page 12 says that BIA -- it 4 refers to BIA, COPA, and their respective predecessor 5 agencies. It was -- COPA is what replaced IPRA, and 6 IPRA is what replaced OPS, correct? 7 A. Correct. 8 Q. So the predecessor agencies to COPA are IPRA 9 and -- 10 A. OPS. 11 Q. Thank you. It's IPRA and OPS, right? 12 A. Correct. 13 Q. So the -- this document says that BIA, COPA, 14 and their predecessor agencies submitted a total of 98 15 affidavit override requests between February 18, 2005, 16 and December 26, 2018, but that 64 of those 98 requests 17 were submitted after January 1, 2016. Do you have any 18 reason to disagree with those numbers? 19 MR. MICHALIK: Objection, foundation. 20 THE WITNESS: No, no reason. 21 BY MR. HILKE: 22 Q. Do you have any reason to think that the 23 Office of Inspector -- and strike that. Has the Office 24 of Inspector General, on occasion -- well, sorry. During 25 this time period, did the Office of Inspector General

Page 114 1 ever participate in a CR investigation? 2 A. I -- I'm not -- I'm not sure if during that 3 time frame, they did. Because now they -- they do, but 4 during that time frame, I'm not sure if they did. 5 Q. Sure. When the offer -- well, strike that. 6 That's fine. Okay. All right. During this time 7 period, was it CPD's policy that an investigator should 8 contact all complainants and witnesses as soon as 9 possible? 10 A. According to the policy? 11 Q. Yes, sir. 12 A. Yes. I think it's -- it's written in the 13 policy, yes. 14 MR. MICHALIK: Okay. He's -- 15 BY MR. HILKE: 16 Q. Okay. And I'm done with the exhibit. 17 A. No, it's just -- 18 Q. Was -- and was that also the expectation, that 19 investigators would contact all complainants and all 20 witnesses as quickly as possible? 21 A. Yes, that -- that was the policy. 22 Q. And did the policy set out that the 23 investigators should, you know, when they weren't -- 24 sorry, I'm -- am I correct that -- strike that. Did the 25 policy require that an investigator -- actually -- I'd	Page 116 1 questions in a -- in a to/from report. 2 Q. And is there any specific guidance that you 3 have knowledge of that was provided to investigators 4 regarding that? 5 A. The -- the -- the guidance for that at the 6 time, that came from our lieutenants. They required -- 7 because they reviewed the case, and they required that 8 these types of investigation be long form Q and A and 9 written-out statements. 10 Q. And when did lieutenants start enforcing that 11 requirement? 12 A. From the -- from the day I stepped foot in BIA 13 in 2006, that was a requirement back then. 14 Q. And that was -- in 2006, remind me, which 15 section of BIA were you in? 16 A. I initially started in Confidential for about 17 five months, and then I was reassigned to Special 18 Investigations for about seven years. 19 Q. Okay. And do you have any basis to say that 20 the same requirement was applied in general 21 investigations? 22 A. Same requirement, yes. 23 Q. Oh, but I mean, what's your basis to say that? 24 A. Because it -- well, in -- in general, they 25 also had a lieutenant and their -- General and Special,
Page 115 1 like to refresh you on -- I'd like to pull up Exhibit -- 2 the exhibit is 93-0303. 3 A. Exhibit 2? 4 Q. Exhibit 2. Thanks. If you'll go to Page 4 5 and 5, and just read Item Number 5, please. 6 MR. MICHALIK: And for the record, you're going 7 to be asking questions about Policy 93-0303, and not 8 Exhibit 2? 9 MR. HILKE: That's correct. I'm just asking 10 about the policy, not -- yeah, correct. 11 THE WITNESS: Okay. 12 BY MR. HILKE: 13 Q. Okay. So having reviewed Policy 93-0303 14 Section 5, when possible with -- strike that. One of 15 the steps in an investigation is to interrogate the 16 accused member, correct? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. And did the department provide any guidance as 19 to when to from memorandum should be used and when 20 statements should be taken? 21 A. Typically, the -- when we're doing the -- the 22 -- the Q and A statements, those are the -- the more 23 serious cases that result in separation of the member, 24 so there's more of a thorough question and answer format 25 as opposed to just having the member respond to	Page 117 1 the way they conducted their investigation was very 2 consistent, very consistent. It is just the type of 3 investigations that were conducted were different, but 4 the manner in which they were conducted were all 5 similar. 6 Q. What's your -- 7 A. I've -- I've -- 8 Q. What's your basis to say that -- 9 A. I've -- I've -- I've seen -- 10 Q. -- they're very similar? 11 A. I've -- I've -- I've seen -- I've seen 12 investigative work from General Investigation Section. 13 I've sometimes worked with people assigned to general to 14 help with their investigations. So it was -- it's the 15 same process. 16 Q. During this time period, 1999 to 2011, how 17 many general investigations did you review? 18 A. That I assist with? 19 Q. That you personally have knowledge of? 20 A. Oh, I would say a couple of thousand. 21 Q. A couple thousand? 22 A. Yeah. 23 Q. Okay. Are general -- for -- during that time 24 period, were general investigations and special 25 investigations, did they operate out of the same

Page 118 1 building? 2 A. Yes. Right -- yes, down the hall from one 3 another. Special Investigations section, we were -- we 4 were contained in two offices, and the rest of the floor 5 at police headquarters was General investigations. So 6 yeah. 7 Q. Where was Confidential Investigations? 8 A. It was offsite. It wasn't inside the police 9 headquarters. It was housed in a -- a separate building 10 on, like, the West Side of Chicago. 11 Q. And the investigation -- oh, actually, 12 specifically, what categories of allegations required 13 statements as opposed to/from memos? 14 A. Category. So it all depends. Like, cases 15 involving an officer intoxication -- intoxicated on 16 duty. Cases involving an officer lying, which would be 17 Rule 14 cases. Those are typically your separation 18 cases, and that requires a to/from format. Any -- 19 really, any case just based on the -- because you're -- 20 you're talking specific category codes. So those -- 21 that can -- that can really be -- it could be anything 22 from -- you're talking about just handled with BIA, 23 right? As opposed to -- because it'll be -- we're 24 talking criminal sexual assault, we're talking excessive 25 force, we're talking, you know, search-and- seizure	Page 120 1 officer down to police headquarters for a Q and A. 2 Q. What other criteria -- what other common 3 criteria for deciding whether to require a statement 4 from the officer, as opposed to a to/from memo, did all 5 the lieutenants use during this time period? 6 A. Well, there -- Okay. So you have your Rule 14 7 cases. Every case that comes in where some officer 8 violated Rule 14, that's a false statement, written or 9 oral. Those are -- those cases should always leave the 10 Bureau of Internal Affairs as separation cases because 11 that's just -- that was -- that was the standard for 12 Rule 14s. So with that said, those cases are always in 13 -- in typed-out, Q-and-A format. 14 Q. And typed out -- when you say typed-out Q and 15 A, you mean there's, like, a live conversation with the 16 accused officer that's recorded in writing, correct? 17 A. Yes. So the -- the investigator is typing out 18 the question, the -- and asking the question, and the 19 accused member would give a response, and then the 20 investigator would type out the response. So it's just 21 whatever is taking place in that conversation will be 22 typed out. And then at the end of it, the accused 23 member will sign off on that document. 24 Q. Any other common criteria? 25 A. I mean, from what I can think of right now,
Page 119 1 complaints. Depending on the severity of the -- the 2 allegations, the penalty can be as stringent as 3 separation. So the category code, that -- that's one 4 thing, but the severity of it and what's uncovered 5 during the course of the investigation, the penalty can 6 -- can be higher. 7 Q. I guess I'm -- were there specific criteria 8 that all lieutenants applied as to when the 9 interrogation of an accused officer should take place in 10 the form of a question-and-answer statement, as opposed 11 to a to/from memo? 12 A. Yeah. So I think the -- the standard was -- 13 one of the criteria were if you had numerous witnesses. 14 For instance, if a complaint occurred in roll call room, 15 you got 20 officers sitting there, right? And you -- 16 you want to get -- get statements from all the officers. 17 Instead of dragging each officer down to the station for 18 a formal Q and A, you can just type out a series of 19 questions related to the allegation and have the 20 officers respond in a -- a typed-out memo regarding the 21 allegation that took place inside the roll call room. 22 So that's -- that was one -- that was one criteria. 23 Like, if you're interviewing multiple people, and 24 depending on the allegation, that could be done in a -- 25 a to/from format, as opposed to bringing each and every	Page 121 1 that's kind of what I recall being some of the criteria. 2 Q. And -- well, do you recall any others right 3 now? 4 A. No. 5 Q. And then did the department do anything, like, 6 in terms of running reports, collecting data, or 7 otherwise monitoring to make sure that those criteria 8 you've just described were consistently enforced? 9 A. No. 10 Q. The -- it was also the policy, CPD's policy, 11 that interrogation should include all members of the 12 department who had knowledge of whether the alleged 13 misconduct occurred, correct? 14 A. Correct. 15 Q. And it was also the policy that officers were 16 not allowed to submit joint statements, correct? 17 A. Correct. 18 Q. And what was the reason for specifically 19 prohibiting joint statements? 20 A. Well, we need -- we needed to have each and 21 every officer's independent recollection of what took 22 place that required this investigation to take place. 23 So yeah, each officer was responsible for drafting their 24 own report or sitting for the respective Q-and-A 25 interview.

Page 122 1 Q. And were officers allowed to work together on 2 their statements when they sent -- like, as in exchange 3 information with one another about what they would 4 submit in a to/from report? 5 A. Were they allowed to? 6 Q. Yeah. 7 A. Well, they -- so what they -- what they did 8 was -- well, we -- when you receive some of these 9 reports, you would look at them and -- and you would 10 notice that, okay, there's a lot of similarities in this 11 verbiage between these seven witnesses, and even 12 sometimes to the point where if one word is misspelled, 13 they're misspelled on every last document, so you know 14 that all they did was change their name. So me 15 personally, I would either bring them in for a Q and A, 16 or I would -- I would not accept the report. 17 Q. And was that a policy you were following, or 18 your personal discretion in your -- 19 A. That was my discretion as an investigator. 20 Q. Were you ever told by a supervisor to do that, 21 one way or another? 22 A. No. 23 Q. Are you aware of any broader policy or 24 practice for reviewing statements in the way you did, of 25 trying to identify if the officers had collaborated on	Page 124 1 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form. 2 THE WITNESS: Typically, the -- if the -- if 3 the case is handled by the Bureau of Internal 4 Affairs, the immediate supervisor may only be made 5 aware of the case when the notification goes to the 6 -- the district or unit to have the member answer to 7 the allegations or -- or if the member is called 8 down for a statement. Other than that, the 9 supervisor would not have much knowledge of the 10 investigation. Only during the notification process 11 to have that member submit paperwork or acknowledge 12 the allegations or be interviewed. 13 BY MR. HILKE: 14 Q. Got it. And what about after the 15 investigation? Does a supervisor learn the outcome of 16 the investigation after the investigation is complete? 17 A. No, just the member. 18 Q. And I know you said you specified BIA before. 19 Would you have any reason it would -- to believe it was 20 different for OPS or IPRA investigations? 21 A. I -- I have no reason -- or no knowledge of 22 their processes. 23 Q. So is it fair then that, as far as you know, 24 the only instance in which a supervisor of an accused 25 officer would learn of the disciplinary recommendation
Page 123 1 the statements they were going to give? 2 A. I'm not -- I'm not sure. I don't want to say 3 there -- that there isn't any policy, but I just -- if 4 there is, I just can't recall where that policy would -- 5 would lie. 6 Q. It's -- if the policy were in writing, it 7 would be in one of the places we've talked about 8 already, correct? 9 A. That's correct. 10 Q. And in terms of a practice, I know you already 11 said your supervisor didn't tell you to do one way or 12 another, but are you aware of any practice of 13 supervisors telling their investigators to look, or not 14 to look, for those kinds of similarities between 15 officers' to/from reports? 16 A. As far as policy and practice, no. But I -- I 17 knew -- I do know that supervisors have had 18 conversations with investigators regarding, you know, 19 catching that. But as far as a -- a policy, or stating 20 a policy when they're having these conversations, I'm -- 21 I'm not aware of that. 22 Q. Okay. So under what circumstances would the 23 supervisors of accused officers be made aware of the CR 24 of the complaint made against an officer under their 25 supervision?	Page 125 1 is if the supervisor actually investigated it because it 2 was assigned to the unit? 3 A. That's correct. Or if the -- or if the 4 accused officer tells the supervisor. 5 Q. Sure. And if the complaint was assigned to 6 the unit, even in that situation, would the supervisor 7 who investigated the complaint learn the ultimate 8 outcome of -- you know, like, after it got sent up for 9 approval and final disposition? 10 A. No. 11 Q. And is that true for all kinds of 12 investigations, general investigations, criminal 13 investigations, and confidential investigations? 14 A. For General, Special, yes. For Confidential, 15 the supervisor may be made aware of the outcome if it 16 becomes newsworthy. Other than that, it -- there will 17 be no in internal notification to the supervisor if the 18 case was handled by Confidential. 19 Q. And when you say would become newsworthy, can 20 you explain what you mean? 21 A. Well, a -- a lot of times, cases that are 22 handled in -- in Confidential that are criminal in 23 nature, it -- it becomes newsworthy. And then of 24 course, the supervisor can see it in writing, or in the 25 news, and learn of the disposition of the case.

Page 126 1 Q. So you mean literally, that -- 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. -- they might see it on TV or the news? 4 A. They might see it on Channel 2 or 3. Yes. 5 Q. Okay. And why didn't CPD give supervisors 6 more information about CRs against their subordinates? 7 A. Why didn't they? 8 Q. Yeah. 9 A. I don't -- I don't know. I think it was -- it 10 was a judgment call from the department higher up. So I 11 just -- I just don't -- I can't -- I don't -- I don't 12 know. 13 Q. In terms of -- did supervisors have access to 14 the -- strike that. Could you -- could supervisors, 15 like in the various, you know, units and divisions of 16 the CPD, could they find out what CRs had been initiated 17 against their subordinates if they wanted to? 18 A. I guess if -- if they wanted to, yes. If they 19 wanted to request some of their disciplinary history 20 from the Records Division within the Bureau of Internal 21 Affairs, they can. And that typically takes -- takes 22 place if a department supervisor, like a -- a -- a 23 tactical supervisor or lieutenant, is considering 24 placing an officer, like, on a tactical team. So you 25 just want to look at their -- their history or their	Page 128 1 transition from OPS to IPRA. 2 A. Okay. 3 Q. When did OPS end and IPRA start? 4 A. I would be guessing. 5 Q. Okay. That's all right. What were the -- 6 operationally, what changed when OPS became IPRA? 7 A. I -- I think the -- the -- the biggest 8 difference, from what I recall, is that IPRA -- OPS had 9 sworn officers assigned to that unit, as opposed to 10 IPRA, where it was all civilian investigators. That was 11 the biggest -- that was the biggest change. 12 Q. Okay. Any other major changes between the 13 entities that you're aware of? 14 A. I -- I think a -- a big part of IPRA was a bit 15 more transparency in their investigation. Yeah. 16 Q. So a change in how much information was shared 17 about investigations they did, correct? 18 A. Yeah. 19 Q. Anything else? 20 A. Not that I can recall right now. 21 Q. And is it correct that many of the staff would 22 work at -- that OPS joined IPRA when IPRA was formed? 23 A. I'm not certain of that. 24 Q. You wouldn't have any reason to agree or 25 disagree, fair enough?
Page 127 1 background and just make a request to see it prior to 2 making a decision. 3 Q. And did that history include just sustained 4 CRs or all dispositions and CRs? 5 A. It -- it typically contains a five-year 6 sustained history. 7 Q. Okay. So just sustained in just the last five 8 years, correct? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And so beyond sustained in the five years -- 11 in the last five years, would supervisors be able to 12 access any other disciplinary information about 13 subordinates if they wanted to? 14 A. The SPAR history. 15 Q. Okay. And other than SPAR history and CR, 16 anything else to -- 17 A. You talking about the -- the findings of, 18 like, all their -- their cases? 19 Q. Yeah. 20 A. A -- a request can be made. And if the -- if 21 the -- the chief agrees to it, they -- they could 22 provide it. But normally, that's at a -- a higher 23 level, and if the commander of the unit requests that, 24 typically, that request is honored. 25 Q. Okay. So I want to ask you a little about the	Page 129 1 A. I would not have reason to disagree. 2 Q. Okay. And -- one second. In terms of -- if I 3 understood your testimony, in terms of operations, in 4 terms of how IPRA actually conducted its investigations, 5 are you aware of anything that IPRA was able to do in 6 investigations that OPS, its predecessor agency, could 7 not do in investigations? 8 A. I'm not aware. 9 MR. HILKE: I only have, like, another 15 10 minutes. And you, how are you doing? 11 MR. MICHALIK: I'm fine. How are you doing? 12 THE WITNESS: I'm good. 13 BY MR. HILKE: 14 Q. Okay. Exhibit 5. To my knowledge, this -- so 15 this is General Order 933, City BG-59013. Well, let me 16 -- I'm going to draw your attention kind of far back in 17 the packet to 59060. Is that -- no, I'm sorry. 59063, 18 please. 19 (EXHIBIT 5 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION) 20 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thanks. 21 BY MR. HILKE: 22 Q. And these are -- this is the order on summary 23 punishment. This would be the order describing how what 24 you referred to earlier as SPARs are implemented, 25 correct?

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1 A. Correct.

2 Q. Now, the -- all right. So looking at 2A, the
3 definitions. SPARs are an alternative to complaint
4 register disciplinary procedures, specifically for
5 conduct defined as a less serious transgression,
6 correct?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. And that 2B gives a definition. What less
9 serious transgression means is it's an act or omission
10 listed in Item 4 of this addendum, correct?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. And it further says that it's the items on
13 that list which warrant prompt and appropriate action,
14 but do not require a complaint register number, right?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. So even if a complaint or -- strike that. Even
17 if an act or a mission falls under one of the items in
18 Item 4, one of the less serious transgressions, that can
19 still be escalated to a complaint register if the
20 situation warrants, correct?

21 A. Oh, definitely.

22 Q. And is there any, like, specific rule as to
23 how to tell if an act or omission should be treated as a
24 SPAR, or should be treated as a complaint register?

25 A. One -- one thing to consider is the severity

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1 of the infraction and the penalty that's warranted for
2 that infraction. You know, and that's case-by-case.
3 Summary punishment, violation noted, reprimand to a
4 three-day suspension. If you believe that that
5 infraction requires a higher penalty that's going to go
6 beyond the three days, then that case would have to be
7 handled up by a CR investigation.

8 Q. I understand.

9 A. So that's one of the things you want to look
10 at.

11 Q. And during this time period, there's no
12 disciplinary matrix laying out the different punishments
13 to be imposed for different categories of misconduct, is
14 there?

15 A. For SPAR, during -- during that time?

16 Q. During that time in general.

17 A. No.

18 Q. And so, the appropriate punishment is
19 ultimately -- well, strike that. Other than the
20 discretion and judgment of the investigator or
21 supervisor, was there any other basis for identifying
22 what the appropriate penalty would be for different
23 kinds of offenses during this time period?

24 A. Well, yeah. You -- you would weigh in their
25 histories, their complaint history, their disciplinary

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1 history, their SPAR history, and then because you -- you
2 don't -- you don't want to continue giving someone a
3 reprimand for the same infraction because in Internal
4 Affairs, we're -- we're kind of all about progressive
5 discipline if needed be -- need be. So if -- if a
6 member continues to violate certain policies, then the
7 -- the penalty gets more and more severe, to the point
8 where that infraction will not be handled by SPAR and
9 will be handled by a CR number.

10 Q. No, I understand. Let me take a step back
11 because I'm -- the question I'm trying to ask is not
12 just about SPARs, but about kind of any kind of
13 misconduct a supervisor might observe.

14 A. Okay.

15 Q. If -- during this time period, if I'm a
16 supervisor and I observe -- I believe one of my officers
17 has committed misconduct, I have to decide whether I
18 want to handle it as a -- well, you -- I -- your
19 testimony before was one of the ways that supervisor
20 will know whether it should be treated as a SPAR is to
21 figure out what the severity of discipline would be for
22 the misconduct, correct?

23 A. Well, yes. But then also, it depends on what
24 we're talking about here, as far as what -- what
25 infraction, or what misconduct the member is completing.

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1 Even though in attention to duty, it -- it can be, okay,
2 yeah, it's a SPAR, right? It -- it's spelled out. And
3 its duty, it's a SPAR. But depending on what the
4 inattention is, it would be handled as a CR
5 investigation.

6 Q. Sure. And I guess my question is: Other than
7 that supervisor's judgment about what punishment is
8 warranted, is there any other source that was given to
9 the officers to refer to, like, guidelines, examples?
10 Anything, you know, for these different kinds of
11 offenses, this is the kind of punishment you should be
12 looking at?

13 A. Okay. So we -- for this order here, so when
14 you -- for the summary replenishment, are you talking
15 about just discipline in general?

16 Q. I'm just talking about discipline in general.
17 Like, what's the reference point for a supervisor when
18 they're trying to figure out -- you know, is there a
19 reference point given to supervisors in determining what
20 kind of discipline do I think would be warranted for
21 this misconduct?

22 A. No, see, it's hard to answer that question. It
23 could be -- see, I -- I have -- see, me, I have the
24 experience, I -- and I know, you know, because I -- I've
25 been doing this for a long time, but the average

Page 134 1 sergeant in the district -- no, there's -- there's no 2 reference point, but depending on the nature of the 3 infraction, or the complaint, you know, if it's not a 4 citizen-based complaint, then they have the ability to 5 decide whether or not it's going to be handled by SPAR, 6 if a SPAR is warranted, or if it'll be handled as a -- a 7 log number. 8 Q. Got it. So that's kind of in their 9 discretion -- 10 A. Yeah. 11 Q. -- to figure out how to proceed, correct? 12 A. Correct. 13 Q. So -- okay. So the -- if you go to the next 14 page, 59064, and the following page also, Section 4A 15 lists 26 specific, less serious transgressions that can 16 be appropriately disciplined via SPARS, correct? 17 A. Correct. 18 Q. And this is a -- this is an inclusive list, 19 right? 20 A. Yeah. 21 Q. These are all the categories that should be 22 handled by SPARS, correct? 23 A. Correct. 24 Q. Or I should say can be handled by SPARS, 25 because even if it qualifies, you could still make it a	Page 136 1 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form of the 2 question. 3 THE WITNESS: Yes. 4 BY MR. HILKE: 5 Q. Okay. 6 A. But SPARS only go from reprimand to three 7 days. 8 Q. Right. 9 A. So depending on the nature of the infraction, 10 the penalty, it might -- it might require a ten-day 11 suspension that cannot be fulfilled during the SPAR 12 process. 13 Q. So if this list is so broad it could include 14 any misconduct, why even have a list of 26 items? Why 15 not just say any minor misconduct can be treated as a 16 SPAR? 17 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form. 18 THE WITNESS: I didn't create this, unless -- I 19 can't answer that question. 20 BY MR. HILKE: 21 Q. Sure. But based on how broadly it applies, it 22 would've been just as accurate to, instead of 26 items, 23 say, look, if it's -- if you think it's a minor 24 misconduct, it's okay to classify it as a SPAR; is that 25 correct?
Page 135 1 CR, if you thought it warranted, correct? 2 A. Correct. 3 Q. But if an item does not fall -- if you observe 4 misconduct as a supervisor and you can't classify it as 5 one of these 26 categories, it would be inappropriate to 6 proceed with it as a SPAR, correct? 7 A. Correct. But there's -- there's a caveat 8 because if -- if the investigator still wants to make it 9 a less serious transgression, depending on the nature of 10 the infraction, because a lot of this is very specific 11 to smoking inside of a car, that kind of very specific. 12 But then you -- you have failure to perform any duty, 13 right? So that's not telling you exactly what that duty 14 is. So depending on the nature of the allegation, it 15 could be handled as a SPAR, you know? So it's really 16 case by case, of what can be handled as a SPAR, because 17 these -- a lot of this stuff is very specific, but then 18 some of it is very general in language. Failure to 19 perform an assigned task. You know, it's like you can 20 do a CR number, or you can SPAR for numerous things that 21 the officer does. 22 Q. So how far does that extend? I mean, is it 23 the case that any kind of alleged misconduct could be 24 re-classed -- could be phrased as failure to perform a 25 duty and appropriately treated as a SPAR?	Page 137 1 MR. MICHALIK: Object to form. 2 THE WITNESS: I think it's a minor -- yes. 3 BY MR. HILKE: 4 Q. So the list of -- when -- so one of the factor 5 when -- I'm going to ask you a question about CRs, but 6 I'm going to bring it back to SPARS. 7 A. Okay. 8 Q. When a CR is sustained, the recommended 9 discipline can consider other recent sustained CRs, 10 correct? 11 A. It can -- yes. It -- it will -- you have to 12 weigh in their disciplinary histories. Yes. 13 Q. And specifically, the sustained CRs, right? 14 You're not allowed to consider unsustained CRs? 15 A. Right. Your five-year sustained history. 16 Q. Okay. When considering discipline for a CR, 17 are investigators also allowed to consider SPARS that 18 have been applied against the officer? 19 A. Yes. You also received the SPAR history. 20 Q. And for what time frame do you receive the 21 SPAR history? 22 A. That's a good question. It might -- yeah. 23 I'm not certain if it's the five-year SPAR history or 24 the full SPAR history. It's either or. 25 Q. And is it correct that the SPARS are expunged

Page 138 1 after one year? 2 A. They -- they are. 3 Q. And what does that mean, that they're 4 expunged? 5 A. They're -- they're taking off your record. 6 Yeah, I think it -- it falls off your -- your record 7 after a year. 8 Q. Okay. 9 A. You're right. 10 Q. So if it falls off after a year, it wouldn't 11 be considered a discipline then, correct? 12 A. It would -- that -- that is correct. I stand 13 corrected. 14 Q. So does expunging the SPAR mean that actual 15 documents or information about the SPAR are destroyed? 16 A. I think they're -- that means it's -- they're 17 -- it is no longer available to the investigator as -- 18 as for the purposes of weighing in on future penalty. 19 Q. Asking about CRs now, my understanding is that 20 CRs are essentially -- although they -- they're not 21 available in the same way after five years, the actual 22 files are sustained indefinitely; is that correct? 23 A. Yes. 24 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form. 25 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Yes, there is a	Page 140 1 page, describe hearing officer review and complaint 2 review panel. 3 A. Okay. Yes, okay. 4 Q. Okay. So the ability to appeal and have the 5 complaint review panel, that would've been in effect at 6 this time period, correct? 7 A. That's correct. 8 Q. And then looking to the final page, 59070, or 9 Page 8. The SPAR policy actually does provide a 10 schedule of policies for various transgression 11 categories, correct? 12 A. Correct. 13 Q. And so, am I correct that this schedule 14 provides minimums and maximums, meaning any punishment 15 given for a SPAR would have to fall within the period 16 defined -- or nature defined here, based on whether it 17 was first second, third, fourth, or following? 18 A. Correct. 19 Q. Are SPARs only given by direct supervisors of 20 subordinates? 21 A. No, not necessarily. 22 Q. So if a sergeant -- and if a sergeant observes 23 a patrol officer from another unit committing 24 misconduct, they can elect to initiate a SPAR against 25 that officer?
Page 139 1 record. There -- we have the file. 2 BY MR. HILKE: 3 Q. And is the same true for SPARs? Is a SPAR 4 file retained indefinitely, even if it's not made 5 available? 6 A. I -- I'm not certain about how the SPARs are 7 maintained and the retention period for SPARs. 8 Q. Okay. In any event -- one second. All right. 9 And even the -- even -- well, strike that. A sustained 10 CR can be appealed by an officer to the complaint -- to 11 a complaint review panel, correct? 12 A. A sustained CR can be appealed? 13 Q. No, I'm sorry. A SPAR. This -- the SPAR 14 process also includes command -- complaint review panel 15 review, if the officer wants it, correct? 16 A. Correct. 17 Q. And if you look at BG -- 18 A. Well, I'm trying -- I'm trying to think about 19 that because within the -- within the SPAR system, I -- 20 I'm -- I'm trying to think about this in terms of the -- 21 the time frame. 22 Q. Can I interrupt you and just point you to 23 59068, Section C? 24 A. Okay. 25 Q. Describes C on that page and B on the next	Page 141 1 A. Correct. I can SPAR an officer if I'm driving 2 home. 3 Q. Okay. 4 And the policy we've just been looking at was 5 provided to all officers, correct? 6 A. Correct. 7 Q. And so, officers would know, for example, how 8 long a SPAR can be used against him in future 9 disciplinary proceedings, correct? 10 A. Correct. 11 MR. HILKE: Okay. All right. Let's take a 12 break. 13 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're off the record. The 14 time is 1:31 p.m. 15 (OFF THE RECORD) 16 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the record 17 for the deposition of Timothy Moore. Today is 18 March 19, 2024, and the time is 2:13 p.m. 19 BY MR. HILKE: 20 Q. I want to ask a couple of questions about, 21 like, reassignments. Did the disciplinary system play 22 any role in recommending that an officer be reassigned, 23 like, from one assignment to another? 24 A. The disciplinary -- no. No, not the 25 disciplinary role. It did not play a role.

Page 142 1 Q. Okay. And so, likewise, did the disciplinary 2 system play any role in the recommendations that 3 officers be reassigned to desk duty? 4 A. Not the disciplinary role, but the -- the 5 investigation itself may lead to someone being 6 reassigned, but that's at the direction of the 7 superintendent. 8 Q. Okay. And in terms of that decision process 9 of reassignment or being put on desk duty, would that 10 happen with, you know, BIA, OPRA -- or IPRA in 11 communication with the superintendent, or would that 12 instead be located with whatever unit the officer who 13 that was being discussed for sits in? 14 MR. MICHALIK: I'm just going to object to the 15 form that question. Go ahead, if you know. 16 THE WITNESS: Can you -- one more -- can you go 17 over that one more time? 18 BY MR. HILKE: 19 Q. Yeah. I guess I'm trying to understand -- 20 basically, I'm trying to understand more about what you 21 mean when you say the superintendent would make that 22 decision. Would that be the superintendent with the 23 chain of command of the accused officer? 24 A. No. That would skip to the superintendent of 25 police.	Page 144 1 better served by that member not being actively on the 2 street, working. 3 Q. Okay. So even before the investigation is 4 concluded, the chief of BIA can go to the superintendent 5 and say, you know, I think this officer should be on 6 desk duty, correct? 7 A. Correct. 8 Q. Chief of BIA can also say, this officer should 9 at least be reassigned to another unit while the 10 investigation is completed, correct? 11 A. Yes. When it -- yes. But of course, the -- 12 the members do have collective bargaining rights. So 13 it's a little bit harder to move the person from one 14 unit to the next without calls. And a lot of times, 15 they would have to go through legal affairs to -- to 16 make that -- that move happen. 17 Q. I see. Is it more straightforward to put an 18 officer on desk duty than to get them reassigned to 19 another area? 20 A. Yes, it is. 21 Q. And so, would that typically be the 22 recommendation if an officer -- if the thought is that 23 something needs to happen while the investigation 24 continues? Like, meaning desk duty instead of changing 25 units.
Page 143 1 Q. Okay. So -- 2 A. To make the decision of personnel movement. 3 Q. So that's -- okay. And just so I apologize, 4 because I think you just said this, but IPRA, OPS, BIA, 5 they're not involved in that conversation, correct? 6 A. Well when you say -- well when it comes to 7 BIA, for movement purposes, the chief of BIA would 8 probably have a conversation with the superintendent so 9 he can get an understanding of why it's taking place. 10 Q. Okay. 11 A. Because cases -- cases that involve movement 12 of officers, typically, the superintendent is aware of 13 the investigation. So it's -- it's easy for him to 14 decide whether or not to make the decision to move the 15 person because he's aware of the case already. 16 Q. I understand. Does the chief of BIA make any 17 recommendation in that situation? 18 A. Yeah, yeah. In -- in the -- at -- at times, 19 the chief has, yes. 20 Q. Okay. So the chief of BIA -- and actually, at 21 what point in the investigation would such a 22 conversation about reassignment take place? 23 A. It -- it's case by case, and it depends on the 24 -- the nature of the complaint and the allegation to 25 determine whether or not the department as a whole is	Page 145 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Did -- during this time frame, did BIA keep 3 track of how many investigations were assigned at the 4 unit level? 5 A. I would say yes. Yes -- 6 Q. Okay. 7 A. -- that -- that information is tracked. 8 Q. All right. And if I -- am I correct that -- 9 well, strike that. When a CR is initiated, a category 10 code is assigned to the CR, correct? 11 A. That's correct. 12 Q. And those are the codes that the department 13 uses to understand what's the nature of the allegations 14 being made? 15 A. That's correct. 16 Q. Was there any limit on categories of 17 allegations that could be assigned to be to the unit 18 level? 19 A. A limit? 20 Q. Yeah. Meaning, were there any categories of 21 allegations that could never be assigned to the unit 22 level? 23 A. Yes. There are certain category codes that 24 would not -- would not be assigned to a unit level. 25 Q. Which category --

Page 146 1 A. Coercion, for example. It -- all -- all 2 criminal investigations, EEOC complaints are not 3 assigned. Basically, any category code that would fall 4 under Special Investigations, Confidential 5 Investigations. Yeah, most of your -- your criminal 6 cases, those would not be assigned to the units and 7 districts. 8 Q. And you mentioned coercion as a category that 9 wouldn't be assigned to the unit level. What 10 categorizes a coercion complaint? What's a -- what's 11 the definition of coercion? 12 A. I don't know, coercion is when you, I don't 13 know, compel someone to -- to -- to do an act. Yeah. I 14 -- I -- yeah, I don't know the specific definition, but 15 it's -- I know you're -- you're compelling someone to -- 16 to do an act of some sort. 17 Q. Yeah. When you say -- when you say 18 compelling, could you explain a little bit more about 19 what you mean? 20 A. Well, compelling -- so as an officer working 21 with the streets, you -- you -- you want to -- I -- I 22 don't -- it's hard for me to describe it. But you want 23 to make a citizen -- for instance, like a tow truck 24 driver, you -- you want the tow truck driver to -- to 25 call you when -- when it's time to tow cars, so you can	Page 148 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Say you say, I need you to give me a statement 3 against, you know, this other person I'm investigating. 4 If you don't, I'm going to arrest you. Would that 5 constitute coercion? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. None of those CBDs -- none of those should be 8 investigated at the unit level, correct? 9 A. Correct. 10 Q. And we talked before a little about how 11 supervisors would take statements or two from them 12 Miranda from accused officers when supervisors 13 investigated their subordinates. I want to ask you, in 14 the Bureau of Internal Affairs -- actually, so stepping 15 back from that. For Internal Affairs, did they have 16 interview rooms where police officers could come in and 17 give statements if they were required to give 18 statements? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. And were those set up with whatever things 21 might be needed to conduct those interviews? 22 A. Yes. 23 MR. MICHALIK: Objection, vague. Go ahead. 24 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Yes. 25 BY MR. HILKE:
Page 147 1 -- you can benefit from it. 2 Q. So like taking bribes would be an example, 3 correct? Or to seek soliciting bribes -- or I'm sorry. 4 That's not what you're talking about. It sounds like -- 5 A. It's not -- 6 Q. -- you're talking about sort of -- well, 7 coercion -- sorry. Let me take a step -- let me ask you 8 if these are examples that you're talking about. So just 9 to give one example, if an officer -- you know, if 10 someone -- if, for example say that there's someone 11 who's, like engaged in prostitution. If an officer, you 12 know, asks for sex or money in exchange for not 13 arresting that person, would that constitute coercion? 14 A. I -- I would say so, yes. 15 Q. Okay. And if -- what if an officer says, I'm 16 going to put charges on you unless you can bring me -- 17 unless you pay me, would that be coercion? 18 A. I think that's more of extortion. 19 Q. Could -- would extortion -- would complaints 20 of extortion be appropriate to assign to the unit level? 21 A. No. 22 Q. Say it's instead, I need you to bring me a 23 gun, right, a gun that I can, you know, report as 24 getting -- or I'm going to arrest you for some charge, 25 would that constitute coercion?	Page 149 1 Q. You know, for example, you know, they'd have a 2 workstation, a computer for typing up a statement, 3 correct? 4 A. That's correct. 5 Q. And were these interviews with police officers 6 -- accused officers recorded at any time during this 7 time period? 8 A. No, not during that time period. 9 Q. Did they use tape recorders to record the 10 statements at all? 11 A. Not during that time period. 12 Q. Okay. Then -- and the investigators in 13 Internal Affairs would've been familiar with like the 14 form and formatting needed to take a statement in an 15 Internal Affairs investigation, correct? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. And same for IPRA and OPS, correct? 18 A. I would -- I would hope so. 19 Q. But what about the -- when supervisors 20 investigated their subordinates, was there, like, any 21 training or process to make sure that they were familiar 22 with the right format and method of taking of statements 23 in their investigations? 24 A. As far as training, that -- that -- a lot of 25 that came about with, like, on the job training.

Page 150 1 Supervisors that had experience in CR investigations, 2 that worked, like, the same watch as the, like, newly 3 minted sergeants that hadn't done CR numbers. So a -- a 4 lot of -- sometimes, that's how the training would take 5 place, by asking other supervisors for assistance. 6 Q. Okay. 7 A. And -- and -- and creating your -- your 8 Q-and-A format, or your memo asking for -- asking for a 9 question to be answered in a case. 10 Q. Got it. Could -- when -- and so when 11 supervisors were investigating their subordinates in CR 12 investigations, was the expectation that if a statement 13 was taken, the investigator would be the one to take it, 14 as opposed to referring that person to an -- another 15 investigator in Internal Affairs or OPS? 16 A. No. If -- there was the understanding that 17 the -- the supervisor, at the time, would take the -- 18 the investigation. 19 Q. Okay. And meaning that the supervisor doing 20 the investigation would either request a to/from memo, 21 or interview the accused officer? 22 A. That is correct. 23 Q. Do you recall that the policies for 24 investigating CRs state that, if, you know, a serious 25 allegation of -- you know what, strike that. CPD's	Page 152 1 A. That's correct. 2 Q. Everyone in the group has to keep the 3 information within the group of investigators until it's 4 time to serve the allegations or end the investigation, 5 correct? 6 A. That's correct to a certain extent, that over 7 in the Confidential Investigation Section, you have the 8 investigator of the -- of that particular case and maybe 9 a -- a partner for that investigation. But everyone at 10 confidential did not know everything about everybody's 11 case. 12 Q. Right. So it's an even smaller group than the 13 whole unit. It's a -- it's a need to know basis, 14 correct? 15 A. Exactly. 16 Q. Okay. So I think what I'm saying is, if the 17 -- if the investigator learns somehow the subject of the 18 investigation has learned there's a confidential 19 investigation against them before they're served with 20 charges, is that the kind of potential violation that 21 needs to be also investigated? 22 A. Yes. That could be the subject of another 23 investigation or a log number, yes. 24 Q. Yeah, you said it could be. Was that -- was 25 it policy that it was required to investigate such a
Page 151 1 policy was that if there's a CR investigation, and the 2 investigation reveals a serious new allegation, or an 3 integrity violation, that that needs to be investigated 4 too, correct? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. And would that include allegations that 7 information about a confidential investigation had been 8 leaked to the subject of that investigation? 9 MR. MICHALIK: Objection, incomplete 10 hypothetical. 11 THE WITNESS: Can -- can you repeat that one? 12 BY MR. HILKE: 13 Q. I can. So in the Confidential Investigation 14 Section -- 15 A. Okay. 16 Q. -- the department's goal was to make sure that 17 the subject of the -- of an investigation, the accused 18 officer, would not learn that there was a confidential 19 investigation proceeding against them, until it was time 20 to serve them with the allegations? 21 A. That is correct. 22 Q. And it would've been a violation of those 23 policies to disseminate information about the 24 investigation, such as the subject of the investigation 25 learned before then, correct?	Page 153 1 leak? 2 A. It -- it depends on -- see for that, a 3 determination has to be made whether or not another log 4 number is going to be obtained. And that's going to 5 come about based on finding out, okay, how can this leak 6 have taken place? You know what I mean? Is it -- yeah. 7 I mean, it's just -- so when we -- it's hard to say if 8 we're going to get a CR number, when we know that a lot 9 of times when we're conducting these investigations, we 10 have to reach outside of Internal Affairs to get 11 information, right. So we have to sometimes contact 12 information services to do database queries of say, for 13 instance, not just watch sheets, but like the vehicles. 14 Tracking vehicles, or requesting OMC tapes and stuff. 15 So in order to do that, we have to kind of go 16 outside of the -- of the unit. And depending on what 17 information we provide these outside agencies, that can 18 lead to a leak or disclosure of information regarding 19 confidential cases. So at that point, a number may or 20 may not be obtained because we only get numbers on 21 department members, like sworn officers or civilians. 22 So it's kind of hard to say. But typically, as you're 23 -- to answer your question, yes, a lot of times, it does 24 lead to another investigation. 25 Q. And is it the department's policy that a leak

Page 154 1 or a disclosure like you described should always be 2 investigated? Whether or not there is a new CR number 3 or not, the investigator needs to follow-up and try to 4 find out what happened and why? 5 A. Well, right. So if there's an allegation of 6 misconduct on the part of a department member, yes. 7 That -- a number should be generated and that should be 8 investigated. 9 Q. I guess, I want to make sure my question's 10 syncing up with your answer. What -- I guess just to 11 clarify my question, I'm not just asking about whether a 12 situation -- strike that. Regardless of whether the 13 investigator thinks there was misconduct by a police 14 officer, if the investigator believes there's been a 15 leak or a disclosure of a confidential investigation, 16 must that investigator pursue that information and try 17 to find out what happened? 18 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form. 19 THE WITNESS: So I don't -- so when you say -- 20 when you say must, you know, the investigator can. 21 They -- they can, but depending on what information 22 has been leaked, how that information impacts the in 23 -- the full investigation, the investigator can do a 24 to/from requesting that a number be generated. But 25 to say must, it's the investigator's case. And	Page 156 1 be identified? 2 Q. Yeah. Like, if you wanted to say how many 3 times did CPD investigate leaks or disclosures in 4 confidential -- 5 A. That was not tracked, no. 6 Q. Okay. All right. This is Exhibit 6. Do you 7 see here in front of you, the Internal Affairs Division 8 standard operating procedures? 9 (EXHIBIT 6 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION) 10 THE WITNESS: Yes. 11 BY MR. HILKE: 12 Q. This is BG-28997. And this is -- are these 13 the standard operating procedures you described 14 reviewing? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Okay. Let me take you to Page 6. It's 17 double-sided. Do you see on Page 6, the description of 18 four different possible disposition categories for CRs? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Is this what you were describing in terms of 21 the description of CR dispositions that would guide 22 investigators as to credibility findings? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. And so, that's the section starting, A, 25 unfounded, and ending with justified disciplinary action
Page 155 1 depending on how or if that information impacted 2 their investigation, it will determine whether or 3 not he chooses to -- to -- to ask that a complaint 4 be initiated. 5 BY MR. HILKE: 6 Q. So whether to pursue more information about a 7 leak or disclosure in a confidential investigation is at 8 the discretion of the investigator, is based on all the 9 circumstances; is that accurate? 10 A. Yeah. I would say that's accurate, yes. 11 Q. All right. And do you know if the department, 12 during this time frame, did ever initiate new CRs to 13 pursue information about leaks or disclosures in 14 confidential investigations? 15 A. I'm not aware. 16 Q. Is that a category -- 17 A. Well, I'm sorry. I -- I honestly that, when I 18 think back, I -- I believe there were times where 19 numbers have been generated to investigate, yeah, leaks 20 from ongoing investigations over at the Confidential 21 Investigation Section. Yes. 22 Q. And were those -- were those CRs given a 23 category or otherwise tracked in any way that would 24 allow them all to be identified? 25 A. You're talking about the -- the case itself to	Page 157 1 on Page 6 of the manual, correct? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. I'll take you to Page 13, the second paragraph 4 from the bottom, do you see where it says, in-depth 5 interviews should be conducted with complainants, 6 victims and/or witnesses. Interviews with parties via 7 the telephone will be documented and the conversation 8 will be summarized in as much detail as possible in a 9 progress report. Do you know whether the department 10 during this time frame did any sort of monitoring or 11 auditing to evaluate how much detail was being put into 12 the reports of interviews with witnesses? 13 A. That -- no, I'm not aware of that. 14 Q. Okay. I'll take you did the next page, Page 15 14. Under the section withdrawal of complaints, are you 16 familiar with the requirement discussed here that even 17 if a complainant withdraws their complaint, the 18 investigator still must complete a thorough and 19 comprehensive investigation? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Do you know if that policy was followed during 22 this time period, whether investigators would stop 23 investigations because they -- because the complaints 24 were withdrawn? 25 A. Do I know if it was followed across the board?

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1 Q. Yes.

2 A. Oh, no. I -- I -- I -- I know I followed it.
3 I don't know if everyone else was following it.

4 Q. Do you know if investigations were monitored
5 or audited in any ways to ensure compliance with this
6 requirement?

7 A. The -- the investigators -- investigations
8 were all overseen by immediate supervisors. In my case,
9 it was a lieutenant. So yeah, they were monitored by
10 the supervisors.

11 Q. So it would've just been at the discretion of
12 the super -- direct supervisors of the investigators
13 during this time period?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Let's go to Page 16. Now do you see there's a
16 section on Page 16 titled Criminal Allegations?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And if you look near the bottom of the page,
19 there is some specific information about what to do if
20 the allegations are of a confidential nature; do you see
21 that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And there are five steps, A through E, on this
24 page and the next, including personally preparing the
25 case report, giving limited information to the control

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1 desk, so -- and telling them the matter is confidential,
2 submitting a report through channels to the director of
3 the records division, informing them of the delay,
4 maintaining control of both copies of the case report,
5 and forwarding to the report -- to the records division
6 when the investigation is completed, or if it won't
7 impede the investigation.

8 A. I think I (Inaudible). All right, I'm good.

9 Q. Do you see that?

10 A. I'm sorry. Yes, I see that.

11 Q. Okay. And when it says, maintain control of
12 both copies of the case report, how is that different
13 from a regular investigation?

14 A. Okay. So for a regular investigation that's
15 not confidential, the -- the actual case report will be
16 maintained at the detective division or, you know, or
17 another division within the police department, as
18 opposed to keeping everything internal at the -- at the
19 Bureau of Internal Affairs' Confidential Section. And
20 there's an avenue in which to mark the -- the case
21 confidential, just so no one else can see the -- the
22 case reports.

23 Q. And during this time in the Confidential
24 Section, do all the investigators in the Confidential in
25 -- Section share a common filing system, or do the

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1 investigators keep their own cases to -- while the
2 investigation is active?

3 A. The -- the investigators keep their own --
4 their own working file --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. -- at -- at their desk.

7 Q. So -- and if I read this right, does even the
8 supervisor of the investigator have a separate copy of
9 the -- of the case report?

10 A. It's not uncommon that they wouldn't have a
11 copy of the case report, but typically, they -- they --
12 they wouldn't. They wouldn't. It -- it would just --
13 the investigator would have it, and if the supervisor
14 had questions, they would sit down and discuss any
15 matters, but the investigator would have the working
16 file, and everything will be held with the -- the --
17 with the investigator.

18 Q. Got it. So the idea is until the case is done
19 -- or it wouldn't impede the investigation to share it
20 further, all the information is concentrated in a single
21 place, and that's with the investigator, correct?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. Okay. And even records division doesn't get a
24 copy of it until the investigation is done, correct?

25 A. Until it's closed.

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1 Q. And below on Page 17, there's a section about
2 the State's Attorney's Special Prosecutions Bureau and
3 Felony Review. Am I correct that that's different from
4 the joint investigations with the FBI that we talked
5 about earlier?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So other -- I guess stepping back a second to
8 what we just looked at under criminal allegations and
9 the description of what happened in Confidential
10 Investigations there, are you aware of any other place
11 in the standard operating procedures that it talks about
12 procedures specific to Confidential Investigations?

13 A. There -- there was a section in here that's
14 titled Confidential Investigation Section. I think I
15 remember that.

16 Q. Yes.

17 MR. MICHALIK: Page 2.

18 THE WITNESS: Yes, Page 2.

19 BY MR. HILKE:

20 Q. Sure. So Page 2, you've got the -- kind of
21 the org chart of the -- of the Confidential
22 Investigation Section, right?

23 A. Page 2. I -- I wouldn't call it a org chart.

24 Q. Oh, no, I'm sorry. Thank you. One minute. I
25 see. Yes, okay. And so, you've also got the

Page 162 1 description at the bottom of Page 2, Confidential 2 Investigation Section, right? 3 A. Correct. 4 Q. And that describes what the Confidential 5 Investigation Section does, that it conducts long-term 6 investigations, involving allegation of department 7 members involved in criminal activity, and it lists 8 certain categories of investigations that they conduct, 9 correct? 10 A. Yep, that is correct. 11 Q. So other than this paragraph you've just 12 pointed to and what we looked at under the criminal 13 allegations section, is there anywhere else in the 14 standard operating procedures that describes how 15 confidential investigations are conducted? 16 A. Well -- 17 Q. And you should take as long as you need to 18 review the document. I won't rush you. 19 A. Okay. Like Page 22, it kind of goes over the 20 medical rule -- medical roll abuse investigations and 21 residency. Those are all handled by the Confidential 22 Investigations Section. 23 Q. Got it. And those are describing specifically 24 the subunits of medical roll abuse in residency, 25 correct?	Page 164 1 Q. Okay. Anything else I've missed yet? 2 A. I hope not. 3 Q. And certainly like, as you said before, this, 4 the general orders, and the standard -- and the special 5 orders that you've identified are exactly where you'd 6 look for any further documentation, correct? 7 A. Correct. 8 Q. This is Exhibit 7. This is Plaintiff's Joint 9 83612. I see a report of the Commission on Police 10 Integrity. Have you seen this report before? 11 (EXHIBIT 7 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION) 12 THE WITNESS: No. 13 BY MR. HILKE: 14 Q. So this is a commission appointed by Mayor 15 Daley in February 1997 in response to the indictment of 16 members of the Chicago Police Department on charges of 17 conspiracy, racketeering, and extortion in the police 18 district in Austin. I just have a few questions about 19 -- I just have a few specific questions about this. I 20 want to point you to Plaintiff's Joint 83621. It's 21 maybe about seven pages in or so. Or I'm sorry, it's 22 also marked Page 9, and in the middle of the page. 23 A. Okay. 24 Q. It says, history of police corruption in 25 Chicago; do you see it?
Page 163 1 A. Correct. 2 Q. Okay. 3 A. Looks like the -- that's about it. 4 Q. Okay. Any other sections that you see that 5 are about confidential investigations? 6 A. No. 7 Q. Okay. 8 MR. MICHALIK: Just to avoid any -- can I point 9 out one that he's overlooking? 10 MR. HILKE: Yeah. Fine. 11 MR. MICHALIK: Yeah, on Page 12. 12 MR. HILKE: Page 12. 13 MR. MICHALIK: By the way, we'll have to back 14 on it later. So might as well do it now. 15 MR. HILKE: No, that's fine. 16 BY MR. HILKE: 17 Q. Okay. So there's also some detail on Page 12 18 about how to initiate confidential complaint register 19 numbers, correct? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. And this describes the report to be submitted, 22 what facts should be included, who to submit it to, and 23 warns members not to tell anyone else about it, other 24 than certain identified persons, correct? 25 A. Correct.	Page 165 1 A. Uh-huh. 2 Q. So if you look at the bottom one on 1989, this 3 report from 1997 describes the conviction of ten 4 Wentworth District officers convicted of taking 5 thousands of dollars in protection money from gamblers 6 and drug dealers; do you see that? 7 A. Yes. 8 MR. MICHALIK: Just for the record, I'm going 9 to object to the use of this exhibit during this 10 deposition. Because obviously, it's from 1997, the 11 time frame involved is '99 through 2011. So for the 12 record, I object. 13 MR. HILKE: Okay. 14 BY MR. HILKE: 15 Q. And then if you go to the next page, PL Joint 16 83622, look at the second of -- sentence of that 17 paragraph. It says, it is no coincidence that the ten 18 Chicago officers under indictment today were assigned to 19 two of the police districts with the highest instance of 20 narcotics arrests, nor that they all worked on tactical 21 teams, whose primary function was narcotics enforcement; 22 do you see that? 23 A. I do. 24 Q. And I'm going to take you to a page of the 25 recommendations of this commission appointed by Mayor

Page 166 1 Daley in 1997. That's going to be Page 22 -- 2 A. Okay. 3 Q. -- of the report. I'm sorry, Page 21 of the 4 report. And then if you look at the second sentence of 5 the second paragraph, do you see it saying, according to 6 the information presented to the commission, the seven 7 indicted Austin officers had a total of 93 complaints, 8 CR numbers, lodged against them during their respective 9 careers? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. And do you see -- this is going to be the next 12 -- the next paragraph recommends, you know, a 13 non-sustained complaint is not the same as one that is 14 unfounded. It indicates if the evidence was such that 15 the complaint could not be proven or disproven. And 16 that's the same as what you said before is the 17 definition of a -- of a non-sustained complaint, 18 correct? 19 A. Correct. 20 Q. And it says, you know, the commission -- in 21 the judgment of the commission, some system needs to be 22 in place which allows a department to take some 23 appropriate action when a clear pattern of 24 non-sustained complaints exists; do you see that? 25 A. Yes.	Page 168 1 BY MR. HILKE: 2 Q. No, I'm sorry. In 1999 to 2011, in your time 3 frame for this deposition. 4 A. Okay. 5 Q. Did the disciplinary system do anything to 6 identify patterns of misconduct among specific units of 7 officers? 8 A. Yes. At some point, the -- the Internal 9 Affairs Division, or Internal Affairs -- you know, 10 utilized the -- let's call it the CRM System. And the 11 CRM system would identify patterns of misconduct. And 12 it was -- it was based on the -- the findings of a -- 13 from a particular category code or allegation. And the 14 trigger was, like, five -- five investigations, which 15 could -- it could be all unfounded, but five similar 16 investigations into one member in a short period of 17 time, that would raise a flag, to where that member 18 would be identified, and steps will be taken to correct 19 that member's behavior. Although, those cases were not 20 sustained. And that was in the -- that was contained 21 within the CRM System. 22 Q. Could you spell the name of the system you're 23 saying? 24 A. C -- C-R-M-S, System. It's the Complaint 25 Reporting Management System.
Page 167 1 MR. MICHALIK: Again, same objection as before 2 regarding this document. Also, foundation. I -- 3 MR. HILKE: Sure. 4 MR. MICHALIK: You're just reading the document 5 into the record. 6 MR. HILKE: Yeah. I'm going to tie it up. 7 BY MR. HILKE: 8 Q. If you -- and then if you look at the next 9 paragraph, it says, looking towards sort of the last 10 sentence or so, it says, corrupt police officers, like 11 other groups of criminals, tend to bond together in 12 groups. As the Chicago Police Department moves towards 13 to a comprehensive early warning system, therefore, an 14 effort should be made to identify specific units which 15 have a higher than usual rate of allegations of 16 misconduct; do you see that? 17 A. I do. 18 Q. All right. In this time frame, did the 19 department -- did the disciplinary system do anything to 20 identify patterns of misconduct within specific groups 21 of officers? 22 MR. MICHALIK: Objection to the form. In this 23 time frame, are you talking about the '97 time 24 frame, or... 25 MR. HILKE: Oh, thank you.	Page 169 1 Q. Okay. And if I understand what you just 2 described, if there were a surging number of CRs against 3 an officer in a time period, like a -- an -- a specific 4 individual officer, that's what would be the trigger for 5 the system, correct? 6 A. That's correct. 7 Q. And what would -- when was -- when did what 8 you're describing, that trigger for several allegations 9 of misconduct in a short time against an officer, when 10 did that start being used? 11 A. So that -- I -- you've got to figure my -- it 12 was -- it was being used when I was in the Special 13 Investigations Section, so that would be, like, after 14 2006, but before 2013, when I was working out of 15 headquarters. I just remember some of my own personal 16 cases involved department members that fell within that 17 category, and there was a trigger that -- that came from 18 the records section, that -- and they told me that, hey, 19 this particular person has five non- sustained or 20 unfounded findings for the same category code in a very 21 short period of time. And -- and so -- but it was -- it 22 was in place at that time, but I don't know when it 23 started, and when they started utilizing that system for 24 that. 25 Q. And do I understand correctly, that there were

Page 170 1 multiple criteria that had to be met for the trigger. 2 One, a surging number of CRS, and two, all in the same 3 category code? 4 A. Yeah. It was -- it was five. It was -- the 5 trigger was the number -- where it's five cases. And if 6 you had five unfounded cases in a -- I forget what the 7 time period was, then that would trigger it. It would 8 trigger the system to -- 9 Q. Right. 10 A. -- to basically report out that this member is 11 a candidate for whatever sanction, or program, that 12 number we would be put in. 13 Q. And in the same category code, right? So it 14 did have to be five, like, excessive forces, or 15 inventory procedure, or whatever the case may be, they 16 all had to be the same? 17 A. Well, I -- I believe they -- they were the 18 same -- yeah. I believe they were the same type of 19 misconduct cases. 20 Q. Yeah, and when you talked about different 21 options for how to proceed after receiving the trigger, 22 what were the options after receiving that trigger for a 23 specific officer? 24 A. I -- I believe they were put in probable -- a 25 personal concerns program, or behavioral intervention.	Page 172 1 to recommend that that person be put in a behavioral 2 intervention program. 3 Q. And was that -- was it automatic in -- was 4 there an automatic process by which -- well, strike 5 that. Did -- were individual investigators involved in 6 deciding whether to refer to personal concerns or 7 behavioral intervention? 8 A. I'm sorry. 9 Q. That's okay. Were investigator level staff 10 involved in deciding whether an officer should be 11 referred to personal concerns or behavioral 12 intervention? 13 A. At the time, no. 14 Q. Okay. Who from Internal Affairs decided? 15 A. Well, it was a notification from the sergeant 16 that worked in the records section of Internal Affairs 17 to the chief. 18 Q. Okay. And then do you know what criteria the 19 chief used to decide how to handle those notifications? 20 A. It was -- it was really based on the nature of 21 the -- the cases that you were looking at. So we had 22 five individual cases, all different allegations, or the 23 same allegations, but they happened in the -- you know, 24 a certain time period. I don't know if -- if it was six 25 months or a year, but --
Page 171 1 I think it was, at the time, behavioral intervention 2 program, which was -- which was organized or -- the 3 Personnel Division was weighing in on that, on the 4 program. 5 Q. And -- I'm sorry. The Personnel Division? 6 A. The Personnel Division. Yeah. 7 Q. Wait. So who decided whether to put such an 8 officer in the program? Was that in the disciplinary -- 9 like, was that a discipline issue, or -- actually, 10 strike that. What's the Personnel Division? 11 A. Personnel is human resources for the police 12 department. 13 Q. It's different from Internal Affairs? 14 A. Definitely. 15 Q. Okay. And so, who decided whether to place an 16 employee in personal concerns or behavioral 17 intervention, Internal Affairs or Personnel? 18 A. Internal Affairs, initially. So there's a 19 sergeant in their records section that would notify the 20 -- the -- the chief of the Bureau -- the Bureau of 21 Internal Affairs, and say, okay, this person has been 22 flagged. And the chief would take a look at it, and 23 see, okay, these cases that were unfounded or not 24 sustained, let me see what they involved. And then 25 they'll -- the determination will be made whether or not	Page 173 1 Q. Okay. 2 A. Yeah, they would determine whether or not this 3 person would be put in a program, just based on the 4 nature of the complaints. 5 Q. Do you know how many -- is there anywhere we 6 could find how many officers were referred from the 7 records sergeant to the Internal Affairs chief? 8 A. See, I don't -- I don't know if that 9 information is contained in the CRM System somehow, 10 because that is still active. They still -- for now, 11 they still use the CRM System, because it -- it -- it 12 will be added to our -- our new CMS system. But for 13 right now, it's still active, and that's something that 14 I can ask, you know. 15 Q. Is it something that's reported in any way on 16 a regular basis? 17 A. No. 18 Q. Okay. Is it -- is -- and by the way, is CRMS, 19 is that part of the CLEAR System? 20 A. No. That's a standalone system that's 21 maintained in the records section of Internal Affairs. 22 Q. Okay. And how long did the specific CRMS 23 trigger for behavioral investigation -- behavioral 24 intervention you've been discussing. For how long was 25 that trigger in place?

Page 174 1 A. You're talking for a particular case, or how 2 long -- because I think it's -- I mean the system's 3 still working. It's still working. 4 Q. And when you say it's still working, do you 5 mean -- 6 A. It's still active. It still triggers cases -- 7 Q. Okay. 8 A. -- involving individual officers. 9 Q. And your -- and do you -- am I correct, the 10 earliest that you can say it was in effect would have 11 been overlapping the time you were in Special 12 Investigations? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. And before that, you wouldn't know one way or 15 another, right? 16 A. I wouldn't know. 17 Q. Now -- okay. So let me get back to the 18 question I meant to ask, which is the report we've been 19 looking at contains a recommendation that trends of 20 misconduct allegations be looked at as a group. So not 21 just officer by officer, but say squad by squad, manager 22 by manager. From 1999 to 2011, did the disciplinary 23 system ever analyze misconduct allegations in that 24 manner? 25 A. By teams? I'm not --	Page 176 1 the last five years, correct? 2 A. Yes. Yes. 3 Q. Okay. 4 A. With records, yes. 5 Q. And so, there are lots of other CRs that were, 6 you know, not sustained, unfounded, exonerated, 7 administratively closed, et cetera, correct? 8 A. That is correct. 9 Q. For all those other CRs, those that were not 10 sustained, did the department conduct any analysis or, 11 you know, take any action with regard to those CRs, 12 after the individual investigations were complete, 13 during this time period? 14 A. Only if there was a trigger within the CRM 15 System that would notify the department that -- or BIA 16 that an individual or particular officer had five or 17 more investigations within that time period of, say, if 18 it's a year, within that year. 19 Q. Was the disciplinary system, as a whole, 20 during this time period, was one of its purposes to 21 specifically address potential corruption among officers 22 who worked in narcotics enforcement? 23 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form. 24 THE WITNESS: Specifically, to -- 25 BY MR. HILKE:
Page 175 1 Q. Yeah. 2 A. I'm not aware of that. 3 Q. Do you have any reason to believe that any 4 kind of squad level, division level, team level analysis 5 took place during this time period? 6 A. I'm -- I'm not aware if it did. 7 Q. Then -- other than the behavioral intervention 8 system you've been describing, was there any other way 9 you're aware of that the department used, other than 10 sustained complaints during this time period? 11 MR. MICHALIK: For what purpose? 12 MR. HILKE: For any purpose. 13 THE WITNESS: Other than sustained complaints? 14 BY MR. HILKE: 15 Q. I think I just made up a new category. But 16 what I mean to say is -- so you've got sustained CRs, 17 right? 18 A. Correct. 19 Q. And for example, when assessing discipline, 20 the only thing that a supervisor is given is sustained 21 CRs, correct? 22 A. Did you say a supervisor? 23 Q. Yeah. If a supervisor is recommending 24 discipline after a sustained investigation, the 25 disciplinary record they get is just sustained CRs in	Page 177 1 Q. Yeah. For example, the 1997 report we just 2 looked at says, it's actually to be expected that -- the 3 place this kind of misconduct will happen, meaning 4 taking bribes, corruption, is in drug enforcement work, 5 because there's so much money there. And so, my 6 question is: During this time period, was the 7 disciplinary system's purpose to specifically address 8 the problem of money and temptation in narcotics 9 enforcement? I know -- I know it's meant to address all 10 kinds of misconduct. My question is: If its purpose 11 singled out that kind of misconduct, as one of its 12 purposes? 13 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form. 14 THE WITNESS: I would say -- I would say no, to 15 the extent that those type of cases -- those cases 16 are developed when there is a complainant, or an 17 allegation of misconduct. As officers that work on 18 gang tactical teams, out of Narcotics, conduct their 19 daily business of just working their cases and 20 investigating narcotics cases, we're -- we're not -- 21 there wasn't a -- a system where we were just 22 monitoring them day to day, if there was no 23 allegation of misconduct for any particular team 24 working narcotics investigations. It just -- that's 25 just not how it was. If there was an allegation,

Page 178 1 then the case would be open, and then we would 2 conduct investigations. 3 BY MR. HILKE: 4 Q. And one of the complaints of the Internal 5 Affairs investigators in this 1997 report is that they 6 spent a lot of time looking at parking tickets and other 7 minor administrative investigations. Was that -- do you 8 know how much capacity of the investigators was taken up 9 investigating parking tickets and more minor 10 administrative investigations during this time period? 11 A. I don't -- 12 MR. MICHALIK: Objection, form, foundation. 13 THE WITNESS: I don't know. I don't know. I'm 14 unaware of that. 15 BY MR. HILKE: 16 Q. All right. As far as you know, was there any 17 effort to shift the allocation of resources during this 18 time period away from more minor administrative 19 investigations and towards more serious allegations of 20 misconduct? 21 A. No. I don't -- I don't think there was a 22 shift in manpower at the -- at Internal Affairs. 23 Q. I want to ask you a few questions about -- and 24 I'm done with this exhibit for now. About civil 25 lawsuits specifically -- actually, strike that. I want	Page 180 1 A. Back then, after being notified by the Office 2 of Legal Affairs, the disposition -- disposition of the 3 -- the civil case is when the investigator would start 4 to work up their administrative case. 5 Q. Got it. And when you say the disposition, you 6 mean at the point the case is over, like -- 7 A. Yeah. 8 Q. -- civil trial, et cetera -- 9 A. Yup. 10 Q. -- dismissed? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Okay. And then what was the purpose of 13 waiting until the -- until the civil case was disposed 14 to proceed in the administrative investigation? 15 A. Well, when we received those -- when BIA 16 receives those cases from the Office of Legal Affairs, 17 OLA, the allegation would be as simple as there's a 18 civil suit, and the -- the CR number that's associated 19 with the civil suit is, for lack of a better term, a 20 placeholder until the civil suit plays out in court. 21 And so, then after the civil suit plays out, then you 22 kind of know what we're dealing with, and then you'll 23 move forward with the administrative investigation, if 24 there's any administrative investigation to be 25 completed. Because depending on how the case is
Page 179 1 to ask you about civil and criminal cases, and how 2 information from those cases could inform CR 3 investigations. Am I correct that during this time 4 period, if a civil lawsuit was filed alleging police 5 misconduct, that that would typically be forwarded to 6 CPD to open up an CR on? 7 A. Correct. And typically, those cases would 8 make their way to Internal Affairs from the Office of 9 Legal Affairs. 10 Q. Okay. And if -- and for those cases, just 11 like any cases, the first step is to try to talk to the 12 complainant, right? 13 A. Yes. At some point during the course of those 14 investigations, the complainant would be -- would be 15 reached out to, but during that time frame, those cases 16 weren't immediately investigated. You would kind of 17 wait to see how the civil suit plays out in civil court, 18 and then make a determination of how to proceed with 19 your administrative investigation, after monitoring the 20 civil case. And those civil suit cases were handled by 21 General Investigations. 22 Q. Okay. And can you tell me, in terms of 23 monitoring the civil suit, at what stage of a civil suit 24 would a decision be made about how to proceed in the 25 investigation?	Page 181 1 resolved in civil court, it just may be adjudicated in 2 court, and there would be no need for a full-fledged BIA 3 investigation, so... 4 Q. And then, in terms of the information that the 5 department requested about those cases, would they just 6 receive the disposition, like, how the case ended, or 7 would they also request, like, you know, transcripts, 8 discovery, other materials that might exist from the 9 case? 10 A. There are times where the investigator will 11 receive the transcripts and other paperwork and 12 materials from the -- the civil trial, in the civil 13 case, as part of their -- to use as part of their 14 administrative case. 15 Q. And was there a policy regarding what 16 materials the investigator should request during civil 17 suit cases during this time period? 18 A. I -- I just -- I don't recall. But I wasn't 19 in General, but I -- I'm -- I'm aware of how the process 20 worked. 21 Q. Sure. And if there were a policy, it would be 22 in the general orders, or special orders, or standard 23 operating procedures we discussed? 24 A. That is correct. 25 Q. And -- so in every civil suit case during this

Page 182 1 time period, once the civil suit has been disposed, at 2 that stage, the investigator following the standard 3 procedures would be charged with taking the preliminary 4 -- the investigative steps in reaching out to the 5 complainant, correct? 6 A. Correct. If there was a need for it, yes, 7 they would follow your -- the typical, regular 8 investigative steps to handle, like any -- any other CR 9 number, depending on what the allegation is. 10 Q. And I said the complainant, in this case it 11 would be the person who had alleged that they were 12 harmed by police, correct? 13 A. Correct. 14 Q. And when you say if there was a need for it, 15 are there -- like, could the investigators say, well, 16 this lawsuit was, you know, dismissed, it was settled, 17 so there's really nothing more to do? 18 A. Well, the -- it's -- it's case by case, 19 obviously. And yeah, when the -- yeah. When the civil 20 suit case has been resolved, yeah, typically the -- the 21 administrative investigation, more often than not, is 22 closed out. 23 Q. And is it more often -- when you say more 24 often than not it's closed out, do you mean closed out 25 without further investigation or context?	Page 184 1 their supervisor to -- to take one step, or you know, 2 take this direction with the case. 3 Q. Exhibit 8, and this is the Police 4 Accountability Task Force, Plaintiff's Joint 6794. Sir, 5 have you seen this report before? 6 (EXHIBIT 8 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION) 7 THE WITNESS: I have not. 8 BY MR. HILKE: 9 Q. So I believe Lori Lightfoot wrote this report 10 before she became mayor. Is that the -- 11 A. Oh, she's -- 12 Q. -- taskforce appointed by Mayor Emanuel, to 13 make recommendations to reform the Chicago Police 14 Department in the wake of the Laquan McDonald shooting? 15 MR. MICHALIK: I'm going to object to that 16 statement. It actually mischaracterizes what this 17 -- Public Police Accountability Task Force Report 18 and how it was generated. 19 MR. HILKE: That's fine. 20 BY MR. HILKE: 21 Q. I really just have a couple questions for you 22 about it. I'm going to focus on -- sorry, I lost my 23 questions. Okay. Can I please turn you to 68 -- 24 Plaintiff's Joint 6872? Also, it's marked Page 73 of 25 the report. This is an excerpt of a few pages I'll ask
Page 183 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. Okay. So -- and that's consistent with the 3 discretion investigators had to decide how to handle 4 their cases, correct? 5 A. Well, it's not just the -- the discretion of 6 the investigator. You -- you do make the decision while 7 consulting with the department advocate, and as well as 8 Legal Affairs, to get an understanding of what happened 9 with the case, and basically how to move forward, and if 10 there's a need to move forward, you know. So there is 11 coordination with -- especially the -- the department 12 advocate that works for BIA. 13 Q. Who makes the decision whether to move 14 forward? 15 A. With the -- the case? 16 Q. Yeah. To -- 17 A. Well, ultimately, it's the investigator's 18 case, but typically, with the civil suit cases, the 19 investigator would speak with the immediate supervisor 20 and the -- the what you call it? The department 21 advocate. 22 Q. Okay. So the investigator is supposed to 23 consult with others, but ultimately, they decide whether 24 to proceed with the investigation or not, correct? 25 A. It -- right. Unless instructed, you know, by	Page 185 1 you about. It has a section that said -- that says, 2 missed opportunities to identify misconduct; do you see 3 that? 4 A. Nope. I think I'm on the wrong page. Yep. 5 Got it. 6 Q. Good. If you look at the bottom paragraph, it 7 says, since its inception, IPRA has had the power to 8 examine patterns of complaints when investigating police 9 misconduct, but has not exercised it. Now is that -- 10 and IPRA is distinct from Bureau of Internal Affairs, 11 correct? 12 A. Correct. 13 Q. And what you described before as the CRMS 14 System, that was within Internal Affairs, correct? 15 A. That's correct. 16 Q. Do you have any reason to disagree with this 17 statement that since IPRA was formed, it had the power 18 to examine patterns of complaints when investigating 19 police misconduct, but has not exercised it? 20 MR. MICHALIK: Objection, form, foundation. 21 And it relies on a statement here without providing 22 the source of that information. 23 THE WITNESS: I'm -- I'm not aware if they -- 24 if they did have the -- the power to do that during 25 the time frame.

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1 BY MR. HILKE:

2 Q. Sure. You don't have any reason to say that
3 IPRA lacked the power to examine patterns of complaints
4 when investigating police misconduct, do you?

5 MR. MICHALIK: Objection, form, foundation.

6 THE WITNESS: No.

7 BY MR. HILKE:

8 Q. And you don't have any reason to say that
9 IPRA, during this -- and again, all my questions are
10 about this time, the 1999 to 2011 time frame, right?

11 A. Understood.

12 Q. That's all I'm asking about today. My
13 question is: During that time frame, 1999 to 2011, you
14 don't have any reason to believe that IPRA did examine
15 patterns of complaints when investigating police
16 misconduct, do you?

17 MR. MICHALIK: Objection, form, foundation.

18 THE WITNESS: No.

19 BY MR. HILKE:

20 Q. Okay. Then, I will show you -- actually, one
21 second. I -- actually, let me ask you this sort of
22 independent of the report, so if you can put the report
23 aside, I'm just going to ask you the question. During
24 this time frame, 1999 to 2011, did CPD have policy --
25 well, strike that. In this time frame, there are times

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1 when an officer would be the subject of a criminal
2 investigation and a complaint register number would be
3 active at the same time, correct?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. And that could include situations where --
6 well, strike that. Yeah, so in that situation, where
7 there's a criminal investigation of a police officer
8 concurrent with an administrative disciplinary
9 investigation being opened, did CPD have any policy
10 about whether they should proceed at the same time, or
11 one after the other, during this time frame?

12 A. Not that I -- not that I can recall.

13 Q. So if there's a pending criminal
14 investigation, but the investigator thought it was
15 appropriate to pursue a disciplinary investigation, they
16 could do that, correct?

17 A. Well -- okay. So it's -- here's the thing.
18 So when handling these criminal investigations, you
19 almost have to look at it as being one in the same
20 sometimes, as the administrative case. Because the --
21 depending on how the -- the criminal investigation plays
22 out, if it plays out in court, if there's a case report,
23 of course, associated with the criminal case, and
24 there's resolution in court regarding that, that
25 criminal case would carry over to the administrative

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1 process.

2 The administrative process determines penalty
3 and holds the officer accountable, based on our rules
4 and regulations, and it determines whether or not the
5 member's going to be separated from the police
6 department. As opposed to the criminal investigation,
7 it's going to decide whether or not this officer's going
8 to be incarcerated. So it's -- it's -- it's kind of --
9 one kind of feeds off the other, but it's hard to say
10 kind of move forward with the administrative
11 investigation, when you're trying to find the proper
12 finding, penalty, resolution for the administrative
13 case, which you're going to get from the criminal case.

14 So depending on what the crime is, if it's --
15 if the member's convicted of a felony, therefore, when
16 you move back to the administrative case, now you're
17 looking at a violation of Rule 1, and recommending
18 separation from the police department, because as a
19 condition of our employment, you cannot be convicted
20 felons. So kind of -- one kind of feeds off the other,
21 so it's kind of hard to move forward with the
22 administrative case, without knowing the outcome of the
23 criminal investigations.

24 Q. I think I understand. So investigators would
25 wait for the criminal case to resolve before proceeding

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1 with the administrative investigation?

2 A. Well, they'll -- they'll -- they'll wait. You
3 won't finalize the administrative case until you get
4 resolution on the -- you can move forward. You can do
5 certain things. You can do certain things if you're
6 handling criminal cases at Confidential, right? We're
7 not talking task force or anything, we're just talking
8 criminal cases at Confidential. The -- yeah, yeah.

9 then you -- you can move forward with the
10 case. You can do certain things. You can take -- you
11 can get video evidence. You can do certain
12 investigative steps, but you don't want to make a final
13 decision or disposition without knowing how the criminal
14 case played out in court.

15 Q. Aside from waiting to make the final
16 disposition, were there any other steps that
17 investigators could not take before the criminal case
18 finished?

19 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form.

20 THE WITNESS: Well, so -- typically, the
21 investigator wouldn't interview the for the
22 administrator, the officer, because that would be a
23 compelled statement. And then that -- that
24 information that was garnered from the
25 administrative case could not be used for the

Page 190 1 criminal case. So typically, you would hold off on 2 interviewing the accused officer before the -- the 3 criminal is complete. 4 BY MR. HILKE: 5 Q. Okay. So other than those steps, was the 6 expectation that the regular preliminary investigative 7 steps should still be taken even if there's a pending 8 criminal case? 9 A. They could be taken. 10 Q. Was there any expectation about what steps 11 should or should not be taken? 12 A. Like I said, interviewing of the -- of the 13 accused officer. And depending on -- it's depending on 14 the nature of the -- of the complaint or the -- the 15 crime. Certain steps will or will not be taken, you 16 know, as not to impact the outcome of the criminal case, 17 which really takes precedence when you're looking at 18 both investigations. 19 Q. And the -- during this time frame, did CPD 20 close administrative investigations that were concurrent 21 with criminal conduct, just because of a not guilty or 22 dismissed finding against an accused officer in a 23 criminal case? 24 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form. 25 THE WITNESS: Did they close them? Just --	Page 192 1 times when you have these criminal investigations 2 into a department member and you have the 3 administrative case, the fact that the member is 4 found not guilty in a court of law, that doesn't 5 mean you just close out the case totally and stop 6 investigating the case, because the administrative 7 case is based on allegations -- allegations. 8 So the -- you know, you have your criminal 9 case, but you can have a series of rule violations 10 and misconduct that's contained within that log 11 number, even though it's a criminal case, but you 12 still have to answer and work up each individual 13 allegation that's in the case. You know what I 14 mean? So a lot of times, those cases be will be -- 15 get reassigned to General because at that point, 16 we're not looking at it criminally, we're just 17 looking at administrative allegations and stuff. So 18 a lot of times, that case will be reassigned to 19 General Investigation Section, or it'll still be 20 handled within Confidential, but you still have to 21 have resolution for the other, like, underlying 22 misconduct allegations. 23 BY MR. HILKE: 24 Q. And am I correct that the special order, 25 general order, and standard operating procedures that
Page 191 1 just -- 2 BY MR. HILKE: 3 Q. Should I try again? 4 A. Just administratively close the case, or... 5 Q. Yeah. Well, what -- 6 A. Or reach -- reach a finding? 7 Q. What -- I guess what I mean is, and I'm going 8 to give you two possibilities and I'll ask you if either 9 or something totally different was how CPD did it. So 10 you're not limited to these two. One possibility is 11 when a -- you know, if there's a criminal and 12 disciplinary investigation, if the officer is found not 13 guilty, then the case should be closed because the 14 officer was found not guilty. Another possibility is 15 well, criminal cases are beyond a reasonable doubt, 16 administrative investigations are a preponderance 17 standard, and so we should still conduct a supplemental 18 investigation when an officer is not guilty. It could 19 also be something completely different from either of 20 those two things. I'm just trying to ask you what CPD's 21 practice was for how the administrative investigation 22 would proceed after the criminal case finishes. 23 MR. MICHALIK: Object to form. 24 THE WITNESS: Okay. So we -- no, you -- you 25 will continue the investigation because a lot of	Page 193 1 you've already testified about, those are the locations 2 that you'd look for, for any written guidance on how to 3 handle these situations, correct? 4 A. Well, I -- I -- I'll tell you this. Yes, 5 those are -- that's our policy. Those are our policies 6 and that's the -- the special -- the SOP is some -- is a 7 -- a guideline to how we conducted our investigations. 8 But yeah, typically a -- a lot of what we did was also 9 learned through on-the-job training and just working 10 cases with other, more seasoned investigators, that -- 11 that really explained to us how to resolve a situation 12 like that, where you -- you have someone that is found 13 not guilty in a court of law, but there are still other 14 less significant matters to be addressed within that log 15 number. 16 Q. That makes sense. And I was just asking about 17 the written guidance. I've specified where we would 18 find that on this issue, correct? 19 A. Yeah. Yeah. There's policies to that. 20 MR. HILKE: You know, I'm close, but let's take 21 a short break. 22 MR. MICHALIK: Okay. 23 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're off the record. The 24 time is 3:27. 25 (OFF THE RECORD)

Page 194 1 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the record 2 for the deposition of Timothy Moore. Today is March 3 19, 2024 and the time is 3:37 p.m. 4 BY MR. HILKE: 5 Q. Rule 14 violations are for -- strike that. 6 Are Rule 14 violations made for intentional misconduct 7 by police officers? 8 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form. 9 THE WITNESS: Intentional, yes. I would say -- 10 I would say yes, it's got to be willful misconduct. 11 BY MR. HILKE: 12 Q. All right. During this the 1999 to 2011 time 13 period, was it the policy to recommend separation when 14 officers committed Rule 14 violations? 15 A. I would say it was a -- it was a policy, but I 16 am aware that there are a number of officers that have 17 sustained Rule 14 as findings and that are still 18 employed by the police department. 19 Q. And is it the case that in some of those -- 20 some of those instances of sustained Rule 14 violations, 21 a superintendent did not recommend separation? 22 MR. MICHALIK: Objection, foundation. 23 THE WITNESS: So here's the thing, so I don't 24 know if that came about by the superintendent or 25 another outside agency, be it the police board or	Page 196 1 sentence of that paragraph, where the report says, 2 witnesses and accused officers are frequently not 3 interviewed at all, or not interviewed until long after 4 the incident, when memories have faded; do you see that? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Do you know whether the -- in the 1999 to 2011 7 time period, there was any sort of -- any monitoring or 8 auditing to determine, you know, how often witnesses 9 were interviewed, or how quickly witnesses were 10 interviewed in investigations? 11 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form of the 12 question, and also the use of this document. You 13 can answer if you know. 14 THE WITNESS: I'm not aware of that. 15 BY MR. HILKE: 16 Q. Okay. We'll go back to that if we need to. 17 I'll take you three pages ahead to Page 50, please. 18 A. Okay. 19 Q. The second sentence of the bottom paragraph 20 says, but in nearly every case, neither IPRA nor BIA 21 will conduct any meaningful investigation of the 22 complaint, unless the investigator -- sorry, unless the 23 complainant meets an investigator in person. And 24 provides a complete recorded statement of the incident 25 and submits a sworn statement that all claims are true
Page 195 1 whomever. I just don't know case by case, but that 2 -- that -- that could be one avenue, the 3 superintendent's recommendation. 4 BY MR. HILKE: 5 Q. Got it. Sitting here, you don't have any 6 reason to say that the superintendent recommended 7 separation in every case of a sustained Rule 14 8 violation during this time period, do you? 9 A. I -- I -- I can't speak to that. 10 Q. Okay. Exhibit 9, it's Plaintiff's Joint 5134. 11 This is the Department of Justice Investigation of the 12 Chicago Police Department dated January 13, 2017. Have 13 you seen this report before? 14 (EXHIBIT 9 MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION) 15 THE WITNESS: I -- I have not, but it's odd 16 that everything happened on my birthday. January 17 15th. 18 BY MR. HILKE: 19 Q. It's this is just excerpt in that. I'm only 20 going to ask questions -- I'm using it as a jumping off 21 point in a few specific pages. Could I start you by 22 looking on -- it's Joint 5183, Page 47 of the document? 23 A. Okay. 24 Q. And I'll point you to the third paragraph. Do 25 you see, in the second of -- the sentence -- the second	Page 197 1 and correct under penalties provided by law. Now, in 2 terms of the issue addressed here, which is whether a 3 meaningful investigation of a complaint is conducted in 4 the absence of a sworn statement, do you have any basis 5 to say how often during the 1999 to 2011 time period a 6 meaningful investigation was conducted when the 7 complainant did not provide a sworn statement? 8 MR. MICHALIK: Just object to the form of the 9 question and reliance on this document. You can 10 answer if you know. 11 THE WITNESS: Okay. So there -- there are many 12 meaningful investigations conducted absent the -- a 13 complainant's signature, because there are 14 oftentimes where the complainant was another police 15 officer. You understand, so -- 16 BY MR. HILKE: 17 Q. Okay. I do. 18 A. -- with those cases. 19 Q. Yeah. Other than complaints not requiring an 20 affidavit, like from another police officer, do you have 21 any basis to say how often a meaningful investigation 22 was conducted in the absence of a sworn statement during 23 our time period? 24 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form of the 25 question.

Page 198 1 THE WITNESS: I wouldn't know how many. 2 BY MR. HILKE: 3 Q. New to -- one second. Can I jump you ahead, 4 please, to Page 61? 5 A. Sure. 6 Q. Plaintiff's Joint 5197, Page 61. Do you see 7 Subsection 4, Hidden Witness Coaching During Officer 8 Interviews? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Do you see, starting with the second sentence, 11 IPRA's investigation procedures manual expressly 12 requires investigators to permit legal representatives 13 to consult with officers about questions and their 14 answers during a recorded interview. In addition, these 15 procedures require investigators to hide the extent of 16 this consulting by turning off the tape recorder 17 whenever officers or their representatives request, even 18 if, and often because, a critical question is pending. 19 The procedures likewise require investigators not to 20 state on the record who was requesting a pause in the 21 recording, why the request was made, how long the 22 parties were off tape, and not to mention anything that 23 occurred while off tape. Do you have any reason to 24 disagree that the investigation's procedure manual as 25 summarized here reflects IPRA's practices during the	Page 200 1 THE WITNESS: I'm -- I'm not sure if there was 2 a -- a policy in place. 3 BY MR. HILKE: 4 Q. Do you have any reason to believe that's 5 something that was required, that if, like, a 6 complainant had a parallel criminal case against the 7 complainant, that the investigator was required to 8 review those criminal proceedings? 9 A. Can you repeat that, because you said a 10 complainant -- complainant against complainant. 11 Q. I meant complainant both times. Like, if a 12 complainant is being prosecuted, was there any 13 requirement you were aware of that the investigator 14 review those proceedings and the process of 15 investigating their complaint? 16 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form. 17 THE WITNESS: No, I don't -- I don't think 18 there -- there was a process in place for that. 19 BY MR. HILKE: 20 Q. Okay. And do you have any reason to believe 21 any periodic review of criminal proceedings parallel to 22 disciplinary investigations was done during the 1999 to 23 2011 time frame? 24 MR. MICHALIK: Object to form. 25 THE WITNESS: I'm -- I'm not sure if that was
Page 199 1 1999 to 2011 time period? 2 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form of the 3 question, foundation, and the reliance on this 4 document. 5 THE WITNESS: I do not. 6 BY MR. HILKE: 7 Q. Okay. I'll point you to Page 65, Plaintiff 8 Joint 5201. I'm going to point you to Subsection A, 9 Ignoring Evidence from Civil and Criminal Proceedings; 10 do you see that? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. The bottom sentence of the first paragraph 13 under it says, yet there is no system that requires 14 investigators to review parallel criminal proceedings 15 and no such periodic review of criminal proceedings is 16 done. And if you look at the paragraph, it's 17 specifically discussing information from parallel 18 criminal prosecutions, like for example, motions to 19 suppress criminal trials and other potential sources of 20 information for misconduct investigations. My question 21 is: Do you have a -- was there a system requiring 22 investigators to review parallel criminal proceedings to 23 their investigations in 1999 to 2011? 24 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form of the 25 question and reliance on this document.	Page 201 1 done or not. 2 BY MR. HILKE: 3 Q. Then I'll point you to Page 75, please? 4 A. Sure. 5 Q. Joint 5211. I'll point you to the second 6 paragraph from the bottom, starting, rather; do you see 7 that? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. It states, rather than aggressively enforcing 10 and seeking discharge for violations of CPD's Rule 14, 11 which prohibits making false statements, enforcement in 12 this area is rarely taken seriously and is largely 13 ignored. The IPRA enabling ordinance makes it 14 discretionary for IPRA to initiate Rule 14 15 investigations incidental to one of its delegated 16 mandatory investigations. Investigators rarely exercise 17 this discretion, and it is so little used, but there is 18 much confusion even over whether EIA or IPRA would have 19 jurisdiction over such a Rule 14 investigation. Do you 20 have any reason to disagree with that characterization 21 of IPRA during the time frame you're testifying about? 22 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form of the 23 question, foundation, and reliance on this document. 24 THE WITNESS: I have no reason to disagree with 25 it. Just not aware of IPRA's policies.

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1 BY MR. HILKE:

2 Q. And then on the next page is 76 near the
3 paragraph, in practice, IPRA rarely asserts, about
4 halfway down; do you see that?

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. It says, in practice, IPRA rarely asserts Rule
7 14 charges when officers make false exculpatory
8 statements or denials in interviews about alleged
9 misconduct. Even when the investigation results in a
10 sustained finding as to the underlying misconduct. Do
11 you have any reason to disagree with that
12 characterization of IPRA during the 1999 to 2011 time
13 frame?

14 MR. MICHALIK: Objection to form, foundation,
15 and reliance on this document.

16 THE WITNESS: I do not.

17 BY MR. HILKE:

18 Q. Then at the bottom, I going to pull you to the
19 very last sentence on Page 76, it says, we learned in
20 our investigation that there is no, and then turning to
21 Page 77, system in place to ensure that all officer
22 disciplinary findings bearing on credibility, including
23 Rule 14 findings, are supplied to the State's Attorney's
24 Office and criminal defendants, even though this is
25 required under Giglio v. United States. Do you have any

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1 reason to disagree with the statement that there was no
2 system to put all -- to give all officer disciplinary
3 findings bearing on credibility to the State's
4 Attorney's Office during this frame?

5 MR. MICHALIK: Objection to form, foundation,
6 incomplete hypothetical, and reliance on this
7 document.

8 THE WITNESS: I do not.

9 BY MR. HILKE:

10 Q. Okay. And then just one more. It's 5553, our
11 Page 117, towards the very end. I want to point you to
12 the paragraph midway down, that starts, more recent
13 studies of CPD's system; do you see that?

14 A. Uh-huh. Yes.

15 Q. So this section is talking about what it
16 describes as EIS and BIS Systems, which I believe mean
17 early intervention system and behavioral intervention
18 system. Are those terms familiar to you?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. So the paragraph I pointed to you says, more
21 recent studies of CPD's systems reaffirm the need for
22 reform. A 2007 study noted that nearly 90 percent of
23 individuals with multiple complaints were never flagged
24 by the EIS, including officers who amassed more than 50
25 abuse complaints within five years. The study also

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1 discussed how of the 33 officers with 30 or more

2 complaints between 2001 and 2006, fewer than half had
3 been flagged within intervention -- for intervention; do
4 you see that?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Do you have any reason to disagree with that
7 characterization of the EIS system during the time frame
8 discussed in that portion?

9 MR. MICHALIK: Object to the form of the
10 question, foundation, and reliance on this document.

11 THE WITNESS: I do not.

12 BY MR. HILKE:

13 Q. Okay. Before I had asked you about different
14 steps in the investigation and the appeal process, all
15 the stages of a disciplinary investigation during this
16 time frame, from the moment the complaint comes in, to
17 the moment that the final appeal is over. Do you
18 remember those questions?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. I just want to confirm now, are there any
21 stages of that process I had neglected to ask you about?

22 A. I -- I -- I think at the time, I didn't
23 mention that after the investigator completes the
24 investigation, the case is reviewed by the lieutenant of
25 that section. The -- that -- that would be the

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1 immediate supervisor of that investigator.

2 Q. Okay. So that's, like, one level of review of
3 the investigator's findings, you know, separate and
4 apart from all the other stages you talked about?

5 A. That is correct. That is correct.

6 Q. Any other steps or details about those stages
7 that I haven't asked you about yet?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Okay. Anything I've asked you about that you
10 need to correct, or amend, or supplement at this point?

11 A. So during the review process of cases, after
12 the case is completed and the case is submitted for
13 approval from the supervisor, and then it goes to the --
14 to the department advocate, and then it goes through
15 Command Channel Review. After Command Channel Review is
16 when the officer, or the accused member, has the ability
17 to utilize the complaint review panel as a grievance
18 process. I think earlier when I spoke, I got the -- the
19 -- the timing of that reversed, and I went from the
20 advocate section to complaint review panel, then to the
21 Command Channel Review. So Command Channel Review is
22 first.

23 Q. Got it. So the grievance process is -- sorry,
24 strike that. So the correction -- sort of the what
25 you're adding now -- strike all that. Just to make sure

Page 206 1 I understand, complaint review panel happens after the 2 superintendent recommends discipline, not before, 3 correct? 4 A. Correct. And it's after the Command Channel 5 Review. 6 Q. Okay. 7 A. Because during Command Channel Review is when 8 the penalties can be modified. 9 Q. Okay. 10 A. Before the officer determines whether or not 11 he wants to answer the complaint review panel for 12 grievance purposes. 13 Q. And were you also adding more details about 14 command channel review that I didn't ask you about 15 earlier, or is that just as you described it earlier? 16 A. Just as I described it earlier. 17 Q. Okay, great. Anything else? 18 A. That's it. 19 MR. HILKE: I'm done for now. If other 20 attorneys have questions, I may have more following, 21 but that's all I have at this moment. I much 22 appreciate it. 23 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you. 24 MR. MICHALIK: Anybody on Zoom have any 25 questions?	Page 208 1 the conclusion of the investigator's investigation, 2 correct? 3 A. That is correct. 4 Q. All right. What happens where his 5 recommendation exceeds five days' suspension? 6 A. Okay. At that point, the -- the investigator 7 will complete a summary report of the investigation as 8 -- as -- as opposed to the summary digest report. 9 Q. When is that appropriate? 10 A. That's for anything five days or under. Any 11 recommended penalties of five days or under. 12 Q. Okay. What if the recommendation is 13 unfounded, exonerated, or not sustained? 14 A. That would be memorialized on a summary digest 15 report. 16 Q. All right. Okay. Once that summary digest 17 report, or the summary report, is completed, what 18 happens next, from that investigator's perspective? 19 A. So the investigator would upload all the 20 attachments into the -- at the time, the auto CR system. 21 And then the final attachment would be either the 22 summary report or the summary digest report. If -- for 23 sustained cases, the officers would have to also get the 24 member's disciplinary and complimentary histories to add 25 as some of the final attachments. And then the full
Page 207 1 MS. OLIVIER: No questions from Kelly Olivier. 2 MR. STORTZ: No questions from Jake Stortz. 3 MS. MIAN: No questions for Ronald Watts, thank 4 you. 5 MR. MICHALIK: All right. I do have -- 6 MR. RAVITZ: Or for -- or from Mohammed -- just 7 for -- Mohammed, just for the record. 8 CROSS-EXAMINATION 9 BY MR. MICHALIK: 10 Q. I do want to go through a couple of things 11 just to clarify, maybe the first thing to do is go back 12 to the topic that you were just clarifying, and that's 13 the review process. And so, I think the best way to do 14 this, if you take a look at Exhibit number 5, it's 93- 15 3. 16 A. Okay. 17 Q. Just make sure that we've got this clear on 18 the record. 19 A. Okay. 20 Q. If I could direct you to Addendum number 4, 21 which starts at City BG-59029. 22 A. All right. Okay. 23 Q. All right. So let's start off with Section 24 2A. It talks about cases where the recommendation 25 exceeds five days of suspension, all right? That's at	Page 209 1 investigator file will be handed off to the immediate 2 supervisor, which will be a lieutenant within the -- 3 that officer's section. 4 Q. All right. And so -- 5 A. The investigator's section. 6 Q. So the investigator provides that report to 7 his or her supervisor, regardless of the recommendation? 8 A. Correct. 9 Q. So if it's sustained, it's reviewed by a 10 supervisor? 11 A. That is correct. 12 Q. If it's not sustained, it's reviewed by a 13 supervisor? 14 A. That is correct. 15 Q. Same for unfounded or exonerated? 16 A. Correct. 17 Q. All right. Let's start with the unfounded, 18 exonerated, or not sustained cases. Those are submitted 19 to the supervisor. What is the supervisor expected to 20 do once they get one of those reports? 21 A. Just -- just to review it, to make sure that 22 the investigator noted the proper finding for the 23 investigation. And the supervisor would also make a 24 determination -- oh, this is just for unfounded, not 25 sustained, and exonerated?

Page 210 1 Q. Right. 2 A. Yeah. They would just make sure that the -- 3 the member had the proper finding for the case. 4 Q. Okay. Could the supervisor recommend 5 additional investigation be conducted? 6 A. Yes, definitely. 7 Q. All right. That's one of the things the 8 supervisor would be looking for to make sure that the 9 investigation was thorough? 10 A. That's correct. 11 Q. All right. Would that be true also sustained 12 -- where -- a report where there was a recommendation of 13 a sustained finding? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. All right. Again, it would go to the 16 supervisor, who would review it for completeness? 17 A. That is correct. 18 Q. And if the supervisor determined additional 19 investigation would need to be done, it would be kicked 20 back to the investigator to do that? 21 A. That is correct. 22 Q. All right. So now the supervisor has approved 23 the report, what happens next? 24 A. At that point, the -- the -- the case is sent 25 to the advocate's section for review, and they'll --	Page 212 1 bypass Command Channel Review, and then the case would 2 go right to the superintendent for review. 3 Q. Okay. You mentioned administratively closed. 4 When would an investigation be administratively closed? 5 A. Typically, those are -- those are closed 6 absent -- absent the signing of the affidavit. 7 Sometimes, those cases are closed out administratively. 8 Yeah, if the -- if you reach out to the complainant and 9 the complainant has a change of -- of heart, or what 10 transpired out there, those -- and the -- that member is 11 not willing to sign an affidavit or a letter of 12 declination, sometimes those cases are also 13 administratively closed. 14 Q. So then after Command Channel Review, the next 15 step would be what? 16 A. So after Command Channel Review, the case goes 17 -- comes back to the Bureau of Internal Affairs. It's 18 reviewed by the -- the chief of Internal Affairs, who 19 has the final say-so for penalty recommendations. And 20 then after the chief reviews the case, depending on the 21 case, the case would go over to the sup's office to 22 review for significant penalty cases. And then at that 23 point, the member is notified of the finding of the -- 24 of the investigation and the penalty recommendation. 25 And that's when the member decides whether or not he
Page 211 1 they'll review it to make sure that every attachment is 2 contained in the file, because there is an attachment 3 list. So they want to make sure the -- the number of 4 attachments match the -- the attachment list. And they 5 also want to make sure that the -- the findings are 6 proper, and that the investigation is sound and complete 7 and thorough. 8 Q. Okay. If the advocate determines additional 9 investigation is required, does that then get kicked 10 back to the investigator? 11 A. Yes, it's -- it's typically sent back to the 12 -- the investigator supervisor, and then the supervisor 13 would make sure that the investigator gets the case 14 back. 15 Q. Okay. Once it's cleared the advocate, what 16 happens next? 17 A. Then that case is prepared, and it's sent for 18 a Command Channel Review. 19 Q. All right. Is there any different Command 20 Channel Review based on the recommendation? 21 A. Yes. If the -- if the -- well, if the case is 22 administratively closed, then that particular case 23 wouldn't go through Command Channel Review. A lot of 24 cases that are sustained, and depending on the nature of 25 the case, there -- there's an avenue in which you can	Page 213 1 wants to file a grievance, which would trigger the 2 complaint review panel. 3 Q. Okay. And I think you said earlier that in 4 terms of cases that would go to the superintendent's 5 office for review, those would be 30 or more days' 6 suspension recommendation or separation? 7 A. That is correct. 8 MR. HILKE: I'm sorry. Objection, form. Go 9 ahead. 10 THE WITNESS: That is correct. 11 BY MR. MICHALIK: 12 Q. In answering questions as to talking about the 13 -- a member's ability to appeal certain findings, you 14 said eventually, a case might be presented to the police 15 board, correct? 16 A. Correct. 17 Q. And I think you said that there was no further 18 appeal after the police board made its decision; is that 19 right? 20 A. That's what I said, yes. 21 Q. Okay. And that's within CPD, correct? 22 A. Correct. 23 Q. Could a member then file a lawsuit challenging 24 the police board's finding? 25 MR. HILKE: Objection, form. Go ahead.

Page 214 1 THE WITNESS: Yes. 2 BY MR. MICHALIK: 3 Q. Okay. So at least there are additional 4 avenues of appeal for a member who disagreed with a 5 police board's finding? 6 A. That is correct. 7 Q. Counsel had asked you questions earlier about 8 the change from OPS to IPRA. Do you remember that 9 series of questions? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. All right. In terms of that, was there any 12 change in the subject matter that IPRA would investigate 13 that OPS did not? 14 A. The subject matter that -- 15 Q. Let me ask it this way. 16 A. Okay. 17 Q. Okay. OPS, I think you testified, 18 investigated excessive force, domestics, 19 police-involved shootings, and deaths in custody, 20 correct? 21 A. I -- I didn't mention deaths in -- in custody. 22 Q. But that was one of the areas -- 23 A. That is -- that is one, yes. 24 Q. -- that OPS would investigate? 25 A. Correct.	Page 216 1 Q. That would have to be something that would go 2 to BIA? 3 A. Yes. That would -- that would be handled 4 through the CR process. 5 Q. All right. And that would be directed to 6 Confidential Investigations? 7 A. That is correct. 8 Q. All right. I think the last thing I want to 9 ask you about is conducting administrative 10 investigations concurrently with a criminal 11 investigation. First off, that would be something that 12 would be handled within BIA, correct? 13 A. Correct. 14 Q. All right. Because -- and that would 15 specifically be the Confidential Investigation Section? 16 A. Correct. 17 Q. Would there be any criminal investigation by 18 BIA that was not being handled by the Confidential 19 Section? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Okay, what kind of -- what kind of case? 22 A. You -- you have -- it's quasi-criminal. We're 23 talking about DUIs. We're talking about certain 24 positive tests for narcotics and -- and other drugs. We 25 put officers through our random testing process that
Page 215 1 Q. All right. Was that the same types of matters 2 that IPRA would investigate, after IPRA came into 3 existence? 4 A. Yes, that's correct. 5 Q. And as far as cases that IPRA would refer to 6 BIA, it was the same as the cases that OPS would refer 7 to BIA? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Do you know, did OPS have subpoena power? 10 A. I -- I'm not sure if they did. 11 Q. Do you know if IPRA had subpoena power? 12 A. I believe IPRA and now COPA does. 13 Q. All right. You also were asked some questions 14 about the SPARs, and there was a list of 26 categories 15 of less serious transgressions that were listed in that 16 order; do you remember that? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Okay. One of the things that you were asked 19 was about any misconduct that could be -- could any 20 misconduct be the subject of a SPAR; do you remember 21 that testimony? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. All right. Could an allegation that involved 24 criminal misconduct, could that be the basis of a SPAR? 25 A. No.	Page 217 1 have some -- a criminal nexus to it, but those are 2 handled by the General Investigation Section. 3 Q. Would that be the type of a case where you 4 could have a parallel criminal investigation with an 5 administrative investigation? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. All right. What about a confidential criminal 8 investigation, one that would involve a joint CPD-FBI 9 investigation of criminal conduct? Is that something 10 where the administrative investigation could proceed in 11 parallel with a criminal investigation? 12 A. Well, when -- when -- when dealing with the -- 13 or when looking at criminal investigations that are 14 handled at the task force, those -- those cases are 15 cases that are spearheaded by the FBI. Those are the 16 FBI's investigations. And the administrative 17 investigation that parallels those cases typically are 18 halted as not to compromise the integrity of the ongoing 19 criminal investigation from that -- from the FBI or any 20 other outside agency, because it -- it could compromise 21 the case itself. And if someone chooses to move forward 22 with the administrative investigation they -- you know, 23 they can actually be held accountable and either charged 24 with obstructing the criminal investigation through the 25 FBI.

Page 218 1 Q. What sort of dangers would there be in 2 conducting the administrative investigation at the same 3 time as the confidential federal CPD investigation of 4 criminal conduct? 5 MR. HILKE: Objection, form. 6 THE WITNESS: Well, a lot of these cases, these 7 long-term criminal investigations involve officers, 8 guns, drugs, what have you. And the officers are 9 conducting long term surveillances and they're -- 10 they're put in very serious situations, depending on 11 the nature of their surveillances and whether or not 12 they are actually purchasing narcotics from these 13 officers and stuff. If their -- if the 14 investigation is compromised and -- and we move 15 forward with the administrative case and start 16 questioning people, when it gets back to the 17 officers that are being investigated, there -- there 18 could be some harm brought to some of the 19 investigators that are -- that are out there in the 20 field doing surveillances and -- and working up 21 these investigations. 22 BY MR. MICHALIK: 23 Q. All right. One of the -- in order to proceed 24 administratively against a department member, you have 25 to inform that member of the charges, correct?	Page 220 1 Q. -- they would charge the investigator? 2 A. Yes, yes, the investigator. 3 Q. Okay. And you mentioned that, you know, in 4 terms of these joint CPD-FBI investigations, the FBI was 5 in charge of the -- of that investigation? 6 A. That is correct. 7 Q. All right. The information that was derived 8 from that investigation, who did that belong to? 9 MR. HILKE: Object -- wait. Object to form. 10 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 11 MR. HILKE: Go ahead. 12 THE WITNESS: FBI. 13 BY MR. MICHALIK: 14 Q. One last thing. In the SOP, there was a 15 reference to initiating a confidential CR for a 16 confidential investigation; do you remember that? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Is that a different process, in terms of 19 initiating a CR for a confidential investigation, as 20 opposed to a general investigation? 21 A. Yes. When -- in -- in General or Special, or 22 just your run-of-the-mill investigation, when initiating 23 those cases, those -- that initiation report gets sent 24 back, to at the time OPS or IPRA, which would then 25 either keep the investigation, or send it back to BIA to
Page 219 1 A. That's -- 2 MR. HILKE: Object to form. Go ahead. 3 THE WITNESS: That is true. 4 BY MR. MICHALIK: 5 Q. All right. Would that present any impact on a 6 confidential criminal investigation? 7 MR. HILKE: Objection to form. 8 THE WITNESS: Well -- well, yes, because the -- 9 the member would know that there's an ongoing 10 investigation into their -- their activity, and a 11 lot of times, the administrative case really 12 directly parallels and impacts the criminal case. 13 So that would tip off the member as to the -- the 14 full scope of the investigation. Even if the member 15 doesn't know that the FBI is part of the 16 investigation, that would tip off the -- the member, 17 and that member would -- would cease his activities, 18 which would taint the overall investigation. 19 BY MR. MICHALIK: 20 Q. And then you mentioned there could be 21 consequences as a result of tainting that investigation? 22 A. Yeah. You know, the -- if they choose to, the 23 -- the FBI can -- can -- can charge a member -- 24 Q. So -- 25 A. -- criminally.	Page 221 1 be handled. Confidential investigations are initiated 2 by the admin sergeant, the bureau of internal affairs, 3 who works directly for the chief of internal affairs. 4 That person -- that sergeant would initiate the number, 5 and it would be maintained in-house. And then number 6 would be only shared with the investigator of that case 7 initially. 8 Q. It would not be shared with IPRA or OPS? 9 A. It would not. 10 MR. MICHALIK: Director, that's all I have. 11 THE WITNESS: Okay. 12 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 13 BY MR. HILKE: 14 Q. Sir, I've got just a few follow-ups. The -- 15 we talked about -- are you aware of anything in the FBI 16 Chicago Police Department MOU that at all suggested that 17 charges of obstruction of justice would result if the 18 CPD moved administratively against an officer under 19 investigation? 20 A. I'm not aware that that was part of the -- the 21 MOU. 22 Q. What's your basis for saying that -- well, and 23 strike that. In saying that if an investigator moved 24 administratively against an officer and it compromised 25 an FBI investigation, it could be the cause for

Page 222 1 obstruction of justice charges. Are you -- do you have 2 any basis to conclude that the FBI would have any 3 likelihood of proceeding with such charges? 4 MR. MICHALIK: Object to form. 5 THE WITNESS: Well, I mean, so if we're -- if 6 we're outside of the time frame, and we're within 7 the time frame of me working on a FBI task force -- 8 BY MR. HILKE: 9 Q. I actually just want to keep you in the time 10 frame. 11 A. I have -- well, the answer -- no. No, no 12 basis. 13 Q. There was no -- and as far as -- do you 14 believe that during the time frame, an investigator who 15 believed it was necessary to get a corrupt officer off 16 the street could not have said, you know, for example, 17 we need this investigation to move faster, we have to 18 get this officer off the street. Would that kind of 19 feedback have been prohibited in Chicago Police 20 Department-FBI joint investigations during this time 21 frame? 22 A. Are -- are you talking about the investigator? 23 Q. Yeah. Is there any reason they -- like, if 24 the investigation had gone on, in their opinion, too 25 long, and they were concerned about leaving an officer	Page 224 1 A. That's correct. 2 Q. There's no reason -- strike that. The 3 investigator could still do any of the other preliminary 4 investigation steps without informing the accused 5 officer of the charges against him, correct? 6 MR. MICHALIK: Objection, mischaracterizes his 7 testimony. 8 THE WITNESS: Yes. 9 BY MR. HILKE: 10 Q. And by the way, in terms of joint -- during 11 this time period, in 1999 to 2011 -- strike all that. 12 You testified about joint criminal civil investigations 13 -- or strike that, too. You testified before about 14 criminal investigations and situations that could be 15 parallel with the disciplinary investigation, and you 16 testified about different categories of complaints where 17 there could be parallel criminal investigations. Are 18 excessive force allegations among those that could have 19 parallel criminal proceedings? 20 A. Excessive force cases were handled by OPS or 21 IPRA at the time. 22 Q. And a civilian complaint of excessive force 23 could have a parallel criminal case against an officer 24 for that force, correct? 25 A. It could. There could be -- there could be a
Page 223 1 on the -- on the street, on the, you know, on the joint 2 FBI CPD operations, could the CPD give feedback about 3 the pace of the operation? 4 A. The -- no. No. I mean, well, you can always 5 give feedback about it and say what's taking so long, 6 but this -- at the end of the day, it was still the 7 investigation -- the FBI's investigation. 8 Q. Right, but that -- okay. Right. So it's not 9 that it was -- there's nothing prohibiting that 10 feedback, but it was still the FBI's investigation? 11 A. That is correct. 12 Q. Okay. And was there anything prohibiting an 13 investigator on an FBI-CPD investigation from saying, we 14 think it's necessary to move administratively. We need 15 your feedback, FBI, on how we can proceed? 16 A. Well, they -- they can always say that, but -- 17 yes. 18 Q. And you mentioned that if CPD moved 19 administratively against an officer who is the subject 20 of a joint Chicago Police Department FBI investigation, 21 the officer would need to be informed of the charges 22 against them. Now, the time they would have to be 23 informed is when the investigator decided to proceed 24 with an interrogation or statement from the accused 25 officer, correct?	Page 225 1 -- an actual case report number associated with that 2 excessive force complaint. 3 Q. And same for shootings by officers, correct? 4 Those were also investigated by OPS-IPRA? 5 A. That's correct. 6 Q. And those could also have parallel criminal 7 proceedings, investigations into shootings by police 8 officers? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And so, excessive force and shootings by 11 police officers, if OPS-IPRA learned that there was a 12 criminal investigation as they investigated such 13 allegations, would they maintain the administrative 14 investigation, or transfer it to Internal Affairs? 15 A. Internal Affairs did not handle shooting 16 incidents involving department members. And excessive 17 force complaints, those are also IPRA and OPS cases. 18 Q. Okay. So those are investigations with a 19 criminal component OPS-IPRA could conduct, correct? 20 A. Yes. 21 MR. HILKE: Okay. Nothing else for now. 22 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 23 BY MR. MICHALIK: 24 Q. Just two quick follow-ups, Mr. Moore, and I 25 think we'll be done. You were asked about an

Page 226 1 investigator where there was a confidential -- a joint 2 CPD-FBI investigation, and he would have to inform the 3 accused member of the charges against him before taking 4 that individual's statement, remember that? 5 A. Yes. Administratively. 6 Q. Right. And then you were asked, could he do 7 other steps short of interviewing the officer? And I 8 think your answer was yes, he could. But I think 9 earlier, you said that he -- there were things that he 10 should not do, such as talking to witnesses, or other 11 things that might tip off the subject of the 12 confidential investigation, correct? 13 A. Correct. 14 Q. Also, the investigator who was involved, some 15 of the evidence and investigation that was part of the 16 joint FBI-CPD investigation would be something that that 17 investigator could use subsequently in administrative 18 proceedings? 19 A. Yes, they could. 20 Q. Second thing is, you were asked about 21 excessive force in police-involved shooting cases, could 22 they be parallel to criminal investigations; do you 23 remember that? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Are excessive force cases or police-involved	Page 228 1 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: I'm going to take us off the 2 video record, but we'll stay on the written so that 3 the court reporter can get orders. All right, we're 4 off. It's 4:22. 5 THE REPORTER: Yes. So just very quickly, 6 would you like a transcript or video? 7 MR. HILKE: I'm -- I'll handle it off the 8 record, please. 9 THE REPORTER: Would you like one? 10 MR. MICHALIK: If he orders, we'll take a copy. 11 THE REPORTER: Okay. Anybody on Zoom would 12 like a copy of the transcript or the video? 13 MS. OLIVIER: No, thank you. 14 MR. STORTZ: No, thank you. 15 MS. MIAN: I don't think so. 16 THE REPORTER: All right then. With that, we 17 are off the written record at 4:23. 18 (DEPOSITION CONCLUDED AT 4:23 P.M. CT) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Page 227 1 shootings confidential investigations? 2 A. No. Those cases are handled by OPS or IPRA at 3 the time. 4 Q. Not confidential? 5 A. No. 6 MR. MICHALIK: That's all I have. Thank you. 7 FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION 8 BY MR. HILKE: 9 Q. Quickly, just because we did different terms. 10 What's the difference between a police-involved shooting 11 and a shooting by a police officer? 12 A. It -- it's one in the same. 13 MR. HILKE: Okay. Nothing more. 14 THE WITNESS: Okay. I thought that was a trick 15 question. 16 MR. HILKE: No, no, I just -- I wanted to make 17 sure we're talking about the same thing on the 18 record. 19 MR. MICHALIK: I think we are. 20 MR. HILKE: I think so, too. 21 MR. MICHALIK: All right. We will reserve 22 signature. 23 THE REPORTER: Do you want me to just send it 24 to you? 25 MR. MICHALIK: Sure, that's fine.	Page 229 1 CERTIFICATE OF DIGITAL REPORTER 2 STATE OF ILLINOIS 3 4 I do hereby certify that the witness in the foregoing 5 transcript was taken on the date, and at the time and 6 place set out on the Title page here of by me after 7 first being duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole 8 truth, and nothing but the truth; and that the said 9 matter was recorded digitally by me and then reduced to 10 typewritten form under my direction, and constitutes a 11 true record of the transcript as taken, all to the best 12 of my skill and ability. I certify that I am not a 13 relative or employee of either counsel, and that I am in 14 no way interested financially, directly or indirectly, 15 in this action. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 TALIA JACKSON, 23 DIGITAL REPORTER/NOTARY 24 COMMISSION EXPIRES: 11/28/2027 25 SUBMITTED ON: 03/28/2024 OFFICIAL SEAL TALIA JACKSON Notary Public, State of Illinois Commission No. 981648 My Commission Expires Nov 28, 2027 

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